Martin Wheatcroft – Page 2 – Advisor and author on public finances, business strategy and financial communication.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK international trade

My chart for ICAEW this week is inspired by International Trade Week and looks at where UK imports come from and exports go to, ahead of what might be some major changes in US trade policy when President-elect Trump assumes office on 20 January 2025.

Column chart showing imports and exports to and from the UK in 2023.

Imports: Americas £142bn + Asia-Pacfic £155bn + Europe £504bn + Rest of the world £75bn = £876bn.

Exports: Americas £219bn + Asia-Pacific £142bn + Europe £400bn + Rest of the world £100bn = £861bn.

My chart of the week illustrates how UK imports in 2023 totalled £876bn, £15bn more than total exports of £861bn.

Imports comprise £142bn (16%) from the Americas, £155bn (18%) from Asia-Pacific, £504bn (57%) from European countries, and £75bn (9%) from the rest of the world. Exports comprise £219bn (25%) to the Americas, £142bn (16%) to Asia-Pacific, £400bn (46%) to European countries, and £100bn (12%) to the rest of the world.

Imports can be analysed between £581bn in goods and £295bn in services, while exports can be broken down into £393bn in goods and £468bn in services, meaning the UK had a trade deficit of £188bn in goods and a trade surplus of £173bn in services in 2023.

The UK’s largest overall trade partner is the EU, which makes up most of the UK’s trade with countries in Europe, while its largest individual trade partner is the US. Excluding Germany (the largest country in the EU), the UK’s next largest trade partner is China. Together, imports from these three economies add up to £635bn or 72% of the total, while exports to the US, EU and China equate to £594bn or 69% of the total.

International Trade Week is an opportunity to celebrate the successes of the UK’s importers in sourcing the goods and services that individuals and businesses need and of the UK’s exporters in selling goods and services around the world.

However, this time around all eyes are on the result of the US general election, and what the potential trade policies of the incoming US administration under Donald Trump might mean for the UK. Not only could they result in major changes in how trade is conducted between the UK and the US (17% of our total trade), but also between the UK and the EU (46%), and between the UK and China (7%).

We trade in interesting times.

Major trading partners

Americas

US – £115bn imports (£58bn goods, £57bn services); £187bn exports (£60bn goods, £127bn services)

Canada – £9bn imports (£5bn goods, £4bn services); £16bn exports (£7bn goods, £9bn services)

Brazil – £5bn imports (£4bn goods, £1bn services); £6bn exports (£3bn goods, £3bn services)

Other countries in the Americas – £13bn imports (£7bn goods, £6bn services), £10bn exports (£5bn goods, £5bn services)

Asia-Pacific

China (including Hong Kong) – £69bn imports (£61bn goods, £8bn services); £51bn exports (£32bn goods, £19bn services)

India – £24bn imports (£10bn goods, £14bn services); £16bn exports (£6bn goods, £10bn services)

ASEAN – £22bn imports (£14bn goods, £8bn services); £25bn exports (£12bn goods, £13bn services)

Japan – £14bn imports (£8bn goods, £6bn services); £14bn exports (£6bn goods, £8bn services)

Australia – £6bn imports (£2bn goods, £4bn services); £15bn exports (£5bn goods, £10bn services)

South Korea – £7bn imports (£6bn goods, £1bn services); £10bn exports (£6bn goods, £4bn services)

Other countries in Asia-Pacific – £13bn imports (£8bn goods, £5bn services); £11bn exports (£4bn goods, £7bn services)

Europe

EU – £451bn imports (£318bn goods, £133bn services); £356bn exports (£186bn goods, £170bn services)

EFTA – £50bn imports (£37bn goods, £13bn service); £40bn exports (£17bn goods, £23bn services)

Other European countries – £3bn imports (£1bn goods, £2bn services); £4bn exports (£3bn goods, £1bn services)

Rest of the world

Turkey – £16bn imports (£11bn goods, £5bn services); £10bn exports (£7bn goods, £3bn services)

UAE – £8bn imports (£3bn goods, £5bn services); £13bn exports (£7bn goods, £6bn services)

Saudi Arabia – £4bn imports (£3bn goods, £1bn services); £13bn exports (£5bn goods, £8bn services)

South Africa – £6bn imports (£4bn goods, £2bn services); £4bn exports (£2bn goods, £2bn services)

UK dependencies – £10bn imports (£1bn goods, £9bn services); £21bn exports (£1bn goods, £20bn services)

Everywhere else – £31bn imports (£20bn goods, £11bn services), £39bn (£18bn goods, £21bn services)

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Economic outlook

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how the OBR is forecasting growth in economic activity per person of 1.1% a year between 2024 and 2030. While better than the average of 0.3% a year achieved over the past 16 years, it is significantly lower than the 2.3% a year seen in the 50 years before that.

Line chart showing GDP per capita between Q1 2008 and Q1 2030, with the forecast period from Q1 2024 onwards shaded grey.

GDP per capita - blue line falling from 2008 to 2010 then rising unevenly to 2019 falling hugely in 2020 then rising again to just below 2019 in 2021 before falling to 2024 and then a projected rise from 2024 onwards.

Trend lines overlaid as follows:
Q1 1958 to Q1 2008: +2.3% a year (not shown in the chart).
Q1 2008 to Q1 2024: +0,3% a year (purple).
Q1 2009 to Q3 2019: +1.3% a year (yellow).
Q1 2024 to Q1 2030: +1.1% a year (dotted black line).

My chart of the week is on the economic projections calculated by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in its October 2024 economic and fiscal outlook that accompanied the Autumn Budget 2024.

This assumption is a key driver for the OBR’s fiscal projections for tax receipts between now and March 2030, and hence how much the government will need to borrow to finance the current deficit and its investment plans.

The chart starts in March 2008 at the height of the financial crisis, illustrating how economic activity per person after adjusting for inflation fell significantly until September 2009. Real GDP per capita then grew at an average rate of 1.3% a year until September 2019, before the rollercoaster ride that saw the economy collapse during the pandemic, recover and then slide back during the energy crisis. A small uptick in the first quarter of 2024 is hardly noticeable.

The result was that real GDP per capita was only 4.4% higher in March 2024 than it was in March 2008, the equivalent of 0.3% a year on average over 16 years.

The OBR has been more optimistic for the current financial year up until March 2030, predicting per capita economic growth of 1.1% a year on average between the first quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of 2030.

This is of course much better than the 0.3% average increase over the past 16 years, but it is below the 1.3% growth in real GDP per capita during the ‘austerity years’ following the financial crisis and is substantially below the 2.3% average increase over the 50 years prior to the financial crisis.

From a ‘glass half empty’ perspective, this emphasises just how poorly the UK economy has performed since the financial crisis and the challenges the incoming government has in trying to improve productivity and economic output, even without the risk of an economic shock, events that appear to occur every decade or so.

However, those with a ‘glass half full’ temperament will be more cheerful. After all, there does appear to be substantial space for economic growth to improve from the OBR’s less-than-sparkling predictions, even without returning to the heady days of the pre-financial crisis long-term trend.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Autumn Budget 2024

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how the fiscal baseline inherited by the Chancellor has changed as a consequence of the Autumn Budget, with higher capital investment driving up borrowing needed to fund the deficit over the next five years.

Column chart showing Spring Budget fiscal deficit and the Autumn Budget change over the forecast period.

2024/25: Spring Budget forecast £87bn + Autumn Budget change £40bn = £127bn (4.5% of GDP).

2025/26: £78bn + £28bn = £106bn (3.6% of GDP).

2026/27: £69bn + £20bn = £89bn (2.9% of GDP).

2027/28: £51bn + £21bn = £72bn (2.3% of GDP).

2028/29: £39bn + £33bn = £72bn (2.2% of GDP).

2029/30: £35bn + £36bn = £71bn (2.1% of GDP).

Our chart of the week sets out the changes in fiscal projections calculated by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in its October 2024 economic and fiscal outlook compared with the numbers at the time of the Spring Budget seven months ago.

These form a revised baseline for the public finances that will form the basis of the Chancellor’s spending and investment plans over the rest of the Parliament.

As our chart highlights, the fiscal deficit – the shortfall between tax and other receipts and public spending calculated in accordance with statistical standards – was forecast to amount to £87bn in 2024/25, but this has increased by £40bn to £127bn, or 4.5% of GDP.

The projections for the following five years were also revised upwards between 2025/26 and 2029/30 have increased from £78bn, £69bn, £51bn, £39bn and £35bn by £28bn, £20bn, £21bn, £33bn and £36bn to result in a revised profile of £106bn (3.6% of GDP), £89bn (2.9% of GDP), £72bn (2.3% of GDP), £72bn (2.2% of GDP) and £71bn (2.1%).

This contrasts with the previous government’s plan to bring down the deficit in relation to the size of the economy to 1.2% of GDP by 2028/29.

Perhaps the biggest surprise was the £40bn upward revision to the budgeted deficit of £87bn for the current financial year ending in March 2025. This reflects a combination of £14bn in higher debt interest and £6bn in other forecast revisions, £23bn in higher spending (most of which is the £22bn ‘black hole’ identified by the incoming government over the summer) and £2bn in additional capital investment, less £1bn in tax measures and £4bn from the indirect economic effect of policy decisions.

In later years, the principal driver of the increases in the deficit is higher capital investment as the Chancellor replaced the previous government’s plan to cut public sector net investment by almost a third over the next five years (from 2.5% to 1.7% of GDP) to a profile that sees net investment increase to 2.7% of GDP in 2025/26 and 2026/27 before returning to 2.5% of GDP in 2029/30.

The changes in the deficit between 2025/26 and 2029/30 can be summarised as follows:

2025/26: £28bn increase = £18bn higher capital investment + £10bn net other changes (£42bn additional spending – £25bn tax rises – £6bn indirect effects of decisions – £1bn forecast changes).

2026/27: £20bn = £23bn capital – £3bn net other changes (£44bn – £35bn – £5bn – £7bn).

2027/28: £21bn = £26bn capital – £5bn net other changes (£47bn – £40bn – £2bn – £10bn)

2028/29: £33bn = £27bn capital + £6bn net other changes (£49bn – £40bn + £2bn – £5bn)

2029/30: £36bn = £25bn capital + £11bn net other changes (£47bn – £42bn + £6bn – not published).

The increases in taxation, spending and capital investment won’t avoid the need for difficult choices in the Spending Review next year as departmental budgets will remain tight.

ICAEW chart of the week: Prime Minister’s salary

My chart for ICAEW this week illustrates how PM Keir Starmer’s £172,153 official salary entitlement would have been £305,770 if prime ministerial pay had kept pace with inflation since 2009.

Column chart showing the Prime Minister's actual salary, official salary and official salary extrapolated in line with inflation on 1 April between 2009 and 2024. See text for numbers.

26 Sep 2024. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. Sources: House of Commons research briefings; ICAEW calculations. (c) ICAEW 2024.

Prime ministerial pay has been in the news quite a lot in recent weeks for a range of reasons, leading our chart of the week to look at how the prime minister’s salary has evolved over the last 15 years.

As the chart illustrates, former PM Gordon Brown was entitled to a salary of £197,689 and had an actual salary of £193,885 on 1 April 2009, significantly higher than today’s current official salary of £172,153 or the actual salary of £166,786 taken by current PM Keir Starmer. This is despite cumulative inflation of 55% (3.0% a year on average) or an increase in MP base pay of 41% (2.3% a year) over the past 15 years.

The reasons for these reductions in prime ministerial salary are primarily the result of a voluntary pay cut to £150,000 taken by Gordon Brown in the run up to the May 2010 election, and a further cut of 5% to £142,500 adopted by incoming PM David Cameron.

Cameron maintained his pay at this level for the duration of his first term in office, converting his voluntary decision into a permanent change in 2012 (backdated to 2011) in how much he and his successors have been entitled to receive. The chart shows how Cameron accepted a pay rise following the 2015 general election, taking him from a salary of £142,500 on 1 April 2012 out of an official entitlement of £142,545 to £150,402 on 1 April 2016 out of £152,532.

Subsequent prime ministers have also exercised pay restraint by restricting increases in ministerial pay, or in not taking all of the increases to which they were entitled. As a consequence, Theresa May concluded her period as prime minister in 2019 on a salary of £154,908 out of an official salary of £158,754, while Boris Johnson and Liz Truss were on annual salaries of £159,584 in 2022, short of their full entitlement of £164,951.

Rishi Sunak concluded his period as prime minister on an official salary of £172,153 from 1 April 2024 onwards, being the amount to which Sir Keir Starmer is entitled to claim if he wanted. However, the politics of accepting pay rises is difficult – perhaps now more than ever – and so Keir Starmer has stuck with the £166,786 actual salary that his predecessor was on before the 2024 general election.

Our chart illustrates how the prime minister’s official salary has eroded in value over the last 15 years by calculating how it would have risen to £219,800 on 1 April 2012, £232,000 on 1 April 2016, £247,720 on 1 April 2019, £266,020 on 1 April 2022 and £305,770 this year if it had increased in line consumer price inflation instead.

There are arguments for using other indexes for this comparison, such as public sector pay, which if used would have led to an official salary of £299,060 on 1 April 2024 ; average GDP per capita, perhaps a better measure of national economic performance, would have resulted in an official salary of £301,530. Linking to overall average pay would have led to an official salary of £311,990 today, while maintaining its value in comparison with pay in the private sector would have delivered a potential pay packet for the PM of £334,360.

The requirement for successive prime ministers to approve their own pay has led to the opposite of what you might think would happen. Instead of raising their salary ever higher because they have the power to do so, political choices and pressures have led them instead to cut or freeze their pay at different points over the last 15 years, resulting in a significant erosion in prime ministerial pay in that time.

These choices have led to the UK paying its head of government substantially less than comparable leaders such as Australian PM Anthony Albanese’s annual salary of A$607,500 (£311,500), German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s €348,300 (£290,250) or Canadian PM Justin Trudeau’s C$408,200 (£226,800).

Ironically, it might be the prime minister (and his successors) who could benefit most of all of our public servants by taking the power to set his own pay away and giving it to an independent pay review body instead.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Eurozone government bond yields

My chart for ICAEW this week is on the cost of government borrowing in the Eurozone, which on 4 September ranged from 2.17% for Danish 10-year bonds up to 3.59% for their Italian equivalents.

My chart this week is on the range of yields payable on 10-year government bonds by 18 out of the 20 countries in the Eurozone for which data is available.

The chart illustrates how investors in German 10-year government bonds (known as ‘bunds’) would have received a yield to maturity of 2.22% – or conversely the German government could have borrowed at an effective interest rate of 2.22% if issuing fresh debt at that point in time. Yields on German bunds are used as benchmark rates for government debt not just in the Eurozone, but globally.

Just one country in the Eurozone has a lower 10-year bond yield than Germany, which is Denmark at 2.17% on 4 September, which is a 0.05 percentage points or 5 basis points (bp) ‘spread’ below the benchmark bund rate.

While quoted yields move up and down all the time, sometimes by quite large amounts, spreads are much less volatile, providing an insight into how debt investors perceive the relative risks of investing in different countries’ sovereign debt.

The next lowest yields were the Netherlands at 2.51%, with a spread of 0.29 percentage points above bunds, and Finland at 2.59% (+0.37%). This is then followed by Ireland on 2.67% (+0.45%), Austria on 2.71% (+0.49%), Belgium on 2.80% (+0.58%), Portugal on 2.82% (+0.60%), France on 2.93% (+0.71%), Slovenia on 2.94% (+0.72%), Cyprus on 3.00% (0.78%) and Spain on 3.02% (+0.80%). There is then a small jump to Greece on 3.28% (+1.06%), Slovakia on 3.30% (+1.08%), Malta on 3.34% (+1.12%), Lithuania on 3.36% (+1.14%) and Croatia on 3.41% (+1.19%).

The highest yield for investors among Eurozone countries – and hence the highest borrowing cost for its government – is Italy with 3.59%, which is 1.37 percentage points above the effective interest rate at which Germany could in theory borrow.

Comparing the bond yields in the Eurozone provides an insight into the relative strengths and weaknesses of these countries’ public finances and economies given that they all share a currency, a central bank base interest rate (currently 3.75%), and are all in the EU Single Market and Customs Union. Comparing yields with other currencies, such as the UK’s 3.95% for example (not shown in the chart), needs to take other factors into account, such as the UK’s much higher central bank base rate of 5%.

The chart also reports the government debt to GDP levels of each country for the second quarter of 2024 according to Eurostat, which may help explain why Denmark (with debt/GDP of 34%) pays a significantly lower borrowing cost than Spain (109%).

However, debt/GDP doesn’t explain all of the differences, with the 10-year yield on Greek government debt (debt/GDP 160%) of 3.28% for example being significantly lower than the 10-year yield on Italian government debt (debt/GDP 138%) of 3.59%.

Not shown in the chart are Estonia (debt/GDP 24%) and Latvia (45%), both of which tend to borrow at shorter maturities.

The lack of a firm correlation between debt/GDP and bond spreads should not be surprising as debt/GDP is a relatively crude measure of public finance strength or weakness. It excludes most government assets and non-debt liabilities, the funded or unfunded nature of their social security systems, as well as a country’s medium- and longer-term economic prospects and the perceived stability of that country’s government. These are all factors debt investors take into account when deciding the level of risk that they are willing to accept when investing.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

Government enters crisis control mode to curb public spending

Boost from self assessment tax receipts not enough to prevent a deficit in July as Chancellor searches for cost savings in the run up to the Autumn Budget.

The monthly public sector finances for July 2024 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Wednesday reported a provisional deficit for the first four months of the 2024/25 financial year of £51.4bn, £4.7bn worse than budgeted.

Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director of Public Sector and Taxation, says: “Today’s data shows that the customary boost from self assessed tax receipts in July was not enough to prevent a deficit of £3.1bn, higher than budgeted, as cost pressures drove up public spending. Debt increased to £2,746bn or 99.4% of GDP at the end of July, up £5.9bn from the end of June 2024.

“The government is now in crisis control mode as it searches for savings to offset significant unbudgeted cost overruns in this financial year, with the cumulative deficit to July 2024 standing at £51.4bn, £4.7bn more than budgeted.

“Rumours that the government is looking at significant cuts in public investment programmes this year to keep within budget are concerning, given the importance to economic growth of infrastructure and the urgent need for upfront investment in technology to fix poorly performing public services. Our hope is that the Chancellor will be able to take a more strategic view in her Autumn Budget in October and in the Spending Review in the spring.”

Month of July 2024

There was a shortfall between receipts and spending of £3.1bn in the month of July 2024, £1.8bn higher than in July 2023 and £3.0bn worse than the budgeted deficit of £0.1bn.

Taxes and other receipts amounted to £99.4bn in July 2024, up £10.3bn or 12% from the previous month driven by self assessment income tax receipts in July, in line with the trend last year. Receipts were £2.0bn or 2% higher than in the same month last year, in contrast with total managed expenditure of £102.5bn, which was £3.8bn or 4% higher than in July 2023.

Financial year to date

The shortfall between receipts and spending of £51.4bn for the four months to July 2024 was £0.5bn better than in the same period last year, but £4.7bn over budget.

Cumulative taxes and other receipts amounted to £359.3bn in the first third of the financial year, up 2% compared with the same period last year, while total managed expenditure was 2% higher at £410.7bn. This is illustrated by Table 1, which highlights how cuts to employee national insurance rates have been offset by higher income tax, VAT, corporation tax, and non-tax receipts.

Total managed expenditure for the first four months of £410.7bn was also up by 2% compared with April to July 2023, but this reflected spending on public services up 4%, welfare spending up 6% and gross investment up 10% driven by overruns and construction cost inflation being offset by lower energy-support subsidies and lower debt interest.

The reduction in debt interest of £6.1bn compared with the first four months of last year was driven by a £26.5bn swing in indexation on inflation-linked debt that more than offset a £20.4bn increase in interest on variable and fixed-rate debt.

Table 1: Summary receipts and spending

	Apr-Jul 2024 £bn	Apr-Jul 2023 £bn	Change %
Income tax	89.9	86.4	+4%
VAT	67.9	66.0	+3%
National insurance	53.5	58.3	-8%
Corporation tax	34.0	31.6	+8%
Other taxes	73.5	72.1	+2%
Other receipts	40.5	37.5	+8%
Total receipts	359.3	351.9	+2%

Public services	(212.2)	(204.8)	+4%
Welfare	(103.1)	(97.5)	+6%
Subsidies	(10.6)	(14.0)	-24%
Debt interest	(46.6)	(52.7)	-12%
Gross investment	(38.2)	(34.8)	+10%
Total spending	(410.7)	(403.8)	+2%

Deficit	(51.4)	(51.9)	-1%

Table 2 summarises how public sector net borrowing (PSNB) to fund the deficit of £51.4bn combined with borrowing of £4.4bn to fund working capital movements, student loans and other financing requirements increased debt by £55.8bn during the first four months of the financial year. As a result, public sector net debt grew to £2,745.9bn on 31 July 2024, which is £931bn or 51% more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic.

The ratio of net debt to GDP ratio is at the highest it has been since the 1960s, having increased by 1.3 percentage points from 98.1% on 1 April 2024 to 99.4% on 31 July 2024. Borrowing to fund the deficit was equivalent to 1.9% of GDP and other borrowing was equivalent to 0.2%, an increase of 2.1% before being offset by 0.8% from the effect of inflation and economic growth on GDP (usually referred to as ‘inflating away’). Lower inflation this year means this effect is less pronounced than in the same period last year.

Table 2: Public sector net debt and net debt/GDP

	Apr-Jul 2024 £bn	Apr-Jul 2023 £bn
PSNB	51.4	52.3
Other borrowing	4.4	(11.4)
Net change	55.8	40.9
Opening net debt	2,694.1	2,539.7
Closing net debt	2,745.9	2,580.6
*PSNB/GDP*	*1.9%*	*2.0%*
Other/GDP	0.2%	(0.4%)
Inflating away	(0.8%)	(1.5%)
*Net change*	*1.3%*	*0.1%*
Opening net debt	98.1%	95.7%
*Closing net debt*	*99.4%*	*95.6%*

Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS last year, was -£740bn on 31 May 2024, comprising £1,613bn in non-financial assets and £1,062bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,746bn of net debt (£343bn liquid financial assets – £3,089bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £669bn. This is a £67bn deterioration from the start of the financial year and is £123bn more negative than in July 2023.

Revisions and other matters

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled. This includes local government, where monthly data is based on budget or high level estimates in the absence of monthly data collection.

The latest release saw the ONS reduce the reported deficit for the first three months of the financial year by £1.5bn from £49.8bn to £48.3bn as estimates were revised for new data.

A new dawn for local government has broken, has it not?

With money tight and many local authorities in a precarious financial state, ICAEW’s Alison Ring asks how the government can deliver on its commitment to devolution in the latest instalment of Room 151’s Municipal Missions Manifesto series.

A change in government. A commitment to devolve power. No money.

We all know that England is the most centralised of the advanced economies, but it is still difficult to comprehend just how strange it is that in a nation of 58 million people (out of a UK total of 69 million), the national government in Westminster should be so intimately involved in deciding which high streets in Nottinghamshire or Cornwall are improved, whether to fund public conveniences in Lancashire or Kent, or which parks in Herefordshire or Hertfordshire should get outdoor chess sets.

We might also wonder why we have a central government ministry dedicated to local government at all when in most countries it is the regions, states or provinces that are responsible for local authorities.

Here in the UK, there is a large bureaucracy devoted to overseeing hundreds of councils across England of many shapes and sizes, while another department decides whether to fund road schemes hundreds of miles from London that the ministers and civil servants making those decisions may never use.

Despite the extensive control exercised by Whitehall, successive governments have found that this does not translate into effective action on the ground, while local leaders are frustrated by excessive bureaucracy and limitations on how they can drive economic development and deliver public services locally and regionally. Labour has committed to devolving power in England, but without resolving many of the current problems in local and regional government it is going to be difficult to make devolution a practical possibility.

Step 1 – stabilise the system

The new government has already made two promising announcements that should go a small way to stabilising the existing system. Firstly, it has confirmed that local authorities will participate in rolling three-year spending reviews to be carried out every other year. This will make a huge difference by enabling budget holders to plan ahead more effectively, particularly on capital investments where projects can often span multiple financial years.

Secondly, a ministerial statement from local government minister Jim McMahon has confirmed that action will be taken to tackle the backlog of incomplete audits which is undermining local authority financial reporting and the assurance provided by external auditors. Although tempered by the knowledge that it will take several years to get local audits back on track, and that many of the longer-term fundamental issues identified by the Redmond Review remain unaddressed, this is a positive step forward.

While money is tight, if funds can be found then supporting local authorities under the most financial pressure should be a priority.

Step 2 – complete the roll out of a regional tier of government

A combination of gentle encouragement, financial incentives and some arm twisting has led to the establishment of 11 combined authorities led by regional ‘metro’ mayors mainly in so called ‘city-regions’. Together with the Greater London Authority this means that around half of the English population now have a regional mayor, but the corollary is that the other half do not.

While a large part of devolution is about empowering individual local authorities, gaps in the regional tier of government make it difficult for Whitehall to hand out some of its core functions. This is particularly the case for economic development where, for example, Greater Manchester’s mayor Andy Burnham is all too eager to grasp whatever powers he can and run with them, but there is no one to take the lead in the same way for most of the South West.

One way to fill in the gaps would be to accelerate the roll-out of combined authorities, while another would be to go for the ‘big bang’ approach adopted by France in 1986 when it created a new tier of regional government across Metropolitan France in one fell swoop.

Step 3 – separate out social care and SEND from funding for local public services

One of the biggest drivers of the financial challenges faced by many local authorities is the growing cost of welfare provision – principally adult social care and special educational needs and disabilities (SEND) support. The ‘reverse hypothecation’ caused by these two costs has had the effect of squeezing budgets for local public services and pretty much everything else delivered by local authorities outside of (ring-fenced) social housing.

Ironically, one of the most effective ways to strengthen local government would be to centralise or regionalise social care and SEND budgets or at the very least deal with them separately in council tax bills as a distinct precept. Depending on how this is implemented, this could provide a much closer link between how much communities pay to their local councils and the local public services they receive.

Step 4 – sort out the finances

As the joke goes, if you want to get to where you want to go, then you shouldn’t start from here.

In this case, ‘here’ is a place where many local authorities are in financial difficulty and struggling to meet their statutory obligations. Funding formulas that are based on out-of-date population numbers and don’t reflect underlying needs. A council tax system reliant on 1991 property valuations. Business rates that are an unwieldy tangled mess.

These weak financial foundations to the local government system in England are crying out for reform, even it is necessary to acknowledge that change will be very difficult and politically risky. Despite the many different options that are theoretically possible, it is worth considering the proposal put forward by the Fabian Society in a recent report on fiscal devolution produced in association with ICAEW.

The Fabians suggested that the distribution of central government grants be agreed among local authorities rather than determined in Westminster, accompanied by a more stable basis to determining their amount. Another route that the Fabians looked at is the system of shared taxation in Germany which provides the core funding for German regions out of national taxes in a way that equalises funding between richer and poorer regions.

Step 5 – rebuild trust

Prising the hand of Whitehall off the shoulder of English local authorities is not going to be easy. It will take significant political capital to make devolution happen, and there will be many reasons found to not hand over control of the purse strings ‘just yet’.

Many of these reasons will be down to a lack of trust. Trust in the ability of local authorities to manage money wisely, not helped by the governance failures of recent years. Trust in the transparency of local authority finances, not helped by the impenetrable nature of the accounts. Trust in the quality of local public audit, not helped by the local audit crisis.

That is why devolution is not just about the decisions that central government makes to give away or delegate power and money, and how it chooses to structure the system. It is also about the choices made by local and regional authorities asking for those new powers.

So, if you are in an area without a combined authority, it is time to start talking to your neighbouring areas about forming one. If your accounts make it difficult for stakeholders to understand how you have spent public money, it is time to streamline and invest in making them better. And if you are behind on your audits, then you need to do what you can to work with your external auditors to get back on track.

There is a big prize here. More effective and efficient local and regional government leading to better outcomes. And more bandwidth in Whitehall to focus on national and international priorities.

Alison Ring OBE FCA is director for public sector and taxation at ICAEW, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.

This article was written on behalf of ICAEW by Martin Wheatcroft in conjunction with Alison Ring, and was originally published in Room 151 and subsequently (with some minor changes) by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: BBC

My chart for ICAEW this week highlights how the BBC is struggling financially after incurring an operating loss of £0.3bn on the provision of public service broadcasting and the failure of commercial activities to contribute to the bottom line.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) recently published its annual report and accounts for the year ended 31 March 2024 (2023/24) and my chart highlights how the BBC is struggling financially with a reported operating loss of £0.3bn and no operating profit contribution from commercial activities.

Licence fee income was £3.7bn in 2023/24, which combined with other income of £0.3bn resulted in public services broadcasting revenue of £4.0bn. After deducting operating costs of £4.3bn, this meant the BBC lost £0.3bn on its eight national and seven regional TV channels, 10 national and 46 regional and local radio stations, BBC World Service radio in 42 languages, BBC iPlayer, BBC Sounds, BBC Education, news, sport and weather internet sites, orchestras and other activities, including funding of the independent S4C TV channel in Wales.

External income generated by the BBC’s commercial operations amounted to £1.4bn but this was offset by £1.4bn in operating costs, leaving the overall group operating loss broadly unchanged from the public service broadcasting total.

Licence fee income of £3.7bn was just under £0.1bn or 2% lower than the year before as the number of households paying the full licence fee reduced from 23.2m to 22.7m at the end of March 2024 on a fee frozen at £159 per year (equivalent to £13.25 per month). There were approximately 4,000 households with monochrome licences and 0.2m households on concessionary fees, with a further 1.0m with free licences (principally given to those aged 75 or more receiving pension credit).

Other income includes £0.2bn from contract income and £0.1bn in grants from the Foreign Office towards the cost of the World Service.

Public services broadcasting expenditure of £4.3bn was £149m lower than the year before and can be analysed between spending on content of £3.0bn, distribution and support costs of £0.9bn, and other activities of £0.4bn. Content spending can be further broken down into £1.7bn on TV channels, £0.5bn on radio, £0.3bn on the World Service, £0.2bn on online services including BBC iPlayer, and £0.3bn on other content.

While external commercial income was broadly matched by costs once intra-group transactions are taken account of, the BBC’s commercial businesses contributed £325m in 2023/24 towards the BBC’s overheads, down from £368bn in the previous year. They principally comprise BBC Studioworks, which supplies studio time and post-production services to the major TV networks and most production companies in the UK, and BBC Studios, which produces TV shows and films on behalf of the BBC and other broadcasters, as well as distributing BBC content around the world. BBC Studios also operates the UKTV network of four ad-supported TV channels, four ad-supported streaming channels and three pay TV channels in the UK, several international TV channels (including BBC America and BBC News international services), and the BritBox International streaming service outside the UK (now 100% owned by the BBC).

Not shown in the chart is £0.5bn in non-operating gains, most of which were one-off items, including £0.2bn in gains on disposals in the year and £0.2bn from tax adjustments in respect of prior years. This resulted in an overall net surplus of £0.2bn for the year ended 31 March 2024.

Real-term cuts in the value of the licence fee and falling returns from commercial activities have put significant financial pressure on the BBC in recent years, causing it to cut back on content and some services, consolidate operations such as domestic and international news gathering, and undergo a series of restructurings to improve efficiency.

The 8.7% increase in the licence fee to £169.50 from 1 April 2024 (equivalent to £14.13 per month) and inflation-linked increases planned over the next three years should help ease some of the pressure in the current financial year, although returning to operating profitability is likely to still require the BBC to look for further savings in its public service broadcasting operations.

Unfortunately, the BBC has not been able to replicate its commercial success in the years before streaming when it was able to generate significant returns from the sale of DVDs and international content licensing. While there are plans to build up its international streaming services (from a relatively low base), the BBC’s commercial businesses are unlikely to generate enough money to affect the dilemma facing the new government on what to do with the licence fee when the BBC’s current financial settlement ends on 31 December 2027.

The temptation will be for the government to defer reform of how the BBC is funded yet again, just as its predecessors have done over the last couple of decades. However, the erosion of income from younger households choosing to not watch broadcast television to stop paying the licence fee, and the likely consolidation of streaming services into a handful of global online ‘broadcasters’ that will dominate the market, is likely to make avoiding this conundrum that much more difficult this time around.

For more information, read the BBC annual report and accounts 2023/24 and the December 2022 House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee report on future funding of the BBC.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

Q1 public finances confirm challenging position for new government

First quarter shortfall between receipts and spending of almost £50bn emphasises the significant challenges facing the Chancellor as she puts together her first Budget.

The monthly public sector finances for June 2024 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Friday 19 July 2024 reported a provisional deficit for the first three months of the 2024/25 financial year of £49.8bn, £1.1bn better than a year previously but £3.2bn worse than budgeted.

Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director of Public Sector and Taxation, says: “This is the first set of public sector finance data since the new government was elected, and today’s numbers set out the size of the obstacle the UK’s leaders face.

“£14.5bn was borrowed to finance the deficit in June, which although £3.2bn less than in June 2023, brought the total for the first three months of the financial year to £49.8bn, slightly worse than expectations. The latest numbers also highlighted the growing amount of public debt, which stood at 99.5% of GDP or £2,740bn on 30 June 2024. Although total debt interest was lower than last year because of the effect of lower inflation on inflation-linked debt, interest on the bulk of debt continues to rise.

“The high level of debt – and the associated interest bill – means that the new Prime Minister and Chancellor will be faced with some very difficult decisions over the coming months as they decide which elements of their programme to prioritise, and which will have to wait.”

Month of June 2024

Taxes and other receipts amounted to £88.2bn in June 2024, up 2% compared with the same month last year, while total managed expenditure was 2% lower at £102.7bn. This resulted in a reduction of £3.2bn from a fiscal deficit of £17.7bn in June 2023 to £14.5bn in June 2024.

Financial year to date

Taxes and other receipts amounted to £258.0bn in the three months to June 2024, up 1% compared with the same month last year, while total managed expenditure was 1% higher at £307.8bn. This resulted in a reduction of £1.1bn from a fiscal deficit of £50.9bn for the first quarter of 2023/24 to £49.8bn for the first quarter of 2024/25. However, this is £3.2bn more than the £46.6bn for the first quarter included in the Spring Budget 2024.

Table 1 analyses receipts for the first quarter of the financial year, highlighting how cuts to employee national insurance rates have been offset by higher income tax, corporation tax, and non-tax receipts.

Table 1: Summary receipts and spending

Three months to	Jun 2024 (£bn)	Jun 2023 (£bn)	Change (%)
Income tax	58.1	56.1	+4%
VAT	49.9	49.6	+1%
National insurance	39.7	43.4	-9%
Corporation tax	25.3	23.4	+8%
Other taxes	54.9	54.1	+1%
Other receipts	30.1	27.7	+9%
Total receipts	258.0	254.3	+1%
Public services	(158.8)	(152.6)	+4%
Welfare	(76.9)	(73.7)	+4%
Subsidies	(7.8)	(11.3)	-31%
Debt interest	(35.2)	(41.1)	-14%
Gross investment	(29.1)	(26.5)	+10%
Total spending	(307.8)	(305.2)	+1%
Deficit	(49.8)	(50.9)	-2%

Table 1 also shows how total managed expenditure for the first quarter of £307.8bn was up by 1% compared with April to June 2023, with higher spending on public services and welfare offset by lower energy-support subsidies and lower debt interest. The reduction in the latter of £5.9bn was driven by a £9.2bn reduction in indexation on inflation-linked debt that more than offset a £3.3bn or 44% increase in interest on variable and fixed-rate debt.

Table 2: Public sector net debt

Three months to	Jun 2024 (£bn)	Jun 2023 (£bn)
Deficit	(49.8)	(50.9)
Other borrowing	3.9	(7.7)
Debt movement	(45.9)	(58.6)
Opening net debt	(2,694.1)	(2,539.7)
Closing net debt	(2,740.0)	(2,598.3)
Net debt/GDP	99.5%	96.7%

Public sector net debt was £2,740bn or 99.5% of GDP on 30 June 2024, just under £46bn higher than at the start of the financial year. At 99.5%, the debt to GDP ratio is the highest it has been since the 1960s.

The increase in the first quarter reflects borrowing to fund the deficit of just under £50bn minus close to £4bn in net cash inflows from loan recoveries and working capital movements in excess of lending by government.

Public sector net debt is £142bn or 5% higher than a year previously, equivalent to an increase of 2.8 percentage points in relation to the size of the economy. It is £925bn or 51% more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic and £1,712bn or 167% more than the £1,028bn net debt amount as of 31 March 2007 before the financial crisis, reflecting the huge sums borrowed over the last two decades.

Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS in 2023, was -£726bn on 31 May 2024, comprising £1,613bn in non-financial assets and £1,070bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,740bn of net debt (£340bn liquid financial assets – £3,080bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £669bn. This is a £53bn deterioration from the start of the financial year and is £77bn more negative than the -£649bn net worth number for June 2023.

Revisions and other matters

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled.

The latest release saw the ONS increase the reported deficit for the first two months of the financial year by £1.8bn from £33.5bn to £35.3bn as estimates were revised for new data. More significantly, public sector net debt at the end of May 2024 was reduced by £16.3bn to £2,726.6bn to correct for omitted data on Bank of England repo transactions during the current financial year. This reduced the reported debt to GDP ratio for May 2024 by 0.7 percentage points from 99.8% of GDP to 99.1%.

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: World population

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how a declining fertility rate means the global population is now anticipated to reach a peak of ‘just’ 10.3bn in 2084, according to the UN.

World population.
ICAEW chart of the week.

Column chart showing the world’s population in 2000, 2025, 2050, 2075 and 2100.

Europe and Middle East – 0.8bn, 0.9bn, 1.0bn, 1.0bn and 1.0bn.
Americas – 0.8bn, 1.1bn, 1.2bn, 1.2bn and 1.1bn.
Asia-Pacific – 2.1bn, 2.4bn, 2.3bn, 1.9bn and 1.5bn.
South and Central Asia – 1.7bn, 2.3bn, 2.7bn, 2.9bn and 2.8bn.
Africa – 0.8bn, 1.5bn, 2.5bn, 3.3bn and 3.8bn.

Total – 6.2bn, 8.2bn, 9.7bn, 10.3bn (10,250m) and 10.2bn (10,180m), with a peak of 10.3bn (10,289m) in 2084.

For the purposes of this chart, Europe and Middle East comprises Europe and Western Asia as defined by the UN but excludes Russia and Northern Africa, Asia-Pacific comprises Eastern Asia, Southeastern Asia and Oceania, and South and Central Asia comprises Southern Asia, Central Asia and Russia.

18 Jul 2024. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday.

Source: UN Department of Economic Affairs, ‘World Population Prospects’.

© ICAEW 2024

The Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) recently published its latest population projections for the 21st century. Its central projection is for the world’s population to increase from 8.2bn next year to a peak of 10.3bn in 2084 in 2084 before falling slightly to 10.2bn at the end of the century.

This means that the population will have increased by 2.0bn between 2000 and 2025 and is projected to increase by 1.5bn over the next 25 years to 9.7bn in 2050 and by 0.6bn to 10.3bn in 2075, before gradually starting to fall from 2084 onwards.

My chart illustrates how this change differs by region, with the population of Africa expected to grow throughout the century from 1.5bn in 2025 to 3.8bn in 2100. South and Central Asia, which has seen its population grow from 1.7bn in 2000 to an anticipated 2.3bn next year, is expected to see further growth to 2.9bn in 2075 before then falling to 2.8bn in 2100, while the population of the Asia-Pacific region is expected to increase from 2.1bn in 2000 to 2.4bn in 2025, is expected to fall gradually from 2030 onwards to 1.5bn in 2100.

The population of the Americas is expected to grow slightly from 1.1bn in 2025 (up from 0.8bn in 2000) to 1.2bn before falling back to 1.1bn by 2100, while Europe and Middle East’s population is expected to increase from 0.9bn in 2025 (up from 0.8bn in 2000) to close to 1.0bn in 2050 and for the rest of the century.

UN DESA says the main driver of global population increase over the next 60 years until it peaks is the momentum created by growth in the past, with increases in the number of women of reproductive age until the late 2050s offsetting a declining fertility rate – currently one child fewer on average than in the 1990s (2.25 live births per woman currently compared with 3.31 in 1990). They also project that the number of people aged 65 will reach 2.2bn in 2080, surpassing the number of children under 18 in that year.

The declining fertility rate is one reason that the UN are projecting that the world’s population in 2100 will be 700m or 6% smaller than they were anticipating a decade ago, despite life expectancy starting to increase again after falling during the COVID-19 pandemic.

For some countries and areas, the declines in population are expected to be quite significant over the remainder of the century, such as the populations of China and Japan, which are expected to reduce from 1,416m to 633m and from 123m to 77m between 2025 and 2100 respectively. Meanwhile India is expected to grow from a population of 1,464m in 2025 to a peak of 1,701m in 2061 before falling to 1,505m in 2100.

Many other countries and areas have already or will shortly see their populations start to decline, except for about 52 countries and areas up until 2054, and 62 up until 2100, where immigration will be the main driver of population growth. The latter includes the UK, where the population is expected to rise from 70m in 2025 to a peak of 76m in 2073 before falling to 74m in 2100, and the US, expected to grow from 347m in 2025 to 421m in 2100.

According to the analysis by the UN, there are around 100 countries and areas (out of the 237 included in their analysis) with relatively youthful populations over the next half century that have a window of opportunity to accelerate their economic development. This ‘demographic dividend’ occurs when the share of the population of working ages is increasing faster than the overall population and a substantial and sustained decline in fertility increases the numbers available to work, assuming the countries concerned can put in the investment needed to take advantage of this opportunity.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.