Tag: #population

ICAEW chart of the week: Pensioners on the rise

My chart for ICAEW this week highlights how the number of pensioners in the UK is expected to increase by 14% over the next 10 years. This will have major implications for the public finances.

Step chart. Starts with a projected UK population aged 66 or more in 2025 of 12,614,000 (21%), adds 2,677,000 over the next 10 years, then a reduction of 867,000 (7%) from the change in the state retirement age to equal a UK population aged 67 or more of 4,424,000 (+14%) in 2035. 31 Jan 2025. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Source: ONS, 'Principal population projection (2022-based), Jan 2025'.

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) published its latest population projections for the UK on 28 January 2025. 

Extrapolated from the 2021 Census in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the 2022 Census in Scotland, the ONS’s principal projection is for the UK population to increase by 5% over the next decade from a projected 69,868,000 in June 2025 to 73,426,000 in June 2035. This is on the basis of 132,000 more deaths than births in total over the next 10 years (6,979,000 versus 6,847,000) and net inward migration of 369,000 a year on average.

Our chart highlights how the number of pensioners is expected to increase by 14% over the next 10 years, from a projected 12,614,000 this summer to 14,424,000 in 2035, despite an increase in the state retirement age from 66 to 67. 

The main driver of this increase is an additional 2,677,000 people aged 66 or more, reflecting 8,522,000 people passing the age of 66 over the 10 years to June 2035, plus 28,000 from net inward migration (119,000 in and 91,000 out), less 5,873,000 deaths

This 21% increase is partially offset by a 7% reduction for the 867,000 66-year-olds who will still be waiting for their state pension in June 2035 as a result of the planned rise in the state retirement age from 66 to 67 between 2026 and 2028.

Over the same period the ONS is projecting a 7% fall in the number of children from 12,272,000 in June 2025 to 11,434,000 in June 2035, and a 6% increase in the size of the working age population from 44,982,000 to 47,569,000. The latter would have been a 4% increase if not for the statutory increase in the state pension age to 67.

The ONS stresses that its national population projections are not forecasts and do not attempt to predict potential changes in international migration in particular. It also notes that demographic assumptions for future fertility and mortality are based on observed demographic trends, which is no guarantee that these trends might not change in the future.

Despite those caveats, the projected increase in the number of pensioners is one of the more likely areas of the projections to turn into reality. This is because almost all of those future pensioners are alive today and already living in the country, while mortality rates tend to change gradually over time. 

A much more significant factor relates to the ONS’s long-term assumption for net inward migration of 340,000. While this is unlikely to affect the anticipated number of pensioners in a decade’s time, it will have a significant impact on the projected ratio between the number of pensioners and those of working age.

Either way, the projected rise in the number of pensioners compared with the size of the working-age population over the coming decade will have major implications for the public finances. 

Tax receipts will fall proportionately as retirees leave the workforce faster than new workers join. State pension payments will increase, even before taking account of the ratchet effect of the pension triple-lock on the amount payable to each pensioner. Health care and adult social care costs will rise substantially given how skewed these costs are to older generations. And pension credit, housing benefit and other welfare benefits that go to poorer pensioners are also likely to increase. 

Successive governments, including the current administration, have worked on the basis that they should be able to afford the higher costs of many more people living for longer in retirement through a combination of gradual rises in the state pension age (long hoped for but not delivered), higher levels of economic growth, and cuts in other areas of public spending such as the defence budget. 

With the number of pensioners increasing much faster than the government can raise the state pension age (given the decade or more advance notice that needs to be given), relatively low levels of economic growth even in more optimistic scenarios, calls for an increase in the defence budget and significant cost pressures affecting many other public services, the big question will be the extent to which taxes will have to go up even further over the next 10 years if the promises made by successive governments over the last century are to be kept.

Read more: ONS’s national population projections.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: What do we all do?

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at what we all do for a living and how the government wants to move more of us from economically inactive categories into the workforce.

Pie chart breaking down UK population between 29.0m employees (42%), 4.3m self-employed (6%), 1.5m unemployed (2%), 3.0m ill or disabled (4%), 2.7m homemakers and other (4%), 12.3m retired (18%), 13.9m children under 16 (20%), 2.5m students 16 and over (4%).

My chart of the week for ICAEW looks at what we do for a living, according to the latest labour market statistics from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) for the third quarter between July and September, when the estimated population was 69.2m. 

According to the ONS, 29m people (42% of the total population) were in employment, 4.3m (6%) were self-employed and 1.5m (2%) were unemployed seeking work. In total this is fractionally just over half of the population (50.3%).

The other (almost) half of the population were not in work. They comprised 3m (4%) not working because of illness or disability, 2.7m (4%) homemakers or not working for other reasons, 12.3m (18%) people in retirement, 13.9m (20%) children under the age of 16, and 2.5m (4%) students aged 16 or over who were not also working.

The 33.3m who were employed or self-employed include 1.5m people aged 65 or more and 1.1m students in full-time education who also work. Around 5.9m work in the public sector. Overall, there are 24.9m people working full-time and 8.4m working part-time, while some 1.2m workers have more than one job. 

The 1.5m unemployed include 0.2m students in full-time education who are actively seeking work. Meanwhile, the 12.3m in retirement include 1.1m people who are under the age of 65.

The ONS also reports that 1.9m of those who are economically inactive between the ages of 16 and 64 would like a job, including 0.7m of those who are not working because of illness or disability. 

The government is very keen to get as many as possible of the 1.5m people who are unemployed, and the 3.0m not working because of illness or disability, into work. This would benefit the public finances twice over by not only reducing the cost to the exchequer of welfare payments paid out, but also by increasing the amount of tax receipts coming in.

Recent statements from government ministers have suggested that their strategy includes tightening the eligibility criteria for illness and disability benefits, in addition to providing additional support to help people back into the workforce.

The government is also looking at how it can encourage some of the 1.1m retirees below the age of 65 back into work, as well as persuading more of us to work beyond the statutory retirement age of 66.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: World population

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how a declining fertility rate means the global population is now anticipated to reach a peak of ‘just’ 10.3bn in 2084, according to the UN.

World population. ICAEW chart of the week. Column chart showing the world’s population in 2000, 2025, 2050, 2075 and 2100. Europe and Middle East – 0.8bn, 0.9bn, 1.0bn, 1.0bn and 1.0bn. Americas – 0.8bn, 1.1bn, 1.2bn, 1.2bn and 1.1bn. Asia-Pacific – 2.1bn, 2.4bn, 2.3bn, 1.9bn and 1.5bn. South and Central Asia – 1.7bn, 2.3bn, 2.7bn, 2.9bn and 2.8bn. Africa – 0.8bn, 1.5bn, 2.5bn, 3.3bn and 3.8bn. Total – 6.2bn, 8.2bn, 9.7bn, 10.3bn (10,250m) and 10.2bn (10,180m), with a peak of 10.3bn (10,289m) in 2084. For the purposes of this chart, Europe and Middle East comprises Europe and Western Asia as defined by the UN but excludes Russia and Northern Africa, Asia-Pacific comprises Eastern Asia, Southeastern Asia and Oceania, and South and Central Asia comprises Southern Asia, Central Asia and Russia. 18 Jul 2024. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. Source: UN Department of Economic Affairs, ‘World Population Prospects’. © ICAEW 2024

The Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) recently published its latest population projections for the 21st century. Its central projection is for the world’s population to increase from 8.2bn next year to a peak of 10.3bn in 2084 in 2084 before falling slightly to 10.2bn at the end of the century.

This means that the population will have increased by 2.0bn between 2000 and 2025 and is projected to increase by 1.5bn over the next 25 years to 9.7bn in 2050 and by 0.6bn to 10.3bn in 2075, before gradually starting to fall from 2084 onwards.

My chart illustrates how this change differs by region, with the population of Africa expected to grow throughout the century from 1.5bn in 2025 to 3.8bn in 2100. South and Central Asia, which has seen its population grow from 1.7bn in 2000 to an anticipated 2.3bn next year, is expected to see further growth to 2.9bn in 2075 before then falling to 2.8bn in 2100, while the population of the Asia-Pacific region is expected to increase from 2.1bn in 2000 to 2.4bn in 2025, is expected to fall gradually from 2030 onwards to 1.5bn in 2100.

The population of the Americas is expected to grow slightly from 1.1bn in 2025 (up from 0.8bn in 2000) to 1.2bn before falling back to 1.1bn by 2100, while Europe and Middle East’s population is expected to increase from 0.9bn in 2025 (up from 0.8bn in 2000) to close to 1.0bn in 2050 and for the rest of the century.

UN DESA says the main driver of global population increase over the next 60 years until it peaks is the momentum created by growth in the past, with increases in the number of women of reproductive age until the late 2050s offsetting a declining fertility rate – currently one child fewer on average than in the 1990s (2.25 live births per woman currently compared with 3.31 in 1990). They also project that the number of people aged 65 will reach 2.2bn in 2080, surpassing the number of children under 18 in that year.

The declining fertility rate is one reason that the UN are projecting that the world’s population in 2100 will be 700m or 6% smaller than they were anticipating a decade ago, despite life expectancy starting to increase again after falling during the COVID-19 pandemic.

For some countries and areas, the declines in population are expected to be quite significant over the remainder of the century, such as the populations of China and Japan, which are expected to reduce from 1,416m to 633m and from 123m to 77m between 2025 and 2100 respectively. Meanwhile India is expected to grow from a population of 1,464m in 2025 to a peak of 1,701m in 2061 before falling to 1,505m in 2100.

Many other countries and areas have already or will shortly see their populations start to decline, except for about 52 countries and areas up until 2054, and 62 up until 2100, where immigration will be the main driver of population growth. The latter includes the UK, where the population is expected to rise from 70m in 2025 to a peak of 76m in 2073 before falling to 74m in 2100, and the US, expected to grow from 347m in 2025 to 421m in 2100.

According to the analysis by the UN, there are around 100 countries and areas (out of the 237 included in their analysis) with relatively youthful populations over the next half century that have a window of opportunity to accelerate their economic development. This ‘demographic dividend’ occurs when the share of the population of working ages is increasing faster than the overall population and a substantial and sustained decline in fertility increases the numbers available to work, assuming the countries concerned can put in the investment needed to take advantage of this opportunity.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Schools out

Our chart looks at the projected state school population in England over the next six years, with an anticipated 10% fall in state nursery and primary school pupils implying school closures and mergers are on the way.

Schools out | ICAEW chart of the week | Dual column charts showing the projected number of pupils in England in thousands ('000) | Left hand chart: State nursery and primary schools | 2023 - 4,593 | 2024 - 4,510 | 2025 - 4,431 | 2026 - 4,350 | 2027 - 4,272 | 2028 - 4,181 | 2029 - 4,113 | Right hand chart: State secondary schools (excluding sixth forms) | 2023 - 3,193 | 2024 - 3,244 | 2025 - 3,244 | 2026 - 3,238 | 2027 - 3,219 | 2028 - 3,191 2029 - 3,145 | 30 May 2024. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. Source: Department for Education, 'National pupil projections'. Full-time equivalent pupils at start of academic year. © ICAEW 2024

According to Department for Education statistics, there were an estimated 8,425,000 school pupils under the age of 16 in England at the start of the current academic year in 2023. Of these, 4,593,000 were in maintained nursery and state primary schools, 3,193,000 were in state secondary schools, 131,000 were in state special schools, 13,000 were in alternative provision, and 496,000 were in independent and other non-maintained schools. 

Our chart this week shows how the first two categories are projected to change over the next six years, starting with a projected 10% fall in pupil numbers in state nursery and primary schools from 4,593,000 in the current academic year to 4,113,000 in the academic year starting in 2029.

Meanwhile the number of state secondary school pupils under the age of 16 at the start of the academic year is expected to increase from 3,193,000 in this academic year to peak at 3,244,000 next year before gradually declining to 3,146,000 in 2029, a fall of 3% from the peak.

Driven by a falling birthrate, the 10% projected fall in state nursery and primary school pupils is likely to be a major issue across England and a political hot potato for the next government. Larger primary schools may be able to cut the number of classes (ironically increasing class sizes) to mitigate reduced income from falling rolls, but this may not be enough. Smaller schools with just one class per year will find it more difficult to find savings. 

Closures and mergers are likely, as are a rise in ‘save our local school’ campaigns as academy trusts and local authorities seek to find savings in response.

The 3% decline from the peak in secondary school pupil numbers will also present major challenges, especially as the fall in numbers is unlikely to be spread evenly across all state secondaries. Some will see smaller falls or even rises in their school rolls, while others will see a much greater drop in their intakes. Again, reducing the number of classes in each year is a likely response for those affected, but some closures and mergers are almost inevitable.

These projections are subject to some uncertainty, despite the core numbers being based on children who have already been born that are likely to stay in the English education system for the entirety of their school careers. The level of migration is a key assumption and could lead to even lower pupil numbers if recently implemented restrictions on the eligibility of immigrants to bring dependents with them are effective. The projections also assume a relatively stable number of pupils going to private schools, which may need to be adjusted in the light of Labour’s proposals to add 20% VAT to school fees.

These statistics are prepared on a full-time equivalent basis, but these are deemed to be the same as total pupil numbers for each age group, apart from the under 5s. Many nursery pupils and primary school reception class students only attend on a part-time basis, with 974,000 under 5s converting into 874,000 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in the current academic year. These numbers exclude most under 5s who attend private nurseries, receive other forms of childcare, or stay at home.

In theory, falling school rolls should reduce pressures on the education budget while at the same potentially increasing per-pupil funding, depending on how much is cut from the school budget. However, with the Spending Review now scheduled for after the general election likely to result in upward revisions to the Spring Budget 2024 medium-term spending plans, any such savings are likely to be swallowed up.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK population projections

The Office for National Statistics has updated its national population projections, lifting its expectations for 2025 by one million to just under 70 million people living in the UK and for 2050 by four million to 78 million.

UK population projections ICAEW chart of the week Step chart with five columns each 25 years apart together with four intermediate steps showing the change over each quarter-century. Legend: Population (blue) Births minus deaths (purple) Net inward migration (orange) 1975: 56m population +2m births minus deaths +1m net inward migration 2000: 59m population +3m births minus deaths +8m net inward migration 2025: 70m population -0m births minus deaths +8m net inward migration 2050: 78m population -3m births minus deaths +8m net inward migration 2075: 83m population 1 Feb 2024. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. Source: ONS, '2021-based UK population projections, 30 Jan 2024'; ONS, 'UK population mid-year estimate'. (c) ICAEW 2024

My chart for ICAEW this week takes the latest principal population projections for the UK published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 30 January 2024 and illustrates how the number of people in the UK has increased since 1975 and is projected to increase to 2075.

According to the ONS, there were 56m people living in the UK in June 1975 and our chart shows how this increased by 2m from births exceeding deaths (18m births – 16m deaths) and by 1m from net inward migration to reach 59m in June 2000, an average annual population growth rate of 0.2%.

The first quarter of the current century is expected to see the population increase to just under 70m by the middle of 2025, from a combination of 3m births less deaths (18m births – 15m deaths) and net inward migration of 8m, an average of just over 300,000 per year. This is equivalent to an average annual population growth rate of 0.7%.

From there, the population is projected to increase by approximately 8m to 78m in 2050, an average annual growth rate of 0.4%. This is driven by an assumption that immigration will continue to exceed emigration in the long-term by 315,000 a year, contributing 8m to the increase, while projected deaths are expected to marginally exceed births (18m deaths – 18m births) over the same period. The latter is also affected by the assumed level of immigration, with the ONS estimating that if net migration was zero then the population would fall by 3m over the 25 years to 2050 (18m deaths – 15m births).

The chart concludes with the projection for the following quarter-century from 2050 to 2075, with deaths exceeding births by 3m (21m deaths – 18m births) to partially offset an 8m projected increase from net inward migration to reach 83m in 2075, an average annual population growth of 0.3%.

These numbers are higher than the previous projection published by the ONS in January 2023 by 1m in 2025, 4m in 2050 and 8m in 2075, partly as a consequence of updating the baseline numbers to reflect the 2021 Census, but mainly because of higher assumptions for net inward migration. The ONS doubled the expected number of net inward migrants over the three years to June 2025 from approximately 300,000 per year to around 600,000 per year, and increased its long-term assumption from 245,000 net inward migrants per year to 315,000.

The challenge for policymakers is in balancing the needs of the economy and the public finances for more workers in order to pay for the pensions and health care costs of a rapidly growing number of pensioners, and fee-paying international students to subsidise the domestic university system, with political pressures to control immigration. Perhaps unsurprisingly this had led to a degree of unpredictability in immigration policy.

The challenge for the ONS is trying to reflect in its projections a highly unpredictable immigration policy, which in this case has resulted in it increasing its assumptions for net inward migration just as the government introduces a series of new restrictions that should significantly reduce the incoming flow of migrants. 

The irony is that the ONS might have been better off just leaving its previous projections in place – but then that’s life in the forecasting game.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Pensioners dilemma

The ‘elephant in the room’ of growing numbers of pensioners and what that will mean for the long-term prospects of the public finances is likely to be avoided yet again at next week’s Autumn Statement.

Pensioners dilemma Two column chart with lines between them showing projected changes in the UK population between 2023 and 2043. 2023: 68.1m (left hand column) Change: +4.0m (+6%) 2043: 72.1m (right hand column) Split into two bars in each column. Pensioners (in purple) 2023: 12.4m Change: +3.3m (+27%) 2043: 15.7m Everyone else 2023: 56.7m Change +0.7m (+1%) 2043: 56.4m

My chart for ICAEW this week is on the ‘elephant in the room’ that haunts fiscal events such as next week’s Autumn Statement – the rapidly rising number of pensioners that is driving some of the biggest line items in the national budget: pensions, health and social care.

This fiscal event is unlikely to be any different, with the Chancellor expected to focus most of his statement on short-term measures to free up headroom for pre-election tax cuts at a time of stagnant economic growth.

Any substantive discussion on the long-term prospects for the public finances is likely to be absent beyond a continued commitment to seeing the debt to GDP ratio start to fall within the next five years. How he – or more likely his successors – might be able to avoid having to raise taxes significantly in the coming decades to pay for the cost of pensions, health and social care for many more people, living longer, sometimes less healthy lives, is unlikely to be at the core of what is announced.

To illustrate the dilemma facing policymakers and the public, our chart shows how pensioners represent 3.3m out of the 4.0m projected increase in the size of the UK population between 2023 and 2043. The total population of the UK is projected to increase by 6% from 68.1m in 2023 to 72.1m in 2043, with the number of pensioners expected to increase by 27% from 12.4m this year to 15.7m in 20 years’ time. 

The number of non-pensioners is expected to increase by 0.7m or 1% from 55.7m to 56.4m, with net inward migration of 5.0m over that period offsetting what would otherwise be a significant fall in the numbers below retirement age. (Not shown in the chart is a projected 3% rise in the working age population and a 7% fall in the number of children.)

The projected 27% rise in the number of pensioners is despite a planned increase in the state pension age from age 66 to age 67 in 2027, one of the few long-term steps the government has taken to mitigate the fiscal effects of rising pensioner numbers. However, increasing the retirement age doesn’t directly impact health and social care costs, as well as being partly offset by the cost of supporting increasing numbers of people out of work between traditional retirement age and the age at which they can take their state pension.

Given the significance of the demographic challenge to the public finances, there is very little public debate on what to do, especially as the current policy of cutting the proportion of spending going on public services outside of health appears increasingly unsustainable. 

Spending on defence and security (the traditional budget to raid) is already close to the NATO minimum and appears likely to need to increase given the global security situation, while extracting further savings from other public services seems extremely unlikely, especially given the reluctance of successive governments to put in the level of upfront and ongoing capital investment that might make operational savings possible.

The irony is that, unlike the game-theory scenario of the prisoners’ dilemma that makes optimal decision-making difficult for two prisoners who can’t communicate with each other, there is no theoretical restriction on the ability of policymakers to talk to the public about the pensioners dilemma and to have a proper debate about that might mean for taxes and public services in the long term.

Read more: ICAEW Autumn Statement 2023 hub.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Japan demographics

We look at how Japan’s population is ageing and falling fast, presenting some major challenges for the public finances of the third largest national economy in the world.

Column chart showing Japan's population at twenty-year intervals from 1963 to 2063, analysed into five age groups: Ages 0-19, Ages 20-39, Ages 40-59, Ages 60-79, Ages 80+. 1963 – 36m, 32m, 19m, 8m and 1m – 96m total 1983 – 35m, 36m, 31m, 15m and 2m – 119m total 2003 – 25m, 35m, 35m, 27m and 5m – 127m total 2023 – 20m, 26m, 35m, 31m and 12m – 124m total 2043 – 15m, 22m, 26m, 31m and 16m – 110m total 2063 – 12m, 17m, 22m, 24m and 18m – 93m total

Our chart this week is on the demographics of Japan, looking at how its population grew rapidly from 96m in 1963 to 119m in 1983 and then 127m in 2003, before falling to 124m this year, to a projected 110m in 20 years’ time, and to 93m in 40 years’ time.

Our analysis starts with the 96m people who lived in Japan in 1963 and shows how increased longevity saw the population increase to 119m in 1983 (an increase of 24m from 36m births and 2m migrants less 14m deaths), before increasing to 127m in 2003 (a further 8m increase from 25m births less 17m deaths). 

The population has been relatively stable since then, peaking at 128m in 2010 (not shown in the chart), before dropping to 124m this year as the number of births (20m over the last 20 years) fell below the number of deaths (25m). This was offset by a small amount of net inward migration, with the non-Japanese component of the population amounting to 3m in 2023.

Fewer younger people means that the number of births is expected to be even smaller over the next 20 years to 2043 at around 15m, at the same time as deaths are expected to increase in line with an older population. According to the latest medium-variant projections of Japan’s National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, the population is projected to drop by 14m to 110m in 2043 (15m births + 3m migrants – 32m deaths) before falling by a further 17m to 93m in 2063 (12m births + 3m migrants – 32m deaths).

The primary purpose of the chart is to illustrate how the age profile has shifted and continues to change as Japan gets older. Grouped into five age segments: 0-19, 20-39, 40-59, 60-79 and 80+, the population was, is, and is projected to be as follows:

1963 – 36m, 32m, 19m, 8m and 1m – 96m total
1983 – 35m, 36m, 31m, 15m and 2m – 119m total
2003 – 25m, 35m, 35m, 27m and 5m – 127m total
2023 – 20m, 26m, 35m, 31m and 12m – 124m total
2043 – 15m, 22m, 26m, 31m and 16m – 110m total
2063 – 12m, 17m, 22m, 24m and 18m – 93m total

The contrast in the age profile in the 20th century compared with 21st century Japan is dramatic, with the proportion of population aged 60 or over increasing from 9% in 1963 to 35% today and to a projected 45% in 2063, at the same time as the share aged under 40 has fallen from 72% in 1963 to 37% in 2023 and to a projected 31% in 2063.

Also not shown in the chart is Japan’s median age, which was 26 in 1963, 33 in 1983, 42 in 2003 and 49 this year, before being projected to reach 53 in 2043 and 56 in 2063 – more than double that of a century earlier.

These demographic shifts have and will continue to present a major fiscal challenge for the Japanese government. The continued growth in size of older generations (who typically consume the most in public services and welfare), accompanied by a shrinking working-age population (the group that typically pays most of the taxes that fund public services and welfare), will not be an easy dynamic to manage. At the same time, Japan already has one of the largest national debts of any country at in excess of 250% of its GDP.

One action Japan could take is to increase the pace of net inward migration even more than it already has, given it is currently at a much lower level than in many other developed countries such as the UK. This would have the benefit of bringing in more tax-paying individuals of working age and potentially assist in driving up the birth rate, slowing the rate of fall in the size of the population. However, there would be significant political challenges to overcome for such a route to be successful.

The good news for Japan is that it can still borrow at very low interest rates, with the effective interest rate payable on 10-year government bonds currently at 0.4%, much lower than in many comparable countries with much lower levels of external debt. This is both a threat, in that interest rates could go up significantly in the future, but also an opportunity in that the Japanese government is able to invest in adapting itself for a very different future.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Africa

I take a look at Africa this week and how its current population of 1.5bn, 18% of the world’s total, is distributed across the continent.

Map of Africa's 1.5bn people with countries coloured into five regions, overlayed by semi-transparent scaled bubbles with the population of each region. Teal: Western Africa 435m. Orange: Northern Africa 221m. Green: Central Africa 178m. Purple: Southern Africa 198m. Blue: Eastern Africa 428m.

My chart this week illustrates how Africa’s population of 1,460m can be divided into five regions. These comprise Western Africa with 435m people, Northern Africa with 221m, Central Africa with 178m, Southern Africa with 198m, and Eastern Africa with 428m. 

These regions are based on the African Union’s official regions for its 55 member states, which differ from the regions used by the United Nations. They include Réunion (1.0m) and Mayotte (0.3m), two French overseas territories in the Indian Ocean that are not members of the African Union, as well as St Helena (5,000), an overseas territory of the UK in the Atlantic. It also includes an estimated 5.8m people living in African Union applicant Somaliland that are included within the number for Somalia.

Excluded are 175,000 or so people living on the African continent in Ceuta and Melilla (Spain), around 2.2m and 250,000 respectively in the Atlantic Ocean on the Canary Islands (Spain) and Madeira (Portugal), and several hundred people in the Indian Ocean within France’s Southern Territories.

The table below breaks down the total by country within each region, highlighting how the four largest countries by population each have more than 100m people, led by Nigeria with 223.8m (15.3% of Africa’s total), Ethiopia with 126.5m (8.7%), Egypt with 112.7m (7.7%) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo with 102.3m (7.0%). 

The next largest are Tanzania with 67.4m (4.6%), South Africa with 60.4m (4.1%), Kenya with 55.1m (3.8%), Uganda with 48.6m (3.3%), Sudan with 48.1m (3.3%), Algeria with 45.6m (3.1%), Morocco with 37.8m (2.6%), Angola with 36.7m (2.5%), Ghana with 34.1m (2.3%), Mozambique with 33.9m (2.3%), Madagascar with 30.3m (2.1%) and Côte d’Ivoire with 28.9m (2.0%).

Table showing populations by each region: Western Africa 435m: Nigeria 223.8m, Ghana 34.1m, Côte d'Ivoire 28.9m, Niger 27.2m, Mali 23.3m, Burkina Faso 23.3m, Senegal 17.7m, Guinea 14.2m, Benin 13.7m, Togo 9.1m, Sierra Leone 8.9m, Liberia 5.4m, Gambia 2.8m, Guinea-Bissau 2.2m, Cabo Verde 0.6m, St Helena (UK) 0.0m. Northern Africa 221m: Egypt 112.7m, Algeria 45.6m, Morocco 37.8m, Tunisia 12.5m, Libya 6.9m, Mauritania 4.9m, Western Sahara 0.6m. Central Africa 178m: DR Congo 102.3m, Cameroon 28.6m, Chad 13.2m, Congo 6.1m, Central African Republic 5.7m, Gabon 2.4m, Equatorial Guinea 1.7m, São Tomé and Principe 0.2m. Southern Africa 198m: South Africa 60.4m, Angola 36.7m, Mozambique 33.9m, Malawi 20.9m, Zambia 20.6m, Zimbabwe 16.7m, Botswana 2.7m, Namibia 2.6m, Lesotho 2.3m, Eswatini 1.2m. Eastern Africa 428m: Ethiopia 126.5m, Tanzania 67.4m, Kenya 55.1m, Uganda 48.6m, Sudan 48.1m, Madagascar 30.3m, Somalia 18.1m, Rwanda 14.1m, South Sudan 11.1m, Eritrea 3.7m, Mauritius 1.3m, Djibouti 1.1m, Réunion (FR) 1.0m, Comoros 0.9m, Mayotte (FR) 0.3m, Seychelles 0.1m.

The population of Africa is expected to grow significantly over the rest of the century, with the UN’s medium variant projecting a population of 1.7bn (20% of the projected global total) in 2030, 2.1bn in 2040 (23%), 2.5bn (26%) in 2050, 2.9bn (28%) in 2060, 3.2bn (31%) in 2070, 3.5bn (34%) in 2080, 3.7bn (36%) in 2090 and 3.9bn (38%) in 2100. This is despite a rapidly declining birth rate, with many more Africans living much longer lives than preceding generations.

Africa is currently relatively poor compared with advanced economies, with the total GDP for its 55 countries and 1.5bn people close in size to the UK’s single country GDP for 67.5m people of around £2.5trn a year at current exchange rates. This is around 3% of the global economy in each case. 

The UK’s share of the global economy is likely to decline over the rest of the century as Africa and other developing economies grow at a much faster pace. For Africa the combination of a rapidly growing population and economic development should see it become substantially more significant to the global economy than it is today.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: China population

Our chart this week follows the news that China’s population has peaked at just over 1.4bn, illustrating the dramatic change that has taken place over the last 40 years.

Step chart showing the change between China's population in 1981 and 2021. 997m in 1981, comprising 765m age 0-39, 228m age 40-79 and 4m age 80+. +776m births - 332m deaths - 15m net migration = 1,426m in 2021 comprising 735m age 0-39, 658m age 40-79 and 33m age 80+.

The news that China’s population has peaked and is starting to fall prompted us to take a look at how the country with the largest population in the world has changed over the last 40 years.

In 1981, two years after the introduction of the one-child policy, China was a young country, with a population of 997m and a median age of 21. Today it is a mature country, with a population of 1,426m and a median age of 38, approaching that of many western countries.

Our chart shows how that population has changed according to the United Nations Population Division. In July 1981, China was estimated to amount to 997m, comprising 765m under the age 40, 228m between the ages of 40 and 79, and 4m aged 80 or over. Since then, there have been 776m births, 332m deaths and net outward migration of 15m to reach a total of 1,426m in July 2021. This comprised 735m people aged between 0 and 39, 658m between 40 and 79 and 33m aged 80 or over.

The dramatic change in the age profile reflects the huge success that China has had in tackling poverty and disease, enabling many more children to survive into adulthood compared with previous generations, and to then live longer lives. Infant mortality fell from 45 per thousand births in 1981 to less than six per thousand in 2021 and life expectancy at birth increased from 65 to 78.

The rapid growth in the population over the last 40 years has slowed in recent years as the number of births has fallen and (as the population has aged) deaths have increased. There were 10.9m births in 2021 (down from 12.2m in 2020, much less than the 22.8m births in 1981) and 10.6m deaths (up from 10.3m in 2020 and much higher than the 7.4m deaths recorded in 1981). With net outward migration of 0.2m, the net increase in the population in 2021 was less than 0.1m, down from the net increase of 1.9m in 2021 and much lower than the 17.1m increase experienced in 1982 and the peak increase of 19.9m in 1990.

According to the UN’s numbers, China’s population was expected to peak this year (in 2023), with a central projection that would see the population falling by 233m the next 40 years to 1,193m in 2061, and then to 767m in 2100.

However, China’s population is now believed to have peaked already, with the National Bureau of Statistics of China announcing on 17 January 2023 that China’s population excluding foreign citizens and excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan fell by 0.85m from 1,412.6m in December 2021 to 1,411.75m at the end of 2022.

India, with an estimated population of 1,407m in July 2021 according to the UN, was expected to overtake China as the world’s largest population during 2023, but there is some speculation following China’s announcement that this has already occurred. India’s population is currently projected to continue to grow over the next 40 years and peak at 1,697m in 2064.

With the population peaking and many more people living longer lives, the fiscal challenge facing China becomes similar to those facing western nations: how to support a rapidly increasing number of pensioners at the same time as the working age population is declining.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: England and Wales Census 2021

The ICAEW chart of the week looks at the results of last year’s census, illustrating how the population of southern and central England has grown much faster than in the north of England and in Wales over the past decade.

Bubble chart overlayed on a map of England & Wales scaled to population in each region with inner bubbles showing the increase in the last decade. North East 2.6m (+1.9%) North West 7.4m (+5.2%) Yorkshire 5.5m (+3.7%) West Midlands 6.0m (+6.2%) East Midlands 4.9m (+7.7%) East of England 6.3m (+8.3%) South West 5.7m (+7.8%) South East 9.3m (+7.5%) London 8.8m (+7.7%) Wales 3.1m (+1.4%)

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) released the first results from Census 2021 in England and Wales on Tuesday 28 June, providing an initial snapshot of who we are and where we live across two of the four nations of the UK. It follows on from the initial release earlier this year of the Northern Ireland Census 2021, but we won’t see a full picture for the UK for some time as the 2022 census in Scotland was delayed until this year.

The chart highlights how the East of England was the fastest growing region in England, with its population growing by 8.3% to 6.3m between 2011 and 2021. This was followed by the South West (up 7.8% to 5.7m), London (up 7.7% to 8.8m), East Midlands (up 7.7% to 4.9m) and the South East (up 7.5% to 9.3m). The West Midlands grew less quickly (up 6.2% to 6.0m), but still by more than the North West (up 5.2% to 7.4m), Yorkshire (up 3.7% to 5.5m) and the North East (up 1.9% to 2.6m). The population of Wales only increased by 1.4% over 10 years to remain at 3.1m.

In total the population of England and Wales amounted to 59.6m in 2021. This was 6.3% higher than the 56.1m people living in the UK in 2011 and 14.6% higher than the 52.0m reported by the 2001 census. This reflects a slowing rate of growth in the last decade at 0.6% a year on average compared with the average rate of 0.8% seen between 2001 and 2011 and is substantially lower than the compound growth of 1.6% a year experienced over 120 years since the first official census in 1801 reported a population of 8.9m in England & Wales.

The ONS has published a breakdown of the population by age and sex by local authority, highlighting how the number of people has changed significantly in some parts of the country, such as Tower Hamlets (up 22% in 10 years), Dartford (up 20%), Barking and Dagenham (up 18%), Bedford (up 18%), Peterborough (up 17.5%), Central Bedfordshire and Tewkesbury (each up 16%) and Salford, Milton Keynes, Uttlesford, Vale of White Horse and Wokingham (each up by around 15%). The biggest falls were in Kensington and Chelsea (down 10%) and Westminster (down 7%), although there is some speculation that this was because of the pandemic as family and second homes elsewhere proved to be more attractive places to work from home during lockdown. This is unlikely to be the driver of decreases in some rural areas such as the 6% fall in Ceredigion in Wales or the 5% fall in Copeland in Cumbria, where long-term trends of population decline have continued.

The census has also confirmed how we are getting older on average, with a 20% increase in those aged 65 and over from 9.2m in 2011 to 11.1m in 2021. This continues to be a big driver for public finances, as more funding is needed to pay for pensions, health and social care at the expense of other public services.

There is still a lot of data crunching to do as the statisticians work through the more in-depth questions on the census, ranging from employment status, education and housing to ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and gender identity among other characteristics – demographics in action and the likely source of future charts of the week.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.