ICAEW chart of the week: End of the first quarter (century)

Our chart this week marks the end of the first fiscal quarter of the 21st century on 31 March 2025 by comparing it with the previous four quarters in the 20th century.

A five column chart showing changes in the public sector net debt to GDP ratio from 1 April 1900 to 31 March 2025 by quarter century. 

1900s Q1: Borrowing of +£7bn or +184% of GDP less debt inflated away of -42% of GDP = +142% of GDP. 

1900s Q2:   +£18bn or +210% of GDP - 182% of GDP = +28% of GDP. 

1900s Q3:   +£26bn or +48% of GDP - 203% of GDP = -155% of GDP. 

1900s Q4:   +£301bn or +72% of GDP - 88% of GDP = -16% of GDP. 

2000s Q1:   +£2,461bn or +130% of GDP - 66% of GDP = +64% of GDP. 

9 May 2025. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. Sources: Bank of England, 'Historical public finances database'; OBR, 'Public finances databank'.

March 2025 marked the end of the first fiscal quarter of the 21st century, comprising the 25 financial years from 2000/01 to 2024/25. Our chart this week takes a look at how it compares with the previous four quarters in the 20th century.

Our chart starts with the first quarter of the 20th century that started on 1 April 1900 and ended on 31 March 1925 – the comparative period a century ago. Public sector net debt increased by £7bn (from just under £1bn to just under £8bn) and by 142 percentage points of GDP (from 33% of GDP to 175% of GDP) over the 25 years. 

As the chart illustrates, the increase in the net debt to GDP ratio reflected an increase in the numerator from borrowing of 184% of GDP, partially offset by 42% of GDP from the ‘inflating away’ effect of economic growth and inflation on the denominator. 

Almost all of the borrowing in the first quarter a century ago was incurred to finance the First World War, while the severe contraction in the UK economy after the war (partly because of the global ‘Spanish flu’ influenza pandemic) meant that the erosion of net debt as a share of GDP from economic growth and inflation was just 42% instead of the 84% it had been in the first 20 years of the century.

Around £15bn of the £18bn or 210% of GDP that was borrowed during the second quarter of the 20th century was during the Second World War years from 1940/41 to 1945/46. This was substantially offset by strong economic growth during the quarter (especially in the five years up to 1949/50 as the nation emerged from the war) that saw debt ‘inflated away’ by 182% of GDP. The consequence was an increase of just 28 percentage points in net debt as a share of GDP to 203% of GDP on 31 March 1950.

The third quarter of the 20th century saw the government borrow a further £26bn, resulting in net debt doubling to £52bn on 31 March 1975. However, net debt fell as a share of GDP by 155 percentage points to 48% of GDP, with borrowing of 48% of GDP being more than offset by a 203-percentage point reduction from economic growth and inflation increasing the denominator in the net debt/GDP ratio.

The last quarter of the 20th century saw a further reduction in the ratio of net debt to GDP of 16 percentage points, from higher borrowing of £301bn or 72% of GDP being offset by an 88% of GDP inflating away effect of economic growth and inflation. Net debt reached £353bn on 31 March 2000, equivalent to 32% of GDP.

The first quarter of the 21st century, based on provisional numbers for the year ended 31 March 2025, saw net debt/GDP increase by 64 percentage points, with £2,461bn or 130% of GDP borrowed over the past 25 years, taking net debt to £2,814bn and net debt/GDP to 96% of GDP after reflecting a 66% of GDP inflating away effect from economic growth and inflation.

One positive from these comparisons is that at least the latest quarter was not as bad as the comparative quarter a century ago. However, for a period of peacetime we still managed to borrow approaching ‘warlike’ sums to fund the costs of a financial crisis, a pandemic (although the comparative period had one of those too) and an energy crisis that all combined to increase public sector net debt massively. Meanwhile, lower levels of economic growth than in the second half of the 20th century mean that we have not inflated debt away as quickly as we might hope.

As we start the second quarter of the 21st century, the hope is that we can avoid wars, boost economic growth, control spending to keep borrowing under control and – at the same time – increase the speed at which debt is inflated away. Doing so will be essential if we are to move the public finances back onto a sustainable path.

ICAEW chart of the week: One trillion pounds (almost)

Our chart this week takes a look at how UK public sector net debt has increased from £1,816bn to £2,814bn over the past five years – an increase just £2bn short of £1tn.

According to the provisional public sector finance numbers for March 2025 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 23 April, public sector net debt was £2,814bn on 31 March 2025. This comprised gross debt of £3,198bn, less cash and other liquid financial assets of £384bn.

Our chart this week illustrates how the net amount the nation owes to its creditors has changed over the last five years, starting with net debt of £1,816bn on 31 March 2020. Debt repayments of £541bn were financed by replacement borrowing of £541bn, followed by borrowing of £847bn to fund deficits over the five years (£315bn in 2020/21, £122bn in 2021/22, £127bn in 2022/23, £131bn in 2023/24 and a provisional £152bn in 2024/25) and borrowing for other reasons of £151bn (principally to fund government lending and working capital requirements). The result is an increase of £998bn to reach net debt of £2,814bn on 31 March 2025.

At just short of a trillion pounds, this is the largest amount ever borrowed by the UK government in a five-year period, with only the £0.8tn (£799bn) borrowed over the five years to March 2013 following the financial crisis coming close – when net debt went from £567bn on 31 March 2008 to £1,366bn on 31 March 2013. 

The pandemic and the subsequent energy and cost-of-living crises are, of course, the main drivers behind the need to borrow so much in such a short time, but the worry is that annual borrowing levels are not coming down as quickly as might have been hoped (or budgeted).

Either way, the consequences of building up so much debt will be with us for a long time to come, with debt interest squeezing the amounts available to pay for public services and the tax burden approaching an all-time high, just as demographic change is reducing the proportion of working-age adults, compared with those in retirement.

Of course, as the latest numbers are provisional and the historical ones are often subject to revision, it would only take a couple of relatively small adjustments to the starting or closing debt balances to turn this from just under a trillion pounds to just over a trillion. 

Perhaps a reminder that while a couple of billion pounds is a huge sum of money to you or me (or even to many billionaires), in terms of the UK public finances it is not much more than a rounding error.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Make America Indebted Again!

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at official projections, published three days before President Trump was inaugurated for the second time, that predict federal debt is on track to return to and exceed levels last seen in the 1940s.

Shaded-area chart showing debt held by the public/GDP between 1905 and 2035, with highlighted peaks of 106% of GDP in 1946, 48% in 1993, a projected 100% in Sep 2025, and a projected 118% in Sep 2035.  

24 Jan 2025. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. Source: US Congressional Budget Office.

The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published its latest 10-year projections for the US federal government finances on 17 January 2025, covering the decade from 2025 to 2035. These projections are based on legislation enacted up to 6 January 2025, prior to the start of President Trump’s second term as President on 20 January 2025.

As the chart of the week illustrates, debt held by the public in relation to the size of the economy was 4% of GDP in 1905, falling to 3% in 1916 before rising to 33% of GDP as a result of the US entering the First World War. Debt/GDP fell over the subsequent decade to 15% of GDP in 1929 before rising again during the Great Depression to 42% of GDP in 1936. A drop to 40% in 1937 was then followed by a rise to 106% of GDP in 1946 following the end of the Second World War.

A rapidly growing economy over the next quarter of a century or so saw debt inflated away despite a major expansion in the size of the federal government over that period, with debt/GDP falling to 23% in 1974. More difficult economic times in the 1970s and 1980s and continued governmental expansion saw debt/GDP rise to 48% in 1993, before a growing economy again eroded debt as a share of GDP to down to 35% in 2007.

Debt rose rapidly during the financial crisis and subsequently, to reach 79% of GDP by 2019, before the pandemic drove it up further to 99% in September 2020. The post-pandemic economic recovery saw debt falling back to 95% of GDP in September 2022, but since then continued deficit spending since then has seen debt held by the public/GDP rise to 98% last year on its way to a projected 100% of GDP in September 2025.

The CBO predicts that debt held by the public will increase from $28.2tn at the end of September 2024 to $30.1bn in September 2025 and then to $52.1tn in September 2035, equivalent 118% of GDP. This assumes economic growth of 1.8% a year over the ten years to 2035 and is based on extrapolating from approved budgets and legislation in place as of 6 January 2025.

The big question is how that projected path will change as a result of the incoming Trump administration. His plan to cut taxes (pushing up the level of borrowing further) and to cut federal spending (offsetting some of that increase) will have a direct fiscal impact, but the indirect effects his policies have on the US economy will also be very important. Faster growth would have the effect of slowing the rise in the debt/GDP ratio or even bringing it down, while slower growth could shorten the time it takes to make America as indebted as it was back in 1946.

For further information, read the CBO’s ‘Budget and Economic Outlook: 2025 to 2035’.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Commonwealth of Australia balance sheet

My chart for ICAEW this week heads down under for some warmer weather and to take a look at the Australian federal government balance sheet in its recently published consolidated financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2024.

Column chart illustrating the Commonwealth of Australia balance sheet. Assets of A$989bn in the left hand column and liabilities of (A$1,557bn) in the right hand column. 

19 Dec 2024. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. Source: Commonwealth of Australia, 'Consolidated financial statements 2023/24'.

The Commonwealth of Australia consolidated financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2024 were published on 12 December, bringing together the results and financial position of 199 audited financial statements for entities within the federal government system, public financial corporations (such as the Reserve Bank of Australia and Export Finance Australia), and public non-financial corporations (including Australia Post and Snowy Hydro for example). However, this does not include state and territory governments or local authorities in each state and territory. 

As my chart this week illustrates, the balance sheet reports negative net worth of $568bn (21% of GDP or £284bn at the current exchange rate of approximately A$1 = £0.50), comprising assets of A$989bn (37% of GDP or £495bn) less liabilities of A$1,557bn (58% of GDP or £779bn). 

Assets consisted of investments and cash of A$527bn (£264bn), receivables and other financial assets of A$162bn (£81bn) and non-financial assets of A$300bn (£150bn), while liabilities comprised debt of A$1,044bn (£522bn), payables and provisions of A$205bn (£103bn), and superannuation liabilities of A$308bn (£154bn).

Investments and cash of A$527bn consisted of investments, loans and placements of A$417bn, equity investments of A$102bn, and cash of A$8bn. Investments include $225bn invested in the Australia Future Fund, a sovereign wealth fund established in 2006 to strengthen the Australian government’s long-term financial position, together with $A$44bn in a series of other sovereign wealth funds established over the last decade.

Receivables and other financial assets of A$162bn comprised tax receivables and accrued taxation of A$59bn, other receivables and accrued revenue of A$26bn, student loans of A$54bn, and other advances of A$23bn. 

Non-financial assets of A$300bn comprised A$89bn of military equipment, A$88bn of other plant, equipment and infrastructure, A$74bn in land and buildings, A$17bn in intangibles, $A13bn in heritage and cultural assets, and A$19bn of inventories and other non-financial assets.

Debt of A$1,044bn consisted of interest-bearing liabilities of A$943bn (A$611bn in government securities, A$227bn in central bank deposit liabilities, A$32bn for leases, and A$73bn in loans and other interest-bearing liabilities) and A$101bn in Australian currency in circulation.

Payables and provisions of A$205bn included A$90bn in provisions, A$63bn in non-pension employee liabilities, A$26bn in supplier payables and A$26bn in other payables.

The net pension obligation of A$308bn includes A$276bn for partially funded defined benefit schemes (obligations of $323bn less scheme assets of $A47bn) and A$32bn for one unfunded scheme. These schemes are now all closed to new members and so the liability is gradually reducing over time.

Not shown in the chart is the operating statement, which reported revenue of A$728bn (27.2% of GDP or £364bn), expenses of A$718bn (26.9% of GDP or £359bn) and net capital investment of A$12bn (0.5% of GDP or £6bn) to result in an operating surplus of A$10bn (0.4% of GDP or £5bn) and a fiscal deficit (on an accounting basis) of A$2bn (0.1% of GDP or £1bn).

Although the reported net worth in the financial statements is negative, Australia’s public finances are in a much stronger position than for many other countries. Australia’s general government net debt (including 13% for state and territory governments) was 32% of GDP on 30 June 2024, in contrast with the equivalent of 91% of GDP for the UK on the same date. This also doesn’t take account of the UK’s much larger public sector pension liabilities that are not included within net debt.

As a result there are more reasons than just the warmer weather to be thinking about enjoying a Christmas barbie on the beach on the other side of the world at this time of the year.

This is the last chart of the week for 2024 and so we would like to wish our readers all the best for the holiday season and for a healthy and prosperous 2025. We return in January.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK public sector pension liabilities

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how public sector net pension obligations reduced by £1.2tn from £2.6tn to £1.4tn during the financial year ended 31 March 2023 as a consequence of a sharply rising discount rate.

Step chart on UK public pension liabilities in the Whole of Government Accounts 2022/23. Opening position at 1 April 2022 £2,639bn (£2,539bn unfunded and £100bn funded) + £117bn service costs + £48bn net interest costs - £1,269bn net actuarial gains = £50bn unfunded benefits paid - £70bn other movements = £1,415bn pension liability on 31 Mar 2023 (£1,419bn unfunded scheme liabilities - £4bn funded scheme net pension asset). 

13 Dec 2024. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday.

My chart of the week for ICAEW is on UK public sector pension liabilities, analysing how the net pension obligations reported in the Whole of Government Accounts 2022/23 reduced from £2,639bn on 1 April 2022 to £1,415bn on 31 March 2023. 

The Whole of Government Accounts are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), with net pension obligations calculated in line with International Accounting Standard 19 (IAS19): Employee benefits.

The chart starts with opening net pension liabilities on 1 April 2022 of £2,639bn, comprising £2,539bn for unfunded schemes (including the NHS, teachers, civil services, armed forces, police and fire service schemes, among others) and a net liability of £100bn for funded schemes (principally local government schemes, but also some central government entities such as the BBC and the Bank of England, for example). The closing position on 31 March 2023 was £1,415bn, being pension liabilities of £1,419bn for unfunded schemes and a net pension asset of £4bn for funded schemes.

Service costs added £117bn to pension liabilities during 2022/23 and net interest added a further £48bn. These increases were more than offset by £1,269bn in net actuarial gains, £50bn in payments to pensioners in the unfunded pension schemes, and £70bn in other movements.

Service costs principally arise from the additional pension entitlements earned by public sector workers during the year, while net interest comprises the unwinding of the discount on pension liabilities (£40bn for unfunded schemes and £11bn for funded schemes) less investment income on assets in funded schemes (£3bn).

The net actuarial gains of £1,269bn comprises £1,357bn from changes in the assumptions underlying the value of liabilities (£1,218bn on unfunded schemes and £139bn in funded schemes) less £60bn (£59bn on unfunded schemes and £1bn on funded schemes) in experience gains and losses, less a loss of £28bn on investments. The principal assumption changes related to a change in the discount rates used to calculate pension obligations, which for the unfunded schemes increased from a real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) rate of 1.3% on 31 March 2022 to 1.7% on 31 March 2023.

The unfunded scheme liability is reduced for pensions paid on behalf of the schemes by the government. This contrasts with the funded schemes where assets are used to fund settlement of pension liabilities, resulting in no change in the net position. Other movements include £35bn in opening balance restatements relating to the NHS and former Royal Mail pension schemes and £39bn from the failure of 198 local authorities and the Northern Ireland Teachers Superannuation Scheme to report numbers to HM Treasury, less a net £4bn in other movements. 

The omission of so many local authorities, and the lack of audit assurance for many others, has led to the first ever audit opinion disclaimer by the Comptroller and Auditor General on the consolidated financial statements for the UK public sector.

Not shown in the chart is the breakdown of the £1,419bn closing balance for unfunded schemes into its constituent schemes: £535bn for NHS workers, £335bn for teachers, £222bn for civil servants, £156bn for the armed forces, £104bn for police, £30bn for pre-privatisation Royal Mail workers, £23bn for fire services, and £14bn for public sector staff in other unfunded schemes. Also not shown is the £304bn of liabilities in local government and other funded pension schemes or the related £308bn in investments in those schemes that result in a net pension fund asset of £4bn on 31 March 2023.

The recognition of a £1.3tn actuarial gain in the statement of comprehensive income and expenditure appears positive for the reported financial position of the nation by contributing to a reduction in overall net liabilities from £3.9tn to £2.4tn. However, it is important to realise that the future obligations to pay pensions to public sector employees haven’t changed – it is how those obligations are converted into current values.

Irrespective of the discount rate used, we as a nation will need to pay out very large amounts of money in public sector pensions.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK long-term fiscal projections

The OBR’s latest fiscal risks and sustainability report projects that public debt could reach 274% of GDP in 50 years’ time, or 324% if likely economic shocks are included.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK long-term fiscal projections. 
 
Line chart showing ‘baseline’ and ‘baseline with shocks’ projected debt to GDP ratio over the next 50 years according to the OBR’s latest fiscal projections, with labels at 10 year intervals. 

2023/24: Baseline 98%, Baseline with shocks 98%. 
2033/34: 90%, 100%. 
2043/44: 100%, 120%. 
2053/54: 130%, 160%. 
2063/64: 188%, 228%. 
2073/74: 274%, 324%. 

12 Sep 2024.   Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. 

Source: OBR, ‘Fiscal risks and sustainability, 12 Sep 2024’. 

© ICAEW 2024.

Our chart this week is on the long-term fiscal projections included in the Office for Budget Responsibility’s (OBR) latest fiscal risk and sustainability report published on 12 September 2024.

The OBR suggests that – without action to improve productivity, increase taxes, cut spending, bring in more people or do more to tackle climate change – public sector net debt is projected to rise to 274%, or potentially 324% if likely economic shocks are included.

As the chart illustrates, debt to GDP was 98% at the end of 2023/24 and the baseline projection shows this falling over the coming decade to 90% by 2033/34, and then gradually increasing to 100% of GDP in 2043/44, 130% in 2053/54, 188% in 2063/64, and then 274% in 2073/74.

Experience tells us to expect an economic shock such as a recession every decade or so, and so the OBR also reports a ‘baseline with shocks’ scenario that sees the debt to GDP ratio reaching 100% of GDP in 2033/34, 120% in 2043/44, 160% in 2053/54, 228% in 2063/64, and then 324% in 2073/74.

The projections reflect long-term pressures on the public finances from the post-economic crisis slowdown in economic growth, an ageing population, the effects of climate change, and higher defence spending. 

They are, of course, dependent on the assumptions used in their calculation, especially reproductivity growth, net inward migration, the health of the population, and the degree of rise in global temperatures. They also assume that the previous government’s plans to cut public spending significantly over the next five years are adopted by the incoming government, which is considered to be unlikely given that most economic commentators thought these plans were unrealistic even if there had not been a change in government.

Alternative scenarios prepared by the OBR include a better health scenario that results in a 44% lower debt to GDP ratio in 2073/74, a worse health scenario that increases debt by 49% of GDP, a higher rise in global temperatures to 2℃ that increases debt by 23% and to 3℃ that increases debt by 33%.

The good news is that all of these projections are completely unrealistic. 

They are based on extrapolating from current tax and spending policies, without taking account of any actions that governments might take in the future to raise taxes, cut spending or develop the economy. It is extremely unlikely that future governments would be willing, or even able, to finance such large fiscal deficits over the next 50 years.

The bad news is that in consequence taxes are likely to go up.

While there are options to mitigate pressures on the public finances by cutting spending on public services or cutting the level of benefits such as the state pension, these are likely to be politically and practically difficult to achieve. Similarly, immigration remains a politically charged issue and encouraging higher levels of net inward migration significantly more than the 315,000 a year assumed from 2028/29 onwards might be challenging. 

The OBR suggests a ‘fiscal tightening’ of 1.5% each decade would be necessary to return debt to its pre-pandemic level of approximately 80% of GDP. If accomplished through tax rises alone, this would see tax levels increase from a projected 37% of GDP in 2027/28 to around 43% of GDP in 2073/24.

Avoiding either of these outcomes – unsustainable debt or ever-increasing levels of taxation – will require productivity growth to increase significantly. So, if you have any good ideas on how to achieve higher productivity that no one else has thought of (preferably without increasing public spending too much), please write to the Chancellor at 11 Downing Street as she would probably be interested to hear them.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Eurozone government bond yields

My chart for ICAEW this week is on the cost of government borrowing in the Eurozone, which on 4 September ranged from 2.17% for Danish 10-year bonds up to 3.59% for their Italian equivalents.

ICAEW chart of the week: Eurozone government bond yields. 
 
Bar chart showing the yields on 10-year government bonds on 4 September 2024, the spread versus German bunds, and each countries’ debt to GDP at the end of the first quarter of 2024. 

Denmark: 2.17% yield, -0.05% spread, 34% debt/GDP. 
Germany: 2.22%, -, 63%. 
Netherlands: 2.51%, +0.29%, 44%. 
Finland: 2.59%, +0.37%, 78%. 
Ireland: 2.67%, +0.45%, 43%. 
Austria: 2.71%, +0.49%, 80%. 
Belgium: 2.90%, +0.58%, 108%. 
Portugal: 2.82%, +0.60%, 100%. 
France: 2.93%, +0.71%, 111%. 
Slovenia: 2.94%, +0.72%, 71%. 
Cyprus: 3.00%, +0.78%, 76%. 
Spain: 3.02%, +0.80%, 109%. 
Greece: 3.28%, +1.06%, 160%. 
Slovakia: 3.30%, +1.08%, 61%. 
Malta: 3.34%, +1.12%, 50%. 
Lithuania: 3.36%, +1.14%, 40%. 
Croatia: 3.41%, +1.19%, 63%. 
Italy: 3.59%, +1.37%, 138%. 

5 Sep 2024.   Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. 

Source: Koyfin, ’10-year government bond yields’, 4 Sep 2024; Eurostat, ‘Government debt to GDP, Q1 2024’.  

© ICAEW 2024.

My chart this week is on the range of yields payable on 10-year government bonds by 18 out of the 20 countries in the Eurozone for which data is available.

The chart illustrates how investors in German 10-year government bonds (known as ‘bunds’) would have received a yield to maturity of 2.22% – or conversely the German government could have borrowed at an effective interest rate of 2.22% if issuing fresh debt at that point in time. Yields on German bunds are used as benchmark rates for government debt not just in the Eurozone, but globally.

Just one country in the Eurozone has a lower 10-year bond yield than Germany, which is Denmark at 2.17% on 4 September, which is a 0.05 percentage points or 5 basis points (bp) ‘spread’ below the benchmark bund rate. 

While quoted yields move up and down all the time, sometimes by quite large amounts, spreads are much less volatile, providing an insight into how debt investors perceive the relative risks of investing in different countries’ sovereign debt.

The next lowest yields were the Netherlands at 2.51%, with a spread of 0.29 percentage points above bunds, and Finland at 2.59% (+0.37%). This is then followed by Ireland on 2.67% (+0.45%), Austria on 2.71% (+0.49%), Belgium on 2.80% (+0.58%), Portugal on 2.82% (+0.60%), France on 2.93% (+0.71%), Slovenia on 2.94% (+0.72%), Cyprus on 3.00% (0.78%) and Spain on 3.02% (+0.80%). There is then a small jump to Greece on 3.28% (+1.06%), Slovakia on 3.30% (+1.08%), Malta on 3.34% (+1.12%), Lithuania on 3.36% (+1.14%) and Croatia on 3.41% (+1.19%). 

The highest yield for investors among Eurozone countries – and hence the highest borrowing cost for its government – is Italy with 3.59%, which is 1.37 percentage points above the effective interest rate at which Germany could in theory borrow.

Comparing the bond yields in the Eurozone provides an insight into the relative strengths and weaknesses of these countries’ public finances and economies given that they all share a currency, a central bank base interest rate (currently 3.75%), and are all in the EU Single Market and Customs Union. Comparing yields with other currencies, such as the UK’s 3.95% for example (not shown in the chart), needs to take other factors into account, such as the UK’s much higher central bank base rate of 5%.

The chart also reports the government debt to GDP levels of each country for the second quarter of 2024 according to Eurostat, which may help explain why Denmark (with debt/GDP of 34%) pays a significantly lower borrowing cost than Spain (109%). 

However, debt/GDP doesn’t explain all of the differences, with the 10-year yield on Greek government debt (debt/GDP 160%) of 3.28% for example being significantly lower than the 10-year yield on Italian government debt (debt/GDP 138%) of 3.59%. 

Not shown in the chart are Estonia (debt/GDP 24%) and Latvia (45%), both of which tend to borrow at shorter maturities.

The lack of a firm correlation between debt/GDP and bond spreads should not be surprising as debt/GDP is a relatively crude measure of public finance strength or weakness. It excludes most government assets and non-debt liabilities, the funded or unfunded nature of their social security systems, as well as a country’s medium- and longer-term economic prospects and the perceived stability of that country’s government. These are all factors debt investors take into account when deciding the level of risk that they are willing to accept when investing.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

Government enters crisis control mode to curb public spending

Boost from self assessment tax receipts not enough to prevent a deficit in July as Chancellor searches for cost savings in the run up to the Autumn Budget.

The monthly public sector finances for July 2024 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Wednesday reported a provisional deficit for the first four months of the 2024/25 financial year of £51.4bn, £4.7bn worse than budgeted.

Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director of Public Sector and Taxation, says: “Today’s data shows that the customary boost from self assessed tax receipts in July was not enough to prevent a deficit of £3.1bn, higher than budgeted, as cost pressures drove up public spending. Debt increased to £2,746bn or 99.4% of GDP at the end of July, up £5.9bn from the end of June 2024.

“The government is now in crisis control mode as it searches for savings to offset significant unbudgeted cost overruns in this financial year, with the cumulative deficit to July 2024 standing at £51.4bn, £4.7bn more than budgeted.

“Rumours that the government is looking at significant cuts in public investment programmes this year to keep within budget are concerning, given the importance to economic growth of infrastructure and the urgent need for upfront investment in technology to fix poorly performing public services. Our hope is that the Chancellor will be able to take a more strategic view in her Autumn Budget in October and in the Spending Review in the spring.”

Month of July 2024

There was a shortfall between receipts and spending of £3.1bn in the month of July 2024, £1.8bn higher than in July 2023 and £3.0bn worse than the budgeted deficit of £0.1bn.

Taxes and other receipts amounted to £99.4bn in July 2024, up £10.3bn or 12% from the previous month driven by self assessment income tax receipts in July, in line with the trend last year. Receipts were £2.0bn or 2% higher than in the same month last year, in contrast with total managed expenditure of £102.5bn, which was £3.8bn or 4% higher than in July 2023. 

Financial year to date

The shortfall between receipts and spending of £51.4bn for the four months to July 2024 was £0.5bn better than in the same period last year, but £4.7bn over budget.

Cumulative taxes and other receipts amounted to £359.3bn in the first third of the financial year, up 2% compared with the same period last year, while total managed expenditure was 2% higher at £410.7bn. This is illustrated by Table 1, which highlights how cuts to employee national insurance rates have been offset by higher income tax, VAT, corporation tax, and non-tax receipts. 

Total managed expenditure for the first four months of £410.7bn was also up by 2% compared with April to July 2023, but this reflected spending on public services up 4%, welfare spending up 6% and gross investment up 10% driven by overruns and construction cost inflation being offset by lower energy-support subsidies and lower debt interest.

The reduction in debt interest of £6.1bn compared with the first four months of last year was driven by a £26.5bn swing in indexation on inflation-linked debt that more than offset a £20.4bn increase in interest on variable and fixed-rate debt.

Table 1: Summary receipts and spending

  Apr-Jul 2024
£bn
 Apr-Jul 2023
£bn
 Change
%
Income tax89.986.4+4%
VAT67.966.0+3%
National insurance53.558.3-8%
Corporation tax34.031.6+8%
Other taxes73.572.1+2%
Other receipts40.537.5+8%
Total receipts359.3351.9+2%
    
Public services(212.2)(204.8)+4%
Welfare(103.1)(97.5)+6%
Subsidies(10.6)(14.0)-24%
Debt interest(46.6)(52.7)-12%
Gross investment(38.2)(34.8)+10%
Total spending(410.7)(403.8)+2%
    
Deficit(51.4)(51.9)-1%

Table 2 summarises how public sector net borrowing (PSNB) to fund the deficit of £51.4bn combined with borrowing of £4.4bn to fund working capital movements, student loans and other financing requirements increased debt by £55.8bn during the first four months of the financial year. As a result, public sector net debt grew to £2,745.9bn on 31 July 2024, which is £931bn or 51% more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic.

The ratio of net debt to GDP ratio is at the highest it has been since the 1960s, having increased by 1.3 percentage points from 98.1% on 1 April 2024 to 99.4% on 31 July 2024. Borrowing to fund the deficit was equivalent to 1.9% of GDP and other borrowing was equivalent to 0.2%, an increase of 2.1% before being offset by 0.8% from the effect of inflation and economic growth on GDP (usually referred to as ‘inflating away’). Lower inflation this year means this effect is less pronounced than in the same period last year.

Table 2: Public sector net debt and net debt/GDP

 Apr-Jul 2024
£bn
Apr-Jul 2023
£bn
PSNB51.452.3
Other borrowing4.4(11.4)
Net change55.840.9
Opening net debt2,694.12,539.7
Closing net debt2,745.92,580.6
PSNB/GDP1.9%2.0%
Other/GDP0.2%(0.4%)
Inflating away(0.8%)(1.5%)
Net change1.3%0.1%
Opening net debt98.1%95.7%
Closing net debt99.4%95.6%

Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS last year, was -£740bn on 31 May 2024, comprising £1,613bn in non-financial assets and £1,062bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,746bn of net debt (£343bn liquid financial assets – £3,089bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £669bn. This is a £67bn deterioration from the start of the financial year and is £123bn more negative than in July 2023.

Revisions and other matters

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled. This includes local government, where monthly data is based on budget or high level estimates in the absence of monthly data collection.

The latest release saw the ONS reduce the reported deficit for the first three months of the financial year by £1.5bn from £49.8bn to £48.3bn as estimates were revised for new data.

Q1 public finances confirm challenging position for new government

First quarter shortfall between receipts and spending of almost £50bn emphasises the significant challenges facing the Chancellor as she puts together her first Budget.

The monthly public sector finances for June 2024 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Friday 19 July 2024 reported a provisional deficit for the first three months of the 2024/25 financial year of £49.8bn, £1.1bn better than a year previously but £3.2bn worse than budgeted.

Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director of Public Sector and Taxation, says: “This is the first set of public sector finance data since the new government was elected, and today’s numbers set out the size of the obstacle the UK’s leaders face. 

“£14.5bn was borrowed to finance the deficit in June, which although £3.2bn less than in June 2023, brought the total for the first three months of the financial year to £49.8bn, slightly worse than expectations. The latest numbers also highlighted the growing amount of public debt, which stood at 99.5% of GDP or £2,740bn on 30 June 2024. Although total debt interest was lower than last year because of the effect of lower inflation on inflation-linked debt, interest on the bulk of debt continues to rise.

“The high level of debt – and the associated interest bill – means that the new Prime Minister and Chancellor will be faced with some very difficult decisions over the coming months as they decide which elements of their programme to prioritise, and which will have to wait.”

Month of June 2024

Taxes and other receipts amounted to £88.2bn in June 2024, up 2% compared with the same month last year, while total managed expenditure was 2% lower at £102.7bn. This resulted in a reduction of £3.2bn from a fiscal deficit of £17.7bn in June 2023 to £14.5bn in June 2024.

Financial year to date

Taxes and other receipts amounted to £258.0bn in the three months to June 2024, up 1% compared with the same month last year, while total managed expenditure was 1% higher at £307.8bn. This resulted in a reduction of £1.1bn from a fiscal deficit of £50.9bn for the first quarter of 2023/24 to £49.8bn for the first quarter of 2024/25. However, this is £3.2bn more than the £46.6bn for the first quarter included in the Spring Budget 2024.

Table 1 analyses receipts for the first quarter of the financial year, highlighting how cuts to employee national insurance rates have been offset by higher income tax, corporation tax, and non-tax receipts.

Table 1: Summary receipts and spending

Three months to Jun 2024 (£bn) Jun 2023 (£bn)Change (%) 
Income tax 58.1 56.1 +4%
VAT 49.9 49.6 +1%
National insurance 39.7 43.4 -9%
Corporation tax 25.3 23.4 +8%
Other taxes 54.9 54.1 +1%
Other receipts 30.1 27.7 +9%
Total receipts 258.0 254.3 +1%
Public services (158.8) (152.6) +4%
Welfare (76.9) (73.7) +4%
Subsidies (7.8) (11.3) -31%
Debt interest (35.2) (41.1) -14%
Gross investment (29.1) (26.5) +10%
Total spending (307.8) (305.2) +1%
Deficit (49.8) (50.9) -2%

Table 1 also shows how total managed expenditure for the first quarter of £307.8bn was up by 1% compared with April to June 2023, with higher spending on public services and welfare offset by lower energy-support subsidies and lower debt interest. The reduction in the latter of £5.9bn was driven by a £9.2bn reduction in indexation on inflation-linked debt that more than offset a £3.3bn or 44% increase in interest on variable and fixed-rate debt.

Table 2: Public sector net debt

Three months toJun 2024 (£bn)Jun 2023 (£bn)
Deficit (49.8) (50.9)
Other borrowing 3.9 (7.7)
Debt movement (45.9) (58.6)
Opening net debt (2,694.1) (2,539.7)
Closing net debt (2,740.0) (2,598.3)
Net debt/GDP 99.5% 96.7%

Public sector net debt was £2,740bn or 99.5% of GDP on 30 June 2024, just under £46bn higher than at the start of the financial year. At 99.5%, the debt to GDP ratio is the highest it has been since the 1960s.

The increase in the first quarter reflects borrowing to fund the deficit of just under £50bn minus close to £4bn in net cash inflows from loan recoveries and working capital movements in excess of lending by government.

Public sector net debt is £142bn or 5% higher than a year previously, equivalent to an increase of 2.8 percentage points in relation to the size of the economy. It is £925bn or 51% more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic and £1,712bn or 167% more than the £1,028bn net debt amount as of 31 March 2007 before the financial crisis, reflecting the huge sums borrowed over the last two decades. 

Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS in 2023, was -£726bn on 31 May 2024, comprising £1,613bn in non-financial assets and £1,070bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,740bn of net debt (£340bn liquid financial assets – £3,080bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £669bn. This is a £53bn deterioration from the start of the financial year and is £77bn more negative than the -£649bn net worth number for June 2023.

Revisions and other matters

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled. 

The latest release saw the ONS increase the reported deficit for the first two months of the financial year by £1.8bn from £33.5bn to £35.3bn as estimates were revised for new data. More significantly, public sector net debt at the end of May 2024 was reduced by £16.3bn to £2,726.6bn to correct for omitted data on Bank of England repo transactions during the current financial year. This reduced the reported debt to GDP ratio for May 2024 by 0.7 percentage points from 99.8% of GDP to 99.1%.

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Debt on the fourth of July

My chart for ICAEW this week ‘celebrates’ US Independence Day by setting out the latest congressional projections for federal debt.

Debt on the fourth of July. 
ICAEW chart of the week. 

Column chart showing projected US federal debt held by the public in $tn (plus as % of GDP) between 2023 and 2034.

2023: $26.2tn (97.3%). 
2024: $28.2tn (99.0%). 
2025: $30.2tn (101.6%). 
2026: $32.1tn (104.1%). 
2027: $33.9tn (106.2%). 
2028: $36.0tn (108.6%). 
2029: $38.0tn (110.5%). 
2030: $40.2tn (112.7%). 
2031: $42.5tn (114.8%). 
2032: $45.0tn (117.1%). 
2033: $47.8tn (119.9%). 
2034: $50.7tn (122.4%). 


04 Jul 2024.   Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, ONS, ‘An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook, June 2024'.


© ICAEW 2024

Two hundred and forty-eight years ago, on 4 July 1776, the United States of America declared its independence from Great Britain, inheriting debts used to finance the revolutionary war but without any tax raising powers to fund repayment of the amounts owed. This was addressed by the adoption of the US Constitution in 1789, which enabled Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton to raise taxes, start repaying those initial debts, and issue new debt to finance a fledgling nation.

My chart this week illustrates how the US federal government has continued to borrow since then, with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reporting that US federal debt held by the public was $26.2tn or 97.3% of GDP in September 2023, on track to reach $28.2tn or 99.0% of GDP on 30 September 2024, before rising to a projected $50.7tn or 122.4% on 30 September 2034. 

Debt on 4 July this year is estimated to be close to $27.8tn. 

The projected rise in debt held by the public over the coming decade is based on extrapolating the gap between federal revenues and spending of around $160bn a month in the current financial year, based on tax and spending legislation enacted at 12 May 2024 together with the CBO’s own assessment of the administration’s financial plans (for example over student loan relief) and assumptions around factors such as interest rates and economic growth.

However, the CBO is keen to stress that these numbers are not a forecast. They say: “The baseline projections are meant to provide a benchmark that policymakers can use to assess the potential effects of changes in policy; they are not a forecast of future budgetary outcomes. Future legislative action could lead to markedly different outcomes. But even if federal laws remained unaltered for the next decade, actual budgetary outcomes would probably differ from CBO’s baseline projections, not only because of unanticipated economic conditions, but also because of the many other factors that affect federal revenues and outlays.”

The challenge for the US is that despite almost 250 years of taxation with representation, that representation finds it difficult to raise taxes to bring debt down, often choosing to cut taxes and increase borrowing instead. 

Whether that will change, or whether debt markets force it to change, remains a big unknown in the experiment commenced by George Washington and Alexander Hamilton all those years ago.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.