Tag: chartoftheweek

ICAEW chart of the week: General Election 2019

With voters in the UK going to the polls tomorrow, the #icaewchartoftheweek is on the political party’s plans for the public finances.

All the political parties are promising to increase taxes, public spending and investment, with the plan to eliminate the fiscal deficit now well and truly abandoned. 

The Conservatives are promising the least in terms of additional spending and investment, with £3bn a year extra spending in 2023-24, £8bn in extra capital investment and tax rises broadly offsetting tax cuts. However, this is unlikely to be the final result as they have deferred significant financial decisions, such as the funding of adult social care, until after the election. 

Labour is planning to spending much more with £83bn a year more spending by 2023-24, funded by £78bn tax increases and £5bn from higher economic growth. They plan capital investment of £55bn a year and £58bn in total over five years to compensate ‘WASPI’ women. This is pretty ambitious, leading the IFS and others to cast doubt on the achievability of their plans, while these numbers don’t include the additional borrowing from their plans to nationalise utilities, nor the borrowing of those businesses post-nationalisation.

The Lib Dem plans are also very ambitious, with £50bn extra a year public spending by 2024-25 funded by £37bn in higher taxes and £14bn in higher economic growth from cancelling Brexit. They plan to borrow an extra £25bn a year to fund new capital investment.

The Greens’ are planning to be even more ambitious, including completely reforming welfare provision with the introduction of a universal basic income, contributing to a £124bn increase in taxes and public spending (albeit some of this is a switch from tax deductions to cash payments). Their capital investment plans are the largest and likely to most difficult to deliver of all the major parties at £82bn a year on average over 10 years.

Unfortunately, none of the major political parties appear to have a fiscal strategy that extends beyond the next five years, with only limited measures to address the big financial challenges of more people living longer. This is disappointing given that relatively small actions taken now could make a big difference to the financial position of the nation in 25 years’ time.

ICAEW’s full analysis of the party manifestos can be found at icaew.com/ge2019manifestoanalysis.


You can be part of the conversation as part of ICAEW’s GE 2019: It’s More Than a Vote campaign.

ICAEW chart of the week: Age profile of monthly public spending

Chart: £902 at age 0, £1,505 at 10, £889, £618, £639, £742, £761 at age 60, £1,761 at 70, £2,246, £3,296, £3,515 at age 100.

With the General Election in full swing, the #icaewchartoftheweek is on one of the principal drivers of public spending: age.

As data from the Office for Budget Responsibility illustrates, public spending on the young increases as the population is educated, but then falls back to a low of around £600 per month at around age 28, after which spending per person starts to increase gradually over working lives until retirement age. From that point on, not only is there a significant increase in welfare spending as the state pension kicks in, but the costs of health care, and then adult social care start to increase dramatically.

With the number of people in the UK aged 70 or more expected to increase by 58% over the next 25 years, total public spending will increase accordingly, especially with all political parties promising to protect and improve the state pension, health provision and adult social care.

The number of people under the age of 70 projected by the ONS to increase by only around 2% over that same period, or potentially even fall by around 7% if net inward migration is lower than expected, while further cuts in public services are apparently off the table with the ‘end of austerity’. The implication is that taxes will need to rise, that social provision in retirement will need to be cut, or for there to be a resumption in austerity policies  (or a combination of all three).

Unfortunately, none of the major political parties appear to have a fiscal strategy that extends beyond the next five years, with only limited measures to address the big financial challenges of more people living longer. This is disappointing given that relatively small actions taken now could make a big difference to the financial position of the nation in 25 years’ time.

This election, voters have the opportunity to focus on the big challenges of sustainability, technology and the public finances. To find out more, visit GE2019 – It’s More Than a Vote.

ICAEW chart of the week: Public sector capital expenditure

Chart: Capex (real-terms) £61.5bn (3.5% of GDP) in 2009-10, to £64.1bn in 2011-12, down to £49.2bn (2.6%) in 2013-14, up to £60.0bn (2.9%) in 2017-18.

With apologies for the delay because of being away, this week’s #ICAEWchartoftheweek is on public sector capital expenditure (capex), something that all the political parties in the #GE2019 have promised to increase – in some cases by very significant amounts! 

As part of ICAEW’s It’s More Than A Vote campaign, ICAEW will be analysing the political party manifestos over the next few weeks, including the potential implications for the public finances.

One area that all the major parties appear to agree on is the need to increase investment in infrastructure and other assets, which is why we thought we would look at the last nine years of capital expenditure reported in the Whole of Government Accounts (WGA), prepared under International Financial Reporting Standards. This differs from public sector investment in the National Accounts, with the latter including capital grants and other transactions that do not result in the creation of publicly-owned fixed assets.

As the chart illustrates, capital expenditure in 2017-18 of £60.0bn was lower than the £64.1bn incurred in 2011-12 after adjusting for inflation and to include Network Rail, the government owned railway infrastructure company prior to 2014-15 when it was incorporated into the WGA). As a proportion of the economy, capex in 2017-18 was 2.9% of GDP, a smaller ratio than the 3.5% calculated for 2011-12.

Only around £16bn (0.8% of GDP) of the amount spent in 2017-18 went into infrastructure assets (principally transport infrastructure such as roads and railways), with in the order of £24bn (1.2%) going into land & buildings, including hospitals and schools. Approximately £9bn (0.4%) was spent on military equipment, with the balance of £11bn (0.5%) invested in other public sector assets, ranging from tangible fixed assets such as plant & equipment, IT hardware, vehicles and furniture & fittings, as well as intangible fixed assets such as software.

Capex comprises a relatively small proportion of total expenditures (capital and non-capital) of £1.0tn reported in the WGA for 2017-18. As a consequence, even relatively small incremental amounts will constitute proportionately large increases in capital budgets in the next few years.

Whether these plans will be deliverable is another question, given that traditionally the government has struggled to spend all its capital budgets, not to mention the difficulties there will be in finding all the workers necessary for a major expansion in construction activity.

It’s More Than A Vote

ICAEW chart of the week: monthly GDP estimates to September 2019

Chart: Monthly GDP estimates. Sep 2018 +0.02%, +0.25%, +0.20%, -0.29%, +0.48%, +0.28%, +0.04%, -0.49%, +0.21%, +0.11%, +0.31%, -0.16%, Sep 2019 -0.07%.

The ONS announced today that the real-terms change in quarterly GDP for Q3 (July to September 2019) was +0.3%, a turnaround from the contraction of -0.2% seen in Q2.

The #icaewchartoftheweek looks instead at the seasonally adjusted monthly changes in GDP over the last year. This is a view that the ONS tends not to highlight because it highlights one of the issues with GDP, which is the inherent difficultly in estimating it accurately. It prefers to remove the rockiness in the monthly numbers by averaging the results over longer periods, such as its headline three-month rolling estimates reported in the media today; a number that is still subject to revision, but to a lesser extent than that for individual months.

The monthly contraction of -0.07% in September may therefore not make the headlines, but it is the principal reason why expectations of 0.4% for quarterly growth were 0.1% too high. Most economists expected the economy to be flat this month, rather than the small contraction in the statistics released this morning.

Revisions may have a significant impact on the October monthly GDP estimates scheduled to be released two days before the general election on 10 December 2019. A flat October with no revisions would see the three-month rolling GDP number fall to 0.0%, while a further contraction could see quarterly growth turn negative, a potentially significant contributor to the public debate in the couple of days before the polling booths open.

Perhaps the main conclusion that can be drawn is not about the specific monthly changes themselves, but rather how the economy is so weak that a very small change either in actual economic activity, or in statistical data collection, can easily move the numbers from positive to negative or vice-versa.

A rather dismal perspective to hold onto as the debate rages and claim and counterclaim are made.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK businesses

UK businesses: average revenue / person. No employees (4.8m people) £63k. Employers (22.7m people) £170k.

The #icaewchartoftheweek is on the 5.9m UK businesses reported by the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) to have been in operation at 1 January 2019, generating a total of £4.1tn in revenue each year.

According to the annual statistics published a couple of weeks ago, there are 4.5m businesses with no employees, generating an average revenue of £63k for the 4.8m person involved (this includes partnerships). This contrasts with the 1.4m businesses with employees with 22.7m people engaged at an average revenue of £170k per person. 

Unsurprisingly, the 3.2m sole traders, freelancers, partnerships and personal companies not registered for VAT or PAYE (a total of 3.5m people engaged, generating an average revenue of £34k per person) have much lower average revenues than the 1.2m that are (1.3m, generating an average of £141k). Most part-time freelancers and self-employed contractors included in the former will have no need to register for VAT, while the latter will include VAT-registered consultants and other highly-paid individuals that are self-employed or employed via their own companies.

Most of the 1.4m employers are small businesses (up to 99 staff), employing 9.9m people with an average revenue of £149k per person (not shown in the chart). These include 141,135 businesses with only 1 employee (0.3m people generating an average of £83k), 751,205 businesses with 2-4 employees (2.1m, £158k), 399,365 with 5-19 employees (3.7m, £136k) and 96,505 businesses with 20-99 employees (3.8m, £162k).

There are 12,055 medium sized businesses with 100-249 employees (1.9m people in total, generating an average of £205k), while 7,685 large businesses employed 10.9m people at an average revenue of £182k per person.

There are some important caveats. Firstly, the numbers employed may include some double counting, as people can be involved in more than one business in different capacities. In addition, it is important to note that revenue is not the same as profit, and the numbers do not analyse the cost-structure of different sizes of business.

To see the underlying data, visit https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/business-population-estimates-2019.

ICAEW chart of the week: First half fiscal deficit

H1 2018-19 -£33.2bn fiscal deficit + £4.5bn growth + £1.8bn RBS dividends - £3.0bn lower revenues - £10.4bn higher spending = -£40.3bn fiscal deficit for H1 2019-20.

The ONS published the fiscal numbers for the first half of the UK Government’s 2019-20 financial year this morning, with the #icaewchartoftheweek illustrating the changes in comparison with the first half of last year.

If revenues had increased in line with economic growth then the deficit would have reduced by £4.5bn (net of the effect of inflation on both revenues and expenditures). Unfortunately, tax receipts have been relatively weak, coming in £3.0bn below growth, with higher national insurance and council tax receipts being more than offset by lower corporation tax, income tax, inheritance tax, fuel duties, excise duties, and stamp duty.

The Government’s preferred measure of the deficit (which excludes government-owned banks) did benefit from £1.8bn in dividends from the Royal Bank of Scotland.  

Expenditures were £10.4bn higher than the first half of last year, reflecting more spending on public services (including the NHS), Brexit preparations, a growth in the size of the civil service, and a £3bn or so increase in capital investment.

This means that there is a shortfall of £40.3bn between receipts of £395.5bn and expenditures of £435.7bn in the first half of this financial year, compared with £33.2bn for the same period last time, when receipts were £384.2bn and expenditures totalled £417.4bn. (The first half deficit last year was originally reported as £19.9bn. This was subsequently revised down to £19.3bn before £13.9bn in accounting changes, including irrecoverable student loans.)

Fortunately for the Chancellor, the deficit tends to be much lower in the second half of the year given the boost from self-assessment tax declarations in January. Despite this the deficit could exceed £50bn this year if trends continue, a big disappointment for those who had hoped to continue on the path to eliminating the deficit.

With warning signs over the economy flashing, these numbers do not provide an auspicious backdrop for the Budget on Wednesday 6 November when the Chancellor is hoping to announce a number of major tax cuts.

For further information go to:

ONS – Public sector finances, September 2019

OBR – Commentary on the Public Sector Finances: September 2019. 

ICAEW chart of the week: Bank of England banknotes

Chart: 396 x £5: £2.0bn | 1,052 x £10: £10.5bn | 2,006m x £20: £40.1bn | 344m x £50: £17.2bn.

The confirmation last week of the new design for the Bank of England £20 banknote prompted the #icaewchartoftheweek to look at the value of banknotes in circulation.

There are just over 2bn paper £20 notes in circulation together worth £40.1bn, more in both number and value terms that the polymer £5 note (396m worth £2.0bn), polymer £10 note (1,052m worth £10.5bn) and the paper £50 note (over 344m worth £17.2bn). This amounts to a total of £69.8bn, not including £4.3bn in high value notes issued to Scottish and Northern Irish banks that in turn print their own banknotes.

On average there are approximately 6 five pound, 17 ten pound, 32 twenty pound and 5 fifty pound notes in circulation for each person living in the UK.

Replacing the existing £20 note with a new polymer design featuring a young J M W Turner will be a much bigger exercise than it was for the £5 and £10 polymer replacements, albeit it is unclear as to how many will be missing in action, having been lost down the back of sofas, hidden away in cupboards, or otherwise misplaced over the 12 and a half years that the current version has been in circulation.

The Bank of England has said the new polymer £20 note will start to be circulated on 20 February 2020. However, it has yet to announce a firm date for the final withdrawal of the current paper £20 note, likely to be in early 2021. Fortunately, Bank of England banknotes remain exchangeable forever.

For more information, visit www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2019/october/the-new-20-note-unveiled or www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/banknote.

ICAEW chart of the week: Welsh Government Budget

Chart: Welsh Government Budget 2019-20. Funding £20.6bn, Spending £20.6bn

This week’s #icaewchartoftheweek is on the subject of the Welsh Government’s Budget for the current financial year.

Officially a £19.4bn Budget to cover £16.3bn in Resource spending and £3.1bn in Capital investment, there is a further £1.2bn of spending funded by EU grants and other income to make a total of £20.6bn overall for 2019-20.

The largest element of funding comes from Whitehall in the form of a £13.7bn block grant, together with £1.3bn from the National Insurance Fund and £1.1bn in business rates. The block grant is lower than it used to be as the Welsh Government is now entitled to a £2.1bn share of income taxes and £0.3bn in other devolved taxes, which is supplemented by £0.2bn in borrowing and £0.7bn in other resources, before taking account of £0.7bn or so in grants from the EU and £0.5bn in other income.

The Welsh NHS takes the majority of the £8.6bn health and social care budget, with the balance supplementing local council budgets for social care, while grants of £5.5bn to local government, include the redistribution of the £1.1bn of business rates income.

The education budget of £2.7bn does not include the main schools’ funding streams (which in Wales is provided by local authorities), but it does include a substantial proportion of post-16 education funding, including £0.8bn in student loans, £0.4bn in student support grants and £0.4bn for further education.

Around half of the £1.4bn economy and transport budget is on capital investment in infrastructure, while the £0.8bn of spending by other departments comprises £0.6bn on environment, energy and rural affairs, and £0.2bn on international relations and the Welsh language. Central services and administration expenditure of £0.9bn includes £86m for the Welsh Assembly, Ombudsman and Audit Office, while the Welsh Government has £0.6bn in unallocated reserves that it can deploy if needed.

While the Chancellor has indicated that there will be more money in 2020-21, that is a still half a year away, and the use of the term ‘First Supplementary Budget’ could be an indication that the Welsh Government might be looking to submit a further budget request before the end of the financial year!

ICAEW chart of the week: fiscal changes

Chart: Fiscal methodology changes and error corrections. £23.6bn 2018-19 deficit before changes, £41.4bn changes after changes.

The public sector finances were subjected this week to some big methodology changes by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), as illustrated by the #icaewchartoftheweek.

At the same time, the ONS took the opportunity to fix some errors in the reported fiscal numbers, including a correction of £2.6bn in 2018-19 relating to double counting by HMRC within corporation tax revenues. This is an error that turns out to have been occurring for the last 7 years, raising questions over the quality of controls over fiscal reporting within government. 

There were also a number of other revisions to the numbers amounting to £1.5bn, increasing the reported deficit for 2018-19 from £23.6bn to £27.7bn before methodology changes.

The treatment of student loans in the fiscal measures has been misleading for many years, and the ONS have finally dealt with the ‘fiscal illusion’ this created (as the OBR describes such flaws in the National Accounts).

The new treatment increases the deficit in 2018-19 by £12.4bn, with a charge of £8.6bn for loans that are never expected to be recovered (just under half of the total loans extended in the year), the removal of £2.3bn in interest on student loans also not expected to be collected, and £1.5bn from the loss experienced on the sale of part of the student loan portfolio during last year.

The treatment of pension funds has changed too, with a £1.3bn increase in the deficit relating to how the Pension Protection Fund and local authority and other public sector pension funds are recorded.

Overall, the fiscal deficit for 2018-19 has been increased to £41.4bn, a 75% increase in the headline number from that previously reported.

Not shown in the chart is the effect on public sector net debt. This was not affected by the student loans change, but was reduced at 31 March 2019 from £1,802bn to £1,773bn as a consequence of eliminating £29bn owed to local authority and other pension funds, without reflecting the associated liability to public sector employees. We disagree with this elimination, which we think understates the headline measure for the national debt.

Despite this, the overall effect of these changes is to improve the reporting of the public finances. A positive step forward, even if there remains a long way to go.

Further information:

– UK public sector finances, 24 September 2019 (ONS)

– Commentary on the public sector finances (OBR)