ICAEW chart of the week: Quarterly GDP per head

GDP statistics have become much more exciting, with low but steady growth in per capita GDP before the pandemic giving way to large swings as the economy adjusts to a major shock.

Column chart showing quarterly GDP per capita from Q1 2015 to Q4 2021 on a real-terms seasonally adjusted basis. Showing steady growth each quarter to Q4 2109 before falling sharply in Q2 2020, recovering partway in Q3 2020 and more fully in Q2 2021 up to £8,820 in Q4 2021. This is about level with Q4 2017 and below Q1 2018 through Q4 2019.

GDP for the fourth quarter of 2021 was calculated to be £596bn by the ONS in its first estimate of this statistic measuring economic activity in the UK, bringing the provisional estimate for the full year to £2,318bn for the 2021 calendar year. On a per capita basis, this was equivalent to approximately £8,820 per person for the fourth quarter and £34,330 per person for the year.

The ICAEW chart of the week looks at how quarterly GDP has changed in real-terms over the past few years on a seasonally adjusted basis – demonstrating how boring GDP statistical releases were in the ‘before times’. Then, a relatively steady average per capita increase of approximately 0.3% each quarter reflected the low but steady level of economic growth that has been seen since the financial crisis. The arrival of the pandemic has seen all that change, with a collapse in GDP during the last half of 2020, followed by a stop-and-start recovery over the past few quarters, with provisional GDP estimate growing by 0.9% in the fourth quarter – faster than the pre-pandemic years, but slower than the revised 1.0% reported for Q3 and the 5.5% rise in Q2 of 2021.

The change in real-terms quarterly GDP per head in 2020 and 2021 illustrated by the chart were -2.7%, -19.5%, +17.4%, +1.3% and -1.3%, +5.5%, +1.0%, +0.9% respectively. It is, of course, always important to note that the statistics reported by the ONS are subject to frequent revision, especially when trying to count up the trillions of transactions entered into each quarter in a large and complex economy like the UK’s. The population estimates used for calculating per capita amounts are also likely to be revised, in particular once the results of the 2021 census are finalised in a few months’ time.

Despite the recovery in the last three quarters, GDP and GDP per capita remained below their peaks in the third quarter of 2019 and more significantly below the trend the economy was on.

With rapidly rising inflation, supply chain disruptions and uncertainty regarding how society will transition from a coronavirus pandemic to an endemic, the likelihood is that quarterly GDP releases are likely to continue to be observed with some excitement by economists (and the rest of us) for some time to come.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: National Insurance Fund 2020-21

We take a look at the Great Britain National Insurance Fund, illustrating how the balance in the fund grew from the equivalent of 4.2 months of annual payments to 4.6 months over the course of 2020-21.

Step chart showing movements in the Great Britain National Insurance Fund in 20201/21. Opening balance £37bn (4.2 months of payments) + receipts £140bn - NHS £26bn - payments £109bn = closing balance £42bn (4.6 months of payments).

One of the many myths about the UK’s public finances is around the use of the word ‘fund’. This is often assumed to imply there is a pot of money set aside to cover spending requirements, when in practice it tends to refer to a budget allocation. An example is the National Productivity Investment Fund that was announced in 2016, which turned out to refer to unallocated amounts within the government’s budget for capital expenditure over several years.

Despite this terminology there are some actual ‘funds’ that have a legal basis and which have money in them, such the Contingencies Fund, where cash of £425bn passed through its accounts in response to the pandemic last year (up from £17bn in the previous year). However, net assets remained unchanged by this tidal wave of money at just £2m, highlighting how many such funds are principally mechanisms to facilitate the flow of money around government on the way to its intended destination.

The Great Britain National Insurance Fund and the Northern Ireland National Insurance Fund are perhaps the most well known of these funds, being the source of payments for the state pension and contributory welfare benefits. Surprisingly, there is a balance in these funds, which caused some excitement in a House of Lords debate last year when a peer decided that this was a pot of money that could be used to fund more spending.

Before getting too excited, it is important to understand that although the £42bn in the Great Britain National Insurance Fund sounds like a large amount of money, the reality is that it is more akin to a float, representing less than five months’ worth of annual payments from the fund and a relatively small fraction of the trillions of pounds in future payments expected to be paid out of the fund over the next quarter of a century and beyond. Likewise for the £1bn in the Northern Ireland National Insurance Fund.

In addition, when you delve into the accounts, you discover that most of the balances are invested in HM Treasury’s Debt Management Account, which are in effect intercompany balances (or ‘intra-government’ to be more technically accurate).

As our chart illustrates, the Great Britain National Insurance Fund had a balance of £37bn on 1 April 2020, equivalent to about 4.2 months of expenditure in the 2019/20 financial year. National Insurance receipts in Great Britain (ie, not including Northern Ireland) amounted to £140bn during 2020/21, including £3bn from other tax receipts to make up for contributions not received for those on statutory maternity, paternity, parental or bereavement pay.

Some £26bn of the national insurance contributions was deducted and sent off to help pay for the NHS, reducing the amount added to the fund to £114bn, while payments from the fund during the year amounted to £109bn. The latter comprised £100.4bn for the state pension, £5.2bn to cover contributory welfare benefits (employment and support allowance and jobseeker’s allowance), £0.9bn in administration costs, £0.8bn in bereavement and maternity allowances, £0.7bn in transfers to the Northern Ireland equivalent fund, £0.5bn in redundancy payments and £0.2bn in other payments.

The £5bn or so of surplus was added to the balance of the fund, taking it to £42bn at 31 March 2021, equivalent to 4.6 months of annual payments.

To be fair to the noble lord concerned, it might well be possible to use some of the money in the fund by reducing the effective float balance by a month or two, at least on a one-off basis. However, in the context of public spending in excess of £1.2tn a year and public sector net debt of £2.3tn, it is not likely to go that far!

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK government major projects portfolio

Our chart this week is based on the Institute for Government’s recently published Whitehall Monitor 2022, illustrating how the government has already started on many of the major projects that form part of the Levelling Up White Paper.

Column chart showing numbers of major projects together with the whole-life cost of those projects 2014: 158 existing projects + 44 new projects (£399bn) 2015: 150 existing + 38 new (£489bn) 2016: 112 existing + 21 new (£436bn) 2017: 107 existing + 36 new (£455bn) 2018: 115 existing + 18 new (£423bn) 2019: 114 existing + 19 new (£442bn) 2020: 108 existing + 17 new (£448bn) 2021: 87 existing + 97 new (£542bn)

On 31 January 2022, the Institute for Government (IfG) published its latest annual Whitehall Monitor, an authoritative compendium of analysis about the functions and effectiveness of central government that makes for compelling reading and contains some great charts to bring to life what would otherwise be pretty dry content.

Our chart this week draws on a couple of the IfG’s charts from pages 60 and 61 in the 2022 edition that take a look at the activities of the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA). One of the IPA’s key roles is to support central government departments with their most expensive and complex projects. As the chart highlights, there was a sizeable jump in 2021 with 97 new projects added to the 87 existing projects brought forward from previous years, bringing the estimated whole-life cost of the projects being supported by the IPA to £542bn, up from £448bn in 2020.

According to the IfG, the major projects portfolio includes infrastructure developments such as the creation of a Midlands Rail Hub, large-scale programmes to improve public services such as the recruitment of 20,000 police officers by 2023, and military projects such as building a new medium-lift helicopter. This is the largest number of new items added to the portfolio in a single year since the publication of the IPA’s first annual report in 2013, with many of the projects now branded as part of the Levelling Up agenda. For comparison, fewer than 20 projects were added to the portfolio each year between 2018 and 2020. The government is currently managing 184 major projects – about 1.5 times as many as it did the year before and the portfolio is now at its largest size since 2015.

From a conventional perspective it may seem strange that the government started many of the projects in its just published Levelling Up White Paper as much as a year before setting out the plan that they form part of, but in practice the main components, such as new investment in transport infrastructure outside London and the South East, have been known for some time – as has the additional capital expenditure funding that has been provided to departmental budgets. What is new is the insight into the metrics that the government intends to use to assess the effectiveness of its levelling up plans by 2030, with 12 key objectives to be achieved.

However, as discussed in ICAEW’s Autumn Budget and Spring Budget coverage last year, much tighter budget settlements for day-to-day spending mean that departments could struggle to deliver major projects successfully given all the other pressures they are under as well as rapidly rising input costs, with the IfG commenting that: “Ministers should be careful to maintain enough administrative resources in their departments to help officials undertake these projects well, on time and to budget.”

The chart illustrates how following the IPA’s inception in 2013, there were 155 existing projects carried forward into 2014 and 44 new projects that year, a total of 199 with a whole-life cost of £399bn. This was followed by 188 projects in 2015 (150 existing and 38 new) of £489bn, 143 in 2016 (112 + 31) of £436bn, 143 in 2017 (107 + 36) of £455bn, 133 in 2018 (115 + 18) of £423bn, 133 in 2019 (114 + 19) of £442bn, 125 in 2022 (108 + 17) of £448bn and 184 projects in 2021 (87 existing + 97 new) with a whole-life cost of £542bn.

The IfG says: “Major reform is needed for government to respond to crises like the pandemic while simultaneously delivering long-term policy goals. Whitehall Monitor 2022 reveals how the government has been handling the Covid crisis while at the same time trying to make progress on priorities such as levelling up and hitting net zero. New employment support schemes and the vaccination programme were delivered rapidly, but progress on pre-pandemic priorities was limited.”

The report also warns that without fundamental reform – such as clarifying ministerial and civil service accountability, better data, improving transparency and ensuring a targeted workforce plan underpins its goal of up to 55,000 civil service job cuts by 2025 – government will continue being knocked off course when faced with shocks to the system. The IfG concludes that whatever happens as a result of the prime minister’s current troubles, with a looming cost-of-living crisis, ongoing COVID-19 challenges, and crunch Brexit deadlines and decisions ahead, 2022 will bring further strain.

The Levelling Up White Paper sets out some big aspirations, but the jury is still out as to whether they can be delivered.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK quarterly public finances

Our chart this week looks at the fiscal forecast for the final quarter of the government’s financial year ending in March 2022.

Column chart showing quarterly deficits: 2019/20 outturn £55bn deficit: Apr-Jun £23bn, Jul-Sep £12bn, Oct-Dec £23bn, Jan-Mar -£3bn 2020/21 outturn £322bn deficit: Apr-Jun £133bn, Jul-Sep £77bn, Oct-Dec £66bn, Jan-Mar £46bn 2021/22 forecast £183bn deficit: Apr-Jun £61bn, Jul-Sep £41bn, Oct-Dec £45bn, Jan-Mar £23bn, with £13bn headroom

The December 2021 public sector finances published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Tuesday 25 January provided numbers for the first three quarters of the current financial year. As our chart this week illustrates, this leaves the final quarter still to go, with £13bn of headroom against the official forecast prepared by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) at the time of the Autumn Budget and Spending Review 2021 back in October.

To put the current fiscal year into context, our chart shows how the deficit of £55bn in 2019/20 comprised quarterly deficits of £23bn for April to June 2019, £12bn for July to September 2019 and £23bn for October to December 2019 less a surplus of £3bn for January to March 2020. Although there was some impact from the pandemic on the last month of that financial year, it broadly provides an indication of a ‘normal’ pattern of deficits across the year, with the second quarter and more especially the fourth quarter benefiting from self assessment tax receipts – the latter despite typically higher levels of capital expenditure in the run up to the end of the financial year.

This was followed by the first full year of the pandemic and associated lockdowns which saw tax receipts fall significantly and expenditures rise dramatically, resulting in an unprecedented peacetime deficit of £322bn in 2020/21, comprising £133bn, £77bn, £66bn and £46bn for the four quarters respectively.

The current forecast is also on course for a pretty eye-watering deficit, which despite being substantially below that seen last year is forecast to be as much as £183bn. The provisional numbers for the first three quarters of 2021/22 of £61bn, £41bn and £45bn respectively are currently £13bn below the October forecast, implying an equivalent amount of headroom for the final quarter, assuming the OBR’s forecast deficit of £23bn for the fourth quarter proves to be accurate.

In practice, it would be surprising if the fourth quarter did come in on target other than by coincidence. Better than expected tax revenues are expected to continue to reduce the deficit over the final quarter but this is likely to be offset to a greater or lesser extent by higher interest costs on index-linked debt driven by rising inflation. There are also significant uncertainties around expenditures given the continuation of pandemic restrictions into January and the potential for further interventions to support businesses and individuals struggling financially as a consequence.

There have been suggestions that this headroom of £13bn is a ‘windfall’ that the Chancellor should use to support households expected to be hit by a greater than 50% rise in energy prices from April 2022 as discussed in last week’s chart of the week.

However, this perspective has also been contradicted by Carl Emmerson, Deputy Director at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), who is reported to have commented: “While borrowing last month was in line with the Budget forecast, over the first nine months of 2021/22 it is now £13bn below that forecast for the same period in the October Budget – £147bn instead of the £160bn expected in October. The latest improvement to borrowing over this period has been driven by higher-than-expected corporation tax being paid by some very large companies.

“Some have suggested better borrowing figures provide the Chancellor room to act on the cost of living by, for example, delaying the rise in National Insurance contributions planned for April. The truth is these figures make no difference to that calculation. Mr Sunak certainly could find money to delay tax rises or find other one-off ways of supporting living standards such as uprating benefits in April with a more up-to-date measure of inflation. But the long-run pressures on public services, especially health and social care, remain just the same and tax rises are likely to be needed if these are to be met. If he acts now on the cost of living, Mr Sunak will also need to find a credible means of committing to taking tough action on the public finances in the not too distant future.”

Even if the deficit does come in below the official forecast of £183bn, it will still be at a much higher level than that expected before the pandemic, when the forecast deficits for 2019/20, 2020/21 and 2021/22 were £47bn, £55bn and £67bn respectively compared with the much larger numbers reported in our chart. A variance of £13bn is also relatively small in the context of the £547bn increase in public sector net debt between March 2020 and December 2021.

All this suggests that the next fiscal event scheduled for 23 March 2022 is likely to take on even more importance as the Chancellor seeks to navigate between the rock of fiscal responsibility and a hard place of a cost of living crisis.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

IFRS 16: A lot of effort, but a great opportunity too

In an article for Room 151, ICAEW Public Sector Director, Alison Ring writes that bringing leases onto the balance sheet from 1 April provides council finance teams with a real “opportunity” to help councillors better understand the scale and scope of local authority finances.

The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standard 16 ‘Leases’ (IFRS 16) on 1 April 2022 will have a significant impact on many local authority balance sheets as well as require a huge effort from council finance teams.

Many finance officers will be glad just to get the work needed to comply with IFRS 16 done, but they should also grasp the opportunity to use the comprehensive review of contracts they are undertaking to educate council leadership teams and councillors on the scale and scope of the local authority finances they are responsible for.

Capturing lease contracts

IFRS 16 abolishes the distinction between off-balance sheet ‘operating leases’ and on-balance sheet ‘finance leases’ and brings almost all leases longer than a year onto the balance sheet. The deadline for public sector entities to become compliant with the standard is April this year, so local authorities need to ensure they are not caught out.

The purpose of IFRS 16 is to provide financial statement users with a better understanding of the resources available to an organisation by requiring assets utilised via contractual arrangements to be recorded on balance sheets alongside legally-owned assets. This will cover many leased office buildings, that will now need to be included in the primary financial statements, rather than being disclosed in the operating lease note towards the end of the accounts.

The standard captures most contracts that give the right to use an asset for a period of time of more than one year, as well as lease arrangements where that right is “embedded” into a larger contract. The latter was already the case for embedded rights that met the old criteria to be treated as finance leases, including many private-finance initiative contracts started a decade or two ago, but IFRS 16 means that other types of lease arrangement will need to be identified and—if they meet the criteria—capitalised as an asset and a related lease liability.

Identifying lease assets

In theory, finance teams should have all the information they need to calculate the amounts to record for both asset and liability sides of the balance sheet, as well as recording depreciation and interest in place of lease payments in the expenditure statement.

However, in practice there needs to be a thorough exercise to review thousands of contracts to see if they are leases or contain embedded lease arrangements that fall within the scope of IFRS 16.

In addition to office buildings, there will be a range of assets to identify, ranging from office equipment to vehicle fleets, to leased facilities and equipment. This is not just about reviewing the legal text of contracts, but also involves working with operating departments to understand whether there is a right to use an asset.

Fortunately, there are two main exemptions that should make this exercise easier, with contracts with a term of 12 months or less or below a de minimus value in the order of £3,500 excluded completely.

Unlike in the private sector, the requirement to revalue local authority assets within the balance sheet adds to the complications that finance teams face. This is in addition to the raft of information required for disclosure purposes, such as sub-leasing arrangements, sale and leaseback transactions and variable lease payments.

There will also be challenges in accounting for lease modifications, where a change to the original terms and conditions requires a reassessment of the carrying value for an asset and its associated lease liability, based on the new pattern of lease payments and discount rate.

Beefing up management controls

The good news is that this exercise, while onerous, has benefits too. Creating an inventory of contracts with key terms identified and understood provides a resource that can be used for other purposes, including controlling costs and monitoring financial exposures.

A more comprehensive understanding of the assets in use across the organisation will help in ensuring that resources are being fully utilised for the benefit of service users and council taxpayers.

Processes to vet new contracts for their accounting implications also provide an opportunity to beef up risk management controls. And there may be opportunities to renegotiate contract terms such as lease lengths and renewal options, or to identify contracts that are no longer needed and that can be dispensed with.

Just as importantly, IFRS 16 implementation provides finance teams with a real opportunity to educate council leadership teams and councillors on the finances of the organisations they are responsible for.

Not only is there a need to explain the accounting change and what this means for the financial statements, but the outputs of the implementation exercise can be used to help those charged with governance to better understand the scale and scope of contracting undertaken, the nature of the assets available to be utilised and, most importantly, the commitments and risks that have been made to suppliers and to service users.

There is a temptation to see IFRS 16 as a problem, and I can understand why yet another major compliance exercise may not be embraced with overwhelming enthusiasm. However, I believe that this particular problem is an opportunity – one that should definitely be grasped.

This article was originally published by Room 151.

December public finances: rising debt interest costs offset higher tax revenues

December’s deficit of £16.8bn saw both a rise in tax revenues and in interest on inflation-linked debt as pressure grows on the Chancellor to address energy price hikes and rising prices in the shops.
The public sector finances for December 2021 released on Tuesday 25 January 2022 reported a monthly deficit of £16.8bn. This was £7.6bn lower than the £24.4bn reported for December 2020 but £11bn higher than the £5.8bn deficit reported for December 2019.

This brings the cumulative deficit for the first nine months of the financial year to £146.8bn compared with £276.1bn and £58.4bn for the same period last year and the year before that respectively.

Public sector net debt increased from £2,321.8bn at the end of November to £2,339.9bn or 96% of GDP at the end of December. This is £205.5bn higher than at the start of the financial year and an increase of £546.8bn from March 2020. As a proportion of GDP, debt is the highest it has been since March 1963, almost 60 years ago.

The deficit for the month was in line with the revised forecast for 2021/22, published by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) alongside last October’s Autumn Budget and Spending Review 2021, although higher than forecast interest charges on index-linked debt offset the benefit of higher than forecast tax revenues.

Cumulative receipts in the first three quarters of the 2021/22 financial year amounted to £641.4bn, £82.8bn or 15% higher than a year previously, but only £44.2bn or 7% above the level seen in the first three quarters of 2019/20. At the same time, cumulative expenditure excluding interest of £700.5bn was £52.4bn or 7% lower than the first nine months of 2020/21, but £113.4bn or 19% higher than the same period two years ago.

Interest amounted to £53bn in the nine months to December 2021, £20.5bn or 63% higher than the same period in 2020/21, principally because of the effect of higher inflation on index-linked gilts. Interest costs were £10.6bn or 25% more than in the equivalent nine months ended 31 December 2019.

Cumulative net public sector investment in the three quarters to December 2021 was £34.7bn. This was £14.6bn or 30% less than the £49.3bn reported for the first nine months of last year, which included around £17bn of COVID-19-related lending that the government does not expect to recover. Investment was £8.6bn or 33% more than two years ago, principally reflecting greater capital expenditures, including on HS2.

The increase in debt of £205.5bn since the start of the financial year comprises the deficit of £146.8bn and £58.7bn in other borrowing. The latter was used to fund lending to banks through the Bank of England’s Term Funding Scheme, lending to businesses overseen by the British Business Bank (including bounce-back and other coronavirus loans), student loans, and other cash requirements, net of the receipt of taxes deferred last year and loan repayments.

Martin Wheatcroft FCA, external advisor on public finances to ICAEW, said: “Today’s numbers highlight the impact inflation is having on the public finances, with higher tax revenues collected in December offset by the rising cost of index-linked debt. We expect interest charges to increase further in the next few months as the time lag on index-linked debt catches up with the current 7.5% rate of RPI.

“With borrowing costs low and headroom in forecasts for the next financial year, the temptation will be to delay fixing the public finances in order to tackle the immediate hit to household budgets from anticipated energy prices hikes and higher prices in the shops, so pressure on the Chancellor to postpone or phase in April’s national insurance rise is likely to grow.”

Table showing receipts, expenditure, interest, net investment, deficit, other borrowing the increase in net debt for the 9 months to Dec 2021 and public sector net debt and public sector net debt / GDP at 31 Dec 2021 together with variances versus prior year and two years ago. Click on link at the end of this article to the version of this article on the ICAEW website which has a readable version of this table.

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled.

The ONS made a number of revisions to prior month and prior year fiscal numbers to reflect revisions to estimates. These had the effect of decreasing the reported fiscal deficit for the eight months to November 2021 from £136bn to £130bn and the deficit for the year ended 31 March 2021 from £321.9bn to £321.8bn.

Table showing receipts, expenditure, interest, net investment and the deficit for each of the 9 months to Dec 2021. Click on link below to the version of this article on the ICAEW website which has a readable version of this table.

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

EU fiscal consultation

Input into ICAEW’s response to the future of the EU Economic Governance Framework.

I recently contributed to ICAEW’s response to a consultation on the future of the EU Economic Governance Framework by Dr Susanna Di Feliciantonio, ICAEW’s Head of European Affairs.

To read more see Susanna’s article about the consultation response.

ICAEW chart of the week: energy prices

My chart this week is about domestic energy prices and the Ofgem energy price cap rises expected in April and October 2022.

Chart showing energy price cap based on typical annual usage of 12,000kWH gas and 2,900kWH electricity. £1,042 for Oct 2020 - Mar 2021 (£360 gas at 3.0p/kWh, £498 electricity at 17.2p/Kwh, £184 standing charges), £1,138 for Apr - Sep 2021 (£400 at 3.3p, £550 at 19.0p, £188), £1,277 for Oct 2021 - Mar 2022 (£488 at 4.1p, £603 at 20.8p, £186) and a projected £2,000 for Apr - Sep 2022 (£960 at 8p, £840 at 29p, £200) and £2,350 for Oct 2022 - Mar 2023 (£1,200 gas at 10p, £950 electricity at 33p, £200 standing charges).

The collapse of all but the largest energy suppliers over the past six months or so has pretty much ended a competitive market for domestic energy in the UK. Most consumers are now on tariffs that are at or close to the energy price cap set by the Office for Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem).

Originally designed as a safeguard for individuals on standard variable tariffs who couldn’t, didn’t or never got around to entering into competitive fixed-price contracts, the energy price cap is now expected to apply to most households as consumers either roll off existing fixed-price deals or – in many cases – transfer to one of the ‘Big Six’ energy suppliers following the collapse of one of the 40 or so energy firms that have gone bust over the past year.

As a consequence, many consumers will have seen their energy bills increase by much more than that implied by our chart of the week, which shows how the energy price cap has increased from an average dual-fuel bill for direct debit customers of £1,042 a year (about £87 per month) between October 2020 and March 2021 to £1,138 (£95 per month) between April 2021 and September 2021, to the current cap of £1,277 (£106 per month) for the period from last October through to March this year.

These amounts assume ‘typical’ usage for a dual-fuel household paying by direct debit of 2,900kWh of electricity and 12,000kWh (410 therms or 41 million British thermal units) of gas, with consumers using prepayment meters or on credit paying higher prices – currently an average of £1,309 (£109 a month) and £1,370 (£114 a month) respectively. Those who use more or less will pay higher or lower amounts accordingly, while the price cap varies by region.

As the chart illustrates, the direct debit price cap during the six months ended 31 March 2020 of £1,042 per year comprised £184 for the standing charge, £498 for 2,900kWh of electricity at 17.2p per kWh and £360 for 12,000kWh of gas at 3p per kWh. This increased to £1,138 per year in the six months to 30 September 2021, comprising £188 for the standing charge, £550 for 2,900kWh of electricity at 19p per kWh and £400 for 12,000kWh of gas at 3.3p per kWh. The current price cap of £1,277 per year, which lasts until 31 March 2022, comprises £186 for the standing charge, £603 for 2,900kWh of electricity at 20.8p per kWh and £488 for 12,000kWh of gas at 4.1p per kWh.

The current price cap is based on annual wholesale energy costs of £528, network costs of £268, operating costs of £204, social and environmental contributions of £159, other costs of £34 and a profit margin of £23 before adding on £61 of VAT at a rate of 5%. These are equivalent to £44, £22, £17, £13, £3, £2 and £5 in an average bill of £106 per month, although in practice energy usage varies across the course of a year.

Recent industry forecasts and speculation from EnAppSys, Investec and Cornwall Insight, among others, suggest that the price cap is likely to increase by more than 50% to somewhere in the region of £2,000 a year (£167 per month) for the six-month period from 1 April and potentially to around £2,350 a year (£196 per month) for the six months from 1 October 2022. Publicly available forecasts do not provide a breakdown on what that means for per kWh prices and so the chart provides illustrative calculations based on gas prices doubling to around 8p per kWh in April and rising to 10p in October and electricity prices increasing by in the order of 40% to 29p in April and then further to 33p per kWh in October. Actual prices will depend on how Ofgem allocates costs between the fixed and variable parts of the bill, as well as how wholesale prices move before they are included in the final calculation. The cost of energy for prepayment meter and credit customers will be even higher.

The scale of these increases is likely to have a significant impact on poorer and middle-income households, with commentators suggesting that the government is likely to want to intervene in some way to cushion the blow. Some have argued for cutting VAT from 5% to zero, although the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the Resolution Foundation and HM Treasury have all noted that doing so would pass much of the benefit on to higher income households rather than helping those most affected. Others have argued for spreading higher wholesale prices over longer periods to reduce the hit to family budgets, while there are also calls for the taxpayer to provide temporary subsidies in order to keep bills down, potentially transferring some of the risk of higher wholesale costs on to the taxpayer.

Policymakers are unlikely to do nothing as – even if there was additional support provided to the very poorest through the welfare system – the anticipated prices are large enough to disturb household budgets for many middle-income families as well. This could have serious implications for the economy and for public finances, with a substantial proportion of households likely to cut back on spending in other areas just as the government is hoping for a post-pandemic bounce to drive economic growth. The government will also be acutely aware that energy prices are a key component of inflation indices, with the consumer prices index 5.4% higher in December than a year earlier, according to the Office for National Statistics, and expected to rise even further once the new price cap comes into force in April.

There may be trouble ahead.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK population projections 2020 to 2045

Our chart this week is based on the latest population projections for the UK, with an expected 67% increase in the number of people over the age of 75 and a fall in the number under the age of 25 over the next quarter of a century.

Chart illustrating how population of 67.1m people in 2020 (19.8m ages 0-24, 21.8m ages 25-49, 19.7m ages 50-74, 5.8m ages 75+) changes over the 25 years with 16.6m births, 18.0m deaths and 5.3m net migrants to get to 71.0m in 2024 (18.0m ages 0-24, 22.4 ages 25-49, 20.9m ages 50-74 and 9.7m ages 75+). For more detail see the text.

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) released 2020-based interim population projections on 12 January 2022 providing an insight into how the population of the UK is expected to change over the next 100 years. They are interim because they don’t include the results of the 2021 Census (which is still being worked on), but they do reflect updated assumptions from the 2018-based projections.

The main differences from the previous projections are a lower fertility rate (revised down from 1.78 to 1.59 per woman) reducing the numbers of births significantly, and slight reductions in anticipated life expectancy (from 82.8 years to 82.2 for males and from 85.7 to 85.3 for females) increasing the number of deaths. This has been partly offset by an increase in net annual long-term international migration from 190,000 a year to 205,000 a year, with a central projection last time of 72.8m people in 2045 revised down to 71.0m. The population is then expected to gradually increase to a peak of 71.8m in 2081, before declining back to 71.0m in 2120.

Our chart focuses on the first 25 years of the projections, illustrating how each generation is expected to change over that time. Overall, the estimated population of 67.1m in June 2020 is expected to change by 16.6m births (an average of around 665,000 a year) less 18.0m deaths (720,000 a year), which would result in a fall of 1.4m (55,000 a year) to 65.7m in 2045, at least before taking into account the effects of migration. Estimated net immigration of 5.3m (230,000 a year until 2026, then 205,000 a year) is expected to mean that the population will instead increase, reaching 71.0m in 2045.

There were an estimated 19.8m 0-24 year-olds in 2020, but in a quarter of a century they will all be in the 25-49 age group and so those under 25 will be formed from the 16.6m projected to be born in the 25 years from 2020, which after around 65,000 deaths would be 16.5m before taking account of migration. Some will leave the country and others will arrive, with a projected 1.5m net addition to take the total to 18.0m in 2045, a reduction of 1.8m compared with the previous cohort.

For the 19.8m under-25s in 2020 moving up a cohort to the 25-49 age group in 2045, deaths of 0.2m would reduce this to 19.6m before taking account of net inward migration of 2.8m to get to a projected 22.4m. This is a net increase of 0.6m compared with the previous generation of 21.8m. That generation, which would be aged 50-74 a quarter of a century later, would be reduced by 1.7m deaths to arrive at 20.1m before adding a net 0.8m from migration to get to 20.9m, a 1.2m increase over the 19.7m who were aged 50-74 in 2020.

A much greater proportion of this cohort will not be around in 2045, with a projected 10.2m deaths reducing numbers to 9.5m before adding 0.2m from net inward migration to arrive at a projected total of 9.7m. This is a 67% increase over the current generation of over-75s of 5.8m, with all bar the 38,000 expected to be over 100 in 2045 expected to have passed on, barring major developments in medical science. This compares with the approximately 15,000 people over the age of 100 in 2020.

Overall the rate of increase in the UK population is expected to fall from an estimated 0.4% a year in 2020 to 0.15% by 2045, an average of 0.2% over the coming quarter of a century. This compares with growth rates of 0.6% to 0.8% a year experienced in the last couple of decades, which has been a key driver of economic growth in that time.

The substantial increase in the numbers aged 75 and over is of course a hugely positive development as more people live much longer lives than in previous generations. However, this will have huge implications for the public finances given the cost implications of providing health services, social care and pensions to older generations, particularly those over the age of 75. With proportionately fewer workers (even with planned increases in the retirement age) this is expected to drive higher levels of taxation over the next quarter of a century without much higher levels of economic growth than are currently anticipated.

Fortunately a quarter of a century provides opportunity for governments to address the financial challenges posed by our success in extending lives if they are willing to do so, even with the added debt arising from the pandemic, which is why ICAEW continues to argue for the development of a long-term fiscal strategy to put the public finances on a sustainable path. Such a strategy could make a significant difference to the prosperity of future generations.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Government borrowing rates

Our first chart of 2022 highlights how the cost of government borrowing remains extremely low for most of the 21 largest economies in the world, despite the huge expansion in public debt driven by the pandemic.

Government 10-year bond yields: Germany -0.13%, Switzerland -0.07%, Netherlands 0.00%, Japan 0.09%, France 0.23%, Spain 0.60%, UK 1.08%, Italy 1.23%, Canada 1.59%, USA 1.65%, Australia 1.79%, South Korea 2.38%, China 2.82%, Poland 3.87%, Indonesia 6.38%, India 6.51%, Mexico 8.03%, Russia 8.38%, Brazil 10.73%, Turkey 24.21%.

Our chart of the week illustrates how borrowing costs are still at historically low rates for most of the 21 largest national economies in the world, with negative yields on 10-year government bonds on 5 January 2022 for Germany (-0.13%) and Switzerland (-0.07%), approximately zero for the Netherlands, and yields of sub-2.5% for Japan (0.09%), France (0.23%), Spain (0.60%), the UK (1.08%), Italy (1.23%), Canada (1.59%), the USA (1.65%), Australia (1.79%) and South Korea (2.38%).

This is despite the trillions added to public debt burdens across the world over the past couple of years as a consequence of the pandemic, including the $5trn added to US government debt since March 2020 (up from $17.6trn to $22.6trn owed to external parties) and the more than £500bn borrowed by the UK government (public sector net debt up from £1.8trn to £2.3trn) for example.

Yields in developing economies are higher, although China (2.82%) and Poland (3.87%) can borrow at much lower rates than Indonesia (6.38%), India (6.51%), Mexico (8.03%), Russia (8.37%) and Brazil (10.73%). The outlier is Turkey (24.21%), which is experiencing some difficult economic conditions at the moment. Data was not available for Saudi Arabia, the 19th or 20th largest economy in the world, which has net cash reserves.

With inflation higher than it has been for several years, real borrowing rates are negative for most developed countries, meaning that in theory it would make sense for most countries to continue to borrow as much as they can while funding is so cheap. However, in practice fiscal discipline appears to be reasserting itself, with Germany, for example, planning on returning to a fully balanced budget by the start of next year and the UK targeting a current budget surplus within three years.

For many policymakers, the concern is not so much about how easy it is to borrow today, but the prospect of higher interest rates multiplied by much higher levels of debt eating into spending budgets just as they are looking to invest to grow their economies over the rest of the decade. Despite that, with the pandemic still raging and an emerging cost of living crisis, there may well be a temptation to borrow ‘just one more time’ to support struggling households over what is likely to be a difficult start to 2022.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.