#publicfinances – Page 2 – Martin Wheatcroft

ICAEW chart of the week: Defence spending battle lines

My chart for ICAEW this week takes a dive into the £53.9bn Ministry of Defence expenditure in 2023/24 ahead of what is likely to be a charged debate about defence spending in the coming year.

Two column chart with parliamentary funding of £54.1bn on the left and MOD expenditure analysis of £53.9bn.

The left hand column comprises £36.0bn from net expenditure £45.2bn minus depreciation of £9.2bn, pus reconciling items of £2.6bn and capital expenditure of £15.5bn.

The right-hand column consists of £17.2bn capital programme, £12.2bn for infrastructure and equipment support and inventory, £2.6bn for Defence Nuclear, £3.9bn for arms-length bodies and other spending, £14.7bn for military and civilian personnel and admin, and £2.6bn for military operations.

10 Jan 2025. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA.
Source: Ministry of Defence, 'Annual Reporting and Accounts 2023/24'.

My chart of the week illustrates how parliamentary funding for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) amounted to £54.1bn for the year ended 31 March 2024 while summarising the MoD’s expenditure analysis of £53.9bn between £17.9bn for the capital programme, £12.2bn for infrastructure and equipment support and inventory, £2.6bn for Defence Nuclear, £3.9bn for arms-length bodies and other spending, £14.7bn for military and civilian personnel and admin, and £2.6bn for military operations.

The parliamentary funding of £54.1bn was used to pay for £36.0bn of day-to-day spending (being net expenditure reported in the accounts of £45.2bn less non-cash depreciation and impairments of £9.2bn) and £15.5bn in capital expenditure, after net reconciling items of £2.6bn (the largest being to exclude an exceptional £2.7bn gain from changes in discount rates).

The £17.9bn incurred on MoD’s capital programme during 2023/24 is higher than the total for capital expenditure because it includes research and development and capital grants that are expensed in the revenue and expenditure statement. Most of the amount spent relates to building or upgrading military equipment for the armed forces, ranging from Astute Class nuclear-powered and Dreadnought Class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and Type 31 frigates for the Royal Navy, remotely piloted Protector surveillance and strike aircraft and radar upgrades to the Typhoon fighter for the Royal Air Force, through to Ajax armoured fighting vehicles and Chinook heavy-lift helicopters for the Army. It also includes investment in digital technology, back-office automation and investments in new military accommodation. (Existing military accommodation has been brought back in house since the end of the financial year).

The £12.2bn incurred in non-capital spending on infrastructure and equipment and inventory comprised £5.0bn to maintain and support infrastructure, £5.7bn to maintain and support equipment, and £1.5bn on inventory. A further £2.6bn was spent by the Defence Nuclear organisation to support the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent capability, while £3.9bn went on arms-length bodies and other spending, including £1.3bn on the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) organisation that manages defence procurement, £0.2bn for the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, the Submarine Delivery Agency and other arms-length bodies, £0.7bn for war pensions, and £1.7bn in other costs.

Personnel and admin costs of £14.7bn comprised £11.0bn for 151,905 full-time equivalent service personnel, £1.8bn for 70,881 full-time equivalent civilian and other staff, and £1.9bn in administration costs. This excludes £5.1bn in combined net expenditure for the Armed Forces Pension Scheme and Armed Forces Compensation Scheme that is reported separately from the MoD’s accounts.

Incremental spending on military operations amounted to £2.6bn in 2023/24, of which £2.2bn (£1.2bn capital and £1.0bn resource) went to support Ukraine and just under £0.2bn was spent on operations in the Middle East, while £0.2bn or so was incurred on other operations elsewhere in the world and on conflict prevention, stabilisation, security and peacekeeping activities.

The net expenditure of £53.9bn reported by MoD in 2023/24 was equivalent to just under 2.0% of GDP, being the majority of the approximately 2.3% of GDP the UK says it currently spends on defence and security for NATO purposes. The difference mainly relates to the cost of armed forces pensions not included in the MoD accounts, spending on the UK’s security services, and spending on counter-terrorism activities.

The UK government has already set out an ‘aspiration’ for UK defence and security spending to reach 2.5% of GDP by the end of the decade, but the return of President-elect Donald Trump to the White House is likely to result in pressure on NATO members to meet an even higher target.

During his first term, President Trump floated the idea of a 4% NATO target, which would have required the UK to spend the equivalent of an additional £47bn of spending based on GDP in 2023/24 and more than £50bn a year extra in future years. Even a more modest target of 3% of GDP would require an extra £19bn (or £20bn in future years) to be found.

Finding such large amounts of money would pose a huge challenge for any government at the best of times, but the current very fragile state of the public finances means the stretch is even greater now – adding to the headaches that are no doubt being inflicted on the Chancellor as she seeks to balance the books over the remainder of the decade.

Definitely time to watch this space.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Commonwealth of Australia balance sheet

My chart for ICAEW this week heads down under for some warmer weather and to take a look at the Australian federal government balance sheet in its recently published consolidated financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2024.

Column chart illustrating the Commonwealth of Australia balance sheet. Assets of A$989bn in the left hand column and liabilities of (A$1,557bn) in the right hand column.

19 Dec 2024. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. Source: Commonwealth of Australia, 'Consolidated financial statements 2023/24'.

The Commonwealth of Australia consolidated financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2024 were published on 12 December, bringing together the results and financial position of 199 audited financial statements for entities within the federal government system, public financial corporations (such as the Reserve Bank of Australia and Export Finance Australia), and public non-financial corporations (including Australia Post and Snowy Hydro for example). However, this does not include state and territory governments or local authorities in each state and territory.

As my chart this week illustrates, the balance sheet reports negative net worth of $568bn (21% of GDP or £284bn at the current exchange rate of approximately A$1 = £0.50), comprising assets of A$989bn (37% of GDP or £495bn) less liabilities of A$1,557bn (58% of GDP or £779bn).

Assets consisted of investments and cash of A$527bn (£264bn), receivables and other financial assets of A$162bn (£81bn) and non-financial assets of A$300bn (£150bn), while liabilities comprised debt of A$1,044bn (£522bn), payables and provisions of A$205bn (£103bn), and superannuation liabilities of A$308bn (£154bn).

Investments and cash of A$527bn consisted of investments, loans and placements of A$417bn, equity investments of A$102bn, and cash of A$8bn. Investments include $225bn invested in the Australia Future Fund, a sovereign wealth fund established in 2006 to strengthen the Australian government’s long-term financial position, together with $A$44bn in a series of other sovereign wealth funds established over the last decade.

Receivables and other financial assets of A$162bn comprised tax receivables and accrued taxation of A$59bn, other receivables and accrued revenue of A$26bn, student loans of A$54bn, and other advances of A$23bn.

Non-financial assets of A$300bn comprised A$89bn of military equipment, A$88bn of other plant, equipment and infrastructure, A$74bn in land and buildings, A$17bn in intangibles, $A13bn in heritage and cultural assets, and A$19bn of inventories and other non-financial assets.

Debt of A$1,044bn consisted of interest-bearing liabilities of A$943bn (A$611bn in government securities, A$227bn in central bank deposit liabilities, A$32bn for leases, and A$73bn in loans and other interest-bearing liabilities) and A$101bn in Australian currency in circulation.

Payables and provisions of A$205bn included A$90bn in provisions, A$63bn in non-pension employee liabilities, A$26bn in supplier payables and A$26bn in other payables.

The net pension obligation of A$308bn includes A$276bn for partially funded defined benefit schemes (obligations of $323bn less scheme assets of $A47bn) and A$32bn for one unfunded scheme. These schemes are now all closed to new members and so the liability is gradually reducing over time.

Not shown in the chart is the operating statement, which reported revenue of A$728bn (27.2% of GDP or £364bn), expenses of A$718bn (26.9% of GDP or £359bn) and net capital investment of A$12bn (0.5% of GDP or £6bn) to result in an operating surplus of A$10bn (0.4% of GDP or £5bn) and a fiscal deficit (on an accounting basis) of A$2bn (0.1% of GDP or £1bn).

Although the reported net worth in the financial statements is negative, Australia’s public finances are in a much stronger position than for many other countries. Australia’s general government net debt (including 13% for state and territory governments) was 32% of GDP on 30 June 2024, in contrast with the equivalent of 91% of GDP for the UK on the same date. This also doesn’t take account of the UK’s much larger public sector pension liabilities that are not included within net debt.

As a result there are more reasons than just the warmer weather to be thinking about enjoying a Christmas barbie on the beach on the other side of the world at this time of the year.

This is the last chart of the week for 2024 and so we would like to wish our readers all the best for the holiday season and for a healthy and prosperous 2025. We return in January.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK public sector pension liabilities

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how public sector net pension obligations reduced by £1.2tn from £2.6tn to £1.4tn during the financial year ended 31 March 2023 as a consequence of a sharply rising discount rate.

Step chart on UK public pension liabilities in the Whole of Government Accounts 2022/23. Opening position at 1 April 2022 £2,639bn (£2,539bn unfunded and £100bn funded) + £117bn service costs + £48bn net interest costs - £1,269bn net actuarial gains = £50bn unfunded benefits paid - £70bn other movements = £1,415bn pension liability on 31 Mar 2023 (£1,419bn unfunded scheme liabilities - £4bn funded scheme net pension asset).

13 Dec 2024. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday.

My chart of the week for ICAEW is on UK public sector pension liabilities, analysing how the net pension obligations reported in the Whole of Government Accounts 2022/23 reduced from £2,639bn on 1 April 2022 to £1,415bn on 31 March 2023.

The Whole of Government Accounts are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), with net pension obligations calculated in line with International Accounting Standard 19 (IAS19): Employee benefits.

The chart starts with opening net pension liabilities on 1 April 2022 of £2,639bn, comprising £2,539bn for unfunded schemes (including the NHS, teachers, civil services, armed forces, police and fire service schemes, among others) and a net liability of £100bn for funded schemes (principally local government schemes, but also some central government entities such as the BBC and the Bank of England, for example). The closing position on 31 March 2023 was £1,415bn, being pension liabilities of £1,419bn for unfunded schemes and a net pension asset of £4bn for funded schemes.

Service costs added £117bn to pension liabilities during 2022/23 and net interest added a further £48bn. These increases were more than offset by £1,269bn in net actuarial gains, £50bn in payments to pensioners in the unfunded pension schemes, and £70bn in other movements.

Service costs principally arise from the additional pension entitlements earned by public sector workers during the year, while net interest comprises the unwinding of the discount on pension liabilities (£40bn for unfunded schemes and £11bn for funded schemes) less investment income on assets in funded schemes (£3bn).

The net actuarial gains of £1,269bn comprises £1,357bn from changes in the assumptions underlying the value of liabilities (£1,218bn on unfunded schemes and £139bn in funded schemes) less £60bn (£59bn on unfunded schemes and £1bn on funded schemes) in experience gains and losses, less a loss of £28bn on investments. The principal assumption changes related to a change in the discount rates used to calculate pension obligations, which for the unfunded schemes increased from a real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) rate of 1.3% on 31 March 2022 to 1.7% on 31 March 2023.

The unfunded scheme liability is reduced for pensions paid on behalf of the schemes by the government. This contrasts with the funded schemes where assets are used to fund settlement of pension liabilities, resulting in no change in the net position. Other movements include £35bn in opening balance restatements relating to the NHS and former Royal Mail pension schemes and £39bn from the failure of 198 local authorities and the Northern Ireland Teachers Superannuation Scheme to report numbers to HM Treasury, less a net £4bn in other movements.

The omission of so many local authorities, and the lack of audit assurance for many others, has led to the first ever audit opinion disclaimer by the Comptroller and Auditor General on the consolidated financial statements for the UK public sector.

Not shown in the chart is the breakdown of the £1,419bn closing balance for unfunded schemes into its constituent schemes: £535bn for NHS workers, £335bn for teachers, £222bn for civil servants, £156bn for the armed forces, £104bn for police, £30bn for pre-privatisation Royal Mail workers, £23bn for fire services, and £14bn for public sector staff in other unfunded schemes. Also not shown is the £304bn of liabilities in local government and other funded pension schemes or the related £308bn in investments in those schemes that result in a net pension fund asset of £4bn on 31 March 2023.

The recognition of a £1.3tn actuarial gain in the statement of comprehensive income and expenditure appears positive for the reported financial position of the nation by contributing to a reduction in overall net liabilities from £3.9tn to £2.4tn. However, it is important to realise that the future obligations to pay pensions to public sector employees haven’t changed – it is how those obligations are converted into current values.

Irrespective of the discount rate used, we as a nation will need to pay out very large amounts of money in public sector pensions.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Inflation jump

Our chart this week looks at how the jump in annual inflation from 1.7% in September to 2.3% in October was driven by higher energy bills.

Side-by-side step charts comparing the components of inflation for two overlapping periods. Visually each bar is weighted to its contribution to the inflation to the index.

12 months to Sep 2024: core inflation +3.2%, food prices +1.9%, alcohol and tobacco +4.9% and energy prices -16.9% = CPI all items 1.7%.

12 months to Oct 2024: core inflation +3.3%, food prices +1.9%, alcohol and tobacco +5.3% and energy prices -10.1% = CPI all items 2.3%.

Our chart of the week illustrates how the annual rate of consumer price inflation (CPI) has changed between September and October 2024.

In the year to September 2024, core inflation – being CPI excluding the more volatile price rises of food, alcohol and tobacco, and energy – was 3.2%, while food prices were 1.9% higher than a year previously, alcohol and tobacco were 4.9% higher and energy prices were 16.9% lower. On a weighted basis these contributed 2.5%, 0.2%, 0.2% and -1.2% respectively to the overall CPI index.

This contrasts with the year to October 2024, where core inflation was 3.3%, food price inflation was 1.9%, alcohol and tobacco prices were up 5.3%, and energy prices were down 10.1%, contributing 2.6%, 0.2%, 0.2% and -0.7% to the annual rise in the CPI all items index.

In moving to the latest set of statistics, price changes during October 2023 are dropped from the annual rate and those for October 2024 are added. This results in a very different picture for energy prices, as a fall in domestic electricity and gas prices in October 2023 was replaced by an increase in the domestic energy price cap in October 2024. This caused energy prices overall to fall by a smaller amount in the year to October than they did in the year to September.

After weighting the different components of the CPI index, the 0.6 percentage point change in the annual rate of inflation reflected a 0.1 percentage point contribution from core inflation, close to zero from food inflation, 0.015 percentage points from higher alcohol and tobacco prices, and a 0.5 percentage point contribution resulting from a lower annual rate of fall in energy prices.

Despite the slight uptick in the annual core inflation rate in October 2024 to 3.3%, it is still significantly lower than the 5.7% rate it was in October 2023, providing some encouragement to the Bank of England to reduce interest rates still further during 2025.

However, the concern for monetary policymakers before they decide to cut rates again will be the potential upward pressures on inflation from measures in the Autumn Budget 2024. The course they chart will be affected by how these and other economic factors (both domestic and international) play out over the course of the next six months or so.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Autumn Budget 2024

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how the fiscal baseline inherited by the Chancellor has changed as a consequence of the Autumn Budget, with higher capital investment driving up borrowing needed to fund the deficit over the next five years.

Column chart showing Spring Budget fiscal deficit and the Autumn Budget change over the forecast period.

2024/25: Spring Budget forecast £87bn + Autumn Budget change £40bn = £127bn (4.5% of GDP).

2025/26: £78bn + £28bn = £106bn (3.6% of GDP).

2026/27: £69bn + £20bn = £89bn (2.9% of GDP).

2027/28: £51bn + £21bn = £72bn (2.3% of GDP).

2028/29: £39bn + £33bn = £72bn (2.2% of GDP).

2029/30: £35bn + £36bn = £71bn (2.1% of GDP).

Our chart of the week sets out the changes in fiscal projections calculated by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in its October 2024 economic and fiscal outlook compared with the numbers at the time of the Spring Budget seven months ago.

These form a revised baseline for the public finances that will form the basis of the Chancellor’s spending and investment plans over the rest of the Parliament.

As our chart highlights, the fiscal deficit – the shortfall between tax and other receipts and public spending calculated in accordance with statistical standards – was forecast to amount to £87bn in 2024/25, but this has increased by £40bn to £127bn, or 4.5% of GDP.

The projections for the following five years were also revised upwards between 2025/26 and 2029/30 have increased from £78bn, £69bn, £51bn, £39bn and £35bn by £28bn, £20bn, £21bn, £33bn and £36bn to result in a revised profile of £106bn (3.6% of GDP), £89bn (2.9% of GDP), £72bn (2.3% of GDP), £72bn (2.2% of GDP) and £71bn (2.1%).

This contrasts with the previous government’s plan to bring down the deficit in relation to the size of the economy to 1.2% of GDP by 2028/29.

Perhaps the biggest surprise was the £40bn upward revision to the budgeted deficit of £87bn for the current financial year ending in March 2025. This reflects a combination of £14bn in higher debt interest and £6bn in other forecast revisions, £23bn in higher spending (most of which is the £22bn ‘black hole’ identified by the incoming government over the summer) and £2bn in additional capital investment, less £1bn in tax measures and £4bn from the indirect economic effect of policy decisions.

In later years, the principal driver of the increases in the deficit is higher capital investment as the Chancellor replaced the previous government’s plan to cut public sector net investment by almost a third over the next five years (from 2.5% to 1.7% of GDP) to a profile that sees net investment increase to 2.7% of GDP in 2025/26 and 2026/27 before returning to 2.5% of GDP in 2029/30.

The changes in the deficit between 2025/26 and 2029/30 can be summarised as follows:

2025/26: £28bn increase = £18bn higher capital investment + £10bn net other changes (£42bn additional spending – £25bn tax rises – £6bn indirect effects of decisions – £1bn forecast changes).

2026/27: £20bn = £23bn capital – £3bn net other changes (£44bn – £35bn – £5bn – £7bn).

2027/28: £21bn = £26bn capital – £5bn net other changes (£47bn – £40bn – £2bn – £10bn)

2028/29: £33bn = £27bn capital + £6bn net other changes (£49bn – £40bn + £2bn – £5bn)

2029/30: £36bn = £25bn capital + £11bn net other changes (£47bn – £42bn + £6bn – not published).

The increases in taxation, spending and capital investment won’t avoid the need for difficult choices in the Spending Review next year as departmental budgets will remain tight.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK long-term fiscal projections

The OBR’s latest fiscal risks and sustainability report projects that public debt could reach 274% of GDP in 50 years’ time, or 324% if likely economic shocks are included.

Our chart this week is on the long-term fiscal projections included in the Office for Budget Responsibility’s (OBR) latest fiscal risk and sustainability report published on 12 September 2024.

The OBR suggests that – without action to improve productivity, increase taxes, cut spending, bring in more people or do more to tackle climate change – public sector net debt is projected to rise to 274%, or potentially 324% if likely economic shocks are included.

As the chart illustrates, debt to GDP was 98% at the end of 2023/24 and the baseline projection shows this falling over the coming decade to 90% by 2033/34, and then gradually increasing to 100% of GDP in 2043/44, 130% in 2053/54, 188% in 2063/64, and then 274% in 2073/74.

Experience tells us to expect an economic shock such as a recession every decade or so, and so the OBR also reports a ‘baseline with shocks’ scenario that sees the debt to GDP ratio reaching 100% of GDP in 2033/34, 120% in 2043/44, 160% in 2053/54, 228% in 2063/64, and then 324% in 2073/74.

The projections reflect long-term pressures on the public finances from the post-economic crisis slowdown in economic growth, an ageing population, the effects of climate change, and higher defence spending.

They are, of course, dependent on the assumptions used in their calculation, especially reproductivity growth, net inward migration, the health of the population, and the degree of rise in global temperatures. They also assume that the previous government’s plans to cut public spending significantly over the next five years are adopted by the incoming government, which is considered to be unlikely given that most economic commentators thought these plans were unrealistic even if there had not been a change in government.

Alternative scenarios prepared by the OBR include a better health scenario that results in a 44% lower debt to GDP ratio in 2073/74, a worse health scenario that increases debt by 49% of GDP, a higher rise in global temperatures to 2℃ that increases debt by 23% and to 3℃ that increases debt by 33%.

The good news is that all of these projections are completely unrealistic.

They are based on extrapolating from current tax and spending policies, without taking account of any actions that governments might take in the future to raise taxes, cut spending or develop the economy. It is extremely unlikely that future governments would be willing, or even able, to finance such large fiscal deficits over the next 50 years.

The bad news is that in consequence taxes are likely to go up.

While there are options to mitigate pressures on the public finances by cutting spending on public services or cutting the level of benefits such as the state pension, these are likely to be politically and practically difficult to achieve. Similarly, immigration remains a politically charged issue and encouraging higher levels of net inward migration significantly more than the 315,000 a year assumed from 2028/29 onwards might be challenging.

The OBR suggests a ‘fiscal tightening’ of 1.5% each decade would be necessary to return debt to its pre-pandemic level of approximately 80% of GDP. If accomplished through tax rises alone, this would see tax levels increase from a projected 37% of GDP in 2027/28 to around 43% of GDP in 2073/24.

Avoiding either of these outcomes – unsustainable debt or ever-increasing levels of taxation – will require productivity growth to increase significantly. So, if you have any good ideas on how to achieve higher productivity that no one else has thought of (preferably without increasing public spending too much), please write to the Chancellor at 11 Downing Street as she would probably be interested to hear them.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Eurozone government bond yields

My chart for ICAEW this week is on the cost of government borrowing in the Eurozone, which on 4 September ranged from 2.17% for Danish 10-year bonds up to 3.59% for their Italian equivalents.

My chart this week is on the range of yields payable on 10-year government bonds by 18 out of the 20 countries in the Eurozone for which data is available.

The chart illustrates how investors in German 10-year government bonds (known as ‘bunds’) would have received a yield to maturity of 2.22% – or conversely the German government could have borrowed at an effective interest rate of 2.22% if issuing fresh debt at that point in time. Yields on German bunds are used as benchmark rates for government debt not just in the Eurozone, but globally.

Just one country in the Eurozone has a lower 10-year bond yield than Germany, which is Denmark at 2.17% on 4 September, which is a 0.05 percentage points or 5 basis points (bp) ‘spread’ below the benchmark bund rate.

While quoted yields move up and down all the time, sometimes by quite large amounts, spreads are much less volatile, providing an insight into how debt investors perceive the relative risks of investing in different countries’ sovereign debt.

The next lowest yields were the Netherlands at 2.51%, with a spread of 0.29 percentage points above bunds, and Finland at 2.59% (+0.37%). This is then followed by Ireland on 2.67% (+0.45%), Austria on 2.71% (+0.49%), Belgium on 2.80% (+0.58%), Portugal on 2.82% (+0.60%), France on 2.93% (+0.71%), Slovenia on 2.94% (+0.72%), Cyprus on 3.00% (0.78%) and Spain on 3.02% (+0.80%). There is then a small jump to Greece on 3.28% (+1.06%), Slovakia on 3.30% (+1.08%), Malta on 3.34% (+1.12%), Lithuania on 3.36% (+1.14%) and Croatia on 3.41% (+1.19%).

The highest yield for investors among Eurozone countries – and hence the highest borrowing cost for its government – is Italy with 3.59%, which is 1.37 percentage points above the effective interest rate at which Germany could in theory borrow.

Comparing the bond yields in the Eurozone provides an insight into the relative strengths and weaknesses of these countries’ public finances and economies given that they all share a currency, a central bank base interest rate (currently 3.75%), and are all in the EU Single Market and Customs Union. Comparing yields with other currencies, such as the UK’s 3.95% for example (not shown in the chart), needs to take other factors into account, such as the UK’s much higher central bank base rate of 5%.

The chart also reports the government debt to GDP levels of each country for the second quarter of 2024 according to Eurostat, which may help explain why Denmark (with debt/GDP of 34%) pays a significantly lower borrowing cost than Spain (109%).

However, debt/GDP doesn’t explain all of the differences, with the 10-year yield on Greek government debt (debt/GDP 160%) of 3.28% for example being significantly lower than the 10-year yield on Italian government debt (debt/GDP 138%) of 3.59%.

Not shown in the chart are Estonia (debt/GDP 24%) and Latvia (45%), both of which tend to borrow at shorter maturities.

The lack of a firm correlation between debt/GDP and bond spreads should not be surprising as debt/GDP is a relatively crude measure of public finance strength or weakness. It excludes most government assets and non-debt liabilities, the funded or unfunded nature of their social security systems, as well as a country’s medium- and longer-term economic prospects and the perceived stability of that country’s government. These are all factors debt investors take into account when deciding the level of risk that they are willing to accept when investing.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

Government enters crisis control mode to curb public spending

Boost from self assessment tax receipts not enough to prevent a deficit in July as Chancellor searches for cost savings in the run up to the Autumn Budget.

The monthly public sector finances for July 2024 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Wednesday reported a provisional deficit for the first four months of the 2024/25 financial year of £51.4bn, £4.7bn worse than budgeted.

Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director of Public Sector and Taxation, says: “Today’s data shows that the customary boost from self assessed tax receipts in July was not enough to prevent a deficit of £3.1bn, higher than budgeted, as cost pressures drove up public spending. Debt increased to £2,746bn or 99.4% of GDP at the end of July, up £5.9bn from the end of June 2024.

“The government is now in crisis control mode as it searches for savings to offset significant unbudgeted cost overruns in this financial year, with the cumulative deficit to July 2024 standing at £51.4bn, £4.7bn more than budgeted.

“Rumours that the government is looking at significant cuts in public investment programmes this year to keep within budget are concerning, given the importance to economic growth of infrastructure and the urgent need for upfront investment in technology to fix poorly performing public services. Our hope is that the Chancellor will be able to take a more strategic view in her Autumn Budget in October and in the Spending Review in the spring.”

Month of July 2024

There was a shortfall between receipts and spending of £3.1bn in the month of July 2024, £1.8bn higher than in July 2023 and £3.0bn worse than the budgeted deficit of £0.1bn.

Taxes and other receipts amounted to £99.4bn in July 2024, up £10.3bn or 12% from the previous month driven by self assessment income tax receipts in July, in line with the trend last year. Receipts were £2.0bn or 2% higher than in the same month last year, in contrast with total managed expenditure of £102.5bn, which was £3.8bn or 4% higher than in July 2023.

Financial year to date

The shortfall between receipts and spending of £51.4bn for the four months to July 2024 was £0.5bn better than in the same period last year, but £4.7bn over budget.

Cumulative taxes and other receipts amounted to £359.3bn in the first third of the financial year, up 2% compared with the same period last year, while total managed expenditure was 2% higher at £410.7bn. This is illustrated by Table 1, which highlights how cuts to employee national insurance rates have been offset by higher income tax, VAT, corporation tax, and non-tax receipts.

Total managed expenditure for the first four months of £410.7bn was also up by 2% compared with April to July 2023, but this reflected spending on public services up 4%, welfare spending up 6% and gross investment up 10% driven by overruns and construction cost inflation being offset by lower energy-support subsidies and lower debt interest.

The reduction in debt interest of £6.1bn compared with the first four months of last year was driven by a £26.5bn swing in indexation on inflation-linked debt that more than offset a £20.4bn increase in interest on variable and fixed-rate debt.

Table 1: Summary receipts and spending

	Apr-Jul 2024 £bn	Apr-Jul 2023 £bn	Change %
Income tax	89.9	86.4	+4%
VAT	67.9	66.0	+3%
National insurance	53.5	58.3	-8%
Corporation tax	34.0	31.6	+8%
Other taxes	73.5	72.1	+2%
Other receipts	40.5	37.5	+8%
Total receipts	359.3	351.9	+2%

Public services	(212.2)	(204.8)	+4%
Welfare	(103.1)	(97.5)	+6%
Subsidies	(10.6)	(14.0)	-24%
Debt interest	(46.6)	(52.7)	-12%
Gross investment	(38.2)	(34.8)	+10%
Total spending	(410.7)	(403.8)	+2%

Deficit	(51.4)	(51.9)	-1%

Table 2 summarises how public sector net borrowing (PSNB) to fund the deficit of £51.4bn combined with borrowing of £4.4bn to fund working capital movements, student loans and other financing requirements increased debt by £55.8bn during the first four months of the financial year. As a result, public sector net debt grew to £2,745.9bn on 31 July 2024, which is £931bn or 51% more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic.

The ratio of net debt to GDP ratio is at the highest it has been since the 1960s, having increased by 1.3 percentage points from 98.1% on 1 April 2024 to 99.4% on 31 July 2024. Borrowing to fund the deficit was equivalent to 1.9% of GDP and other borrowing was equivalent to 0.2%, an increase of 2.1% before being offset by 0.8% from the effect of inflation and economic growth on GDP (usually referred to as ‘inflating away’). Lower inflation this year means this effect is less pronounced than in the same period last year.

Table 2: Public sector net debt and net debt/GDP

	Apr-Jul 2024 £bn	Apr-Jul 2023 £bn
PSNB	51.4	52.3
Other borrowing	4.4	(11.4)
Net change	55.8	40.9
Opening net debt	2,694.1	2,539.7
Closing net debt	2,745.9	2,580.6
*PSNB/GDP*	*1.9%*	*2.0%*
Other/GDP	0.2%	(0.4%)
Inflating away	(0.8%)	(1.5%)
*Net change*	*1.3%*	*0.1%*
Opening net debt	98.1%	95.7%
*Closing net debt*	*99.4%*	*95.6%*

Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS last year, was -£740bn on 31 May 2024, comprising £1,613bn in non-financial assets and £1,062bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,746bn of net debt (£343bn liquid financial assets – £3,089bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £669bn. This is a £67bn deterioration from the start of the financial year and is £123bn more negative than in July 2023.

Revisions and other matters

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled. This includes local government, where monthly data is based on budget or high level estimates in the absence of monthly data collection.

The latest release saw the ONS reduce the reported deficit for the first three months of the financial year by £1.5bn from £49.8bn to £48.3bn as estimates were revised for new data.

A new dawn for local government has broken, has it not?

With money tight and many local authorities in a precarious financial state, ICAEW’s Alison Ring asks how the government can deliver on its commitment to devolution in the latest instalment of Room 151’s Municipal Missions Manifesto series.

A change in government. A commitment to devolve power. No money.

We all know that England is the most centralised of the advanced economies, but it is still difficult to comprehend just how strange it is that in a nation of 58 million people (out of a UK total of 69 million), the national government in Westminster should be so intimately involved in deciding which high streets in Nottinghamshire or Cornwall are improved, whether to fund public conveniences in Lancashire or Kent, or which parks in Herefordshire or Hertfordshire should get outdoor chess sets.

We might also wonder why we have a central government ministry dedicated to local government at all when in most countries it is the regions, states or provinces that are responsible for local authorities.

Here in the UK, there is a large bureaucracy devoted to overseeing hundreds of councils across England of many shapes and sizes, while another department decides whether to fund road schemes hundreds of miles from London that the ministers and civil servants making those decisions may never use.

Despite the extensive control exercised by Whitehall, successive governments have found that this does not translate into effective action on the ground, while local leaders are frustrated by excessive bureaucracy and limitations on how they can drive economic development and deliver public services locally and regionally. Labour has committed to devolving power in England, but without resolving many of the current problems in local and regional government it is going to be difficult to make devolution a practical possibility.

Step 1 – stabilise the system

The new government has already made two promising announcements that should go a small way to stabilising the existing system. Firstly, it has confirmed that local authorities will participate in rolling three-year spending reviews to be carried out every other year. This will make a huge difference by enabling budget holders to plan ahead more effectively, particularly on capital investments where projects can often span multiple financial years.

Secondly, a ministerial statement from local government minister Jim McMahon has confirmed that action will be taken to tackle the backlog of incomplete audits which is undermining local authority financial reporting and the assurance provided by external auditors. Although tempered by the knowledge that it will take several years to get local audits back on track, and that many of the longer-term fundamental issues identified by the Redmond Review remain unaddressed, this is a positive step forward.

While money is tight, if funds can be found then supporting local authorities under the most financial pressure should be a priority.

Step 2 – complete the roll out of a regional tier of government

A combination of gentle encouragement, financial incentives and some arm twisting has led to the establishment of 11 combined authorities led by regional ‘metro’ mayors mainly in so called ‘city-regions’. Together with the Greater London Authority this means that around half of the English population now have a regional mayor, but the corollary is that the other half do not.

While a large part of devolution is about empowering individual local authorities, gaps in the regional tier of government make it difficult for Whitehall to hand out some of its core functions. This is particularly the case for economic development where, for example, Greater Manchester’s mayor Andy Burnham is all too eager to grasp whatever powers he can and run with them, but there is no one to take the lead in the same way for most of the South West.

One way to fill in the gaps would be to accelerate the roll-out of combined authorities, while another would be to go for the ‘big bang’ approach adopted by France in 1986 when it created a new tier of regional government across Metropolitan France in one fell swoop.

Step 3 – separate out social care and SEND from funding for local public services

One of the biggest drivers of the financial challenges faced by many local authorities is the growing cost of welfare provision – principally adult social care and special educational needs and disabilities (SEND) support. The ‘reverse hypothecation’ caused by these two costs has had the effect of squeezing budgets for local public services and pretty much everything else delivered by local authorities outside of (ring-fenced) social housing.

Ironically, one of the most effective ways to strengthen local government would be to centralise or regionalise social care and SEND budgets or at the very least deal with them separately in council tax bills as a distinct precept. Depending on how this is implemented, this could provide a much closer link between how much communities pay to their local councils and the local public services they receive.

Step 4 – sort out the finances

As the joke goes, if you want to get to where you want to go, then you shouldn’t start from here.

In this case, ‘here’ is a place where many local authorities are in financial difficulty and struggling to meet their statutory obligations. Funding formulas that are based on out-of-date population numbers and don’t reflect underlying needs. A council tax system reliant on 1991 property valuations. Business rates that are an unwieldy tangled mess.

These weak financial foundations to the local government system in England are crying out for reform, even it is necessary to acknowledge that change will be very difficult and politically risky. Despite the many different options that are theoretically possible, it is worth considering the proposal put forward by the Fabian Society in a recent report on fiscal devolution produced in association with ICAEW.

The Fabians suggested that the distribution of central government grants be agreed among local authorities rather than determined in Westminster, accompanied by a more stable basis to determining their amount. Another route that the Fabians looked at is the system of shared taxation in Germany which provides the core funding for German regions out of national taxes in a way that equalises funding between richer and poorer regions.

Step 5 – rebuild trust

Prising the hand of Whitehall off the shoulder of English local authorities is not going to be easy. It will take significant political capital to make devolution happen, and there will be many reasons found to not hand over control of the purse strings ‘just yet’.

Many of these reasons will be down to a lack of trust. Trust in the ability of local authorities to manage money wisely, not helped by the governance failures of recent years. Trust in the transparency of local authority finances, not helped by the impenetrable nature of the accounts. Trust in the quality of local public audit, not helped by the local audit crisis.

That is why devolution is not just about the decisions that central government makes to give away or delegate power and money, and how it chooses to structure the system. It is also about the choices made by local and regional authorities asking for those new powers.

So, if you are in an area without a combined authority, it is time to start talking to your neighbouring areas about forming one. If your accounts make it difficult for stakeholders to understand how you have spent public money, it is time to streamline and invest in making them better. And if you are behind on your audits, then you need to do what you can to work with your external auditors to get back on track.

There is a big prize here. More effective and efficient local and regional government leading to better outcomes. And more bandwidth in Whitehall to focus on national and international priorities.

Alison Ring OBE FCA is director for public sector and taxation at ICAEW, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.

This article was written on behalf of ICAEW by Martin Wheatcroft in conjunction with Alison Ring, and was originally published in Room 151 and subsequently (with some minor changes) by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: BBC

My chart for ICAEW this week highlights how the BBC is struggling financially after incurring an operating loss of £0.3bn on the provision of public service broadcasting and the failure of commercial activities to contribute to the bottom line.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) recently published its annual report and accounts for the year ended 31 March 2024 (2023/24) and my chart highlights how the BBC is struggling financially with a reported operating loss of £0.3bn and no operating profit contribution from commercial activities.

Licence fee income was £3.7bn in 2023/24, which combined with other income of £0.3bn resulted in public services broadcasting revenue of £4.0bn. After deducting operating costs of £4.3bn, this meant the BBC lost £0.3bn on its eight national and seven regional TV channels, 10 national and 46 regional and local radio stations, BBC World Service radio in 42 languages, BBC iPlayer, BBC Sounds, BBC Education, news, sport and weather internet sites, orchestras and other activities, including funding of the independent S4C TV channel in Wales.

External income generated by the BBC’s commercial operations amounted to £1.4bn but this was offset by £1.4bn in operating costs, leaving the overall group operating loss broadly unchanged from the public service broadcasting total.

Licence fee income of £3.7bn was just under £0.1bn or 2% lower than the year before as the number of households paying the full licence fee reduced from 23.2m to 22.7m at the end of March 2024 on a fee frozen at £159 per year (equivalent to £13.25 per month). There were approximately 4,000 households with monochrome licences and 0.2m households on concessionary fees, with a further 1.0m with free licences (principally given to those aged 75 or more receiving pension credit).

Other income includes £0.2bn from contract income and £0.1bn in grants from the Foreign Office towards the cost of the World Service.

Public services broadcasting expenditure of £4.3bn was £149m lower than the year before and can be analysed between spending on content of £3.0bn, distribution and support costs of £0.9bn, and other activities of £0.4bn. Content spending can be further broken down into £1.7bn on TV channels, £0.5bn on radio, £0.3bn on the World Service, £0.2bn on online services including BBC iPlayer, and £0.3bn on other content.

While external commercial income was broadly matched by costs once intra-group transactions are taken account of, the BBC’s commercial businesses contributed £325m in 2023/24 towards the BBC’s overheads, down from £368bn in the previous year. They principally comprise BBC Studioworks, which supplies studio time and post-production services to the major TV networks and most production companies in the UK, and BBC Studios, which produces TV shows and films on behalf of the BBC and other broadcasters, as well as distributing BBC content around the world. BBC Studios also operates the UKTV network of four ad-supported TV channels, four ad-supported streaming channels and three pay TV channels in the UK, several international TV channels (including BBC America and BBC News international services), and the BritBox International streaming service outside the UK (now 100% owned by the BBC).

Not shown in the chart is £0.5bn in non-operating gains, most of which were one-off items, including £0.2bn in gains on disposals in the year and £0.2bn from tax adjustments in respect of prior years. This resulted in an overall net surplus of £0.2bn for the year ended 31 March 2024.

Real-term cuts in the value of the licence fee and falling returns from commercial activities have put significant financial pressure on the BBC in recent years, causing it to cut back on content and some services, consolidate operations such as domestic and international news gathering, and undergo a series of restructurings to improve efficiency.

The 8.7% increase in the licence fee to £169.50 from 1 April 2024 (equivalent to £14.13 per month) and inflation-linked increases planned over the next three years should help ease some of the pressure in the current financial year, although returning to operating profitability is likely to still require the BBC to look for further savings in its public service broadcasting operations.

Unfortunately, the BBC has not been able to replicate its commercial success in the years before streaming when it was able to generate significant returns from the sale of DVDs and international content licensing. While there are plans to build up its international streaming services (from a relatively low base), the BBC’s commercial businesses are unlikely to generate enough money to affect the dilemma facing the new government on what to do with the licence fee when the BBC’s current financial settlement ends on 31 December 2027.

The temptation will be for the government to defer reform of how the BBC is funded yet again, just as its predecessors have done over the last couple of decades. However, the erosion of income from younger households choosing to not watch broadcast television to stop paying the licence fee, and the likely consolidation of streaming services into a handful of global online ‘broadcasters’ that will dominate the market, is likely to make avoiding this conundrum that much more difficult this time around.

For more information, read the BBC annual report and accounts 2023/24 and the December 2022 House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee report on future funding of the BBC.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.