Our chart this week takes a look at how UK public sector net debt has increased from £1,816bn to £2,814bn over the past five years – an increase just £2bn short of £1tn.
According to the provisional public sector finance numbers for March 2025 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 23 April, public sector net debt was £2,814bn on 31 March 2025. This comprised gross debt of £3,198bn, less cash and other liquid financial assets of £384bn.
Our chart this week illustrates how the net amount the nation owes to its creditors has changed over the last five years, starting with net debt of £1,816bn on 31 March 2020. Debt repayments of £541bn were financed by replacement borrowing of £541bn, followed by borrowing of £847bn to fund deficits over the five years (£315bn in 2020/21, £122bn in 2021/22, £127bn in 2022/23, £131bn in 2023/24 and a provisional £152bn in 2024/25) and borrowing for other reasons of £151bn (principally to fund government lending and working capital requirements). The result is an increase of £998bn to reach net debt of £2,814bn on 31 March 2025.
At just short of a trillion pounds, this is the largest amount ever borrowed by the UK government in a five-year period, with only the £0.8tn (£799bn) borrowed over the five years to March 2013 following the financial crisis coming close – when net debt went from £567bn on 31 March 2008 to £1,366bn on 31 March 2013.
The pandemic and the subsequent energy and cost-of-living crises are, of course, the main drivers behind the need to borrow so much in such a short time, but the worry is that annual borrowing levels are not coming down as quickly as might have been hoped (or budgeted).
Either way, the consequences of building up so much debt will be with us for a long time to come, with debt interest squeezing the amounts available to pay for public services and the tax burden approaching an all-time high, just as demographic change is reducing the proportion of working-age adults, compared with those in retirement.
Of course, as the latest numbers are provisional and the historical ones are often subject to revision, it would only take a couple of relatively small adjustments to the starting or closing debt balances to turn this from just under a trillion pounds to just over a trillion.
Perhaps a reminder that while a couple of billion pounds is a huge sum of money to you or me (or even to many billionaires), in terms of the UK public finances it is not much more than a rounding error.
The OBR’s latest fiscal risks and sustainability report projects that public debt could reach 274% of GDP in 50 years’ time, or 324% if likely economic shocks are included.
Our chart this week is on the long-term fiscal projections included in the Office for Budget Responsibility’s (OBR) latest fiscal risk and sustainability report published on 12 September 2024.
The OBR suggests that – without action to improve productivity, increase taxes, cut spending, bring in more people or do more to tackle climate change – public sector net debt is projected to rise to 274%, or potentially 324% if likely economic shocks are included.
As the chart illustrates, debt to GDP was 98% at the end of 2023/24 and the baseline projection shows this falling over the coming decade to 90% by 2033/34, and then gradually increasing to 100% of GDP in 2043/44, 130% in 2053/54, 188% in 2063/64, and then 274% in 2073/74.
Experience tells us to expect an economic shock such as a recession every decade or so, and so the OBR also reports a ‘baseline with shocks’ scenario that sees the debt to GDP ratio reaching 100% of GDP in 2033/34, 120% in 2043/44, 160% in 2053/54, 228% in 2063/64, and then 324% in 2073/74.
The projections reflect long-term pressures on the public finances from the post-economic crisis slowdown in economic growth, an ageing population, the effects of climate change, and higher defence spending.
They are, of course, dependent on the assumptions used in their calculation, especially reproductivity growth, net inward migration, the health of the population, and the degree of rise in global temperatures. They also assume that the previous government’s plans to cut public spending significantly over the next five years are adopted by the incoming government, which is considered to be unlikely given that most economic commentators thought these plans were unrealistic even if there had not been a change in government.
Alternative scenarios prepared by the OBR include a better health scenario that results in a 44% lower debt to GDP ratio in 2073/74, a worse health scenario that increases debt by 49% of GDP, a higher rise in global temperatures to 2℃ that increases debt by 23% and to 3℃ that increases debt by 33%.
The good news is that all of these projections are completely unrealistic.
They are based on extrapolating from current tax and spending policies, without taking account of any actions that governments might take in the future to raise taxes, cut spending or develop the economy. It is extremely unlikely that future governments would be willing, or even able, to finance such large fiscal deficits over the next 50 years.
The bad news is that in consequence taxes are likely to go up.
While there are options to mitigate pressures on the public finances by cutting spending on public services or cutting the level of benefits such as the state pension, these are likely to be politically and practically difficult to achieve. Similarly, immigration remains a politically charged issue and encouraging higher levels of net inward migration significantly more than the 315,000 a year assumed from 2028/29 onwards might be challenging.
The OBR suggests a ‘fiscal tightening’ of 1.5% each decade would be necessary to return debt to its pre-pandemic level of approximately 80% of GDP. If accomplished through tax rises alone, this would see tax levels increase from a projected 37% of GDP in 2027/28 to around 43% of GDP in 2073/24.
Avoiding either of these outcomes – unsustainable debt or ever-increasing levels of taxation – will require productivity growth to increase significantly. So, if you have any good ideas on how to achieve higher productivity that no one else has thought of (preferably without increasing public spending too much), please write to the Chancellor at 11 Downing Street as she would probably be interested to hear them.
My chart for ICAEW this week is on the cost of government borrowing in the Eurozone, which on 4 September ranged from 2.17% for Danish 10-year bonds up to 3.59% for their Italian equivalents.
My chart this week is on the range of yields payable on 10-year government bonds by 18 out of the 20 countries in the Eurozone for which data is available.
The chart illustrates how investors in German 10-year government bonds (known as ‘bunds’) would have received a yield to maturity of 2.22% – or conversely the German government could have borrowed at an effective interest rate of 2.22% if issuing fresh debt at that point in time. Yields on German bunds are used as benchmark rates for government debt not just in the Eurozone, but globally.
Just one country in the Eurozone has a lower 10-year bond yield than Germany, which is Denmark at 2.17% on 4 September, which is a 0.05 percentage points or 5 basis points (bp) ‘spread’ below the benchmark bund rate.
While quoted yields move up and down all the time, sometimes by quite large amounts, spreads are much less volatile, providing an insight into how debt investors perceive the relative risks of investing in different countries’ sovereign debt.
The next lowest yields were the Netherlands at 2.51%, with a spread of 0.29 percentage points above bunds, and Finland at 2.59% (+0.37%). This is then followed by Ireland on 2.67% (+0.45%), Austria on 2.71% (+0.49%), Belgium on 2.80% (+0.58%), Portugal on 2.82% (+0.60%), France on 2.93% (+0.71%), Slovenia on 2.94% (+0.72%), Cyprus on 3.00% (0.78%) and Spain on 3.02% (+0.80%). There is then a small jump to Greece on 3.28% (+1.06%), Slovakia on 3.30% (+1.08%), Malta on 3.34% (+1.12%), Lithuania on 3.36% (+1.14%) and Croatia on 3.41% (+1.19%).
The highest yield for investors among Eurozone countries – and hence the highest borrowing cost for its government – is Italy with 3.59%, which is 1.37 percentage points above the effective interest rate at which Germany could in theory borrow.
Comparing the bond yields in the Eurozone provides an insight into the relative strengths and weaknesses of these countries’ public finances and economies given that they all share a currency, a central bank base interest rate (currently 3.75%), and are all in the EU Single Market and Customs Union. Comparing yields with other currencies, such as the UK’s 3.95% for example (not shown in the chart), needs to take other factors into account, such as the UK’s much higher central bank base rate of 5%.
The chart also reports the government debt to GDP levels of each country for the second quarter of 2024 according to Eurostat, which may help explain why Denmark (with debt/GDP of 34%) pays a significantly lower borrowing cost than Spain (109%).
However, debt/GDP doesn’t explain all of the differences, with the 10-year yield on Greek government debt (debt/GDP 160%) of 3.28% for example being significantly lower than the 10-year yield on Italian government debt (debt/GDP 138%) of 3.59%.
Not shown in the chart are Estonia (debt/GDP 24%) and Latvia (45%), both of which tend to borrow at shorter maturities.
The lack of a firm correlation between debt/GDP and bond spreads should not be surprising as debt/GDP is a relatively crude measure of public finance strength or weakness. It excludes most government assets and non-debt liabilities, the funded or unfunded nature of their social security systems, as well as a country’s medium- and longer-term economic prospects and the perceived stability of that country’s government. These are all factors debt investors take into account when deciding the level of risk that they are willing to accept when investing.
Boost from self assessment tax receipts not enough to prevent a deficit in July as Chancellor searches for cost savings in the run up to the Autumn Budget.
The monthly public sector finances for July 2024 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Wednesday reported a provisional deficit for the first four months of the 2024/25 financial year of £51.4bn, £4.7bn worse than budgeted.
Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director of Public Sector and Taxation, says: “Today’s data shows that the customary boost from self assessed tax receipts in July was not enough to prevent a deficit of £3.1bn, higher than budgeted, as cost pressures drove up public spending. Debt increased to £2,746bn or 99.4% of GDP at the end of July, up £5.9bn from the end of June 2024.
“The government is now in crisis control mode as it searches for savings to offset significant unbudgeted cost overruns in this financial year, with the cumulative deficit to July 2024 standing at £51.4bn, £4.7bn more than budgeted.
“Rumours that the government is looking at significant cuts in public investment programmes this year to keep within budget are concerning, given the importance to economic growth of infrastructure and the urgent need for upfront investment in technology to fix poorly performing public services. Our hope is that the Chancellor will be able to take a more strategic view in her Autumn Budget in October and in the Spending Review in the spring.”
Month of July 2024
There was a shortfall between receipts and spending of £3.1bn in the month of July 2024, £1.8bn higher than in July 2023 and £3.0bn worse than the budgeted deficit of £0.1bn.
Taxes and other receipts amounted to £99.4bn in July 2024, up £10.3bn or 12% from the previous month driven by self assessment income tax receipts in July, in line with the trend last year. Receipts were £2.0bn or 2% higher than in the same month last year, in contrast with total managed expenditure of £102.5bn, which was £3.8bn or 4% higher than in July 2023.
Financial year to date
The shortfall between receipts and spending of £51.4bn for the four months to July 2024 was £0.5bn better than in the same period last year, but £4.7bn over budget.
Cumulative taxes and other receipts amounted to £359.3bn in the first third of the financial year, up 2% compared with the same period last year, while total managed expenditure was 2% higher at £410.7bn. This is illustrated by Table 1, which highlights how cuts to employee national insurance rates have been offset by higher income tax, VAT, corporation tax, and non-tax receipts.
Total managed expenditure for the first four months of £410.7bn was also up by 2% compared with April to July 2023, but this reflected spending on public services up 4%, welfare spending up 6% and gross investment up 10% driven by overruns and construction cost inflation being offset by lower energy-support subsidies and lower debt interest.
The reduction in debt interest of £6.1bn compared with the first four months of last year was driven by a £26.5bn swing in indexation on inflation-linked debt that more than offset a £20.4bn increase in interest on variable and fixed-rate debt.
Table 1: Summary receipts and spending
Apr-Jul 2024 £bn
Apr-Jul 2023 £bn
Change %
Income tax
89.9
86.4
+4%
VAT
67.9
66.0
+3%
National insurance
53.5
58.3
-8%
Corporation tax
34.0
31.6
+8%
Other taxes
73.5
72.1
+2%
Other receipts
40.5
37.5
+8%
Total receipts
359.3
351.9
+2%
Public services
(212.2)
(204.8)
+4%
Welfare
(103.1)
(97.5)
+6%
Subsidies
(10.6)
(14.0)
-24%
Debt interest
(46.6)
(52.7)
-12%
Gross investment
(38.2)
(34.8)
+10%
Total spending
(410.7)
(403.8)
+2%
Deficit
(51.4)
(51.9)
-1%
Table 2 summarises how public sector net borrowing (PSNB) to fund the deficit of £51.4bn combined with borrowing of £4.4bn to fund working capital movements, student loans and other financing requirements increased debt by £55.8bn during the first four months of the financial year. As a result, public sector net debt grew to £2,745.9bn on 31 July 2024, which is £931bn or 51% more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic.
The ratio of net debt to GDP ratio is at the highest it has been since the 1960s, having increased by 1.3 percentage points from 98.1% on 1 April 2024 to 99.4% on 31 July 2024. Borrowing to fund the deficit was equivalent to 1.9% of GDP and other borrowing was equivalent to 0.2%, an increase of 2.1% before being offset by 0.8% from the effect of inflation and economic growth on GDP (usually referred to as ‘inflating away’). Lower inflation this year means this effect is less pronounced than in the same period last year.
Table 2: Public sector net debt and net debt/GDP
Apr-Jul 2024 £bn
Apr-Jul 2023 £bn
PSNB
51.4
52.3
Other borrowing
4.4
(11.4)
Net change
55.8
40.9
Opening net debt
2,694.1
2,539.7
Closing net debt
2,745.9
2,580.6
PSNB/GDP
1.9%
2.0%
Other/GDP
0.2%
(0.4%)
Inflating away
(0.8%)
(1.5%)
Net change
1.3%
0.1%
Opening net debt
98.1%
95.7%
Closing net debt
99.4%
95.6%
Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS last year, was -£740bn on 31 May 2024, comprising £1,613bn in non-financial assets and £1,062bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,746bn of net debt (£343bn liquid financial assets – £3,089bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £669bn. This is a £67bn deterioration from the start of the financial year and is £123bn more negative than in July 2023.
Revisions and other matters
Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled. This includes local government, where monthly data is based on budget or high level estimates in the absence of monthly data collection.
The latest release saw the ONS reduce the reported deficit for the first three months of the financial year by £1.5bn from £49.8bn to £48.3bn as estimates were revised for new data.
First quarter shortfall between receipts and spending of almost £50bn emphasises the significant challenges facing the Chancellor as she puts together her first Budget.
The monthly public sector finances for June 2024 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Friday 19 July 2024 reported a provisional deficit for the first three months of the 2024/25 financial year of £49.8bn, £1.1bn better than a year previously but £3.2bn worse than budgeted.
Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director of Public Sector and Taxation, says: “This is the first set of public sector finance data since the new government was elected, and today’s numbers set out the size of the obstacle the UK’s leaders face.
“£14.5bn was borrowed to finance the deficit in June, which although £3.2bn less than in June 2023, brought the total for the first three months of the financial year to £49.8bn, slightly worse than expectations. The latest numbers also highlighted the growing amount of public debt, which stood at 99.5% of GDP or £2,740bn on 30 June 2024. Although total debt interest was lower than last year because of the effect of lower inflation on inflation-linked debt, interest on the bulk of debt continues to rise.
“The high level of debt – and the associated interest bill – means that the new Prime Minister and Chancellor will be faced with some very difficult decisions over the coming months as they decide which elements of their programme to prioritise, and which will have to wait.”
Month of June 2024
Taxes and other receipts amounted to £88.2bn in June 2024, up 2% compared with the same month last year, while total managed expenditure was 2% lower at £102.7bn. This resulted in a reduction of £3.2bn from a fiscal deficit of £17.7bn in June 2023 to £14.5bn in June 2024.
Financial year to date
Taxes and other receipts amounted to £258.0bn in the three months to June 2024, up 1% compared with the same month last year, while total managed expenditure was 1% higher at £307.8bn. This resulted in a reduction of £1.1bn from a fiscal deficit of £50.9bn for the first quarter of 2023/24 to £49.8bn for the first quarter of 2024/25. However, this is £3.2bn more than the £46.6bn for the first quarter included in the Spring Budget 2024.
Table 1 analyses receipts for the first quarter of the financial year, highlighting how cuts to employee national insurance rates have been offset by higher income tax, corporation tax, and non-tax receipts.
Table 1: Summary receipts and spending
Three months to
Jun 2024 (£bn)
Jun 2023 (£bn)
Change (%)
Income tax
58.1
56.1
+4%
VAT
49.9
49.6
+1%
National insurance
39.7
43.4
-9%
Corporation tax
25.3
23.4
+8%
Other taxes
54.9
54.1
+1%
Other receipts
30.1
27.7
+9%
Total receipts
258.0
254.3
+1%
Public services
(158.8)
(152.6)
+4%
Welfare
(76.9)
(73.7)
+4%
Subsidies
(7.8)
(11.3)
-31%
Debt interest
(35.2)
(41.1)
-14%
Gross investment
(29.1)
(26.5)
+10%
Total spending
(307.8)
(305.2)
+1%
Deficit
(49.8)
(50.9)
-2%
Table 1 also shows how total managed expenditure for the first quarter of £307.8bn was up by 1% compared with April to June 2023, with higher spending on public services and welfare offset by lower energy-support subsidies and lower debt interest. The reduction in the latter of £5.9bn was driven by a £9.2bn reduction in indexation on inflation-linked debt that more than offset a £3.3bn or 44% increase in interest on variable and fixed-rate debt.
Table 2: Public sector net debt
Three months to
Jun 2024 (£bn)
Jun 2023 (£bn)
Deficit
(49.8)
(50.9)
Other borrowing
3.9
(7.7)
Debt movement
(45.9)
(58.6)
Opening net debt
(2,694.1)
(2,539.7)
Closing net debt
(2,740.0)
(2,598.3)
Net debt/GDP
99.5%
96.7%
Public sector net debt was £2,740bn or 99.5% of GDP on 30 June 2024, just under £46bn higher than at the start of the financial year. At 99.5%, the debt to GDP ratio is the highest it has been since the 1960s.
The increase in the first quarter reflects borrowing to fund the deficit of just under £50bn minus close to £4bn in net cash inflows from loan recoveries and working capital movements in excess of lending by government.
Public sector net debt is £142bn or 5% higher than a year previously, equivalent to an increase of 2.8 percentage points in relation to the size of the economy. It is £925bn or 51% more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic and £1,712bn or 167% more than the £1,028bn net debt amount as of 31 March 2007 before the financial crisis, reflecting the huge sums borrowed over the last two decades.
Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS in 2023, was -£726bn on 31 May 2024, comprising £1,613bn in non-financial assets and £1,070bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,740bn of net debt (£340bn liquid financial assets – £3,080bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £669bn. This is a £53bn deterioration from the start of the financial year and is £77bn more negative than the -£649bn net worth number for June 2023.
Revisions and other matters
Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled.
The latest release saw the ONS increase the reported deficit for the first two months of the financial year by £1.8bn from £33.5bn to £35.3bn as estimates were revised for new data. More significantly, public sector net debt at the end of May 2024 was reduced by £16.3bn to £2,726.6bn to correct for omitted data on Bank of England repo transactions during the current financial year. This reduced the reported debt to GDP ratio for May 2024 by 0.7 percentage points from 99.8% of GDP to 99.1%.
While government borrowing requirements have almost halved from its peak in the last financial year, it is still higher than the financial crisis a decade ago.
Our chart this week is on the topic of government borrowing, which continues at an astonishing pace compared with pre-pandemic times. The UK Debt Management Office has been tasked with raising £253bn from the sale of government securities, comprising £174bn in new finance and £79bn to cover the repayment of existing debts as they fall due. That’s an average of £21bn a month, more than twice the £9.4bn raised in IPOs on the London Stock Exchange in the whole of 2020.
Admittedly, this is a slower pace than the even more astonishing fundraising in 2020-21 that saw £486bn in gilts issued (almost half a trillion pounds), with £98bn raised to repay existing debts and £388bn used to cover the costs of the pandemic and the shortfall in tax receipts it caused.
Despite that, the £253bn needed from the sale of gilts this year is still more than was raised in the 2009-10 financial year during the depths of the financial crisis, the previous peacetime peak. This partly reflects a higher refinancing requirement than a decade ago, one of the legacies of the financial crisis. The legacy of the pandemic will be even higher refinancing requirements into the future, keeping the debt markets busy for decades to come.
The chart does not provide the full story of the UK’s public debt raising, as the Bank of England purchased £450bn of fixed-interest gilts in the market over the last couple of years as part of its quantitative easing operations, in effect swapping the fixed rates of interest payable on the government bonds concerned for the variable rate that is payable on central bank deposits. This has arguably helped the gilt market finance the purchase of such large amounts of government debt and helped keep the cost of government borrowing at extremely low levels but at the cost of significantly increasing the exposure of the public finances to changes in interest rates.
While the government’s financing requirements should be lower in the next few years as the economy recovers, substantial sums will still need to be raised, potentially in much less favourable market conditions. Rising inflation, higher interest rates, and potentially the unwinding of QE, would all combine to increase the cost of borrowing substantially. The days of issuing 30-year gilts at yields of less than 1% may not be with us for much longer.
For more information about the UK’s public debt portfolio, visit the Debt Management Office.
11 December 2020: Ultra-low or negative yields provide governments with an opportunity to borrow extremely cheaply, but what will happen if and when interest rates rise?
On 9 December, the benchmark ten-year government bond yield for major western economies ranged from -0.61% for investors in German Bunds through to 0.95% for US Treasury Bonds and 1.02% for Australia Government Bonds, as illustrated in the #icaewchartoftheweek.
One of the more astonishing developments of the last decade or so has been the arrival of an era of ultra-low or negative interest rates, even as governments have borrowed massive sums of money to finance their activities. This is not only a consequence of weak economic conditions and the slowing of productivity-led growth, but it has also been driven by the monetary policy actions of central banks through quantitative easing operations that have driven down yields by buying long-term fixed interest rate government bonds in exchange for short-term variable rate central bank deposits.
For bond investors this has been a wild ride, with the value of existing bonds sky-rocketing as central banks have come calling to buy a proportion of their holdings, crystallising their gains. The downside is the extremely low yields available to debt investors on fresh purchases of government bonds, which in some cases involve paying governments for the privilege of doing so.
Yields vary according to maturity, with yields on UK gilts ranging from -0.08% on two-year gilts through to 0.26% for 10-year gilts (as shown in the chart) up to 0.81% on 30-year gilts. In practice, the UK issues debt with an average maturity between 15 and 20 years, so the current average cost of its financing is higher than that shown in the chart at between 0.48% and 0.77% being the yields on 15-year and 20-year gilts respectively. This has the benefit of locking in low interest rates for longer, in contrast with most of the other countries shown that tend to issue debt with an average maturity of less than ten years.
Quantitative easing complicates the picture, as by repurchasing a significant proportion of government debt and swapping it for central bank deposits, central banks have reversed the security of fixed interest rates locked in to maturity with a variable rate exposure that will hit the interest line immediately if rates change.
In theory, this should not be a problem, as higher interest rates are most likely to accompany stronger economic growth and hence higher tax revenues with which to pay the resultant higher debt interest bills, but in practice treasury ministers are not so sanguine. In leveraging public balance sheets to finance their responses to COVID-19 – on top of the legacy of debt from the financial crisis – governments have significantly increased their exposure to movements in interest rates, just as other fiscal challenges are growing more pressing.
Expect to hear a lot more over the coming decade about the resilience of public finances as governments seek to reduce gearing and reduce their vulnerability to the next unexpected crisis, whenever that may occur.
22 June 2020: The fiscal deficit of £103.7bn for April and May 2020 is over six times as large as the £16.7bn reported for the same period last year.
The latest public sector finances for May 2020 published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Friday 19 June 2020 reported a revised deficit of £48.5bn for April and a deficit of £55.2bn for May 2020.
Public sector net debt increased to £1,950.1bn or 100.9% of GDP, an increase of £173.2bn (up 20.5 percentage points) compared with April 2019. This is the first time the headline debt number has exceeded 100% of GDP since 1963, although the ONS cautions that the numbers for the deficit and for GDP are both subject to potentially significant revisions.
These results reflect the substantial fiscal interventions by the UK Government to support businesses and individuals affected by the coronavirus pandemic, together with a collapse in tax revenues as a consequence of the lockdown.
The deficit of £103.7bn for the two months to May is more than the budgeted deficit of £55bn for the whole of the 2020-21 financial year set in the Spring Budget in March.
Cash funding (aka the ‘public sector net cash requirement’) for the two months was £143.5bn, compared with £1.8bn for the same period in 2019.
Some caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled.
Alison Ring, director of public sector for ICAEW, commented:
“Significant borrowing over recent months means that this is the first time in more than 50 years that debt has been larger than GDP. And though the furlough scheme to date has cost less than originally estimated, cash funding in April and May was more than in the previous three financial years combined.
These are major milestones for the public finances and demonstrate the unparalleled impact of coronavirus, even if this is not surprising given the huge amounts of financial support the government is providing to keep the economy going through lockdown.”
29 May 2020: Government looks to financial markets to fund large-scale fiscal interventions in the economy.
The #icaewchartoftheweek shines a light on the massive expansion in borrowing being undertaken by the UK Government as it seeks to plug an expanding gap between tax receipts and spending and fund a huge amount of loans to banks and businesses in order to try and keep the economy from collapsing.
At the Spring Budget on 11 March, HM Treasury issued a financial remit to the Debt Management Office and National Savings & Investment amounting to £162bn, comprising £98bn to fund the repayment of existing debts, £55bn to fund a planned shortfall between tax receipts and public spending (the deficit), and £9bn to fund public lending to individuals and businesses.
Since then the fiscal situation has transformed, with the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) suggesting that the deficit could increase by as much as £243bn to £298bn in 2020-21, while lending activities could increase by a further £168bn to £177bn. Public sector net debt at 31 March 2021 might increase by £411bn from the Spring Budget forecast of £1,819bn to £2,230bn.
The good news is that the cost of this borrowing is relatively small, with yields on ten-year gilts as low as 0.20%.
1 May 2020: The unsung heroes at the Debt Management Office (DMO) have swung into action as the UK Government has started to burn through cash at an astonishing rate, as illustrated by the #icaewchartoftheweek.
The DMO, the low-profile unit within HM Treasury responsible for the national debt, raised an astonishing £58bn from selling gilt-edged government securities in April, compared with an average of £11bn obtained each month in the financial year to March. The size and frequency of gilt auctions went from an average of £2.6bn from one auction a week in 2019-20 to £3.2bn from four auctions a week in April.
The scale of the challenge became apparent in March as the Government announced a series of eye-watering fiscal interventions, with the DMO going overdrawn by £18.5bn to keep the Government supplied with cash in advance of ramping up gilt auctions in April.
Fortunately, the DMO is able to finance the Government at ultra-low rates of interest at the moment, with auctions oversubscribed and yields on 10-year gilts at just over 0.3% during the course of April. If maintained, the incremental cost of the additional £384bn in public sector net debt in 2020-21 set out by the Office for Budget Responsibility in its coronavirus reference scenario would be less than £2bn a year.
A legacy of debt for future generations to deal with, but – at least for now – a relatively cheap burden to service.