Our chart this week finds that the UK is ranking highly in the IMF’s latest five-year forecasts for general government net debt.
The International Money Fund (IMF) released its latest IMF Fiscal Monitor on 17 April 2024, highlighting how public debts and deficits are higher than before the pandemic and public debts are expected to remain high. The IMF says: “Amid mounting debt, now is the time to bring back sustainable public finances”, commenting that as prospects for a global economic soft landing have improved, it is time for action to bring government finances back under control.
Our chart this week illustrates how the UK is one of the ‘leading’ nations in government borrowing, with general government net debt projected by the IMF to reach 98% of GDP by 2029, compared with 92.5% in 2023. (Note: general government net debt is different to the public sector net debt measure used in the UK public finances – the latter includes the Bank of England and other public corporations.)
The chart illustrates how the major countries with the largest debt burdens tend to be advanced economies, with Spain (92% of GDP), the UK (98%), France (107%), US (108%), Italy (136%) and Japan (153%) having debt levels close to, or exceeding, the sizes of their economies.
Some countries are in much better fiscal positions, with Germany expected to bring its general government net debt down to 43% of GDP by 2029, while the Netherlands (43%), South Korea (29%), Australia (24%) and Canada (13%) also have relatively low levels of public debt compared with other advanced economies.
Emerging market ‘middle-income’ and ‘low-income’ developing countries often have much lower levels of public debt than advanced countries, often simply because it is more difficult for them to borrow to the same extent as well as not having the same scale of welfare provision as richer countries to finance. Examples include Kazakhstan (projected to have a general government debt of 8% of GDP in 2029), Saudi Arabia (22%), Iran (23%), Türkiye (30%) and Indonesia (37%). However, that does not stop some emerging and developing countries borrowing more, such as Nigeria (47%), Mexico (51%), Poland (55%), Egypt (56%), Pakistan (61%), Brazil (70%) and South Africa (84%).
Not shown in the chart are China and India for which no net debt numbers are available. The IMF projects them to have general government gross debt in 2029 of 110% and 78% of GDP respectively, indicating how their public debts have grown substantially in recent years. However, without knowing their levels of cash holdings it is less clear where they stand in the rankings.
Also not shown is Norway, the only country with negative general government net debt reported by the IMF. Norway’s general government net cash is projected to reach 139% of GDP in 2029, up from 99% in 2023.
As with all metrics, there are some issues in comparing the circumstances of individual countries. Many countries will also have investments, other public assets, or natural resource rights that are not netted off against debt, while many will also have other liabilities or financial commitments that aren’t counted within debt. For example, the UK has significant liabilities for unfunded public sector pensions as well as even larger financial commitments to the state pension, either of which, if included, would move the UK above the US in the rankings.
The IMF believes that as the world recovers from the pandemic and inflation is brought under control, it is important for countries to start tackling the deficits in the public finances and start bringing down the level of public debt.
This may be difficult for countries such as the UK where significant pressures on the public finances mean public debt is expected to increase over the medium term rather than fall.
Public spend as a share of the economy must fall over the next five years to make the sums add up – a big challenge for the next government.
My recently published in-depth Fiscal Insight into the Spring Budget 2024 highlights how the UK’s public finances are in a weak position, with difficult choices on spending deferred and post-election tax rises likely, irrespective of who wins the general election.
My chart for ICAEW this week illustrates how total public spending is forecast to fall by 3.6% as a share of national income between the first and final year of the fiscal forecast. This is equivalent to a 1.6 percentage point reduction in total managed expenditure from a budget of 44% of GDP in 2024/25 to a forecast of 42.4% of GDP in 2028/29.
At a reduction of 1.1% in 2025/26, 0.7% in 2026/27, 1.1% in 2027/28 and 0.7% in 2028/29, this may not sound that large – after all surely there must be some efficiencies that can be found in a budget of £1.2trn, or £1.4trn by 2028/29?
However, this doesn’t take account of the fact that around half of public spending goes on welfare, health and social care spending, where costs are principally driven by people living longer, the triple-lock state pension guarantee, and increasing levels of ill-health. And another 10% or so goes on interest, where costs are driven by no-longer-very-low interest rates on a growing level of debt.
Nor does it allow for the significant pressures facing many public services that are likely to need additional funding to address. This includes the deteriorating international security situation that has prompted recent calls for defence and security spending to increase from 2% to 3% of GDP, underperformance across a range of public services from the criminal justice system to potholes to HMRC service standards, local authorities that are struggling financially, and crumbling infrastructure (in some cases literally) – among many others. There is also little sign of the scale of investment that would be needed to transform the delivery of public services to achieve sustainable cost reductions while maintaining or improving service quality.
It is perhaps unsurprising that the government decided to postpone the three-year Spending Review scheduled for 2024 until after the general election, given how the Office for Budget Responsibility has highlighted how the 2021 Spending Review led to a departmental spending increase of £32bn a year, or around 1.2% of GDP. A similar revision to current spending plans would have more than absorbed the amounts used for tax cuts in the Autumn Statement 2023 and the Spring Budget 2024, or pushed up borrowing levels even higher than are currently planned.
If we are lucky, there will be more detail on each party’s tax and spending plans in their manifesto documents. Then again…
Now that the dust has settled on last month’s Spring Budget, ICAEW has published a more detailed analysis on the implications for the public finances.
ICAEW’s Fiscal Insight on the Spring Budget 2024 provides an analysis of the key numbers, risks to the Office for Budget Responsibility forecast, tax measures, forecast revisions since the 2023 Autumn Statement, the fiscal position in the 2024/25 Budget year, borrowing over the next five years, the calculation of underlying debt, the £1.2trn that HM Treasury needs to raise from debt investors, and our conclusions on what the numbers mean for the public finances.
Key points highlighted in the report include:
Headlines
Modest improvement in forecasts and small tax increases ‘pay for’ national insurance cut.
Headroom of £9bn against the Chancellor’s primary fiscal rule is tiny compared with risks.
End of low-cost borrowing is hampering investment in infrastructure and public services.
Weak economy, high debt, demographic challenges, underperforming public services.
No long-term fiscal strategy.
Key numbers
Tax and other receipts of £1,139bn in 2024/25, equivalent to £1,375 per person per month.
Public spending of £1,226bn in 2024/25, equivalent to £1,480 per person per month.
Deficit projected to fall by a quarter to £87bn in 2024/25 and gradually to £39bn in 2028/29.
Headline debt expected to reach £2.8trn by March 2025 and £3.0trn by March 2029.
Underlying debt/GDP forecast to increase from 88.8% to 93.2% and then fall to 92.9%.
Conclusions
Difficult choices on spending deferred until after the general election.
Post-election tax increases likely, irrespective of who wins the general election.
A badly designed fiscal rule driving poor decisions and unrealistic spending forecasts.
Predicted reduction in the deficit to below 2% of GDP by 2027/28 is unlikely to occur.
Further pre-election tax cuts could affect credibility with debt markets.
Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director for Public Sector and Taxation, is quoted in the Fiscal Insight as follows:
“The principal story of the Spring Budget has been how the Chancellor was able to find room for tax cuts while still meeting his fiscal targets to ‘bring down debt and the deficit’.
“This is a frustrating narrative as it misses the bigger picture of public finances that are on an unsustainable path, with little sign of a long-term fiscal strategy to address demographic change, growing balance sheet liabilities, underperforming public services, rising debt interest, or resilience against future economic shocks.
“Debt is high and projected to be even higher in five years’ time than it is today. ‘Headroom’ is tiny in context of trillions of pounds of tax receipts and public spending over the next five years and forecasts that don’t reflect government practice in freezing fuel duties nor likely spending increases from the now postponed Spending Review.
“And we have a fiscal target that discourages essential infrastructure investment while at the same time never needing to be achieved as it is rolled forward each year.
“All of our fiscal eggs are now in a basket labelled ‘hope’ [for economic growth].”
Fiscal Insight
Read the full Fiscal Insight report, which provides detailed analysis on the Spring Budget’s implications for the public finances.
My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how retail sales have increased by 19.5% over the past five years, comprising a 1.4% fall in volumes and a 21.2% increase in prices.
The latest statistics from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) up to February 2024 highlight how retail sales in Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland) have been on a rollercoaster ride over the past five years as the pandemic, then the cost-of-living crisis, battered the economy.
As our chart of the week illustrates, changes in retail sales can be split between volumes and prices, with growth in retail sales of 19.5% over the five years to February 2024 consisting of a 1.4% fall in volumes and a 21.2% increase in prices.
Our chart also shows how retail sales have increased by year, starting with a 0.8% increase in retail sales in the year to February 2020 (from a 0.2% fall in volumes and a 1% increase in prices) before the first pandemic lockdown the following month. That first year of the pandemic to February 2021 resulted in a 4.4% decline in sales (a 3.3% fall in volumes and a 1.1% reduction in prices) as we cut back on spending, followed by a massive 15.4% jump in retail sales in the year to February 2022 (7% from higher volumes and 7.8% from higher prices) as the nation emerged and started to spend heavily.
The cost-of-living crisis was behind a 5% increase in retail sales in the year to February 2023, as although prices rose 9.6% as inflation accelerated, households cut back on what they bought in response to drive a 4.2% fall in retail volumes.
Retail sales were up by a more modest 2.3% in the year to February 2024, comprising a 0.3% fall in volumes and a 2.6% increase in prices as inflation moderated.
Evening out the ups and downs gives an average increase in retail sales of 3.6% a year over the last five years, comprising an average fall of 0.3% a year in volumes and an average increase of 3.9% in prices.
This is not as positive a picture for retail business as the numbers might imply. Although it appears that retailers are selling slightly less overall at much higher prices, our chart doesn’t reflect the substantial increases many have seen in their input costs over the same period.
For more ICAEW analysis on the economy, click here.
My chart for ICAEW this week takes a look at how average earnings have risen over the last decade and how they compare with the headline rate of inflation.
According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), average weekly earnings including bonuses on a seasonally adjusted basis increased by 5.5% between January 2023 and January 2024 to £672 (equivalent to £2,912 per month). This is 1.5 percentage points higher than the rate of consumer price inflation (CPI) over the same 12-month period of 4.0%.
While this might seem positive for the theoretical ‘average’ worker, this follows a 6.2% increase in the preceding year to January 2023, 3.9 percentage points lower than the corresponding 10.1% increase in consumer prices.
Our chart this week takes these numbers back a decade, with CPI of 0.3%, 0.3%, 1.8%, 3.0%, 1.8%, 1.8%, 0.7%, 5.5%, 10.1% and 4.0% respectively in the years from January 2015 through to January 2024. Average earnings increased by 1.4%, 2.8%, 1.7%, 2.6%, 3.8%, 3.1%, 4.3%, 5.1%, 6.2% and 5.5% respectively over the same period, giving rise to net differences of +1.1%, +2.5%, -0.1%, -0.4%, +2.0%, +1.3%, +1.3%, +3.6%, -0.4%, -3.9% and +1.5%.
Overall, wages have increased faster than inflation over the last decade, up 43.2% compared with a 32.8% increase in the CPI Index, equivalent to average rises of 3.7% a year and 2.9% a year respectively – or a net 0.8 percentage point a year improvement in average wages over CPI.
Private sector wages have risen faster at 45.7% over ten years (3.8% a year on average), while public sector wages have gone up by 33.7% (2.9% a year on average), only marginally ahead of CPI (by 0.07% a year). Of course, averages are just that and individual and household experiences will differ significantly.
This comparison would not be approved of by the statistical authorities, who prefer the consumer prices including housing (CPIH) measure of inflation to headline CPI. However, CPIH was up 31.7% over the past decade to January 2024 (or 2.8% a year on average), so while the numbers might have been slightly different in individual years if we had used CPIH in the chart, the increase in average wages over 10 years is only slightly better – by 1.1% in total or 0.1% a year on average.
Assuming inflation falls to below 2% later this year as predicted, the picture for the coming year is likely to show a significant positive variance for earnings, especially given the 9.8% increase in the minimum wage scheduled for April. This should have the effect of pushing up average earnings, unless something very surprising happens to wages further up the income scale.
For more ICAEW analysis on the economy, click here.
Our chart this week takes a look at the effect of the Spring Budget 2024 on the public finances.
This week’s chart summarises the changes announced in the Spring Budget 2024, analysing the changes in the budgeted fiscal deficit for 2024/25 and the forecast fiscal deficit for 2028/29 since the forecasts that accompanied the Autumn Statement 2023 last November.
As the chart illustrates, the budgeted deficit for 2024/25 of £85bn anticipated in November has been revised up to £87bn, comprising forecast revisions reducing the deficit of £10bn, followed by tax cuts of £14bn increasing the deficit, offset by tax rises of close to zero and other changes of £2bn reducing the deficit.
The chart also shows the changes to the final year of the forecast period, with the forecast of deficit £35bn at the time of the Autumn Statement 2023 reduced by £1bn from forecast revisions, increased by £13bn to fund tax cuts, reduced by £6bn from tax rises and £2bn from other changes to reach a new forecast for the deficit in 2028/29 of £39bn.
The good news for the Chancellor was the improvement in the public finances in the earlier years of the forecast, with interest rate expectations coming down from last year. This resulted in an improvement in the forecasts of £16bn in 2024/25 and £14bn in 2028/29, offset by the effect of lower inflation expectations on tax and other receipts of £2bn and £13bn respectively to result in net forecast revisions of £10bn and £1bn respectively. The lower inflation assumption has a bigger impact over time as there is a compounding effect on tax and other receipts.
This allowed the Chancellor to announce a two-percentage point cut in national insurance pushing up the deficit by £10bn in 2024/25 and £11bn in 2028/29, together with freezes in fuel and alcohol duties, changes in the high-income child benefit charge, an increase in the VAT threshold from £85,000 to £90,000, and a four-percentage point cut in capital gains tax on property sales from 28% to 24%. The latter change is expected to increase tax receipts by a few hundred million pounds a year as it is expected to encourage more property sales, with higher volumes offsetting lower tax on each sale. Overall, these other tax cuts push up the deficit by £4bn in 2024/25 and £2bn in 2028/29.
The forecast revisions weren’t enough to allow the Chancellor to cover the cost of cutting taxes, and so he also announced some tax rises. These include the introduction of a duty on vaping and an increase in tobacco duty, an extension of the energy profits levy to March 2029, and changes in the tax treatment of ‘non-doms’. These have a relatively small effect in 2024/25 but build up to a reduction in the deficit around £6bn a year by 2028/29.
Other changes of £2bn in 2024/25 comprised £1bn in other policy measures and £1bn in indirect benefits to the economy from the Chancellor’s announcements in 2024/25, while the £2bn in 2028/29 reflected £1bn from improvements in tax collection, £1bn in other measures, and £2bn from indirect benefits to the economy, offset by £1bn from interest on increased borrowing, and £1bn to be invested in public sector productivity.
In summary, these are relatively tiny changes in the outlook for the public finance in the context of £1.2trn of public spending each year and public sector net debt that is still on track to exceed £3.0trn by the end of the forecast period in March 2029.
Even relatively small changes in economic assumptions, in spending plans, or in tax policies could have a significant impact on the fiscal forecasts, especially those for 2028/29.
For more information about the Spring Budget 2024 and ICAEW’s letters to the Chancellor and HM Treasury, click here.
While tax cuts will likely headline next week’s Spring Budget, debt markets will be questioning plans to reduce the deficit by constraining public spending.
Last week’s chart of the week looked at the pre-Budget forecast for debt and the very low level of headroom the Chancellor had against his primary fiscal rule of seeing debt falling by the final year of the forecast period.
Our chart this week is on the ‘P&L’ side of the equation, illustrating how the Chancellor’s plan at the time of the Autumn Statement 2023 was to bring down the deficit by constraining growth in public spending to less than the level of growth in tax and other receipts.
The starting point is the deficit of £85bn for the financial year ending March 2025 (2024/25) forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility last November, with spending (excluding interest) expected to increase by less each year than receipts (net of interest): by £13bn and £21bn respectively in 2025/26, £10bn and £19bn in 2026/27, £5bn and £24bn in 2027/28, and £7bn and £21bn in 2089/29, to reach a projected deficit of £35bn in 2028/29.
If achieved, this would see the deficit reduce to the equivalent of 1.6% in 2027/28 and 1.1% of GDP in 2028/29, the first time the deficit would come in below 2% of GDP since 2002/03, a quarter of a century earlier.
Although the increases in taxes and other receipts may seem substantial, they are broadly in line with the projected growth in the size of the economy, with ‘fiscal drag’ from the freezing of several key tax allowances mitigating the effect of tax cuts announced last November. Meanwhile, planned spending increases are relatively small in the context of the overall public finances, equivalent to real terms rises in public spending excluding interest of 1.1%, 0.8%, 0.4% and 0.5% respectively.
This relatively low level of increase in spending may seem surprising in the context of demographic changes that are pushing up spending on pensions, health and social care, a deteriorating international security situation, the severe financial difficulties facing many local authorities, and the pressure many other public services are under, not to mention the need to increase investment in infrastructure if the economy is to return to growth.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies has questioned whether the Chancellor’s spending plans are realistically achievable, given that they imply significant cuts in the budgets of unprotected departments over the course of the forecast period. These are unlikely to be deliverable in practice.
A modest boost to public finances reported in the current financial year, together with moderating interest rate expectations, are expected to provide the Chancellor with capacity to cut taxes while still meeting his fiscal rules. But debt investors will be wondering how much an incoming government – irrespective of which party wins power – will actually be able to raise taxes to fully cover expected spending-plan revisions. Not raising taxes sufficiently in the first Budget after the election would likely lead to the next government needing to borrow even more at a time when the Bank of England is flooding debt markets with gilts as it unwinds quantitative easing.
For more information about the Spring Budget 2024 and ICAEW’s letters to the Chancellor and HM Treasury, click here.
My chart for ICAEW this week looks ahead to the Spring Budget and asks how much headroom the Chancellor will have available for tax cuts or higher spending while still meeting his fiscal targets.
The Chancellor is currently getting ready for his Spring Budget on Wednesday 6 March 2024, with rumours, leaks and misinformation swirling around ahead of what will be a keenly watched event – quite probably the last fiscal event before the general election.
As our chart illustrates, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) at the time of the Autumn Statement last November projected that the ratio of underlying debt to GDP would increase in the current financial year (2023/24) and further over the first four years of the forecast period, before starting to fall in the final year (2028/29).
Underlying debt is defined as public sector net debt (PSND) excluding Bank of England liabilities (PSNDexBoE). This alternative metric avoids distortion in the headline measure of debt caused by £170bn of Term Funding Scheme loan receivables not netted against related Bank of England liabilities that will reduce PSND as these loans are repaid, even though net financial assets and liabilities are not changing.
The projected increases are +4.1% from 84.9% at March 2023 to 89.0% at the end of 2023/24, +2.6% to 91.6% in 2024/25, +1.1% to 92.7% in 2025/26 and +0.5% to 93.2% in 2026/27, before staying flat in 2027/28 and then falling -0.4% to 92.8% in March 2029.
The fall in 2028/29 projected by the OBR in November provided the Chancellor with £13bn of fiscal headroom in the final year of the forecast. In theory this meant he could have planned to spend more, or cut taxes, by up to £13bn in 2028/29 and still met his primary fiscal target, which is for underlying debt/GDP to be declining in the final year of the fiscal forecast period.
Building such a relatively small amount of headroom into a forecast – less than four days of total government spending – is perhaps surprising given the high degree of uncertainty in predicting future receipts, spending and borrowing, not to mention GDP. These numbers can all move by tens of billions between forecasts, as the economic situation changes and policy and budgetary decisions are made.
GDP can be especially variable, with the Office for National Statistics making frequent revisions to its estimates, sometimes many years later. Several commentators also believe the numbers for planned public spending from April 2025 onwards are unrealistic and that there will be a need to revise these numbers upwards in subsequent fiscal events.
Although there has been a modest boost to the public finances in the reported numbers for the first 10 months of the current financial year, underlying debt/GDP at January 2023 was 88.1%, on track to end the financial year at close to the 89.0% in the November OBR forecast.
The news that the UK had entered recession in the last quarter of 2023 will not have been positive for the Chancellor in his search for additional headroom but, despite this, it is believed that the forecasts will improve sufficiently to allow him some capacity to either increase the total amounts allocated to public spending, or announce tax cuts, while still keeping with his fiscal targets. Of these options, tax cuts are considered much more likely.
Either way, underlying debt/GDP will be expected to be higher in five years’ time – potentially even higher than in previous forecasts. From a fiscal target perspective, what is important is whether the ratio is falling in the fifth year of the forecast period, not the overall change in the level between now and then.
For more information about the Spring Budget 2024 and ICAEW’s letters to the Chancellor and HM Treasury, click here.
Prior month revisions boost public finances despite worse than expected self assessment receipts, as a think tank says tax cuts in the Budget will be sandwiched between tax rises in the years before and after.
The monthly public sector finances for January 2024 reported a provisional surplus for the month of £17bn, slightly less than expected, while at the same time revising the year-to-date deficit down.
The figures, released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) yesterday, show a cumulative deficit for the first 10 months of the financial year to £97bn, £3bn less than in the same period last year. The year-to-date variance against the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)’s Autumn Statement forecast improved from £5bn last month to £9bn this month.
Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director for Public Sector and Taxation, said: “Lower self assessment tax receipts than expected in January were offset by revisions to numbers from previous months to improve the overall financial picture.
“This small improvement helps only a little with an extremely weak fiscal position facing the Chancellor as he approaches the Budget, with questions already being asked about whether existing plans to cut public spending in the near term are realistically achievable. Rumours that the Chancellor is thinking about further reductions in public spending to fund tax cuts will therefore need to be balanced with his ability to maintain credibility with debt markets.”
The Resolution Foundation reported that likely net tax cuts in the coming financial year of around £10bn are sandwiched between £20bn of tax rises that have already been implemented in the current financial year – including threshold freezes and the corporation tax rate rise from 19% to 25% – and £17bn in net tax rises that have been pre-announced up to 2027/28 (primarily from threshold freezes and stamp duty land tax).
The think tank’s pre-Budget analysis estimates that the cut in national insurance announced in November plus around £10bn in potential new tax cuts to be announced in the Budget would result in a net reduction in taxes of just under £10bn for 2024/25 after taking account of threshold freezes and other tax changes.
The Resolution Foundation analysis does not take account of the normal pattern that sees governments typically raise taxes in the first Budget after a general election, which is even more likely this time around given what many commentators believe are unrealistic spending assumptions for 2025/26 onwards.
Month of January 2024
Self assessment tax receipts were lower than expected in January 2024, with the fiscal surplus of £17bn for the month coming in at £9bn better than last year but £2bn less than the OBR’s Autumn Statement projection.
Taxes and other receipts amounted to £120bn, up 4% compared with January 2023, while total managed expenditure was £103bn, down 5%.
Public sector net debt as of 31 January 2024 was £2,646bn or 96.5% of GDP, £41bn lower than 31 December but £107bn higher than at the start of the financial year.
Ten months to January 2024
The provisional shortfall in taxes and other receipts compared with total managed expenditure for the first five sixths of the 2023/24 financial year to January 2024 was £97bn, £3bn less than the £100bn deficit reported for the first ten months of 2022/23. This reflected a year-to-date shortfall between tax and other receipts of £901bn and total managed expenditure of £998bn, up 6% and 5% compared with April 2022 to January 2023.
Inflation benefited tax receipts for the first 10 months compared with the same period in the previous year, with income tax up 11% to £224bn and VAT up 6% to £165bn. Corporation tax receipts were up 17% to £85bn, partly reflecting the increase in the corporation tax rate from 19% to 25% from 1 April 2023.
Meanwhile,national insurance receipts were up by just 1% to £148bn as the abolition of the short-lived health and social care levy in 2022/23 offset the effect of wage increases in the current financial year, as well as the cut in national insurance implemented in January.
Council tax receipts were up 6% to £36bn, but stamp duty on properties was down by 25% to £11bn and the total for all other taxes was flat at £137bn as economic activity slowed. Non-tax receipts were up 10% to £95bn, primarily driven by higher investment income and higher interest charged on student loans.
Total managed expenditure of £998bn in the ten months to January 2024 can be analysed between current expenditure excluding interest of £846bn, interest of £105bn and net investment of £47bn, compared with £949n in the same period in the previous year, comprising £810bn, £114bn and £25bn respectively.
The increase of £36bn or 4% in current expenditure excluding interest was driven by a £28bn increase in pension and other welfare benefits (including cost-of-living payments), £18bn in higher central government pay and £10bn in additional central government procurement spending, less £13bn in lower subsidy payments (principally relating to energy support schemes) and £7bn in net other changes.
The fall in interest costs for the ten months of £9bn or 8% to £105bn comprises a £23bn or 50% reduction to £23bn for interest accrued on index-linked debt as the rate of inflation fell, partially offset by a £14bn or 21% increase to £82bn from higher interest rates on variable-rate debt and new and refinanced fixed-rate debt.
The £21bn increase in net investment spending to £47bn in the first ten months of the current year is distorted by a one-off credit of £10bn arising from changes in interest rates and repayment terms of student loans recorded in December 2022. Adjusting for that credit, the increase of £12bn reflects high construction cost inflation amongst other factors that saw a £16bn or 19% increase in gross investment to £101bn, less a £4bn or 8% increase in depreciation to £54bn.
Public sector finance trends: January 2024
The cumulative deficit of £97bn for the first 10 months of the financial year is £9bn below the OBR’s November 2023 forecast of £106bn for that same period. The OBR is forecasting deficits of £6bn and £12bn in February and March to result in a full year forecast of £124bn, or £115bn if the £9bn forecast variance persists.
Balance sheet metrics
Public sector net debt was £2,646bn at the end of January 2024, equivalent to 96.5% of GDP.
The debt movement since the start of the financial year is £107bn, comprising borrowing to fund the deficit for the ten months of £97bn plus £10bn in net cash outflows to fund lending to students, businesses and others, net of loan repayments and working capital movements.
Public sector net debt is £831bn more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic and £2,108bn more than the £538bn number as of 31 March 2007 before the financial crisis, reflecting the huge sums borrowed over the last couple of decades.
Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS this year, was -£677bn on 31 January 2024, comprising £1,584bn in non-financial assets and £1,047bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,646bn of net debt (£303bn liquid financial assets – £2,949bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £662bn. This is a £62bn deterioration from the -£615bn reported for 31 March 2023.
Revisions
Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled.
The latest release saw the ONS revise the reported deficit for the nine months to December 2023 down by £6bn from £119bn to £113bn as estimates of tax receipts and expenditure were updated for better data and the correction of errors in HMRC reporting, while the debt to GDP ratio at the end of December 2023 was revised up by 0.5 percentage points from 97.7% to 98.2% as GDP estimates were updated.
The ONS also revised its estimate for the deficit for the financial year to March 2023, down by £1bn to £129bn for 2022/23.
Two quarters of shallow negative GDP growth may be just enough for the UK to be in a mere ‘technical’ recession, but seven successive quarters of negative GDP growth per capita present a more worrying picture.
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) released its latest statistics on quarterly GDP on 15 February 2024, reporting that GDP in the fourth quarter of 2023 (October to December) had fallen by 0.3% compared with the previous quarter, which in turn was 0.1% below the quarter before that. This was sufficient for the UK to meet one of widely accepted definitions of a recession: two successive quarters of economic contraction.
Many economists have chosen to describe this as a ‘technical’ recession given how shallow the fall in growth has been over the past two quarters, very different from the scale of contraction seen in ‘proper’ recessions such as that experienced during the financial crisis (when GDP fell in the order of 6% over four successive quarters). The ‘technical’ label also emphasises how relatively small subsequent revisions to the quarterly statistics could easily lift the UK out of recession again.
Perhaps more worrying for all of us living in the UK are how changes in GDP per capita have been negative over the past seven quarters, as illustrated by our chart this week. GDP per person can often be more important to individuals than the overall change in GDP given how living standards are, by definition, experienced on a per capita basis.
According to the official chained volume measure of GDP per head, economic activity per capita grew by 0.2% in the first quarter of 2022 (over the previous quarter) but has declined since then: by -0.2%, -0.2% and -0.0% respectively in the second, third and fourth quarters of 2022, and then -0.1%, -0.2%, -0.4% and -0.6% in the first, second, third and fourth quarters of 2023.
Overall, this is equivalent to a reduction of 1.5% in GDP per head between the fourth quarter of 2021 and the fourth quarter of 2023, although one additional note of caution is that the per capita numbers are based on population projections that are even more susceptible to revision than estimates of the size of the economy. Despite that, these numbers are not a sign of an economy doing well.
The per capita numbers put the reported GDP growth rates for the same eight quarters of +0.5%, +0.1%, -0.1%, +0.1%, +0.2%, +0.0%, -0.1%, and -0.3% respectively (equivalent to cumulative GDP growth of +0.4% between 2021 Q4 and 2023 Q4), into perspective, highlighting just how weak the performance of the UK economy has been over the past two years.
Just as the recession is being described as ‘technical’, there are good arguments for describing positive growth in GDP as also ‘technical’ when per capita growth is negative at the same time, reflecting how much stronger economic growth needs to be for living standards to improve.
![Table with fiscal numbers for the ten months to Jan 2020, Jan 2021, Jan 2022, Jan 2023 and Jan 2024, all in £bn.
Receipts: 685 | 647 | 754 | 849 | 901
Expenditure: (588) | (746) | (686) | (722) | (761)
Interest: (44) | (33) | (55) | (103) | (97)
Net investment: (26) | (51) | (35) | (16) | (37)
[subtotal] Deficit: (61) | (270) | (123) | (108) | (119)
Other borrowing: 3 | (67) | (85) | (8) | (27)
[total] Debt movement: (58) | (337) | (208) | (116) | (146)
Net debt: 1,835 | 2,152 | 2,360 | 2,497 | 2,686
Net debt / GDP: 84.8% | 98.7% | 97.9% | 95.8% | 97.7%](https://martinwheatcroft.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Public-sector-finance-trends-2024-01.jpg)
