Government deficit hits £100bn in the first half of the financial year

Revisions and corrections help reduce the budget overrun to £7bn for the six months to September 2025, but the outlook remains bleak.

The UK government deficit hit £100bn in the six months to September 2025, according to the latest Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) monthly public sector finances release for September 2025, published on 21 October 2025. 

The report also revealed a provisional shortfall between receipts and public spending of £20bn last month. The deficit for the month was £1bn higher than the previous year, in line with the budget. The cumulative deficit was £12bn higher than the first half of 2024/25, and £7bn more than budgeted.

Month of September 2025

Provisional receipts and total public spending for September – £95bn and £115bn respectively – were each 8% more than the previous year.

Current spending included depreciation of £108bn, comparable to the £108bn monthly average in the first five months of the financial year. Net investment was £7bn, higher than the £4bn monthly average investment between April and August 2025.

Excluding net investment, the current budget deficit for the month was £13bn – £2bn more than in the same month last year, £1bn more than budgeted. This was offset by a £1bn underspend on net investment.

Six months to September 2025

The provisional deficit for the six months to September 2025 was £12bn (14%) more than in the same six months last year. This was £7bn higher than budget, which can be analysed as a £13bn budget overrun on the current budget deficit (current receipts less current spending), less a £6bn underspend on net investment.

Table 1 highlights the changes in year-to-date receipts, up 7% overall on last year’s equivalents. These increases were mostly driven by factors such as inflation and fiscal drag from frozen tax allowances. The 20% increase in national insurance revenues reflects the increase in employers’ national insurance.

The 9% increase in current spending over the year has been driven by public sector pay rises, higher supplier costs, and the uprating of welfare benefits.

Net investment of £28bn in the first six months of 2025/26 was £1bn, or 4% higher than the same period last year. Capital expenditure of £46bn was up by £2bn and capital transfers (capital grants, research and development funding, and student loan write-offs) of £18bn were up by £1bn, offset by depreciation of £36bn, up by £2bn.

Table 1  Summary receipts and spending

6 months to Sep2025/26
£bn
2024/25
£bn
Change
%
Income VAT145133+9%
VAT104100+4%
National insurance9882+20%
Corporation tax5248+8%
Other taxes115112+3%
Other receipts6362+2%
Current receipts577537+7%
Public services(363)(334)+9%
Welfare(155)(146+6%
Subsidies(18)(17)+6%
Debt interest(77)(67)+15%
Depreciation(36)(34)+6%
Current spending(649)(598)+9%
Current deficit(72)(61)+18%
Net investment(28)(27)+4%
Deficit(100)(88)+14%

Budget for the rest of the financial year

The deficit is budgeted to be £118bn for the full year ending 31 March 2026, comprising £93bn in the first half of the year to September 2025 and £25bn in the second half of the year.

Borrowing and debt

Table 2 summarises government borrowing in the first six months of the financial year, taking public sector net debt to a provisional £2,916bn on 30 September 2025. This comprised £100bn in public sector net borrowing (PSNB) to fund the deficit and a further £6bn to fund government lending and working capital requirements.

The table also illustrates how the debt-to-GDP ratio increased by 1.6 percentage points, from a revised 93.7% of GDP at the start of the financial year to 95.3% on 30 September 2025, with incremental borrowing of £106bn, equivalent to 3.5% of GDP. It was partly offset by 1.9 percentage points due to inflation and economic growth adding to GDP.

Table 2  Public sector net debt and net debt/GDP

6 months to Sep2025/26
£bn
2024/25
£bn
PSNB10088
Other borrowing6(14)
Net change10674
Opening net debt2,8102,686
Closing net debt2,9162,760
PSNB/GDP3.3%3.1%
Other/GDP0.2%(0.5%)
Inflating away(1.9%)(2.7%)
Net change1.6%(0.1%)
Opening net debt/GDP93.7%94.4%
Closing net debt/GDP95.3%94.3%

Public sector net debt on 30 September 2025 of £2,916bn comprised gross debt of £3,368bn less cash and other liquid financial assets of £452bn. 

Public sector net financial liabilities were £2,565bn, comprising the net debt plus other financial liabilities of £715bn, less illiquid financial assets of £1,066bn. Public sector negative net worth was £908bn – net financial liabilities of £2,565bn less non-financial assets of £1,657bn.

Revisions

Caution is needed with ONS figures, which are repeatedly revised as estimates are refined, and gaps in the underlying data are filled. This includes local government, where numbers are updated in arrears and are based on budget or high-level estimates in the absence of monthly data collection.

This month, the ONS revised down the previously reported deficit for the five months to August 2025 by £4bn, including a £2bn error correction for understated VAT receipts. The ONS also increased the reported deficit for the previous financial year (2024/25) by £4bn to £150bn to incorporate estimates of local government actual expenditure.

More significantly, the ONS revised its methodology for calculating economic activity, resulting in an increase in GDP of 1%. Doing so causes historical percentages for deficit and debt as a proportion of GDP to be revised downwards. This includes a 1.1 percentage reduction in public sector net debt/GDP at the start of the financial year on 1 April 2025, from the previously reported 94.8% to the 93.7% shown in Table 2.  

Martin Wheatcroft, external advisor on public finances to ICAEW, said that public finances were broadly as expected, with the £20bn deficit for the month in line with budget.

“Borrowing to fund the deficit was a fraction under £100bn in the six months to September, the second-highest half-year deficit on record after the pandemic year. This was despite a narrowing of the year-to-date budget overrun to £7bn, as a consequence of error corrections and other revisions to previous months. In addition, statistical revisions to the size of the economy resulted in around a percentage point fall in the ratio of public sector net debt to GDP.”

Tepid economic growth and high debt interest costs will continue to weigh on prospects for the rest of the financial year, he added. “The revisions do very little to alter the bleak outlook for the public finances that is driving the need for a significant fiscal correction in the Autumn Budget 2025.”

This article was written by Martin Wheatcroft for ICAEW and was originally published by ICAEW.

Public finances turn ugly just as Chancellor needs good news

Weaker receipts than expected combined with prior month corrections resulted in a £12bn year-to-date budget overrun in the August monthly public finances.

The monthly public sector finances release for August 2025 published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 19 September reported a provisional shortfall between receipts and total public spending of £18bn in August 2025 and £84bn for the five months then ended. These were £6bn and £12bn over budget respectively and £4bn and £16bn higher than in the same periods in 2024.

Martin Wheatcroft, external adviser on public finances to ICAEW, says: “This month’s public finance numbers took a turn for the worse as not only did weaker than expected receipts drive a £6bn budget overrun in August, but revisions to prior months added a further £6bn to the deficit to turn a broadly neutral position a month ago into a £12bn year-to-date budget overrun for the first five months of the 2025/26 financial year.

“These numbers are far from helpful to a Chancellor in desperate need of some good financial news, adding to the prospect of even higher tax rises in the Autumn Budget 2025 than previously feared.”

Month of August 2025

Receipts of £93bn in August 2025 were £5bn or 5% higher than the same month last year, while total public spending was £111bn, £8bn or 8% more than in August 2024. The latter can be analysed between current spending including depreciation of £107bn, slightly below the £108bn monthly average in the first four months of the financial year, and net investment of £4bn, in line with the monthly average incurred between April and July 2025.

Excluding net investment, the current budget deficit for the month of £14bn represented a £4bn deterioration over the current budget deficit of £10bn in the same month last year, highlighting how receipts have failed to keep pace with increases in current spending.

The overall £18bn fiscal deficit for the month was £6bn over budget and £4bn more than in August 2024.

Five months to August 2025

Table 1 highlights how year-to-date receipts of £477bn were up 6% on last year’s equivalents. This included income tax receipts, up 8% from a combination of inflation and fiscal drag from frozen tax allowances, and national insurance receipts, up 18% as a consequence of the increase in employer national insurance from April 2025. VAT receipts were flat year-on-year, in effect a 3% to 4% fall after taking account of consumer price inflation, highlighting the weak economic conditions facing the UK.

Meanwhile, the 8% increase over last year in current spending including depreciation to £539bn in the first five months to August 2025 has principally been driven by public sector pay rises, higher supplier costs, and the uprating of welfare benefits.

This included a £7bn or 12% increase in debt interest to £64bn, which comprised a £6bn increase in indexation on inflation-linked debt as inflation resurged and a £1bn increase in interest on variable and fixed-interest debt. The latter reflects a higher level of debt compared with a year ago being partially offset by a lower Bank of England base rate.

The resulting current budget deficit of £62bn to August 2025 was 29% higher than the £48bn for the same five months last year, a major concern given that the government’s plan was to reduce the cumulative current budget deficit to £47bn at this point.

Net investment of £22bn in the first five months of 2025/26 was £2bn or 10% higher than the same period last year with capital expenditure of £39bn up by £3bn and capital transfers (capital grants, research and development funding, and student loan write-offs) of £13bn up by £1bn, offset by depreciation of £30bn up by £2bn.

The overall provisional deficit for the five months to August 2025 of £84bn is £16bn or 24% more than in the same five months last year and £12bn higher than budget. The latter can be analysed as a £15bn budget overrun on current receipts less current spending for the year-to-date, less a £3bn saving on net investment.

Table 1: Summary receipts and spending

5 months to Aug2025/26
£bn
2024/25
£bn
Change
%
Income tax122113+8%
VAT8484
National insurance8068+18%
Corporation tax4340+7%
Other taxes9693+3%
Other receipts5251+2%
Current receipts477449+6%
    
Public services(301)(276)+9%
Welfare(129)(122)+6%
Subsidies(15)(14)+7%
Debt interest(64)(57)+12%
Depreciation(30)(28)+7%
Current spending(539)(497)+8%
Current deficit(62)(48)+29%
Net investment(22)(20)+10%
Deficit(84)(68)+24%

Borrowing and debt

Table 2 summarises how the government borrowed £99bn in the first five months of the financial year to take public sector net debt to a provisional £2,909bn on 31 August 2025. This comprised £84bn in public sector net borrowing (PSNB) to fund the deficit and a further £15bn to fund government lending and working capital requirements.

The table also illustrates how the debt to GDP ratio increased by 1.6 percentage points from 94.8% of GDP at the start of the financial year to 96.4% on 31 August 2025, with incremental borrowing of £99bn, equivalent to 3.3% of GDP, being partly offset by 1.7 percentage points from the ‘inflating away’ effect of inflation and economic growth adding to GDP, the denominator in the net debt to GDP ratio.

Table 2: Public sector net debt and net debt/GDP

5 months to Aug2025/26
£
bn
2024/25
£
bn
PSNB8468
Other borrowing157
Net change9975
Opening net debt2,8102,686
Closing net debt2,9092,761
   
PSNB/GDP2.8%2.4%
Other/GDP0.5%0.2%
Inflating away(1.7%)(2.3%)
Net change1.6%0.3%
Opening net debt/GDP94.8%95.6%
Closing net debt/GDP96.4%95.9%

Public sector net debt on 31 August 2025 of £2,909bn comprised gross debt of £3,339bn less cash and other liquid financial assets of £430bn. 

Public sector net financial liabilities were £2,550bn, comprising net debt of £2,909bn plus other financial liabilities of £715bn less illiquid financial assets of £1,074bn. 

Public sector negative net worth was £893bn, being net financial liabilities of £2,550bn less non-financial assets of £1,657bn.

Revisions

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled. This includes local government, where the numbers are only updated in arrears and are based on budget or high-level estimates in the absence of monthly data collection.

This month was no different, with the ONS revising the previously reported deficit for the four months to July 2025 up by £6bn, as well as updating prior year numbers for the annual results of the Bank of England and several other public bodies as well as other typical annual updates such as revised student loan calculations. 

More significantly, the ONS revised reported deficits back to 1998 for methodology and classification changes and back to 2011 for local government outturn numbers that had not previously been incorporated. The reported deficits for 2020/21 and 2021/22 were decreased by £3bn and £2bn to £311bn and £120bn respectively, 2022/23 remained unchanged at £127bn, 2023/24 was increased by £2bn to £134bn, and 2024/25 was reduced by £2bn to £146bn.

This article was written by Martin Wheatcroft for ICAEW and was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Employment costs

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how employment costs in June 2025 have risen by 4.8% compared with the same month last year, adding to the expense of doing business in the UK.

ICAEW chart of the week on employment costs. 

A step chart showing the changes between the UK monthly payroll in June 2024 and June 2025.

June 2024: £96,975m UK total gross salaries + £8,848m UK total employer national insurance.

Step 1: -£520m from 0.5% fewer employees. 
Step 2: +£3,985m from 3.6% increase in salaries. 
Step 3: +£1,666m from 17.9% higher employer national insurance. 

Net change: +£5,131m. 

June 2025: £100,000m UK total gross salaries + £10,954m UK total employer national insurance. 

12 Sep 2025. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Sources: ONS, 'PAYE real time information, non-seasonally adjusted'; HMRC, 'Monthly tax receipts'.

According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), UK employers paid a total of £111bn in gross salaries and employer national insurance in June 2025, an increase of £5.1bn or 4.8% over the same month a year ago.

My chart this week starts with the payroll in June 2024 of £105,823, comprising gross salaries paid by employers of £96,975m and employer national insurance of £8,848m, although it excludes employer pension contributions.

This monthly cost was reduced by £520m from a reduction in the national workforce, which saw the number of payrolled employees drop by 149,937 or 0.5% from 30,532,600 in June 2024 to 30,382,663 in June 2025. This arose from 7,296,859 leavers exceeding 7,146,922 joiners, most of which are people moving jobs. The reduction in the number of payrolled employees at a time of still-rising overall population numbers highlights the difficult economic situation currently facing the UK. The reduction comprised £476m in less pay and £44m in less employer national insurance (calculated at last year’s rates)

Salary increases since last year of approximately 3.6% added £3,985m or 3.8% to the cost of employment, with mean salaries increasing from £3,176 in the month of June 2024 to £3,291 in the month of June 2025. This comprised an increase of £3,501m or 3.6% in gross salaries and an estimated increase in employer national insurance of £484m or 5.5% (based on last year’s rates).

The median monthly salary increased from £2,389 in June 2024 to £2,530 in June 2025, which is a 5.9% increase compared with a year previously. This was less than monthly pay at the 25th percentile, which increased by 7.8% from £1,408 to £1,518, which was partly driven by a 6.7% increase in the minimum wage implemented in April 2025 (16.3% for those aged 18 to 20 and 18% for those aged under 18) that help lift the salaries of lower paid workers.

Pay at the 75th percentile increased by 4.7% (from £3,632 to £3,803) compared with a year previously, while pay at the 95th and 99th percentiles increased by 3.1% (from £7,461 to £7,692) and 2.6% (from £15,181 to £15,583) respectively. These lower rates of increase for higher paid workers primarily relate to base pay and so do not tell the full story as bonuses and other variable compensation for 2025 will in most cases not show up in pay packets until early next year.

A further £1,666m or 1.5% was added to the total cost of employment as a consequence of changes in employer national insurance effective from April 2025. These took the rate payable by employers from 13.8% of salaries over £792 a month to 15.0% of salaries above £417 per month, adding an extra 17.9% to the amount paid in employer national insurance after taking account of changes in the number of payrolled employees and salary increases since last year. Just under half of the increase (£808m) resulted from the change in the main rate of employer national insurance going up from 13.8% to 15.0% on salaries above £792 a month, with the balance (£858m) coming from lowering the threshold at which the 15.0% applies to £417 per month.

The overall effect was a net increase of £5,131m or 4.8% in total pay and employer national insurance to £110,954m in June 2025, comprising a net increase of £3,025m or 3.1% in total gross salaries to £100,000m and a net increase of £2,106m or 23.8% in employer national insurance to £10,954m.

The chart does not reflect the full cost of employment as it does not include employer pension contributions, non-payrolled benefits, and employment-related costs such as facilities, equipment, training and travel amongst others. However, it still gives a useful illustration of how payroll costs have changed significantly over the course of one year.

ICAEW’s growth campaign identifies how it is too difficult, expensive and uncertain to do business in the UK and calls for the government to do what it can to streamline regulations, reduce unnecessary costs, and provide businesses with the confidence they need to invest.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Business growth

Our chart this week asks whether the recent low rate of growth in numbers of businesses registered for PAYE and VAT is linked to the increasing difficulty of doing business in the UK.

ICAEW chart of the week on business growth, showing the net change in the number of PAYE and VAT registered businesses by year. 

2017: +13,400 
2018: +35,300 
2019: +44,300 
2020: +13,700 
2021: +9,400 
2022: -48,000 
2023: -26,300 
2024: +12,100 
H1 2025: +10,000 

5 Sep 2025. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Source: ONS, 'Business demography: Q2 (Apr to Jun) 2025.

According to the Office for National Statistics, there were net additions of approximately 13,400, 35,300 and 44,300 to the UK inter-departmental business register in 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively. This was followed by net additions of 13,700 and 9,400 in 2020 and 2021 during the pandemic and then net reductions of 48,000 and 26,300 in 2022 and 2023 during the cost-of-living crisis.

The register started growing again in 2024 with net additions of 12,100, followed by a net increase of approximately 10,000 in the first half of 2025. This rate of increase is significantly lower than the average rate of net business formation before the pandemic but is a significant improvement over the net contraction in the number of businesses in 2022 and 2023 during the cost-of-living crisis.

The net changes are equivalent to 0.5%, 1.3%, 1.6%, 0.5%, 0.3%, -1.7%, -1.0% and 0.4% in the total number of registered businesses in 2017 to 2024 respectively and annualised growth of 0.7% in the first half of 2025.

The total number of PAYE and VAT registered businesses is projected to have reached around 2.75m in June 2025, based on the last published count for March 2024 plus reported movements since then. This is out of an overall total of somewhere in the region of 5.5m businesses in the UK, with the difference mainly due to single-person companies and sole traders that do not employ any staff and operate below the VAT threshold of £90,000 per year.

The approximately 2.75m registered businesses can be analysed into just under 2.1m companies and other types of corporations, approximately 400,000 sole proprietors, 150,000 or so partnerships, and around 100,000 non-profit bodies, mutual associations and public sector organisations. Approximately 945,000 registered businesses are in London and the South East, 675,000 are in the Midlands and the East of England, 535,000 in the North of England, 340,000 in the South West of England and Wales, 175,000 in Scotland, and 80,000 in Northern Ireland.

Business births between 2017 and 2024 were approximately: 338,700; 341,100; 355,700; 322,000; 354,300; 327,500; 307,100; and 310,100; there were 167,600 in the first half of 2025. Business deaths in 2017 to 2024 were: 325,300; 304,800; 311,400; 308,300; 344,900; 375,500; 333,400; and 298,000; with 157,600 in the first half of 2025.

The overall change in the total number of registered businesses between 2017 and the first half of 2025 was 63,900, an average of 7,500 or 0.3% a year over eight and a half years, comprising an annual average of 332,100 business births less 324,600 business deaths in that time.

The chart highlights both the very difficult economic times we have been through in the past few years with the pandemic and cost-of-living crisis and the current period of weak economic growth that has yet to return to pre-pandemic levels.

One of the key ways that we can increase the rate of net business formation is to make it easier to do business in the UK, as discussed in ICAEW’s growth campaign. This asks why it is too difficult, too expensive and too uncertain to do business in the UK today and suggests ways the government can streamline regulation, reduce costs and unnecessary frictions, and provide businesses with greater confidence to invest and grow.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Global GDP

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at the relationship between population and GDP around the world.

A three column chart each adding up to 100% with the central bar showing percentages of the global population, the left-hand bar showing percentages of market GDP. and the right-hand bar showing percentage of power-purchasing-parity (PPP) GDP. The bars are linked with lines to emphasise the relative proportions. 

US & Canada: Market GDP 29% - Population 5% - PPP GDP 16%. 
Europe: Market GDP 23% - Population 7% - PPP GDP 18%. 
China: Market GDP 17% - Population 17% - PPP GDP 20%.  
Rest of the world: Market GDP 24% - Population 28% - PPP GDP 30%. 
South Asia & China: Market GDP 7% - Population 43% - PPP GDP 16%. 

27 Jun 2025. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft. Design by Sunday. Source: IMF, 'World Economic Outlook Database, Apr 2025'.

According to the latest World Economic Outlook Database published by the International Monetary Fund in April 2025, the 387m people that live in the US and Canada, some 5% of the global population of 8.1bn, are together expected to generate about 29% of global economic activity as measured by GDP converted at market exchange rates in 2025. 

The US – the largest economy in the world – is expected to generate 27% with 4.3% of the global population, while Canada with 0.5% of the world’s people represents 2% of the global economy.

My chart this week also shows how the US and Canada together constitute 16% of the global economy using GDP converted on a Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for the relative cost of living between countries. The US is the world’s second largest economy on this basis with 15% of total economic output, while Canada represents 1.3% of the total.

Europe’s 602m people are 7% of the global population (excluding Russia, but including Georgia) and are expected to generate around 23% of global economic output at market exchange rates in 2025 or around 18% on a PPP basis. 

This includes the 452m people or 5.6% of the total living in the EU that generate 18% of global output or 14% on a PPP basis, the second largest economy on a market exchange rate basis and the third largest after adjusting for purchasing power. Germany with 1% population generates 4.3% and 3% of market GDP and PPP GDP respectively, followed by France (0.8% generating 2.9% and 2.2%), Italy (0.7% generating 2.2% and 1.8%), Spain (0.6% generating 1.6% and 1.4%), the Netherlands (0.2% generating 1.2% and 0.7%) and Poland (0.5% generating 0.9% and 1%). 

Outside the EU, the 70m people in the UK, 0.9% of the world’s total, generate 3.4% of global economic activity on a market exchange rate basis and 2.2% on a purchasing power basis.

China’s 1.4bn people constitute 17% of the world’s population and generate 17% of market GDP, in effect the average level of global economic activity on a per capita basis at current exchange rates. However, on a cost-of-living adjusted basis, they are the world’s biggest economy at 20% of PPP GDP and above average on a per capita basis.

The chart groups the rest of East Asia, South East Asia, Oceania, the Middle East, Russia, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean into a ‘rest of the world’ category with 2.3bn people or 28% of the world’s population. They generate 24% of the global economy on a market exchange rate basis and 30% on a purchasing power basis.

This category includes the 10 ASEAN countries in South East Asia that together make up 8.5% of the world’s population, 3.6% of market GDP and 6.4% of PPP GDP led by Indonesia (3.5%, 1.2% and 1.4%). Others include Japan (1.5% population, 3.6% market GDP and 3.3% PPP GDP), Russia (1.5%, 2.3% and 3.5%), Türkiye (1.3%, 1.1% and 1.8%), Mexico (1.6%, 1.6% and 1.6%), South Korea (0.6%, 1.6% and 1.6%), Australia (0.3%, 1.5% and 1%), Brazil (2.6%, 1.0% and 2.4%), Taiwan POC (0.3%, 1% and 0.8%) and Saudi Arabia (0.4%, 0.8% and 1%).

The final category is South Asia and Africa, which together include many of the poorest countries on Earth, with 43% of the global population but just 7% of the global economy based on market exchange rates and 16% on a cost-of-living adjusted basis.

South Asia’s 2bn people are 24.3% of the world’s population, generating 4.4% of market GDP and 10.3% of PPP GDP. This includes India’s 1.5bn people (17.9% of the global population generating 3.6% and 8.5% respectively), the world’s fifth largest national economy at market exchange rates behind the US, China, Germany and Japan, and the third largest on a PPP basis behind China and the US. It also includes Pakistan (3% of the world’s people generating 0.3% and 0.8% of economic activity) and Bangladesh (2.1% generating 0.4% and 0.9%).

Africa’s 1.5bn people constitute 18.3% of the world’s total, generating just 2.7% of market GDP and only 5.3% of PPP GDP. This includes South Africa (0.8%, 0.4% and 0.5%), Egypt (1.3%, 0.3% and 1.1%), Nigeria (2.9%, 0.2% and 0.8%), Ethiopia (1.4%, 0.1% and 0.2%) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.3%, 0.1% and 0.1%).

The chart illustrates how economic activity, both before and after adjusting for purchasing power, is weighted towards the US and Europe, while South Asia and Africa have a long way to go to become as prosperous.

While this may seem a stiff mountain to climb economically, China’s transformation over the last 30 years provides an example of what is possible, especially as ageing populations in many developed countries reduce their ability to grow as quickly as those countries with much younger demographics such as in South Asia and Africa.

As they say, watch this space.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Quarterly GDP over three years

Our chart this week looks at how quarterly GDP has risen from £610.3bn in the first quarter of 2022 to £738.6bn in the first quarter of 2025.

A step chart showing the change in quarterly GDP over the last three years. 
 
Left hand column: Quarterly GDP in 2022 of £610.3bn. 
 
Step 1: Inflation (GDP deflator) +£108.0bn or +17.7%. 
 
Step 4: Economic growth +£20.3bn or +2.8%. 
 
Right hand column: Quarterly GDP in 2025 Q1 of £738.6bn. 
 
Shaded box in the middle of the chart for steps 2 and 3 which are a breakdown of step 4. 
 
Step 2: Population growth +£23.7bn or +3.3bn. 
 
Step 3: Per capita economic growth -£3.4bn or -0.5%. 
 
30 May 2025. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. Source: ONS, 'GDP first quarterly estimate, UK: Jan-Mar 2025'.

According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), GDP was £738.6bn in the quarter from January to March 2025, £128.3bn or 21.0% higher than the £610.3bn reported for the same quarter three years ago.

Our chart of the week illustrates how quarterly GDP was £108.0bn or +17.7% higher in the first quarter of 2025 compared with the same quarter in 2022 as a result of inflation (using the GDP deflator measure) while economic growth contributed a further £20.3bn or +2.8%. 

The chart also breaks down economic growth over the past three years between a contribution from there being more people of £23.7bn or +3.3% and a decline in economic activity per person of £3.4bn or -0.5%.

Not shown on the chart are the changes by year, which comprised annual inflation of +8.2%, +4.1% and +4.5% and annual economic growth of +0.8%, +0.7% and +1.3% in 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 respectively, with the latter split between annual population growth of +1.2%, +1.1% and +1.0%, and annual per capita economic growth of -0.4%, -0.4% and +0.3%. 

Also not shown in the chart is economic growth over the last four quarters, which was +0.5%, +0.0%, +0.1% and +0.7% between the first and second quarters of 2024, the second and third quarters, the third and fourth quarters, and the fourth quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 respectively. These comprised quarterly population growth of +0.3%, +0.2%, +0.2% and +0.2% and quarterly per capita economic growth of +0.2%, -0.2%, -0.1% and +0.5%.

Lower levels of net inward migration are expected to reduce the rate of population growth over the next three years to closer to 0.5% a year, which means that growing the economy faster than inflation will depend on our ability to improve productivity and hence increase real economic activity per person. 

In theory, that should be eminently possible given how per capita economic growth averaged 2.4% per year for the 50 years before the financial crisis. Unfortunately, with per capita growth averaging just 0.6% a year over the past decade, productivity will need to increase significantly if we are to turn the situation around over the coming decade.

The good news is that a 21% increase in GDP means tax receipts should be that much higher. The bad news is that public spending has been going up, too.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Economic outlook

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how the OBR is forecasting growth in economic activity per person of 1.1% a year between 2024 and 2030. While better than the average of 0.3% a year achieved over the past 16 years, it is significantly lower than the 2.3% a year seen in the 50 years before that.

Line chart showing GDP per capita between Q1 2008 and Q1 2030, with the forecast period from Q1 2024 onwards shaded grey.

GDP per capita - blue line falling from 2008 to 2010 then rising unevenly to 2019 falling hugely in 2020 then rising again to just below 2019 in 2021 before falling to 2024 and then a projected rise from 2024 onwards.

Trend lines overlaid as follows: 
Q1 1958 to Q1 2008: +2.3% a year (not shown in the chart). 
Q1 2008 to Q1 2024: +0,3% a year (purple). 
Q1 2009 to Q3 2019: +1.3% a year (yellow). 
Q1 2024 to Q1 2030: +1.1% a year (dotted black line).

My chart of the week is on the economic projections calculated by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in its October 2024 economic and fiscal outlook that accompanied the Autumn Budget 2024.

This assumption is a key driver for the OBR’s fiscal projections for tax receipts between now and March 2030, and hence how much the government will need to borrow to finance the current deficit and its investment plans.

The chart starts in March 2008 at the height of the financial crisis, illustrating how economic activity per person after adjusting for inflation fell significantly until September 2009. Real GDP per capita then grew at an average rate of 1.3% a year until September 2019, before the rollercoaster ride that saw the economy collapse during the pandemic, recover and then slide back during the energy crisis. A small uptick in the first quarter of 2024 is hardly noticeable.

The result was that real GDP per capita was only 4.4% higher in March 2024 than it was in March 2008, the equivalent of 0.3% a year on average over 16 years.

The OBR has been more optimistic for the current financial year up until March 2030, predicting per capita economic growth of 1.1% a year on average between the first quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of 2030.

This is of course much better than the 0.3% average increase over the past 16 years, but it is below the 1.3% growth in real GDP per capita during the ‘austerity years’ following the financial crisis and is substantially below the 2.3% average increase over the 50 years prior to the financial crisis.

From a ‘glass half empty’ perspective, this emphasises just how poorly the UK economy has performed since the financial crisis and the challenges the incoming government has in trying to improve productivity and economic output, even without the risk of an economic shock, events that appear to occur every decade or so.

However, those with a ‘glass half full’ temperament will be more cheerful. After all, there does appear to be substantial space for economic growth to improve from the OBR’s less-than-sparkling predictions, even without returning to the heady days of the pre-financial crisis long-term trend.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: IMF World Economic Outlook Update

My chart for ICAEW this week illustrates how countries rank in the IMF’s latest forecasts for economic growth over 2024 and 2025.

IMF World Economic Outlook Update
ICAEW chart of the week

(Horizontal bar chart)

Legend:

Emerging markets and developing economies (green)
World (purple)
Advanced economies (blue)
UK (red)

Projected annualised real GDP growth 2024 and 2025

Bars in green except where noted.

India: +6.5%
Philippines: +6.0%
Indonesia: +5.0%
Kazakhstan: +4.4%
China: +4.3%
Malaysia: +4.3%
Saudi Arabia: +4.3%
Egypt: +3.8%
Iran: +3.4%
Thailand: +3.2%
Türkiye: +3.1%
World Output: +3.1% (purple)
Nigeria: +3.0%
Poland: +3.0%
Pakistan: +2.7%
World Growth: +2.6% (purple)
South Korea: +2.3% (blue)
Mexico: +2.1%
United States: +1.9% (blue)
Canada: +1.8% (blue)
Russia: +1.8%
Brazil: +1.8%
Spain: +1.8% (blue)
Australia: +1.7% (blue)
France: +1.3% (blue)
South Africa: +1.1%
United Kingdom: +1.1% (red)
Germany: +1.0% (blue)
Argentina: +1.0%
Netherlands: +1.0% (blue)
Italy: +0.9% (blue)
Japan: +0.8% (blue)


8 Feb 2024.
Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Update, 30 Jan 2024.

(c) ICAEW 2024

Each January, the International Money Fund (IMF) traditionally releases an update to its World Economic Outlook forecasts for the global economy. This year it says that it expects the global economy to grow by an average of 2.6% over the course of 2024 and 2025 at market exchange rates, or by 3.1% when using the economists-preferred method of converting currencies at purchasing power parity (PPP).

The chart shows how the 30 countries tracked by the IMF fit between emerging market and developing economies, most of which are growing faster than the global averages, and advanced economies, which tend to grow less quickly. 

The biggest drivers of the global forecast are the US, China and the EU, with both the US and China expected by the IMF to grow less strongly on average over the next two years than in 2023. This contrasts with an improvement over 2023 (which involved a shrinking economy in Germany) by the advanced national economies in the EU over the next two years – apart from Spain, which is expected to fall back from a strong recovery in 2023. 

Growth in emerging and developing countries is expected to average 4.1% over the two years, led by India (now the world’s fifth largest national economy after the US, China, Germany and Japan), followed by the Philippines, Indonesia, Kazakhstan growing faster than China, followed by Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Thailand and Türkiye. 

Nigeria, Poland and Pakistan are expected to grow slightly less than world economic output, followed by Mexico. 

Russia, Brazil and South Africa are expected to grow less strongly, while Argentina is expected to grow the least, with a forecast contraction in 2024 expected to be followed by a strong recovery in 2025.

The strongest-growing of the advanced economies in the IMF analysis continues to be South Korea, followed by the US, Canada, Spain, Australia, France, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, with Japan expected to have the lowest average growth. Overall, the advanced economies are expected to grow by an average of 1.6% over the next two years.

For the UK, forecast average growth of 1.0% over the next two years is expected to be faster than the 0.5% estimated for 2023, but at 0.6% in 2024 and 1.6% in 2025 we may not feel that much better off in the current year.

Of course, forecasts are forecasts, which means they are almost certainly wrong. However, they do provide some insight into the state of the world economy and how it appears to be recovering the pandemic.

For further information, read the IMF World Economic Outlook Update.

More data

Not shown in the chart are the estimate for 2023 and the breakdown in 2024 and 2025, so for those who are interested, the forecast percentage growth numbers are as follows:

Emerging market and developing countries:

CountryAverage over
2024 and 2025
2023
Estimate
2024
Forecast
2025
Forecast
India6.5%6.7%6.5%6.5%
Philippines6.0%5.3%6.0%6.1%
Indonesia5.0%5.0%5.0%5.0%
Kazakhstan4.4%4.8%3.1%5.7%
China4.3%5.2%4.6%4.1%
Malaysia4.3%4.0%4.3%4.4%
Saudi Arabia4.1%-1.1%2.7%5.5%
Egypt3.8%3.8%3.0%4.7%
Iran3.4%5.4%3.7%3.2%
Thailand3.2%2.5%4.4%2.0%
Türkiye3.1%4.0%3.1%3.2%
Nigeria3.0%2.8%3.0%3.1%
Poland3.0%0.6%2.8%3.2%
Pakistan2.7%-0.2%2.0%3.5%
Mexico2.1%3.4%2.7%1.5%
Russia1.8%3.0%2.6%1.1%
Brazil1.8%3.0%2.6%1.1%
South Africa1.1%0.6%1.0%1.3%
Argentina1.0%-1.1%-2.8%5.0%

Advanced economies (including the UK): 

CountryAverage over
2024 and 2025
2023
Estimate
2024
Forecast
2025
Forecast
South Korea2.3%1.4%2.3%2.3%
USA1.9%2.5%2.1%1.7%
Canada1.8%1.1%1.4%2.3%
Spain1.8%1.1%1.4%2.3%
Australia1.7%1.8%1.4%2.1%
France1.3%0.8%1.0%1.7%
UK1.1%0.5%0.6%1.6%
Germany1.0%-0.3%0.5%1.6%
Netherlands1.0%0.2%0.7%1.3%
Italy0.9%0.7%0.7%1.1%
Japan0.8%1.9%0.9%0.8%

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: South Korea

My chart this week looks at the economic success story of South Korea over the last 30 years or so, using Japan as a comparator.

Line chart showing GDP per capita in current US$ between 1990 and 2023.

Japan $2,158 in 1990, steady up to 1995 then zigzags ups and down and up and down and up to a peak in 2012 before falling to 2015 then up then flattish then down and then up to $2,949 in 2023.

South Korea $551 in 1990, steady up to 1996, then down to 1998 then up then down then steady up to 2007, then down to 2009, then zig zag up to 2021, then down, then up to $2,783 in 2023.

The news that South Korea, to align with most of the rest of the world, is cutting the age of its citizens by a year or two – it used to deem a baby one year old at birth, and add a year on 1 January – prompted us to take a look at this peninsula nation and its amazing economic success story.

As my chart this week illustrates, GDP per capita in 1990 in South Korea was $551 per month in then current US$, approximately one quarter of its neighbour Japan’s GDP per capita per month at that time of $2,158

South Korea has seen its economy grow pretty strongly over the last three decades to reach a forecast GDP of $2,783 per person per month for the current year according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is only a little below the economic activity of $2,949 per person per month anticipated to be generated by Japan in 2023. 

South Korea has made steady economic progress since 1990. Outside of recessions and pandemics there have been continual improvements in economic activity and in living standards, resulting in the country moving from the developing nation category to an advanced economy.

This compares with the economic performance of neighbouring Japan, which has been on an economic rollercoaster since the end of the economic boom in the mid-1990s. While a strong currency in the run-up to the global financial crisis boosted the size of its economy in US dollar terms, Japan has subsequently underperformed as its ageing population and lack of immigration has caused its economy to slow and the Yen to fall.

Not shown in the chart is the progress made in purchasing power parity (PPP) international dollars, the measure that economists prefer to use when comparing economic performance between countries as it takes account of differences in living costs. This would show a narrower difference in 1990, when South Korean and Japanese GDP per capita per month were 629 and 1,692 international dollars respectively, and would also show South Korea outgrowing Japan with GDP per capita per month in 2023 of 4,725 international dollars, compared with 4,317 international dollars for Japan.

Many South Koreans waking up on Wednesday 28 June 2023 will have been pretty happy to discover they are now a year or two younger than they were the day before. They may be less likely to reflect on the economic miracle that has taken their country from the depths of extreme poverty in the early 1950s, following the Korean War, to becoming the prosperous nation that South Korea is today. 

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Fuel prices

Our chart this week gives a breakdown of what makes up the cost of petrol and diesel, which continue to soar in price despite the temporary cut in fuel duty.

Column chart showing wholesale costs for 50 litres, distribution and retail costs, taxes and the fuel duty saving.

Petrol: £36.75, £4.30 and £40.40 = £81.45 (162.9p/litre x 50) after a fuel duty saving of £3.00.

Diesel: £44.20, £2.90 and £41.60 = £88.70 (177.4p/litre x 50) after a fuel duty saving of £3.00.

Source: RAC Foundation, 'Daily Fuel Prices 2022-05-03' x 50 litres.

A key component of the cost-of-living crisis is the expense incurred filling up our cars, which has risen by over 50% in two years from approximately 107p a litre for petrol and 112p a litre for diesel back in May 2020 to average prices of 162.9p and 177.4p per litre respectively on 3 May 2022.

Our chart illustrates how much this means in terms of a 50-litre fuel purchase. For petrol, this would have cost an average of £81.45 according to numbers supplied by the RAC Foundation, comprising £36.75 in wholesale costs, £4.30 in distribution and retail costs, and £40.40 in taxes. For diesel, the cost of buying 50 litres would have been £88.70, comprising £44.20 in wholesale fuel costs, £2.90 for distribution and the retailer, and £41.60 in taxes.

In each case, the Chancellor’s temporary 5p cut in fuel duty saves 6p per litre once VAT is taken into account, or £3.00 on a 50-litre purchase.

The wholesale costs of £36.75 and £44.20 (73.5p and 88.4p per litre) for petrol and diesel respectively are made up of £31.30 and £35.55 (62.6p and 71.1p per litre) for refined petrol and diesel and £5.45 and £8.65 (10.9p and 17.3p per litre) for bio content (principally ethanol) included in what you buy at the pump. Distribution and retail costs of £4.30 and £2.90 (8.7p and 5.8p per litre) for petrol and diesel respectively comprise delivery and distribution costs of £0.85 and £1.05 (1.7p and 2.1p per litre) and retailer margin of £3.45 and £1.85 (6.9p and 3.7p per litre). 

Taxes of £40.40 and £41.60 (80.7p and 83.2p per litre) comprise fuel duty of £26.45 (52.9p per litre) and £0.35 (0.7p per litre) in greenhouse gas and development fuel obligations for both petrol and diesel, and £13.60 for petrol and £14.80 for diesel (27.1p and 29.6p respectively) in VAT at 20%.

Most of the fuel duty cut has been absorbed by higher wholesale costs, meaning that prices at the pump are only just below their peak immediately prior to the Spring Statement on 23 March. However, retail fuel prices could well go up further in the coming weeks as higher crude oil prices flow through into the cost of refined petrol and diesel in response to EU sanctions against Russian oil.

Taxes on petrol and diesel remain a significant contributor to the public purse, with £26bn expected to be generated in fuel duty in the current fiscal year, despite a decade or so of freezing the rate and the recent temporary cut until March next year. The plan to phase out petrol and diesel vehicles poses a big dilemma for HM Treasury, which will need to make up for lost tax revenues once there is no hydrocarbon fuel to levy duties on. 

The current favourite option to fill the gap is road pricing, but the government has yet to formally announce a decision, something that will become more pressing as more and more drivers switch to electric cars.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.