Government deficit hits £100bn in the first half of the financial year

Revisions and corrections help reduce the budget overrun to £7bn for the six months to September 2025, but the outlook remains bleak.

The UK government deficit hit £100bn in the six months to September 2025, according to the latest Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) monthly public sector finances release for September 2025, published on 21 October 2025. 

The report also revealed a provisional shortfall between receipts and public spending of £20bn last month. The deficit for the month was £1bn higher than the previous year, in line with the budget. The cumulative deficit was £12bn higher than the first half of 2024/25, and £7bn more than budgeted.

Month of September 2025

Provisional receipts and total public spending for September – £95bn and £115bn respectively – were each 8% more than the previous year.

Current spending included depreciation of £108bn, comparable to the £108bn monthly average in the first five months of the financial year. Net investment was £7bn, higher than the £4bn monthly average investment between April and August 2025.

Excluding net investment, the current budget deficit for the month was £13bn – £2bn more than in the same month last year, £1bn more than budgeted. This was offset by a £1bn underspend on net investment.

Six months to September 2025

The provisional deficit for the six months to September 2025 was £12bn (14%) more than in the same six months last year. This was £7bn higher than budget, which can be analysed as a £13bn budget overrun on the current budget deficit (current receipts less current spending), less a £6bn underspend on net investment.

Table 1 highlights the changes in year-to-date receipts, up 7% overall on last year’s equivalents. These increases were mostly driven by factors such as inflation and fiscal drag from frozen tax allowances. The 20% increase in national insurance revenues reflects the increase in employers’ national insurance.

The 9% increase in current spending over the year has been driven by public sector pay rises, higher supplier costs, and the uprating of welfare benefits.

Net investment of £28bn in the first six months of 2025/26 was £1bn, or 4% higher than the same period last year. Capital expenditure of £46bn was up by £2bn and capital transfers (capital grants, research and development funding, and student loan write-offs) of £18bn were up by £1bn, offset by depreciation of £36bn, up by £2bn.

Table 1  Summary receipts and spending

6 months to Sep2025/26
£bn
2024/25
£bn
Change
%
Income VAT145133+9%
VAT104100+4%
National insurance9882+20%
Corporation tax5248+8%
Other taxes115112+3%
Other receipts6362+2%
Current receipts577537+7%
Public services(363)(334)+9%
Welfare(155)(146+6%
Subsidies(18)(17)+6%
Debt interest(77)(67)+15%
Depreciation(36)(34)+6%
Current spending(649)(598)+9%
Current deficit(72)(61)+18%
Net investment(28)(27)+4%
Deficit(100)(88)+14%

Budget for the rest of the financial year

The deficit is budgeted to be £118bn for the full year ending 31 March 2026, comprising £93bn in the first half of the year to September 2025 and £25bn in the second half of the year.

Borrowing and debt

Table 2 summarises government borrowing in the first six months of the financial year, taking public sector net debt to a provisional £2,916bn on 30 September 2025. This comprised £100bn in public sector net borrowing (PSNB) to fund the deficit and a further £6bn to fund government lending and working capital requirements.

The table also illustrates how the debt-to-GDP ratio increased by 1.6 percentage points, from a revised 93.7% of GDP at the start of the financial year to 95.3% on 30 September 2025, with incremental borrowing of £106bn, equivalent to 3.5% of GDP. It was partly offset by 1.9 percentage points due to inflation and economic growth adding to GDP.

Table 2  Public sector net debt and net debt/GDP

6 months to Sep2025/26
£bn
2024/25
£bn
PSNB10088
Other borrowing6(14)
Net change10674
Opening net debt2,8102,686
Closing net debt2,9162,760
PSNB/GDP3.3%3.1%
Other/GDP0.2%(0.5%)
Inflating away(1.9%)(2.7%)
Net change1.6%(0.1%)
Opening net debt/GDP93.7%94.4%
Closing net debt/GDP95.3%94.3%

Public sector net debt on 30 September 2025 of £2,916bn comprised gross debt of £3,368bn less cash and other liquid financial assets of £452bn. 

Public sector net financial liabilities were £2,565bn, comprising the net debt plus other financial liabilities of £715bn, less illiquid financial assets of £1,066bn. Public sector negative net worth was £908bn – net financial liabilities of £2,565bn less non-financial assets of £1,657bn.

Revisions

Caution is needed with ONS figures, which are repeatedly revised as estimates are refined, and gaps in the underlying data are filled. This includes local government, where numbers are updated in arrears and are based on budget or high-level estimates in the absence of monthly data collection.

This month, the ONS revised down the previously reported deficit for the five months to August 2025 by £4bn, including a £2bn error correction for understated VAT receipts. The ONS also increased the reported deficit for the previous financial year (2024/25) by £4bn to £150bn to incorporate estimates of local government actual expenditure.

More significantly, the ONS revised its methodology for calculating economic activity, resulting in an increase in GDP of 1%. Doing so causes historical percentages for deficit and debt as a proportion of GDP to be revised downwards. This includes a 1.1 percentage reduction in public sector net debt/GDP at the start of the financial year on 1 April 2025, from the previously reported 94.8% to the 93.7% shown in Table 2.  

Martin Wheatcroft, external advisor on public finances to ICAEW, said that public finances were broadly as expected, with the £20bn deficit for the month in line with budget.

“Borrowing to fund the deficit was a fraction under £100bn in the six months to September, the second-highest half-year deficit on record after the pandemic year. This was despite a narrowing of the year-to-date budget overrun to £7bn, as a consequence of error corrections and other revisions to previous months. In addition, statistical revisions to the size of the economy resulted in around a percentage point fall in the ratio of public sector net debt to GDP.”

Tepid economic growth and high debt interest costs will continue to weigh on prospects for the rest of the financial year, he added. “The revisions do very little to alter the bleak outlook for the public finances that is driving the need for a significant fiscal correction in the Autumn Budget 2025.”

This article was written by Martin Wheatcroft for ICAEW and was originally published by ICAEW.

Public finances turn ugly just as Chancellor needs good news

Weaker receipts than expected combined with prior month corrections resulted in a £12bn year-to-date budget overrun in the August monthly public finances.

The monthly public sector finances release for August 2025 published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 19 September reported a provisional shortfall between receipts and total public spending of £18bn in August 2025 and £84bn for the five months then ended. These were £6bn and £12bn over budget respectively and £4bn and £16bn higher than in the same periods in 2024.

Martin Wheatcroft, external adviser on public finances to ICAEW, says: “This month’s public finance numbers took a turn for the worse as not only did weaker than expected receipts drive a £6bn budget overrun in August, but revisions to prior months added a further £6bn to the deficit to turn a broadly neutral position a month ago into a £12bn year-to-date budget overrun for the first five months of the 2025/26 financial year.

“These numbers are far from helpful to a Chancellor in desperate need of some good financial news, adding to the prospect of even higher tax rises in the Autumn Budget 2025 than previously feared.”

Month of August 2025

Receipts of £93bn in August 2025 were £5bn or 5% higher than the same month last year, while total public spending was £111bn, £8bn or 8% more than in August 2024. The latter can be analysed between current spending including depreciation of £107bn, slightly below the £108bn monthly average in the first four months of the financial year, and net investment of £4bn, in line with the monthly average incurred between April and July 2025.

Excluding net investment, the current budget deficit for the month of £14bn represented a £4bn deterioration over the current budget deficit of £10bn in the same month last year, highlighting how receipts have failed to keep pace with increases in current spending.

The overall £18bn fiscal deficit for the month was £6bn over budget and £4bn more than in August 2024.

Five months to August 2025

Table 1 highlights how year-to-date receipts of £477bn were up 6% on last year’s equivalents. This included income tax receipts, up 8% from a combination of inflation and fiscal drag from frozen tax allowances, and national insurance receipts, up 18% as a consequence of the increase in employer national insurance from April 2025. VAT receipts were flat year-on-year, in effect a 3% to 4% fall after taking account of consumer price inflation, highlighting the weak economic conditions facing the UK.

Meanwhile, the 8% increase over last year in current spending including depreciation to £539bn in the first five months to August 2025 has principally been driven by public sector pay rises, higher supplier costs, and the uprating of welfare benefits.

This included a £7bn or 12% increase in debt interest to £64bn, which comprised a £6bn increase in indexation on inflation-linked debt as inflation resurged and a £1bn increase in interest on variable and fixed-interest debt. The latter reflects a higher level of debt compared with a year ago being partially offset by a lower Bank of England base rate.

The resulting current budget deficit of £62bn to August 2025 was 29% higher than the £48bn for the same five months last year, a major concern given that the government’s plan was to reduce the cumulative current budget deficit to £47bn at this point.

Net investment of £22bn in the first five months of 2025/26 was £2bn or 10% higher than the same period last year with capital expenditure of £39bn up by £3bn and capital transfers (capital grants, research and development funding, and student loan write-offs) of £13bn up by £1bn, offset by depreciation of £30bn up by £2bn.

The overall provisional deficit for the five months to August 2025 of £84bn is £16bn or 24% more than in the same five months last year and £12bn higher than budget. The latter can be analysed as a £15bn budget overrun on current receipts less current spending for the year-to-date, less a £3bn saving on net investment.

Table 1: Summary receipts and spending

5 months to Aug2025/26
£bn
2024/25
£bn
Change
%
Income tax122113+8%
VAT8484
National insurance8068+18%
Corporation tax4340+7%
Other taxes9693+3%
Other receipts5251+2%
Current receipts477449+6%
    
Public services(301)(276)+9%
Welfare(129)(122)+6%
Subsidies(15)(14)+7%
Debt interest(64)(57)+12%
Depreciation(30)(28)+7%
Current spending(539)(497)+8%
Current deficit(62)(48)+29%
Net investment(22)(20)+10%
Deficit(84)(68)+24%

Borrowing and debt

Table 2 summarises how the government borrowed £99bn in the first five months of the financial year to take public sector net debt to a provisional £2,909bn on 31 August 2025. This comprised £84bn in public sector net borrowing (PSNB) to fund the deficit and a further £15bn to fund government lending and working capital requirements.

The table also illustrates how the debt to GDP ratio increased by 1.6 percentage points from 94.8% of GDP at the start of the financial year to 96.4% on 31 August 2025, with incremental borrowing of £99bn, equivalent to 3.3% of GDP, being partly offset by 1.7 percentage points from the ‘inflating away’ effect of inflation and economic growth adding to GDP, the denominator in the net debt to GDP ratio.

Table 2: Public sector net debt and net debt/GDP

5 months to Aug2025/26
£
bn
2024/25
£
bn
PSNB8468
Other borrowing157
Net change9975
Opening net debt2,8102,686
Closing net debt2,9092,761
   
PSNB/GDP2.8%2.4%
Other/GDP0.5%0.2%
Inflating away(1.7%)(2.3%)
Net change1.6%0.3%
Opening net debt/GDP94.8%95.6%
Closing net debt/GDP96.4%95.9%

Public sector net debt on 31 August 2025 of £2,909bn comprised gross debt of £3,339bn less cash and other liquid financial assets of £430bn. 

Public sector net financial liabilities were £2,550bn, comprising net debt of £2,909bn plus other financial liabilities of £715bn less illiquid financial assets of £1,074bn. 

Public sector negative net worth was £893bn, being net financial liabilities of £2,550bn less non-financial assets of £1,657bn.

Revisions

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled. This includes local government, where the numbers are only updated in arrears and are based on budget or high-level estimates in the absence of monthly data collection.

This month was no different, with the ONS revising the previously reported deficit for the four months to July 2025 up by £6bn, as well as updating prior year numbers for the annual results of the Bank of England and several other public bodies as well as other typical annual updates such as revised student loan calculations. 

More significantly, the ONS revised reported deficits back to 1998 for methodology and classification changes and back to 2011 for local government outturn numbers that had not previously been incorporated. The reported deficits for 2020/21 and 2021/22 were decreased by £3bn and £2bn to £311bn and £120bn respectively, 2022/23 remained unchanged at £127bn, 2023/24 was increased by £2bn to £134bn, and 2024/25 was reduced by £2bn to £146bn.

This article was written by Martin Wheatcroft for ICAEW and was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Employment costs

My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how employment costs in June 2025 have risen by 4.8% compared with the same month last year, adding to the expense of doing business in the UK.

ICAEW chart of the week on employment costs. 

A step chart showing the changes between the UK monthly payroll in June 2024 and June 2025.

June 2024: £96,975m UK total gross salaries + £8,848m UK total employer national insurance.

Step 1: -£520m from 0.5% fewer employees. 
Step 2: +£3,985m from 3.6% increase in salaries. 
Step 3: +£1,666m from 17.9% higher employer national insurance. 

Net change: +£5,131m. 

June 2025: £100,000m UK total gross salaries + £10,954m UK total employer national insurance. 

12 Sep 2025. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Sources: ONS, 'PAYE real time information, non-seasonally adjusted'; HMRC, 'Monthly tax receipts'.

According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), UK employers paid a total of £111bn in gross salaries and employer national insurance in June 2025, an increase of £5.1bn or 4.8% over the same month a year ago.

My chart this week starts with the payroll in June 2024 of £105,823, comprising gross salaries paid by employers of £96,975m and employer national insurance of £8,848m, although it excludes employer pension contributions.

This monthly cost was reduced by £520m from a reduction in the national workforce, which saw the number of payrolled employees drop by 149,937 or 0.5% from 30,532,600 in June 2024 to 30,382,663 in June 2025. This arose from 7,296,859 leavers exceeding 7,146,922 joiners, most of which are people moving jobs. The reduction in the number of payrolled employees at a time of still-rising overall population numbers highlights the difficult economic situation currently facing the UK. The reduction comprised £476m in less pay and £44m in less employer national insurance (calculated at last year’s rates)

Salary increases since last year of approximately 3.6% added £3,985m or 3.8% to the cost of employment, with mean salaries increasing from £3,176 in the month of June 2024 to £3,291 in the month of June 2025. This comprised an increase of £3,501m or 3.6% in gross salaries and an estimated increase in employer national insurance of £484m or 5.5% (based on last year’s rates).

The median monthly salary increased from £2,389 in June 2024 to £2,530 in June 2025, which is a 5.9% increase compared with a year previously. This was less than monthly pay at the 25th percentile, which increased by 7.8% from £1,408 to £1,518, which was partly driven by a 6.7% increase in the minimum wage implemented in April 2025 (16.3% for those aged 18 to 20 and 18% for those aged under 18) that help lift the salaries of lower paid workers.

Pay at the 75th percentile increased by 4.7% (from £3,632 to £3,803) compared with a year previously, while pay at the 95th and 99th percentiles increased by 3.1% (from £7,461 to £7,692) and 2.6% (from £15,181 to £15,583) respectively. These lower rates of increase for higher paid workers primarily relate to base pay and so do not tell the full story as bonuses and other variable compensation for 2025 will in most cases not show up in pay packets until early next year.

A further £1,666m or 1.5% was added to the total cost of employment as a consequence of changes in employer national insurance effective from April 2025. These took the rate payable by employers from 13.8% of salaries over £792 a month to 15.0% of salaries above £417 per month, adding an extra 17.9% to the amount paid in employer national insurance after taking account of changes in the number of payrolled employees and salary increases since last year. Just under half of the increase (£808m) resulted from the change in the main rate of employer national insurance going up from 13.8% to 15.0% on salaries above £792 a month, with the balance (£858m) coming from lowering the threshold at which the 15.0% applies to £417 per month.

The overall effect was a net increase of £5,131m or 4.8% in total pay and employer national insurance to £110,954m in June 2025, comprising a net increase of £3,025m or 3.1% in total gross salaries to £100,000m and a net increase of £2,106m or 23.8% in employer national insurance to £10,954m.

The chart does not reflect the full cost of employment as it does not include employer pension contributions, non-payrolled benefits, and employment-related costs such as facilities, equipment, training and travel amongst others. However, it still gives a useful illustration of how payroll costs have changed significantly over the course of one year.

ICAEW’s growth campaign identifies how it is too difficult, expensive and uncertain to do business in the UK and calls for the government to do what it can to streamline regulations, reduce unnecessary costs, and provide businesses with the confidence they need to invest.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

Little comfort for Chancellor as public finances stay in line

Borrowing to fund the deficit in the first four months of the financial year of £60bn was in line with expectations.

The monthly public sector finances release for July 2025 published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 21 August reported a provisional shortfall between receipts and total public spending of £60bn for the four months ended 31 July 2025. This is in line with budget and £7bn more than in the same period last year.

Martin Wheatcroft, External Adviser on Public Finances to ICAEW, says: “This month’s ‘not bad’ result may provide a small amount of relief to a Chancellor under significant pressure.

“The monthly deficit for July was slightly better than expected, while the cumulative result for the first third of the financial year was almost exactly in line with the Office for Budget Responsibility’s prediction at the time of the Spring Statement 2025.

“Unfortunately, this does not change the dismal outlook for the public finances and the rising costs of public services, welfare provision and debt interest that means the Chancellor is again having to work out how she can ask Parliament to authorise higher levels of taxation.”

Month of July 2025

Receipts of £108.8bn in July 2025 were £9.2bn or 9% higher than in July 2024 and also higher than the £92.6bn average for the first three months of the financial year, principally as a result of a boost from income tax self-assessment collections in the month.

Meanwhile, current spending including depreciation of £105.5bn in July was £6.0bn or 6% more than in the same month a year previously. This was slightly lower than the £108.0bn monthly average incurred during April to June 2025.

The result was a current budget surplus for the month of £3.3bn, a £3.2bn improvement over the current budget surplus of £0.1bn in the same month last year.

Net investment of £4.4bn in July 2025 was £0.9bn more than the £3.5bn incurred in July 2024 and slightly higher than the £4.2bn average incurred during the three months to June 2025.

The provisional fiscal deficit for July 2025 was therefore £1.1bn, £1.0bn less than the £2.1bn budget for the month and a £2.3bn improvement over the £3.4bn deficit in July 2024.

Four months to July 2025

Table 1 highlights how year-to-date receipts of £387bn were up 7% on last year’s equivalents, with income tax receipts up 8% from a combination of inflation and fiscal drag from frozen tax allowances, and national insurance receipts up 19% as a consequence of the increase in employer national insurance that was implemented in April 2025.

Meanwhile, the 8% increase over last year in current spending including depreciation to £430bn in the first four months to July 2025 was primarily as a consequence of public sector pay rises, higher supplier costs, and the uprating of welfare benefits.

This included a £6bn or 13% increase in debt interest to £53bn, which comprised a £5bn increase in indexation on inflation-linked debt as inflation resurged and a £1bn increase in interest on variable and fixed-interest debt. The latter was primarily the result of a higher level of debt compared with a year ago partially offset by a lower Bank of England base rate.

The resulting current budget deficit of £43bn to July 2025 was 16% higher than for the same four months last year.

Net investment of £17bn in the first four months of 2025/26 was £1bn or 6% higher than the same period last year. Capital expenditure of £30bn was up by £1bn and capital transfers (capital grants, research and development funding, and student loan write-offs) of £11bn were up by £2bn, less depreciation of £24bn that was up by £2bn compared with the same four month period a year prior.

The consequence is a provisional deficit for the first third of the 2025/26 financial year of £60bn, which is £7bn or 13% more than in the same four month period last year. Despite being almost exactly in line with budget (only £0.1bn higher) this is the third-highest April-to-July deficit since monthly records began in 1993 (after 2020/21 and 2021/22 during the pandemic).

Table 1: Summary receipts and spending

4 months to July2025/26
£bn
2024/25
£bn
Change
%
Income tax10093+8%
VAT7067+4%
National insurance6454+19%
Corporation tax3532+9%
Other taxes7674+3%
Other receipts4241+2%
Current receipts387361+7%
    
Public services(239)(221)+8%
Welfare(103)(97)+6%
Subsidies(11)(11)
Debt interest(53)(47)+13%
Depreciation(24)(22)+9%
Current spending(430)(398)+8%
Current deficit(43)(37)+16%
Net investment(17)(16)+6%
Deficit(60)(53)+13%

Borrowing and debt

Table 2 summarises how the government borrowed £81bn in the first third of the financial year to take public sector net debt to a provisional £2,891bn on 31 July 2025. This comprised £60bn in public sector net borrowing (PSNB) to fund the deficit and £21bn to fund government lending activities and working capital movements.

The table also illustrates how the debt to GDP ratio increased from 94.8% of GDP at the start of the financial year to 96.1% on 31 July 2025, with the incremental borrowing partly offset by the ‘inflating away’ effect of inflation and economic growth adding to GDP, the denominator in the net debt to GDP ratio.

Table 2: Public sector net debt and net debt/GDP

4 months to July2025/26
£bn
2024/25
£bn
PSNB6053
Other borrowing21(1)
Net change8152
Opening net debt2,8102,686
Closing net debt2,8912,738
   
PSNB/GDP2.1%1.9%
Other/GDP0.7%
Inflating away(1.5%)(1.9%)
Net change1.3%
Opening net debt/GDP94.8%95.6%
Closing net debt/GDP96.1%95.6%

Public sector net debt on 31 July 2025 of £2,891bn comprised gross debt of £3,309bn less cash and other liquid financial assets of £418bn.

Public sector net financial liabilities were £2,525bn, comprising net debt of £2,891bn plus other financial liabilities of £707bn less illiquid financial assets of £1,073bn. Public sector negative net worth was £899bn, being net financial liabilities of £2,525bn less non-financial assets of £1,626bn.

Revisions

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled. This includes local government, where the numbers are only updated in arrears and are based on budget or high-level estimates in the absence of monthly data collection.

The latest release saw the ONS revise the previously reported deficit for the three months to June 2025 up by £1bn. The ONS also revised up its estimate of GDP in the first quarter of the financial year, resulting in a 0.4 reduction in the opening debt to GDP ratio on 1 April 2025 from 95.2% to 94.8% and the debt to GDP ratio for 30 June 2025 from 96.2% to 95.8%.

This article was written by Martin Wheatcroft FCA on behalf of ICAEW and was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Autumn Statement 2023

My chart for ICAEW this week illustrates how Chancellor Jeremy Hunt used almost all of the available upside from inflation and fiscal drag to fund his tax measures and a series of business growth initiatives.

Autumn Statement 2023

Step chart (waterfall diagram) showing the average change to 2023/24 to 2027/28 forecasts since the Spring Budget 2023.

Forecast revisions (steps in orange):

Inflation +$41bn
Fiscal drag +£7bn
Other changes +£4bn
Debt interest -£21bn
Welfare uprating -£13bn

= Forecast revisions +£18bn (subtotal in purple)

Policy measures (steps in blue):

Tax measures -£11bn
Spending and other -£6bn

= Net changes +£1bn (total in purple)


23 Nov 2023.
Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday.
Sources: HM Treasury, 'Autumn Statement 2023'; OBR, 'Economic and fiscal outlook, Nov 2023'.

The Autumn Statement 2023 on Wednesday 22 November featured a surprise tax cut to national insurance and a perhaps less surprising decision to make full expensing of business capital expenditure permanent.

As my chart illustrates, the forecasts for the deficit over the next five years benefited by £41bn a year on average in higher receipts from inflation, £7bn a year on average in additional ‘fiscal drag’ as higher inflation erodes the value of frozen tax allowances more quickly, and a net £4bn in other upward forecast revisions. These improvements to the forecasts were offset by an average of £21bn a year in higher debt interest and £13bn from the expected inflation-driven uprating of the state pension and welfare benefits, to arrive at a net improvement of £18bn a year on average over the five financial years from 2023/24 to 2027/28 before policy decisions.

In theory, these upward forecast revisions should be absorbed by more spending on public services as higher inflation feeds through into salaries and procurement costs. However, the Chancellor has chosen to (in effect) sharply cut public spending and use almost all of the upward revisions to fund tax measures and business growth initiatives instead. These amounted to £11bn a year on average in tax changes and £6bn a year on average in spending increases and other changes to reduce the net impact to just £1bn a year on average over the five-year period.

The resulting net change of £1bn on average in forecasts for the deficit is to reduce the forecast deficit by £8bn for the current year (from £132bn to £124bn) and by £1bn for 2024/25 (to £85bn), with no net change in 2025/26 (at £77bn), an increase of £5bn in 2027/28 (to £68bn), and no net change for 2027/28 (at £49bn).

The main tax changes announced were the cuts in national insurance for employees by 2 percentage points from 12% to 10% and by 1 percentage point for the self-employed from 9% to 8%, reducing tax receipts by an average of £9bn over five years. This is combined with the effect of making full expensing permanent of £4bn – this change mainly affects the later years of the forecast (£11bn in 2027/28), although ironically the average is a better proxy for the long-term cost of this change, which the OBR estimates is around £3bn a year. 

Other tax changes offset this to a small extent. 

Spending and other changes of £6bn a year on average comprise incremental spending of £7bn a year plus £2bn higher debt interest to fund that spending, less £3bn in positive economic effects from that spending and from the tax measures above.

Although the cumulative fiscal deficit over five years has been revised down by £4bn, the OBR has revised its forecast for public sector net debt as of 31 March 2028 up by £94bn from to £3,004bn. This principally reflects changes in the planned profile of quantitative tightening and higher lending to students and businesses.

The big gamble the Chancellor appears to be making by choosing to opt for tax cuts now is that the OBR and Bank of England’s pessimistic forecasts for the economy are not realised – enabling him to find extra money in future fiscal events to cover the effect of inflation on public service spending. Otherwise, while it may be possible to cut public spending by as much as the Autumn Statement suggests, it is difficult to see how he can do so without a further deterioration in the quality of public services given he is not providing any additional investment in technology, people and process transformation to deliver sustainable efficiency gains.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: National Insurance Fund 2020-21

We take a look at the Great Britain National Insurance Fund, illustrating how the balance in the fund grew from the equivalent of 4.2 months of annual payments to 4.6 months over the course of 2020-21.

Step chart showing movements in the Great Britain National Insurance Fund in 20201/21.

Opening balance £37bn (4.2 months of payments) + receipts £140bn - NHS £26bn - payments £109bn = closing balance £42bn (4.6 months of payments).

One of the many myths about the UK’s public finances is around the use of the word ‘fund’. This is often assumed to imply there is a pot of money set aside to cover spending requirements, when in practice it tends to refer to a budget allocation. An example is the National Productivity Investment Fund that was announced in 2016, which turned out to refer to unallocated amounts within the government’s budget for capital expenditure over several years.

Despite this terminology there are some actual ‘funds’ that have a legal basis and which have money in them, such the Contingencies Fund, where cash of £425bn passed through its accounts in response to the pandemic last year (up from £17bn in the previous year). However, net assets remained unchanged by this tidal wave of money at just £2m, highlighting how many such funds are principally mechanisms to facilitate the flow of money around government on the way to its intended destination.

The Great Britain National Insurance Fund and the Northern Ireland National Insurance Fund are perhaps the most well known of these funds, being the source of payments for the state pension and contributory welfare benefits. Surprisingly, there is a balance in these funds, which caused some excitement in a House of Lords debate last year when a peer decided that this was a pot of money that could be used to fund more spending.

Before getting too excited, it is important to understand that although the £42bn in the Great Britain National Insurance Fund sounds like a large amount of money, the reality is that it is more akin to a float, representing less than five months’ worth of annual payments from the fund and a relatively small fraction of the trillions of pounds in future payments expected to be paid out of the fund over the next quarter of a century and beyond. Likewise for the £1bn in the Northern Ireland National Insurance Fund.

In addition, when you delve into the accounts, you discover that most of the balances are invested in HM Treasury’s Debt Management Account, which are in effect intercompany balances (or ‘intra-government’ to be more technically accurate).

As our chart illustrates, the Great Britain National Insurance Fund had a balance of £37bn on 1 April 2020, equivalent to about 4.2 months of expenditure in the 2019/20 financial year. National Insurance receipts in Great Britain (ie, not including Northern Ireland) amounted to £140bn during 2020/21, including £3bn from other tax receipts to make up for contributions not received for those on statutory maternity, paternity, parental or bereavement pay.

Some £26bn of the national insurance contributions was deducted and sent off to help pay for the NHS, reducing the amount added to the fund to £114bn, while payments from the fund during the year amounted to £109bn. The latter comprised £100.4bn for the state pension, £5.2bn to cover contributory welfare benefits (employment and support allowance and jobseeker’s allowance), £0.9bn in administration costs, £0.8bn in bereavement and maternity allowances, £0.7bn in transfers to the Northern Ireland equivalent fund, £0.5bn in redundancy payments and £0.2bn in other payments.

The £5bn or so of surplus was added to the balance of the fund, taking it to £42bn at 31 March 2021, equivalent to 4.6 months of annual payments.

To be fair to the noble lord concerned, it might well be possible to use some of the money in the fund by reducing the effective float balance by a month or two, at least on a one-off basis. However, in the context of public spending in excess of £1.2tn a year and public sector net debt of £2.3tn, it is not likely to go that far!

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: personal tax bands

This week’s chart examines the complexity in the tax system and potential options for reform by looking at the number of tax bands for salaried employees across the UK.

Chart showing personal tax bands from £150,000 (45% UK income tax +1% Scottish income tax + 2% Employee national insurance) down to £0.

See text for more details.

The new tax year saw the introduction of an additional tax band to the UK system of personal taxation, bringing the total number to nine tax bands in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and twelve in Scotland.

The #icaewchartoftheweek continues on the theme of complexity in the tax system and potential options for tax reform by looking at the number of tax bands for salaried employees, with up to nine tax bands in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and up to twelve in Scotland.

Although the advertised personal tax allowance of £12,570 a year suggests that individuals only start to pay tax above that point, in practice ‘taxation’ in its wider sense can start from as little as £0, which is when some of those claiming universal credit start to have their benefits withdrawn at a rate of 63p in the pound. The threshold is £0 for those without dependent children, £3,516 for those on housing benefit and with dependent children or limited capability to work, or £6,180 for those with dependent children or limited capability to work who are not on housing benefit. The rate of withdrawal is even higher for those receiving council tax benefit, with an additional 20% or more levied on incomes above a certain level until it is fully clawed back – the details vary by council.

Tax in its more formal sense starts at £9,568 when employee national insurance of 12% starts to be levied. Although ‘constitutionally’ different in how the money collected is used and its role in entitlement to the state pension, in substance it operates as an income tax in all but name.

Income tax itself starts to be levied on earnings above £12,570 at a basic rate of 20%, adding to national insurance to give a marginal tax rate of 32% for those not on universal credit and 74.8% for those who are.

For those in England, Wales and Northern Ireland this tax band goes from £12,570 up to £50,000 but in Scotland, there are intermediate tax bands, with a lower rate of income tax of 19% between £12,570 and £14,667, 20% between £14,667 and £25,926, 21% between £25,926 and £43,662, and 41% above £43,662 when the higher rate of Scottish income tax kicks in.

The new tax band this year arises because the government failed to increase the £50,000 threshold at which child benefit is withdrawn from the higher-earning parent to align with the increase in the higher rate tax threshold to £50,270. This means the insertion of a new tax band between £50,000 and £50,270 as the government starts to withdraw entitlement to ‘universal’ child benefit of £21.15 a week for the eldest child and £14.00 a week for remaining children by collecting an additional tax of 11% for the eldest child and 7.3% for the second and each of any subsequent children.

Above £50,270, the higher rate of income tax of 40% starts to be levied in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, but the marginal rate of national insurance reduces to 2% meaning that this is a 10% increase from 32% to 42% in the combined marginal rate – at least assuming you don’t have children! This rate also applies to those with children from £60,000 up until £100,000 when the marginal rate jumps to 62% (63% in Scotland) as the personal income tax allowance is gradually withdrawn. The marginal rate reverts to 42% (43%) from £125,140 before increasing to 47% (48%) for those on the 45% top rate of income tax above £150,000.

While devolution has led to some of the complexity, this probably hasn’t been helped by the perennial tendency of governments to find ever more complicated approaches to extract additional money from taxpayers without touching the headline rates of tax – for example through the ‘withdrawal’ of the personal tax allowance, which in substance operates as an additional 20% tax payable by those earning between £100,000 and £125,140.

The consequence of this tinkering with the tax systems means there are now nine different tax bands in England, Wales and Northern Ireland with marginal tax rates of 0%, 12%, 32%, 32% + 11% (or more) for higher-earning parents, 42% + 11% (or more) for higher-earning parents, 42%, 62%, 42% and 47%. In Scotland there are twelve: 0%, 12%, 31%, 32%, 33%, 53%, 53% + 11% (or more) for higher earning parents, 43% + 11% (or more) for higher earnings parents, 43%, 63%, 43% and 48%. 

Such a complex system invites the question of how it might be reformed, with the possibility of increasing the national insurance threshold to align with the income tax personal allowance being actively discussed in recent years to eliminate one of the bands. However, this now seems less likely than it once did since the pandemic caused such damage to the public finances. Other ideas have included aligning the 40% higher rate and 45% top rate of income tax (either up or down depending on political preference) or ‘folding’ in the personal tax allowance withdrawal into the tax system as part of the higher or top tax rates in conjunction with a reform to tax thresholds.

However, another option would be to add even more complexity, a real possibility now the Welsh government has obtained devolved powers to adjust its income tax rates and thresholds like Scotland, albeit powers that have thankfully not been used so far.

Either way, the nirvana that some tax reformers aspire to of a single flat rate of income tax applying to all earnings seems more remote than ever. One can but dream!

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: personal taxation by legal form

ICAEW’s chart this week compares the differences in the tax payable depending on legal form – an area ripe for reform in theory, but much more difficult in practice.

Chart showing tax payable on £80,000 of business earnings:

Employee - income tax: 20.0%, employee NI 6.6%, employer NI 10.7% - take home pay 62.7%.

Self-employed - income tax: 24.3%, employee NI 5.5% - take home pay 70.2%.

Company owner - income tax 9.9%, corporation tax 16.9% - take home pay 73.2%.

Comments by the Chancellor last year suggested he might tackle one of the thorniest challenges in the UK tax system – the differences in tax paid by individuals depending on the legal form through which they conduct their business activities. However, as the controversy over IR35 has demonstrated, a significant amount of political capital is likely to be needed if changes are to be made.

The #icaewchartoftheweek provides an illustrative example of just how significant the differences can be, with £80,000 in business earnings attracting an effective tax rate of 37.3% if paid to an employee on a salary of £71,460, 29.8% if paid to an individual who is self-employed or in a partnership, or 26.8% if earned through a company and distributed as dividends. 

(It is important to note that this is a theoretical illustrative example for a single person with no other earnings and not paying any pension contributions, with the company owner in the example paying a salary equivalent to the secondary threshold for national insurance before paying the rest as dividends. Actual amounts of tax paid will of course depend on both business and individual circumstances, which can vary significantly.)

The last decade or so has seen a significant increase in the numbers of people becoming self-employed or conducting business through their own companies, and the tax authorities have been concerned about the loss in tax that has followed. One way they have sought to tackle this is by removing the tax benefits of being self-employed or operating through a company from some people, which is the approach adopted by IR35. Coming into force this month, IR35 in effect creates a new legal status of ‘deemed employee’ for tax purposes, reclassifying individuals back into the scope of employment taxes. This has proved highly controversial, accompanied as it is by extensive compliance requirements and general unhappiness by those determined to be subject to it.

Another potential approach would be to change the taxes and tax rates applying to three different forms – either by reducing the taxes on employees or by increasing them on the self-employed or those operating through companies. The former seems unlikely given the state of the public finances, but the challenge in increasing rates can be extremely politically difficult, as former Chancellor Philip Hammond found a few years ago when he proposed a relatively modest increase in the amount of national insurance to be paid by the self-employed.

Whether current Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak will take forward a suggestion he made last year when he announced the self-employed income support scheme last year that taxes on the self-employed might rise is yet to be seen. However, what is likely is that this and future Chancellors will continue to look at this particular aspect of the tax system and wonder how they might collect a little more from the ranks of the self-employed and company owners. 

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.