ICAEW chart of the week: Inflation around the world

This week we look at how inflation is racing upwards across the world, with the UK reporting in April one of the highest rates of increase among developed countries.

Bar chart showing inflation rates by G20 country: Russia 17.8%, Nigeria 16.8%, Poland 12.4%, Brazil 12.1%, Netherlands 9.6%, UK 9.0%, Spain 8.3%, USA 8.3%, India 7.8%, Mexico 7.7%, German 7.4%, Canada 6.8%, Italy 6.0%, South Africa 5.9%, France 4.8%, South Korea 4.8%, Indonesia 3.5%, Switzerland 2.5%, Japan 2.4%, Saudia Arabia 2.3%, China 2.1%.

Inflation has increased rapidly over the last year as the world has emerged from the pandemic. A recovery in demand combined with constraints in supply and transportation has driven prices, with myriad factors at play. These include the effects of lockdowns in China (the world’s largest supplier of goods), the devastation caused by the Russian invasion in Ukraine (a major food exporter to Europe, the Middle East and Africa), and the economic sanctions imposed on Russia (one of the world’s largest suppliers of oil and gas).

As the chart shows, the UK currently has – at 9% – the highest reported rate of consumer price inflation in the G7, as measured by the annual change in the consumer prices index (CPI) between April 2021 and April 2022. This compares with 8.3% in the USA, 7.4% in Germany, 6.8% in Canada, 6.0% in Italy, 4.8% in France and 2.4% in Japan. 

The UK’s relatively higher rate partly reflects the big jump in energy prices in April from the rise in the domestic energy price cap, which contrasts with France, for example, where domestic energy price rises have been much lower (thanks in part to state subsidies). The UK inflation rate also hasn’t been helped by falls in the value of sterling, making imported goods and food more expensive.

Other countries shown in the chart include Russia at 17.8%, Nigeria at 16.8%, Poland at 12.4%, Brazil at 12.1%, Netherlands at 9.6%, Spain at 8.3%, India at 7.8%, Mexico at 7.7%, South Africa 5.9%, South Korea at 4.8%, Indonesia at 3.5%, Switzerland at 2.5%, Saudi Arabia at 2.3% and China at 2.1%. For most countries, the rate of inflation is substantially higher than it has been for many years, reflecting just how major a change there has been in a global economy that had become accustomed to relatively stable prices in recent years. 

This is not the case for every country, and the chart excludes three hyperinflationary countries that already had problems with inflation even before the pandemic, led by Venezuela with an inflation rate of 222.3% in April, Turkey with a rate of 70%, and Argentina at 58%.

Policymakers have been alarmed at the prospect of an inflationary cycle as higher prices start to drive higher wages, which in turn will drive even higher prices. For central banks that has meant increasing interest rates to try and dampen demand, while finance ministries have been looking to see how they can protect households from the effect of rising prices, particular on energy, whether that be by intervention to constrain prices, through temporary tax cuts, or through direct or indirect financial support to struggling households.

Here in the UK, both the Bank of England and HM Treasury have been calling for restraint in wage settlements as they seek to head off a further ramp-up in inflation. They hope that inflation will start to moderate later in the year as price rises in the last six months start to drop out of the year-on-year comparison and supply constraints start to ease, for example as oil and gas production is ramped up in the USA, the Middle East and elsewhere to replace Russia as an energy supplier, and as China emerges from its lockdowns.

Despite that, prices are likely to rise further, especially in October when the energy price cap is expected to increase by 40%, following a 54% rise in April. This is likely to force many to make difficult choices as household budgets come under increasing strain.

After all, inflation is much more than the rate of change in an arbitrary index; it has an impact in the real world of diminishing spending power and in eroding the value of savings. 

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Global population

The ICAEW chart of the week looks at how the estimated global population of almost 8bn people is distributed around the world.

Bubble chart showing estimated global population of 7,995m in 2022: South Asia 1,894m, East Asia 1,671m, South East Asia 682m, Pacific 43m, Africa 1,419, Europe 592m, Middle East 357m, Eurasia 246m, North America 511m, South America 443m and Central America & Caribbean 97m.

UN projections show that the planetary population will reach approximately 7,955m in June this year, a 1.0% increase over the 7,875m estimate for June 2021.

The largest region on our chart is South Asia, which has 1,894m inhabitants, including 1,411m in India, 216m in Pakistan, 173m in Bangladesh, 40m in Afghanistan and 31m in Nepal. This is followed in size by the 1,671m people living in East Asia, including 1,432m in mainland China (currently the most populous country in the world), 126m in Japan, 52m in South Korea and 26m in North Korea.

Africa is the third largest region with 1,419m inhabitants, with 482m living in Eastern Africa (including Ethiopia 118m, Tanzania 67m, Kenya 56m, Uganda 50m, Mozambique 34m and Madagascar 29m), 424m in Western Africa (including Nigeria 217m, Ghana 32m, Côte d’Ivoire 27m and Niger 26m), 254m in Northern Africa (including Egypt 106m, Sudan 46m, Algeria 45m and Morocco 38m), 190m in Middle Africa (including the Democratic Republic of the Congo 95m, Angola 35m and Cameroon 27m), and 69m in Southern Africa (of which 60m are in South Africa).

Excluding Russia and Belarus, Europe has 592m people, including 444m in the 27 countries of the EU (including Germany 83m, France 66m, Italy 59m, Spain 46m and Poland 38m), 68m in the UK and 43m in Ukraine, although these numbers are all before taking account of the several million Ukrainians who have been forced to flee the war and are living temporarily in other countries. 

Eurasia, comprising the Commonwealth of Independent States of Russia, Belarus and the ‘stans’ of central Asia, has 246m inhabitants (including Russia 143m and Uzbekistan 34m), while the Middle East has an estimated 357m people (including Turkey 85m, Iran 85m, Iraq 44m, Saudi Arabia 36m and Yemen 32m.

North America has 511m inhabitants (USA 336m, Mexico 137m, Canada 38m), while 97m live in Central America (52m) and the Caribbean (45m), and 443m live in South America (including Brazil 217m, Colombia 51m, Argentina 46m, Peru 34m and Venezuela 34m).

South East Asia has 682m inhabitants, including 277m in Indonesia, 113m in the Philippines, 100m in Vietnam, 70m in Thailand, 56m in Myanmar and 34m in Malaysia. A further 43m people live in the Pacific region, of which 26m are in Australia. 

Although the rate of global population growth was projected to slow significantly in recent years, from 1.3% a year in 2000 when the population was 6.1bn, to 1.0% a year currently and to a forecast of around 0.7% in 20 years’ time, that still means that the number of people on the planet is expected to grow to around 9.8bn in 2050, placing even greater demands on natural resources than today. 

This highlights just how important achieving net zero and environmental sustainability is to the lives and wellbeing of future generations.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Real interest rates

The ICAEW chart of the week looks at how real interest rates – net of inflation – remain stubbornly negative despite recent increases in the Bank of England base rate.

Chart with three lines - nominal yields on government debt, the Bank of England base rate and real yields on government debt. See text for details.

A feature of the economy since the financial crisis has been negative real interest rates, with the Bank of England reporting a -2.33% implied spot yield on 10-year government gilts as of 30 April 2022. This compares with a base rate of 0.75% on that day (since raised to 1%) and a nominal yield of +1.9%. With further increases in interest rates likely as the Bank of England seeks to bring inflation under control it is possible that real interest rates will become less negative over the next few months, at least assuming inflation peaks and doesn’t accelerate out of control.

Negative real interest rates are generally considered to be stimulative to the economy, reflecting the monetary policy support that the Bank of England has been providing since the financial crisis almost a decade and a half ago. Economic theory suggests that this should encourage spending and investment, as the nominal interest earned on savings will not be sufficient to offset the erosion in the value of money as prices rise over time.

The chart highlights how real interest rates were -2.59% in January 2020, before falling to almost -3.08% in June 2020 and bouncing around between -2.50% and -3.00% until November 2021 when they fell to -3.33%. They have since increased to -2.33% in April and to -2.20% as of 10 May 2022. Over that same period, nominal interest rates similarly based on government bond yields have fallen from 0.53% in January 2020 to 0.13% in July 2020 before increasing to between 0.3% and 0.4% until January 2021 after which they bounced between 0.8% and 1.0% until December 2021 since when rates have gradually increased to 1.92% on 30 April 2022, falling slightly to 1.86% on 10 May 2022. During this time, the Bank of England base rate was reduced from 0.75% in January 2020, to 0.25% and then 0.10% in March 2020 where it stayed until increasing to 0.25% in December 2021, to 0.50% in February 2022 to 0.75% in March 2022 and to 1.00% in May 2022.

The yields used in the chart are only one way of measuring real and nominal interest rates, and it is important to note that the former depend on the inflation expectations of market participants at particular points in time, which are not the same as the actual rates of inflation that are or will be experienced.

The challenge for the Bank of England over the next few months in tackling the current surge in inflation is how to take away the economic stimulus theoretically provided by negative real interest rates without causing a collapse in asset prices and a potential recession. A series of tough calls for even the most hardened policy makers.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Fuel prices

Our chart this week gives a breakdown of what makes up the cost of petrol and diesel, which continue to soar in price despite the temporary cut in fuel duty.

Column chart showing wholesale costs for 50 litres, distribution and retail costs, taxes and the fuel duty saving.

Petrol: £36.75, £4.30 and £40.40 = £81.45 (162.9p/litre x 50) after a fuel duty saving of £3.00.

Diesel: £44.20, £2.90 and £41.60 = £88.70 (177.4p/litre x 50) after a fuel duty saving of £3.00.

Source: RAC Foundation, 'Daily Fuel Prices 2022-05-03' x 50 litres.

A key component of the cost-of-living crisis is the expense incurred filling up our cars, which has risen by over 50% in two years from approximately 107p a litre for petrol and 112p a litre for diesel back in May 2020 to average prices of 162.9p and 177.4p per litre respectively on 3 May 2022.

Our chart illustrates how much this means in terms of a 50-litre fuel purchase. For petrol, this would have cost an average of £81.45 according to numbers supplied by the RAC Foundation, comprising £36.75 in wholesale costs, £4.30 in distribution and retail costs, and £40.40 in taxes. For diesel, the cost of buying 50 litres would have been £88.70, comprising £44.20 in wholesale fuel costs, £2.90 for distribution and the retailer, and £41.60 in taxes.

In each case, the Chancellor’s temporary 5p cut in fuel duty saves 6p per litre once VAT is taken into account, or £3.00 on a 50-litre purchase.

The wholesale costs of £36.75 and £44.20 (73.5p and 88.4p per litre) for petrol and diesel respectively are made up of £31.30 and £35.55 (62.6p and 71.1p per litre) for refined petrol and diesel and £5.45 and £8.65 (10.9p and 17.3p per litre) for bio content (principally ethanol) included in what you buy at the pump. Distribution and retail costs of £4.30 and £2.90 (8.7p and 5.8p per litre) for petrol and diesel respectively comprise delivery and distribution costs of £0.85 and £1.05 (1.7p and 2.1p per litre) and retailer margin of £3.45 and £1.85 (6.9p and 3.7p per litre). 

Taxes of £40.40 and £41.60 (80.7p and 83.2p per litre) comprise fuel duty of £26.45 (52.9p per litre) and £0.35 (0.7p per litre) in greenhouse gas and development fuel obligations for both petrol and diesel, and £13.60 for petrol and £14.80 for diesel (27.1p and 29.6p respectively) in VAT at 20%.

Most of the fuel duty cut has been absorbed by higher wholesale costs, meaning that prices at the pump are only just below their peak immediately prior to the Spring Statement on 23 March. However, retail fuel prices could well go up further in the coming weeks as higher crude oil prices flow through into the cost of refined petrol and diesel in response to EU sanctions against Russian oil.

Taxes on petrol and diesel remain a significant contributor to the public purse, with £26bn expected to be generated in fuel duty in the current fiscal year, despite a decade or so of freezing the rate and the recent temporary cut until March next year. The plan to phase out petrol and diesel vehicles poses a big dilemma for HM Treasury, which will need to make up for lost tax revenues once there is no hydrocarbon fuel to levy duties on. 

The current favourite option to fill the gap is road pricing, but the government has yet to formally announce a decision, something that will become more pressing as more and more drivers switch to electric cars.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: VAT receipts by quarter

This week’s chart highlights how the VAT deferral scheme is almost entirely behind higher VAT receipts in recent quarters, providing a note of caution to recent media headlines welcoming bumper tax revenues.

Horizontal bar chart showing VAT receipts by quarter from Jan-Mar 2017 through to Jan-Mar 2022.

2017: £31.7bn, £30.3bn, £31.1bn,  £31.8bn (Oct-Dec)
2018: £33.2bn, £30.8bn, £33.5bn, £32.9bn
2019: £35.4bn, £32.2bn, £34.3bn, £34.2bn
2020: £29.2bn, -£0.4bn, £28.4bn, £34.2bn
2021: £39.4bn, £35.2bn, £40.2bn, £41.4bn
2022 Jan-Mar: £40.6bn

The ICAEW chart of the week is on the topic of VAT, illustrating the quarterly pattern of VAT receipts since 2017 according to the HMRC tax receipts and national insurance contributions monthly bulletin published on 26 April.

The chart highlights how VAT receipts have grown steadily since 2017 up until the start of the pandemic, with receipts in calendar quarters of £31.7bn (Jan-Mar), £30.3bn (Apr-Jun), £31.1bn (Jul-Sep) and £31.8bn (Oct-Dec) in 2017; £33.2bn, £30.8bn, £33.5bn and £32.9bn in 2018; and £35.4bn, £32.2bn, £34.3bn and £34.2bn in 2019. This was followed by a big dip in 2020, with £29.2bn in Jan-Mar 2020, a net negative outflow of -£0.4bn in Apr-Jun, £28.4bn in Jul-Sep and £34.2bn in Oct-Dec 2020. In 2021, VAT receipts strengthened, with £39.4bn, £35.2bn, £40.2bn and £41.4bn by quarter, followed by £40.6bn in Jan-Mar 2022, the last quarter of the 2021/22 fiscal year.

The significant drop in VAT receipts in 2020 was driven by a combination of the economic contraction caused by the pandemic, cuts in VAT rates for hospitality, and – most significantly – £33.5bn in deferrals under the VAT payments deferral scheme implemented at the time of the first lockdown in 2020. This is the primary driver of the negative VAT receipts in the Apr-Jun quarter 2020 highlighted in the chart.

The original intention was that VAT deferred from 2020 would be due by no later than 30 June 2021, however, further relief in the form of a monthly instalment plan allowed VAT-registered businesses to spread the payment of the deferred VAT over the rest of the 2021/22 fiscal year. This has boosted the last three quarters of VAT receipts shown in the chart.

HMRC reports that £31.3bn of the VAT deferred was carried forward in 2021/22, which would imply a swing between financial years in the order of £60bn. This is greater than the £56bn increase in VAT receipts seen between the £101bn recorded for the four quarters to March 2021 and the £157bn in the following four quarters constituting the 2021/22 fiscal year.

VAT receipts excluding the effect of the deferral scheme may therefore have decreased in the last four quarters, which is surprising in the context of rising prices and the end of the discounted VAT rate for hospitality.

Recent media headlines reporting a bumper tax windfall for the Chancellor should therefore be treated with some caution. While tax receipts in 2021/22 have been much stronger than expected, a significant element of the increase relates to the collection of VAT held over from the previous year and not to any genuine increase in underlying tax revenues.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: G7 economic growth

The latest IMF economic forecasts put the UK at the bottom of the pile in 2023, but our chart this week elevates the UK to fifth place out of seven by looking at average growth for the four years from 2020 to 2023.

Chart presenting economic growth for the G7 in 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and the average over four years.

USA: -3.4%, +5.7%, +3.7%, +2.3%, average +2.0%
Canada: -5.2%, +4.6%, +3.9%, +2.8%, average +1.4%
Germany: -4.6%, +2.8%, +2.1%, +2.7%, average +0.7%
France: -8.0%, +7.0%, +2.9%, +1.4%, average +0.7%
UK: -9.3%, +7.4%, +3.7%, +1.2%, average +0.6%
Japan: -4.5%, +1.6%, +2.4%, +2.3%, average +0.4%
Italy: -9.0%, +6.6%, +2.3%, +1.7%, average +0.2%

Recent media reports have contrasted the government’s boast of being the best performing economy in the G7 in 2021 with the latest forecasts from International Monetary Fund (IMF) that suggest the UK economy will be bottom of the same league in 2023. Our chart this week attempts to take a step back and look at the overall picture by illustrative average economic growth by the G7 nations over the four years between 2020 and 2023.

These numbers are based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and the accompanying World Economic Outlook Database that were published on 19 April, setting out economic forecasts for the world economy over the next few years.

According to the IMF, the USA is the best performing economy in the G7, with average annual economic growth of +2.0% over the period from 2020 to 2023. An economic contraction of 3.4% in 2020 was more than offset by a rebound of 5.7% in 2021, followed by forecast growth of 3.7% in 2022 and 2.3% in 2023. Canada is not far behind, with an average growth of 1.4% over the four years, comprising respectively -5.2%, +4.6%, +3.9% and +2.8% in 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023.

Germany and France fare pretty similarly to each other, with Germany projected to experience marginally above 0.7% average growth and France marginally below. The patterns are different, however, with Germany having suffered a less severe economic hit during 2020 followed by moderate growth (-4.6%, +2.8%, +2.1%, 2.7%), while France was hit much harder by the pandemic followed by a much stronger rebound before a return to lower growth in 2023 (-8.0%, +7.0%, +2.9%, +1.4%).

The UK is in fifth place in this league table, but at 0.6% average economic growth over the four years selected this is only slightly less than Germany and France. With an economic contraction in 2020 of 9.3%, the UK suffered more severely from the pandemic than the other members in the G7 (although this is partly because of differences in statistical methodologies) but then saw the biggest rebound in 2021 with growth of 7.4%. Growth this year is forecast by the IMF to be 3.7% before falling to an (unfortunately) more typical level of 1.2% in 2023.

Vying for the wooden spoon are Japan and Italy, with Japan continuing a long period of low growth and a slower recovery from the pandemic than the others to average 0.4% a year (-4.5%, +1.6%, +2.4%, +2.3%). Italy secured the bottom position by virtue of being hit hardest by the pandemic and having less of a rebound than others (-9.0%, +6.6%, +2.3%, +1.7%), a net average growth rate of 0.2% over the four-year period.

For those that follow this particular league table, there is a hope that slightly stronger growth than the IMF has forecast could move the UK up one or two places above France and/or Germany. However, the bigger concern for most of us is about the downside risks to the global and UK economies from the war in Ukraine, rampant inflation, and a global cost of living crisis. These may put back even further any hope of returning the UK and other developed economies to a pre-financial crisis path of moderate economic growth.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK International Reserves

We take a look at the UK’s official international reserves that are held to safeguard sterling and support monetary policy.

Step chart showing components of the UK International Reserves.

Gross reserves: £101bn foreign currency securities and deposits, £36bn IMF, £15bn gold, £23bn other instruments.

Liabilities: (£109bn) other instruments

Net reserves: £66bn

Our chart this week is on the UK International Reserves, which comprise foreign currency securities and deposits, gold, investments in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other financial instruments primarily used to manage sterling as a national currency and support monetary policy.

As illustrated by the chart, the combined total of UK government and Bank of England international gross reserves was £175bn at 31 March 2022, comprising £101bn in foreign currency securities and deposits, £36bn invested in the IMF, £15bn in gold and £23bn in other financial instruments. This was offset by £109bn in liabilities to arrive at net reserves of £66bn.

According to the Bank of England, the £101bn in foreign currency securities consisted of £75bn in bonds and notes issued by foreign governments, £15bn in foreign government money market investments, £6bn in foreign central bank deposits and £5bn in private sector securities. The £36bn invested the IMF comprises £6bn in IMF reserves (effectively the IMF’s share capital) and £31bn in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a government-specific financial asset underpinned by a basket of currencies (US dollar, Euro, Chinese Yuan, Japanese Yen and sterling). The UK government also owned or had rights to 9,976,041 fine troy ounces of gold worth £15bn on 31 March 2022, while other financial instruments of £23bn included £20bn of claims against counterparties on account of reverse repo transactions.

Reserve assets were offset by £109bn in liabilities, comprising loans and securities used to finance reserve assets, repo obligations, and derivative financial instruments including foreign currency forwards, cross currency interest rate swaps and sterling interest rate swaps.

Not shown in the chart is the split between the UK government’s net reserves of £66bn, consisting of £151bn in gross assets less £85bn in liabilities, and the Bank of England’s approximately zero net reserve position, consisting of £24bn in gross assets (£12bn in foreign currency securities and bonds plus £12bn in other financial instruments) less £24bn in liabilities.

The Bank of England manages both its own foreign currency reserves, used to support its monetary policy objectives of controlling inflation, and the UK government’s international reserves, most of which sit in the Exchange Equalisation Account established in 1932 to provide a fund that can be used, when necessary, to regulate the exchange value of sterling. In normal circumstances the Bank of England’s main objectives in managing the reserves are to ensure the liquidity of sterling, the liquidity and security of the reserve assets themselves, and to ensure the reserves are managed in a cost-effective way.

In normal circumstances, the reserves are not used to actively intervene in foreign exchange markets, but are kept ‘in reserve’ on a precautionary basis in case there is any change in exchange rate policy in the future or in the event of any unexpected shocks. More prosaically, they are used to provide foreign currency services for government departments and agencies needing to transact in foreign currencies, as well as to buy, hold and sell SDRs as required by the UK’s membership of the IMF.

Although relatively small in the context of over £1trn a year in UK public spending and £2.3trn in public sector net debt, the UK’s international reserves provide HM Treasury and the Bank of England with a substantial amount of firepower in the foreign exchange markets should there ever be a need to intervene to support sterling. Fortunately, almost all of the foreign currency securities and deposits held in the reserves are invested in governments and central banks of allied countries, a contrast to the position of Russia, which has seen a substantial proportion of its international reserves frozen following its invasion of Ukraine.

One piece of good news amid all the economic gloom at the moment is that the UK International Reserves aren’t hitting the headlines. Because when they do, you really will know that all is not well.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: GCSE maths grade inflation

Our chart this week looks at the grade inflation challenge facing 16-year-olds across England as they study for their forthcoming GCSEs in the third year of the pandemic.

Chart showing GCSE results by grade for 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 respectively.

2018 – U (2.4%), grades 1-3 (5.4%, 8.8%, 12.7%), grades 4-6 (20.3%, 18.5%, 11.8%), grades 7-9 (9.5%, 6.9%, 3.7%)

2019 – U (2.3%), grades 1-3 (5.3%, 8.5%, 12.6%), grades 4-6 (21.1%, 18.2%, 11.4%), grades 7-9 (9.6%, 7.2%, 3.8%)

2020 – U (0.7%), grades 1-3 (4.0%, 7.3%, 11.1%), grades 4-6 (19.6%, 20.1%, 12.9%), grades 7-9 (11.0%, 7.9%, 5.4%)

2021 – U (1.1%), grades 1-3 (4.3%, 7.0%, 9.9%), grades 4-6 (18.7%, 20.3%, 12.7%), grades 7-9 (11.4%, 8.6%, 6.0%)

The ICAEW chart of the week is on the results of the General Certificate of General Education (GCSE) in mathematics for the past four years in England according to the Department for Education (DfE), illustrating how a burst of grade inflation in the pandemic poses challenges for both students and their examiners in the reinstated examinations this summer.

Maths is one of the core exam subjects taken by almost all 16-year-olds in England, with passes at grade 4 or above in both maths and English being a base requirement for most students wanting to progress onto GCSE Advanced (A level) courses and to university or a degree apprenticeship after that. It is also a prerequisite for many vocational qualifications, where good numeracy skills are often essential. 

The current grading system was adopted in 2017, with results now split into nine grades, which can be grouped into three categories of three grades each: below standard (1-3), good performance (4-6) and high performance (7-9). The four former grades of G, F, E and D were condensed into three (grades 1-3), while the old passing grade of C and the next level up of B were expanded to three, being 4 (pass), 5 (strong pass) and 6. The former high performance grades of A and A* were replaced by grades 7, 8 and 9, providing even more granularity at the top end.

The chart illustrates how before the pandemic the results in 2018 and 2019 were similar with 2.4% and 2.3% ungraded ‘U’ results respectively (which includes those who failed to turn up or who withdrew after entering), with respectively 26.9% and 26.4% of students receiving below standard grades (1-3), 50.6% and 50.7% received good performance grades (4-6), and 20.1% and 20.6% received high performance grades (7-9).

The debacle of the cancelled school examinations and regraded results in 2020, and the deliberate decision in 2021 to adopt teacher-assessed grades instead of exams, saw a significant rise in the number of higher grades awarded. There were fewer ungraded results (0.7% in 2020 and 1.1% in 2021), fewer below standard awards (22.4% and 21.2% respectively), more good performance grades (52.6% and 51.7%) and a great deal more high performance grades (24.3% and 26.0%). There was a big jump in the very top award, the so-called A**, with 6.0% of students receiving grade 9 in 2021 compared with 3.7% in 2018.

The percentage of each grade awarded by year were as follows:

2018 – U (2.4%), grades 1-3 (5.4%, 8.8%, 12.7%), grades 4-6 (20.3%, 18.5%, 11.8%), grades 7-9 (9.5%, 6.9%, 3.7%) – 535,312 entrants

2019 – U (2.3%), grades 1-3 (5.3%, 8.5%, 12.6%), grades 4-6 (21.1%, 18.2%, 11.4%), grades 7-9 (9.6%, 7.2%, 3.8%) – 554,598 entrants

2020 – U (0.7%), grades 1-3 (4.0%, 7.3%, 11.1%), grades 4-6 (19.6%, 20.1%, 12.9%), grades 7-9 (11.0%, 7.9%, 5.4%) – 571,624 entrants

2021 – U (1.1%), grades 1-3 (4.3%, 7.0%, 9.9%), grades 4-6 (18.7%, 20.3%, 12.7%), grades 7-9 (11.4%, 8.6%, 6.0%) – 584,933 entrants

The Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation (Ofqual), which regulates qualifications, examinations and assessments in England, has expressed a desire to return to a pre-pandemic grade profile but has acknowledged that the current cohort of GCSE students have experienced significant disruption to their education over the past two years. As a consequence, they believe it would be unfair to revert back to the previous level awards in one go and have said that they will set grade boundaries around the mid-point between the 2019 and 2021 results, subject to the normal process of moderation. 

This may seem unfair to students who can expect to be rewarded with less generous marks than their immediate predecessors given the difficulties being experienced in many schools over the past two years as they have studied for their GCSEs. There have been frequent closures and class disruptions as the coronavirus has and continues to propagate around the country. But Ofqual and the examiners are keen to avoid the grade inflation experienced over the last two years of teacher-assessed grades becoming embedded, a real prospect if they were to wait another year or two before attempting to bring grades back down towards pre-pandemic levels.

The experience of the last two years is that the ability of Ofqual and the DfE to deliver their plan will depend on events, so we will need to wait to see how well the process of sitting exams goes and how the results when they are announced are viewed by the court of public opinion.

In the meantime, we wish all the best of success to all those studying for their GCSEs this summer in England, as well as to their compatriots sitting equivalent exams in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

ICAEW chart of the week: US proposed federal budget 2023

Our chart this week illustrates the $5.8tn federal budget for the 2023 fiscal year proposed by President Biden to Congress for approval – a process that will not be straightforward.

Chart illustrating the 2023 US federal budget proposal.

Receipts $4.6tn + Deficit $1.2tn = Outlays $5.8tn.

Receipts comprise social security $1.5tn, income taxes $2.3tn, corporate taxes $0.5tn and other $0.3tn.

Outlays comprise welfare $3.7tn (social security $1.3tn, healthcare $1.4tn, veterans $0.2tn, income security $0.8tn), net interest of $0.4tn and federal government spending of $1.77tn (defence $0.8tn, non-defence $0.9tn).

The US Office for Management and Budget (OMB) has just published President Biden’s proposal for the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2023, which commences on 1 October 2022.

Federal spending proposed of $5.8tn comprises $3.7bn of ‘mandatory’ spending, primarily on welfare programmes, $0.4tn on debt interest, and $1.7tn of ‘discretionary’ spending. Welfare spending includes $1.3tn on social security, $1.4tn on healthcare (Medicare and Medicaid), $0.2tn on support to veterans, and $0.8tn on income security and other programmes.

This is a $60bn reduction from the $5.9tn forecast for the current financial year ending on 30 September 2022, with increases in social security ($99bn), Medicare and Medicaid ($67bn), interest ($39bn) and defence ($29bn), offset by a reduction of $280bn in income security (primarily pandemic support) and $14bn in non-defence departmental spending. This compares with the $6.8trn spent in the fiscal year ended 30 September 2021 at the height of the pandemic.

Receipts are forecast at $4.6tn, comprising social security payroll taxes of $1.5tn, federal income taxes of $2.3tn, corporate taxes of $0.5tn, and other taxes $0.3tn, resulting in a deficit of $1.2tn to be funded by borrowing.

Receipts are forecast to be $201bn higher than the $4.4tn forecast for the current financial year, with social security receipts up $64bn, income taxes up $82bn and corporate taxes up $118bn, offset by a fall of $63bn in other receipts. This primarily relates to economic factors as the US emerges from the pandemic but, as has been publicly reported, also involves higher taxes on ‘billionaires’, among other tax measures.

With pandemic income security and furlough programmes no longer required, the deficit has fallen from $2.8tn in 2021 to $1.4tn in the current year and a proposed $1.2tn in the next, before increasing to $1.8tn in 2032, reflecting increases in both receipts and spending over the coming decade.

The budget documents prepared by the OMB focus in particular on the major plans to improve infrastructure embodied in the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 2021, as well as further investment in defence, in lowering health and social care costs for individuals, in improving housing, pre-school and college education, and in reducing energy costs by combating climate change. The OMB suggests that there is some prudence in the budget given the uncertainties about whether proposed tax rises will obtain political support from within Congress, with an indication that this will be used to reduce the federal deficit even further if all the proposed tax rises are enacted into law.

For President Biden, this is his last budget proposal before the mid-term elections in November, when there is a possibility that the Democrats might lose control of one, or even both, houses of Congress. This makes it particularly important to his ability to deliver his domestic agenda.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Spring Statement 2022

This week we look at the Spring Statement, where the story is all about inflation as the Chancellor responded to the pressures that have contributed to the cost of living crisis.

Step chart showing changes from the October forecast for the deficit in 2022/23 and the revised Spring Statement forecast for the same period.

October forecast £83bn - higher receipts £30bn - lower unemployment £3bn + debt interest +£41bn + other revisions £2bn = updated forecast of £93bn.

The - student loans £11bn + energy support £12bn + tax cuts £6bn - other changes £1bn = Spring Statement forecast of £99bn.

What Chancellor Rishi Sunak had originally hoped would be a short report to Parliament on the latest economic and fiscal forecasts turned into a fully-fledged fiscal event as he responded to a ‘cost of living’ crisis that is expected to put severe pressure on household budgets and is risking the viability of many businesses. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) estimates that the Chancellor’s energy support package and tax cuts will cover around a third of the decline in living standards expected in the coming financial year.

Inflation is now centre stage in a way that it hasn’t been since the 1970s.

Our chart summarises the changes in the forecast for fiscal deficit the coming financial year commencing on 1 April 2022, showing how last October’s forecast of a £83bn shortfall between receipts and expenditure has increased to a £99bn shortfall in the latest forecasts by the OBR.

The good news is that the economic recovery from the pandemic has been stronger than previously thought, with the pandemic support measures such as the furlough scheme being rewarded with stronger tax receipts coming through into the forecasts. An extra £30bn is expected in 2022/23, complemented by lower unemployment than expected, which also reduces the forecast for welfare spending by an estimated £3bn.

Offsetting that is a huge rise in interest costs. This is driven by a sharp rise in the retail prices index (RPI), to which a substantial proportion of the government’s debt is linked, combined with higher interest rates as the Bank of England attempts to prevent inflation rising even further. These factors add an extra £41bn to the forecast interest bill for next year, bringing it up to £83bn, three and a half times the £24bn in 2020/21 and more than 50% higher than the £54bn now expected for the current financial year. Interest in subsequential financial years has been revised up by around £9bn a year on the basis (the forecasters hope) that inflation is brought back under control in 2023/24.

Other changes to the fiscal forecast add £2bn to the deficit forecast, bringing it up to £93bn before taking account of policy decisions announced since last October. The first, which for some reason was not highlighted by the Chancellor in his speech, was the impact of increasing the amounts that graduates will have to repay on their student loans, reducing the anticipated bad debt write-off in 2022/23 by £11bn from the estimate made last October.

The Chancellor did talk about the energy support package that he announced last month as the energy prices rises coming in April were announced. However, he did not add to that package directly – instead choosing to announce tax cuts of about £6bn in 2022/23. The main element is an increase from July of around £3,000 in the threshold at which National Insurance is payable by employees, which will benefit many low to middle income families, but not (as the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the Resolution Foundation and others have pointed out) the very poorest that will be hit hardest by price rises. More than two thirds of the benefit will go to higher income households.

Overall, the OBR says the energy support package and tax cuts together will offset around a third of the fall in living standards that is expected in the coming year.

Other policy changes amounting to around £1bn were offset by indirect effects of £2bn, resulting in a net £1bn benefit to bring the forecast deficit to £99bn, some £16bn higher in total than that predicted in October.

These numbers don’t include the 1p cut in the basic rate of income tax from 6 April 2024 that was also announced by the Chancellor. This is expected to cost around £6bn a year in lower tax receipts, but is expected to be more than offset by the effect of freezing both income tax and national insurance thresholds (expected to bring in somewhere in the region of £18bn extra a year). In effect, the Chancellor has chosen to bank the ‘benefit’ of higher inflation on his decision to freeze thresholds.

The big question is whether the Chancellor will be able to hold off from providing further support to households and businesses for the rest of the financial year. Most commentators appear to suggest that it is likely that he will return to the despatch box in the House of Commons before the next round of energy prices rises in October in order to make further announcements.

This article was originally published by ICAEW.