My chart for ICAEW this week divides some very big numbers for the public finances by an estimated 69.2m people living in the UK to highlight how UK public spending is now in excess of £1,500 per person per month.
According to the Autumn Budget 2024, the UK public sector expects to bring in £1,149bn and spend £1,276bn in the financial year ended 31 March 2025 (2024/25). At more than a trillion pounds a year in each case, these are very big numbers that can be difficult to comprehend.
My chart of the week attempts to make these numbers more understandable by averaging them over an estimated UK population of 69.2m for the current financial year and dividing them by 12 to arrive at per person per month equivalents (rounded to the nearest £5).
On this basis, total receipts are expected to average £1,385 per month for each person living in the UK in 2024/25, comprising £1,235 a month from tax receipts (£1,025bn in total) and £150 a month in other receipts (£124bn).
Not shown in the chart is the approximately £940 per person per month on average – just over two-thirds of total receipts – that comes from the top five taxes: income tax £375 per month, VAT £245 per month, employer national insurance £135 per month, corporation tax £120 per month, and employee national insurance £65 per month.
Public spending is expected to average £1,535 per person per month in 2024/25, comprising approximately £445 per month on pensions and welfare, £370 per month on health and social care, £160 per month on education, £410 per month on other public services, and £150 per month on debt interest, based on forecast total spending in 2024/25 of £370bn, £307bn, £134bn, £340bn, and £125bn respectively.
Spending on welfare
Welfare spending includes (but is not limited to) approximately £170 per person per month to cover the cost of paying the state pension, around £105 per month to pay for universal credit (including housing benefit), and in the order of £75 per month to fund disability and illness benefits.
Per capita spending on health and social care comprises close to £290 per person per month on the NHS, £55 on social care and £25 on public health, health research and other health-related spending.
Education costs each of us an average of £160 per month, of which approximately £115 per month pays for schools, £35 funds university and higher education (including just over £10 for student loans that are not expected to be repaid) and around £10 per month goes on further education, training and other.
The £410 per month cost of other public services includes in the region of £85 per month on defence and security, approximately £75 per month on roads and railways, £65 on industry and agriculture, nearly £60 per month on public order and safety, £15 per month on dealing with waste, and around £10 per month on international development and aid. This leaves approximately £100 per month to pay for all the other services that central and local government provide, including 11p per person per month for the Royal Family and palaces.
These numbers are averages and of course the amounts individuals pay in taxes and receive either in pensions and welfare benefits or in public services will vary significantly. For example, while health and social care spend is £370 per month when spread over the whole population, average spending on teenagers and those in their 70s are estimated to be significantly different from each other at £130 per month and £700 per month respectively.
Forecast per capita taxes and other receipts of £1,385 per month fall short of planned public spending of £1,535 per month to give rise to an expected deficit of approximately £150 per month funded by borrowing, being £127bn in total in 2024/25, divided by the estimated population of 69.2m. As a consequence, public debt now exceeds £2.8tn, equivalent to just under £41,000 for each person living in the UK, or somewhere in the region of £98,000 per household.
Navigating the public finances can be difficult at the best of times, but it is often helpful to translate the huge numbers you hear on the news into per capita equivalents to make sense of them. £1bn when spread across the UK population works at being equivalent to just over £1.20 per month.
My chart for ICAEW this week looks at how the fiscal baseline inherited by the Chancellor has changed as a consequence of the Autumn Budget, with higher capital investment driving up borrowing needed to fund the deficit over the next five years.
Our chart of the week sets out the changes in fiscal projections calculated by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in its October 2024 economic and fiscal outlook compared with the numbers at the time of the Spring Budget seven months ago.
These form a revised baseline for the public finances that will form the basis of the Chancellor’s spending and investment plans over the rest of the Parliament.
As our chart highlights, the fiscal deficit – the shortfall between tax and other receipts and public spending calculated in accordance with statistical standards – was forecast to amount to £87bn in 2024/25, but this has increased by £40bn to £127bn, or 4.5% of GDP.
The projections for the following five years were also revised upwards between 2025/26 and 2029/30 have increased from £78bn, £69bn, £51bn, £39bn and £35bn by £28bn, £20bn, £21bn, £33bn and £36bn to result in a revised profile of £106bn (3.6% of GDP), £89bn (2.9% of GDP), £72bn (2.3% of GDP), £72bn (2.2% of GDP) and £71bn (2.1%).
This contrasts with the previous government’s plan to bring down the deficit in relation to the size of the economy to 1.2% of GDP by 2028/29.
Perhaps the biggest surprise was the £40bn upward revision to the budgeted deficit of £87bn for the current financial year ending in March 2025. This reflects a combination of £14bn in higher debt interest and £6bn in other forecast revisions, £23bn in higher spending (most of which is the £22bn ‘black hole’ identified by the incoming government over the summer) and £2bn in additional capital investment, less £1bn in tax measures and £4bn from the indirect economic effect of policy decisions.
In later years, the principal driver of the increases in the deficit is higher capital investment as the Chancellor replaced the previous government’s plan to cut public sector net investment by almost a third over the next five years (from 2.5% to 1.7% of GDP) to a profile that sees net investment increase to 2.7% of GDP in 2025/26 and 2026/27 before returning to 2.5% of GDP in 2029/30.
The changes in the deficit between 2025/26 and 2029/30 can be summarised as follows:
2025/26: £28bn increase = £18bn higher capital investment + £10bn net other changes (£42bn additional spending – £25bn tax rises – £6bn indirect effects of decisions – £1bn forecast changes).
2026/27: £20bn = £23bn capital – £3bn net other changes (£44bn – £35bn – £5bn – £7bn).
2027/28: £21bn = £26bn capital – £5bn net other changes (£47bn – £40bn – £2bn – £10bn)
2028/29: £33bn = £27bn capital + £6bn net other changes (£49bn – £40bn + £2bn – £5bn)
2029/30: £36bn = £25bn capital + £11bn net other changes (£47bn – £42bn + £6bn – not published).
The increases in taxation, spending and capital investment won’t avoid the need for difficult choices in the Spending Review next year as departmental budgets will remain tight.
My chart for ICAEW this week illustrates how PM Keir Starmer’s £172,153 official salary entitlement would have been £305,770 if prime ministerial pay had kept pace with inflation since 2009.
Prime ministerial pay has been in the news quite a lot in recent weeks for a range of reasons, leading our chart of the week to look at how the prime minister’s salary has evolved over the last 15 years.
As the chart illustrates, former PM Gordon Brown was entitled to a salary of £197,689 and had an actual salary of £193,885 on 1 April 2009, significantly higher than today’s current official salary of £172,153 or the actual salary of £166,786 taken by current PM Keir Starmer. This is despite cumulative inflation of 55% (3.0% a year on average) or an increase in MP base pay of 41% (2.3% a year) over the past 15 years.
The reasons for these reductions in prime ministerial salary are primarily the result of a voluntary pay cut to £150,000 taken by Gordon Brown in the run up to the May 2010 election, and a further cut of 5% to £142,500 adopted by incoming PM David Cameron.
Cameron maintained his pay at this level for the duration of his first term in office, converting his voluntary decision into a permanent change in 2012 (backdated to 2011) in how much he and his successors have been entitled to receive. The chart shows how Cameron accepted a pay rise following the 2015 general election, taking him from a salary of £142,500 on 1 April 2012 out of an official entitlement of £142,545 to £150,402 on 1 April 2016 out of £152,532.
Subsequent prime ministers have also exercised pay restraint by restricting increases in ministerial pay, or in not taking all of the increases to which they were entitled. As a consequence, Theresa May concluded her period as prime minister in 2019 on a salary of £154,908 out of an official salary of £158,754, while Boris Johnson and Liz Truss were on annual salaries of £159,584 in 2022, short of their full entitlement of £164,951.
Rishi Sunak concluded his period as prime minister on an official salary of £172,153 from 1 April 2024 onwards, being the amount to which Sir Keir Starmer is entitled to claim if he wanted. However, the politics of accepting pay rises is difficult – perhaps now more than ever – and so Keir Starmer has stuck with the £166,786 actual salary that his predecessor was on before the 2024 general election.
Our chart illustrates how the prime minister’s official salary has eroded in value over the last 15 years by calculating how it would have risen to £219,800 on 1 April 2012, £232,000 on 1 April 2016, £247,720 on 1 April 2019, £266,020 on 1 April 2022 and £305,770 this year if it had increased in line consumer price inflation instead.
There are arguments for using other indexes for this comparison, such as public sector pay, which if used would have led to an official salary of £299,060 on 1 April 2024 ; average GDP per capita, perhaps a better measure of national economic performance, would have resulted in an official salary of £301,530. Linking to overall average pay would have led to an official salary of £311,990 today, while maintaining its value in comparison with pay in the private sector would have delivered a potential pay packet for the PM of £334,360.
The requirement for successive prime ministers to approve their own pay has led to the opposite of what you might think would happen. Instead of raising their salary ever higher because they have the power to do so, political choices and pressures have led them instead to cut or freeze their pay at different points over the last 15 years, resulting in a significant erosion in prime ministerial pay in that time.
These choices have led to the UK paying its head of government substantially less than comparable leaders such as Australian PM Anthony Albanese’s annual salary of A$607,500 (£311,500), German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s €348,300 (£290,250) or Canadian PM Justin Trudeau’s C$408,200 (£226,800).
Ironically, it might be the prime minister (and his successors) who could benefit most of all of our public servants by taking the power to set his own pay away and giving it to an independent pay review body instead.
Boost from self assessment tax receipts not enough to prevent a deficit in July as Chancellor searches for cost savings in the run up to the Autumn Budget.
The monthly public sector finances for July 2024 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Wednesday reported a provisional deficit for the first four months of the 2024/25 financial year of £51.4bn, £4.7bn worse than budgeted.
Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director of Public Sector and Taxation, says: “Today’s data shows that the customary boost from self assessed tax receipts in July was not enough to prevent a deficit of £3.1bn, higher than budgeted, as cost pressures drove up public spending. Debt increased to £2,746bn or 99.4% of GDP at the end of July, up £5.9bn from the end of June 2024.
“The government is now in crisis control mode as it searches for savings to offset significant unbudgeted cost overruns in this financial year, with the cumulative deficit to July 2024 standing at £51.4bn, £4.7bn more than budgeted.
“Rumours that the government is looking at significant cuts in public investment programmes this year to keep within budget are concerning, given the importance to economic growth of infrastructure and the urgent need for upfront investment in technology to fix poorly performing public services. Our hope is that the Chancellor will be able to take a more strategic view in her Autumn Budget in October and in the Spending Review in the spring.”
Month of July 2024
There was a shortfall between receipts and spending of £3.1bn in the month of July 2024, £1.8bn higher than in July 2023 and £3.0bn worse than the budgeted deficit of £0.1bn.
Taxes and other receipts amounted to £99.4bn in July 2024, up £10.3bn or 12% from the previous month driven by self assessment income tax receipts in July, in line with the trend last year. Receipts were £2.0bn or 2% higher than in the same month last year, in contrast with total managed expenditure of £102.5bn, which was £3.8bn or 4% higher than in July 2023.
Financial year to date
The shortfall between receipts and spending of £51.4bn for the four months to July 2024 was £0.5bn better than in the same period last year, but £4.7bn over budget.
Cumulative taxes and other receipts amounted to £359.3bn in the first third of the financial year, up 2% compared with the same period last year, while total managed expenditure was 2% higher at £410.7bn. This is illustrated by Table 1, which highlights how cuts to employee national insurance rates have been offset by higher income tax, VAT, corporation tax, and non-tax receipts.
Total managed expenditure for the first four months of £410.7bn was also up by 2% compared with April to July 2023, but this reflected spending on public services up 4%, welfare spending up 6% and gross investment up 10% driven by overruns and construction cost inflation being offset by lower energy-support subsidies and lower debt interest.
The reduction in debt interest of £6.1bn compared with the first four months of last year was driven by a £26.5bn swing in indexation on inflation-linked debt that more than offset a £20.4bn increase in interest on variable and fixed-rate debt.
Table 1: Summary receipts and spending
Apr-Jul 2024 £bn
Apr-Jul 2023 £bn
Change %
Income tax
89.9
86.4
+4%
VAT
67.9
66.0
+3%
National insurance
53.5
58.3
-8%
Corporation tax
34.0
31.6
+8%
Other taxes
73.5
72.1
+2%
Other receipts
40.5
37.5
+8%
Total receipts
359.3
351.9
+2%
Public services
(212.2)
(204.8)
+4%
Welfare
(103.1)
(97.5)
+6%
Subsidies
(10.6)
(14.0)
-24%
Debt interest
(46.6)
(52.7)
-12%
Gross investment
(38.2)
(34.8)
+10%
Total spending
(410.7)
(403.8)
+2%
Deficit
(51.4)
(51.9)
-1%
Table 2 summarises how public sector net borrowing (PSNB) to fund the deficit of £51.4bn combined with borrowing of £4.4bn to fund working capital movements, student loans and other financing requirements increased debt by £55.8bn during the first four months of the financial year. As a result, public sector net debt grew to £2,745.9bn on 31 July 2024, which is £931bn or 51% more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic.
The ratio of net debt to GDP ratio is at the highest it has been since the 1960s, having increased by 1.3 percentage points from 98.1% on 1 April 2024 to 99.4% on 31 July 2024. Borrowing to fund the deficit was equivalent to 1.9% of GDP and other borrowing was equivalent to 0.2%, an increase of 2.1% before being offset by 0.8% from the effect of inflation and economic growth on GDP (usually referred to as ‘inflating away’). Lower inflation this year means this effect is less pronounced than in the same period last year.
Table 2: Public sector net debt and net debt/GDP
Apr-Jul 2024 £bn
Apr-Jul 2023 £bn
PSNB
51.4
52.3
Other borrowing
4.4
(11.4)
Net change
55.8
40.9
Opening net debt
2,694.1
2,539.7
Closing net debt
2,745.9
2,580.6
PSNB/GDP
1.9%
2.0%
Other/GDP
0.2%
(0.4%)
Inflating away
(0.8%)
(1.5%)
Net change
1.3%
0.1%
Opening net debt
98.1%
95.7%
Closing net debt
99.4%
95.6%
Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS last year, was -£740bn on 31 May 2024, comprising £1,613bn in non-financial assets and £1,062bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,746bn of net debt (£343bn liquid financial assets – £3,089bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £669bn. This is a £67bn deterioration from the start of the financial year and is £123bn more negative than in July 2023.
Revisions and other matters
Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled. This includes local government, where monthly data is based on budget or high level estimates in the absence of monthly data collection.
The latest release saw the ONS reduce the reported deficit for the first three months of the financial year by £1.5bn from £49.8bn to £48.3bn as estimates were revised for new data.
First quarter shortfall between receipts and spending of almost £50bn emphasises the significant challenges facing the Chancellor as she puts together her first Budget.
The monthly public sector finances for June 2024 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Friday 19 July 2024 reported a provisional deficit for the first three months of the 2024/25 financial year of £49.8bn, £1.1bn better than a year previously but £3.2bn worse than budgeted.
Alison Ring OBE FCA, ICAEW Director of Public Sector and Taxation, says: “This is the first set of public sector finance data since the new government was elected, and today’s numbers set out the size of the obstacle the UK’s leaders face.
“£14.5bn was borrowed to finance the deficit in June, which although £3.2bn less than in June 2023, brought the total for the first three months of the financial year to £49.8bn, slightly worse than expectations. The latest numbers also highlighted the growing amount of public debt, which stood at 99.5% of GDP or £2,740bn on 30 June 2024. Although total debt interest was lower than last year because of the effect of lower inflation on inflation-linked debt, interest on the bulk of debt continues to rise.
“The high level of debt – and the associated interest bill – means that the new Prime Minister and Chancellor will be faced with some very difficult decisions over the coming months as they decide which elements of their programme to prioritise, and which will have to wait.”
Month of June 2024
Taxes and other receipts amounted to £88.2bn in June 2024, up 2% compared with the same month last year, while total managed expenditure was 2% lower at £102.7bn. This resulted in a reduction of £3.2bn from a fiscal deficit of £17.7bn in June 2023 to £14.5bn in June 2024.
Financial year to date
Taxes and other receipts amounted to £258.0bn in the three months to June 2024, up 1% compared with the same month last year, while total managed expenditure was 1% higher at £307.8bn. This resulted in a reduction of £1.1bn from a fiscal deficit of £50.9bn for the first quarter of 2023/24 to £49.8bn for the first quarter of 2024/25. However, this is £3.2bn more than the £46.6bn for the first quarter included in the Spring Budget 2024.
Table 1 analyses receipts for the first quarter of the financial year, highlighting how cuts to employee national insurance rates have been offset by higher income tax, corporation tax, and non-tax receipts.
Table 1: Summary receipts and spending
Three months to
Jun 2024 (£bn)
Jun 2023 (£bn)
Change (%)
Income tax
58.1
56.1
+4%
VAT
49.9
49.6
+1%
National insurance
39.7
43.4
-9%
Corporation tax
25.3
23.4
+8%
Other taxes
54.9
54.1
+1%
Other receipts
30.1
27.7
+9%
Total receipts
258.0
254.3
+1%
Public services
(158.8)
(152.6)
+4%
Welfare
(76.9)
(73.7)
+4%
Subsidies
(7.8)
(11.3)
-31%
Debt interest
(35.2)
(41.1)
-14%
Gross investment
(29.1)
(26.5)
+10%
Total spending
(307.8)
(305.2)
+1%
Deficit
(49.8)
(50.9)
-2%
Table 1 also shows how total managed expenditure for the first quarter of £307.8bn was up by 1% compared with April to June 2023, with higher spending on public services and welfare offset by lower energy-support subsidies and lower debt interest. The reduction in the latter of £5.9bn was driven by a £9.2bn reduction in indexation on inflation-linked debt that more than offset a £3.3bn or 44% increase in interest on variable and fixed-rate debt.
Table 2: Public sector net debt
Three months to
Jun 2024 (£bn)
Jun 2023 (£bn)
Deficit
(49.8)
(50.9)
Other borrowing
3.9
(7.7)
Debt movement
(45.9)
(58.6)
Opening net debt
(2,694.1)
(2,539.7)
Closing net debt
(2,740.0)
(2,598.3)
Net debt/GDP
99.5%
96.7%
Public sector net debt was £2,740bn or 99.5% of GDP on 30 June 2024, just under £46bn higher than at the start of the financial year. At 99.5%, the debt to GDP ratio is the highest it has been since the 1960s.
The increase in the first quarter reflects borrowing to fund the deficit of just under £50bn minus close to £4bn in net cash inflows from loan recoveries and working capital movements in excess of lending by government.
Public sector net debt is £142bn or 5% higher than a year previously, equivalent to an increase of 2.8 percentage points in relation to the size of the economy. It is £925bn or 51% more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic and £1,712bn or 167% more than the £1,028bn net debt amount as of 31 March 2007 before the financial crisis, reflecting the huge sums borrowed over the last two decades.
Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS in 2023, was -£726bn on 31 May 2024, comprising £1,613bn in non-financial assets and £1,070bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,740bn of net debt (£340bn liquid financial assets – £3,080bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £669bn. This is a £53bn deterioration from the start of the financial year and is £77bn more negative than the -£649bn net worth number for June 2023.
Revisions and other matters
Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled.
The latest release saw the ONS increase the reported deficit for the first two months of the financial year by £1.8bn from £33.5bn to £35.3bn as estimates were revised for new data. More significantly, public sector net debt at the end of May 2024 was reduced by £16.3bn to £2,726.6bn to correct for omitted data on Bank of England repo transactions during the current financial year. This reduced the reported debt to GDP ratio for May 2024 by 0.7 percentage points from 99.8% of GDP to 99.1%.
Public sector net debt has passed £2.7tn for the first time. In May the debt increased by £49bn from £2,694bn to £2,743bn, 51% higher than it was in March 2020 at the start of the pandemic.
The monthly public sector finances for May 2024 released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on Friday 21 June 2024 reported a provisional deficit for the first two months of the 2024/25 financial year of £33.5bn, £1.5bn better than the £35.0bn predicted by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) and £0.4bn higher than in April and May 2023.
An ICAEW spokesperson said: “Today’s numbers show that public sector net debt continues to grow, up from £2.69tn in April to £2.74tn in May, the first time it has exceeded £2.7tn.
“Net debt is now 51% higher than it was at the start of the pandemic in March 2020, and 167% higher than it was in March 2010, pushed up by the spikes in spending during the pandemic and to offset energy bills, as well as borrowing to fund day-to-day spending and investment. High borrowing costs and the financial consequences of more people living longer mean that the public finances are significantly weaker and less resilient than they were 14 years ago.
“When the country goes to the polls on 4 July, the reality is that whoever wins power will inherit an extremely challenging fiscal position that will hamper their ability to turn the country around.”
Month of May 2024
Taxes and other receipts amounted to £85.1bn in May 2024, up 2% compared with the same month last year, while total managed expenditure was also 2% higher at £100.1bn.
The resulting fiscal deficit of £15.0bn for the month was £0.8bn higher than in May 2023.
Financial year to date
As summarised in Table 1, total receipts in April and May 2024 of £170.4bn were 2% higher than in the same two months last year, with the cuts to employee national insurance rates offset by higher income tax, corporation tax, and non-tax receipts.
Table 1: Summary receipts and spending
Two months to
May 2024 £bn
May 2023 £bn
Change %
Income tax
38.2
36.8
+4%
VAT
33.9
33.6
+1%
National insurance
25.9
28.2
-8%
Corporation tax
16.6
15.5
+7%
Other taxes
36.0
35.2
+2%
Other receipts
19.8
18.5
+7%
Total receipts
170.4
167.8
+2%
Public services
(108.3)
(104.5)
+4%
Welfare
(51.4)
(49.1)
+5%
Subsidies
(5.2)
(7.8)
-33%
Debt interest
(21.4)
(21.6)
-1%
Gross investment
(17.6)
(17.9)
-2%
Total spending
(203.9)
(200.9)
+1%
Deficit
(33.5)
(33.1)
+1%
Table 1 also shows how total managed expenditure for the two months of £203.9bn was up by more than 1% compared with April and May 2023, with higher spending on public services and welfare offset by lower energy-support subsidies and marginally lower debt interest. The latter was driven by significantly lower indexation on inflation-linked debt offsetting the much higher rates of interest payable on variable rate and refinanced fixed-rate debt.
Table 2: Public sector net debt
Two months to
May 2024 £bn
May 2023 £bn
Deficit
(33.5)
(33.1)
Other borrowing
(10.2)
2.1
Debt movement
(43.7)
(31.0)
Opening net debt
(2,699.2)
(2,539.7)
Closing net debt
(2,742.9)
(2,570.7)
Net debt/GDP
99.8%
96.1%
Public sector net debt as of 31 May 2024 was £2,743bn or 99.8% of GDP, just under £44bn higher than at the start of the financial year. The increase reflects borrowing to fund the deficit of £33.5bn and £10.2bn borrowed to fund lending by government and other cash requirements, net of loan recoveries.
Public sector net debt was £172bn or 7% higher than a year previously, and 3.7 percentage points higher in relation to the size of the economy.
Public sector net debt is £928bn or 51% more than the £1,815bn reported for 31 March 2020 at the start of the pandemic and £1,715bn or 167% more than the £1,028bn net debt amount as of 31 March 2007 before the financial crisis, reflecting the huge sums borrowed over the last 14 years.
Public sector net worth, the new balance sheet metric launched by the ONS in 2023, was -£726bn on 31 May 2024, comprising £1,613bn in non-financial assets and £1,074bn in non-liquid financial assets minus £2,743bn of net debt (£300bn liquid financial assets – £3,043bn public sector gross debt) and other liabilities of £670bn. This is a £47bn deterioration from the start of the financial year and is £95bn more negative than the -£631bn net worth number for May 2023.
Revisions and other matters
Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled.
The latest release saw the ONS reduce the reported deficit for April 2024 by £2.1bn from £20.5bn to £18.4bn and revise the deficit for the year to March 2024 up by £0.7bn from £121.4bn to £122.1bn as estimates of tax receipts and expenditure were updated for better data.
This week’s chart for ICAEW is on manifesto costings, illustrating the scale of each party’s promises and how they expect to fund them.
My chart for ICAEW this week summarises the financial commitments in the manifestos of the five UK-wide political parties, together with how they propose to fund their plans.
The Labour Party
The Labour Party manifesto costings are the most cautious financially, with plans to find £9bn in 2028/29 from a combination of tax rises and tackling tax avoidance and evasion and £1bn or so in spending reductions to provide most of the funding for its spending commitments of £11bn.
The additional tax revenue proposed by Labour includes £5.2bn from increasing taxes on non-doms and tackling tax avoidance and evasion, £1.5bn from VAT and business rates on private schools, £1.2bn from extending windfall tax on oil and gas, and £0.6bn from increasing the tax rate on private equity carried interest. Spending reductions include £0.7bn from cutting spending on consultants, £0.4bn from increased collaboration between police forces, and £0.2bn from scrapping the Rwanda plan and ending the use of hotels for asylum seekers.
Labour’s proposals for new spending comprise approximately £6bn for public services and £5bn a year in capital investment. The former includes £1.8bn for the NHS, £1.0bn for schools and young people (including £0.3bn for primary school breakfast clubs), £0.9bn for HMRC to tackle tax avoidance and evasion, £0.7bn for improving public service delivery and capability, £0.4bn for 13,000 neighbourhood and community PCSOs, and £0.2bn for asylum and border control. The latter includes £1.7bn for Great British Energy, £1.5bn for green investment programmes, £1.1bn for home insulation, and £0.3bn in incentives for green energy suppliers.
Labour’s proposals add up to £1bn in extra borrowing in 2028/29, although Labour suggest that they could add £3.5bn to borrowing in 2028/29, implying a further £2.5bn could be available for other priorities.
The Conservative Party
The Conservative Party’s plans are more ambitious, with plans to raise £5bn a year by 2028/29 from tackling tax avoidance and evasion and £21bn from spending cuts and efficiency savings, which they intend to use to fund tax cuts of £16bn and extra spending of £9bn.
Proposed spending cuts by the Tories comprise £11bn from cutting planned spending on welfare (principally disability benefits), £5bn from other cuts (£1.6bn R&D, £1.5bn regional development, £0.9bn from cutting ‘low value’ degrees, £0.4bn from visa changes, and £0.6bn in other measures), and £5bn from efficiency savings (£2.9bn civil service headcount, £1.1bn from quangos, £0.6bn consultancy and £0.4bn NHS managers).
Proposed tax cuts include £10bn per year by 2028/29 to halve employee national insurance, £1.7bn to abolish self-employed national insurance, £2.2bn to increase pensioner tax allowances, £1.2bn to reform the high-income child benefit charge, and £0.6bn to reduce stamp duty for first time buyers.
Unlike Labour, there is no additional investment in HMRC to help achieve the planned reduction in the tax gap, but there is £4.5bn in 2028/29 to increase defence spending to 2.44% of GDP (on its way to 2.5% by 2030/31), £2.0bn for national / community service, £1.4bn for the NHS, £0.8bn for 8,000 more police officers, and £0.7bn for apprenticeships.
The Liberal Democrats
The Liberal Democrats are more hopeful in that they believe they can find £7.2bn from tackling tax avoidance and evasion to supplement proposed tax rises of £19.7bn (£5.2bn capital gains tax, £4.3bn bank levies, £4.0bn aviation taxes, £2.1bn oil and gas, £2.1bn digital services tax, £1.4bn on share buybacks and £0.6bn other). The party also plans to find £5.8bn from spending cuts (£4.3bn asylum, £0.9bn free schools, and £0.6bn consultants).
The Lib Dems plan use this additional funding to spend an extra £32bn on public services in 2028/29 (£9.8bn NHS and social care, £6.7bn on defence, borders and international aid, £6.6bn on education and childcare, £4.1bn to tackle child poverty, £2.9bn for the devolved administrations, £1.0bn for farmers and the environment and £0.6bn for transport.
The balance of £20.7bn a year on average over five years for capital investment is expected to be funded mainly by additional borrowing, including £8.4bn to tackle climate change and protect the environment, £6.2bn for social housing, £1.9bn on school buildings, £1.9bn for the devolved administrations, £1.2bn on transport infrastructure, and £1.1bn for hospitals and other health facilities.
The Reform Party
The Reform UK costings in the ‘Our Contract with You’ are on a much bigger scale than everyone apart from the Green Party, with proposals to raise taxes by £14bn and cut spending by £136bn (10% of total public spending, or more once costs such as the state pensions are excluded) in order to fund an £88bn programme of tax cuts and £53bn a year in spending commitments.
The proposed spending cuts include a blanket £50bn a year in efficiency savings from cutting public service spending by 5% “without touching front line services”, £35bn from ceasing to pay interest to commercial banks on central bank deposits, £20bn from scrapping net zero, £15bn from cutting welfare benefits, £6bn from foreign aid, £5bn from reducing immigration and £5bn from stopping HS2 completely. The tax rises comprise a £10bn tax on renewable electricity generators and a £4bn immigration surcharge on employers, together with unquantified amounts from a 4% online delivery tax and a cut in entrepreneur’s relief to 5% that are netted off within the numbers below.
Reform UK plans to use these sums to cut personal taxes by £70bn (raise income tax threshold to £20,000, abolish VAT on energy bills, cut stamp duty, allow VAT reclaims for tourists, halve inheritance tax rate to 20% and raise threshold to £2m), cut business taxes by £18bn (reduce corporation tax to 15% and to zero for profits under £100,000, increase the VAT threshold to £150,000, abolish business rates for high street SMEs and create SME enterprise zones with zero tax when creating jobs).
Spending commitments include £17bn health and social care (a three-year basic rate tax holiday for NHS and social care staff, 20% tax relief on private healthcare and insurance, write-off medical student fees over 10 years and private treatment vouchers), £14bn for defence and veterans (2.5% of GDP with an aspiration to meet 3% after 2030), £8bn for children and families (including £5,000 transferrable marriage allowance and front loading of child benefit for ages 1-4), £5bn for police and courts (recruiting 40,000 new officers over five years), £5bn for education (including 20% tax relief on private school fees – and no VAT), and £4bn for agriculture, fishing and coastal communities
The Green Party
The Green Party has the most ambitious set of proposals, with tax rises of £151bn and cost savings of £12bn together with £63bn in additional borrowing to fund incremental spending of £226bn in 2028/29. It has an expansive agenda that involves nationalising water and the Big 5 energy companies, investing large sums in the green transition, and spending a significant amount more on health and welfare.
Its proposed tax increases comprise £72bn in higher personal and wealth taxes, £70bn from a carbon tax and around £9bn from business taxation, with £12bn in savings from cancelling the Trident replacement and roadbuilding programmes. Its proposals include aligning capital gain tax rates and investment income with income tax, increasing national insurance above the upper earnings limit from 2% to 10%, restricting pension tax relief to the basic rate, reforming inheritance tax, and introducing a 1% wealth tax on individuals with assets above £10m and 2% above £1bn. It also wants to replace council tax and business rates with land value taxes.
If achieved, this would allow it to pay for £145bn in additional current spending of £145bn in 2028/29 and £81bn in extra capital investment. The former includes £46.4bn for health and social care, £27.2bn welfare, £20.1bn overseas aid, £13.2bn education, £11.9bn transport, £4.5bn nature, food and farming, and £21.7bn for other priorities. The latter includes £56.7bn for green investment, £10.5bn for social housing, £6.6bn for health and education, and £6.8bn for other capital expenditures.
Upcoming Spending Review does not feature
None of the parties addresses the ‘elephant in the room’ represented by the upcoming three-year Spending Review for 2025/26 to 2027/28 that is expected by the Institute for Fiscal Studies and others to identify up to £20bn per year of additional funding requirements to maintain public services at their current level.
Overcoming the current weak state of the public finances is likely to be first order of business for whichever party wins the election.
Our chart zooms across the Atlantic this week to take a look at Canada’s federal budget for 2024/25.
Canada’s budget 2024 sets out the financial plans of the government of Canada for the year from 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025 (2024/25).
Like UK budgets, Canada’s budget 2024 is accompanied by financial projections for the four subsequent years to 2028/29. However, unlike the UK, Canada’s fiscal budget is prepared on an accruals basis, with a balance sheet including both financial and non-financial assets and liabilities, and a budgetary surplus or deficit that is equivalent to the accounting profit or loss in a private sector set of financial statements.
Canada’s approach contrasts with the statistics-based system of national accounts that most other countries use for setting fiscal targets, including the UK. This is despite the UK adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in its consolidated (Whole of Government Accounts), departmental and other public body financial statements, and an accruals-based resource accounting system derived from IFRS for internal budgeting and performance management.
Our chart this week shows how Canada’s federal budgetary balance is expected to be in deficit by C$40bn in both 2023/24 and 2024/25, before reducing over the rest of the forecast period to reach C$20bn in 2028/29, equivalent to 1.4%, 1.3% and 0.6% of GDP in 2023/24, 2024/25 and 2028/29 respectively. Or £24bn, £24bn and £12bn if converted at the 1 April 2024 exchange rate of C$1.70 to £1.00.
Budget 2024 assumes an average increase in nominal GDP of 4.0% a year between 2024 and 2028, reflecting a combination of economic growth of 1.8% on average and projected GDP inflation of 2.1%. Economic growth is expected to reflect a 0.9% annual increase in labour supply (1.6% from growth in the working-age population less 0.6% from lower labour force participation, 0.1% from higher unemployment, and 0.1% from fewer hours worked) and 0.9% from improved productivity.
Total revenue is forecast to grow by 7.1% from C$465bn (£274bn) in 2023/24 to C$498bn (£293bn) in 2024/25 before rising by an average of 4.2% a year to C$586bn (£345bn) in 2028/29. This is equivalent to 16.1%, 16.6% and 16.7% of GDP in 2023/24, 2024/25 and 2028/29 respectively.
Around two-thirds of revenue comes from federal income tax, amounting to a budgeted C$225bn in 2024/25. A further 15% comes from other taxes, with the C$76bn in 2024/25 comprising C$54bn from goods and services tax (GST, the Canadian version of VAT), C$6bn from customs import duties, C$13bn from excise taxes and other duties, and C$2bn from other federal taxes.
Other revenue is budgeted to amount to C$86bn in 2024/25 or 17% of total revenue, comprising C$30bn in employment insurance premiums, C$13bn from pollution pricing, C$9bn in revenues from Crown enterprises (net of Bank of Canada losses), C$3bn in foreign exchange revenues (principally returns on international reserves), and C$31bn in other income (including interest on tax receivables).
Total expenditure including net actuarial losses is expected to increase by 6.5% from C$505bn in 2023/24 to C$538bn (£316bn) in 2024/25 and then by an average of 3.0% a year to C$606bn (£356bn) in 2028/29. This is equivalent to 17.5%, 17.9% and 17.2% of GDP in 2023/24, 2024/25 and 2028/29 respectively.
Expenditure can be categorised between government programmes, welfare benefits, transfers to provinces, territories and municipalities, and interest and actuarial losses.
In 2024/25, spending on government programmes is budgeted to amount to C$225bn (C$123bn in operating expenses and C$102bn in transfer payments), while major transfers to persons are expected to be C$135bn (comprising C$80bn in elderly benefits, C$28bn in child benefit payments and C$27bn in employment insurance benefits).
Major transfers to provinces, territories and municipalities in 2024/25 of C$121bn comprise contributions of C$57bn for health care, C$25bn in equalisation payments to provinces, C$24bn for social programmes (social care, social assistance, post-secondary education, early years development, early learning and child care), C$5bn for territories, and C$2bn for community building, net of a C$7bn reduction in payments to Quebec (which acquired a greater share of taxes in the 1960s and 1970s), plus C$15bn in proceeds from pollution pricing returned to Canadians either directly or via provinces and territories.
Not shown in the chart is the projected balance sheet, with net liabilities expected to increase from an estimated C$1,216bn (£715bn) on 31 March 2024 to a budgeted C$1,255bn (£738bn) on 31 March 2025 and a projected C$1,372bn (£807bn) on 31 March 2029. The forecast balance sheet for 31 March 2025 comprises C$117bn (£69bn) in non-financial assets and financial assets of C$719bn (£423bn) less total liabilities of C$2,091bn (£1,230bn).
Net liabilities are expected to increase more slowly than the size of the economy, resulting in the ratio of net liabilities to GDP falling from 42.1% to 41.9% to 39.0% over the same period.
The budget document also reports on the Canadian government’s long-term financial projections, with federal net liabilities expected to reduce to 9.0% of GDP by 2055-56 despite a projected increase in the budgetary deficit back up to 1.1% of GDP. This partly reflects an assumption that net immigration will continue at 0.9% a year, offsetting the effects of more people living longer and a fertility rate of 1.5 births per woman.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, affordable housing is the first area of focus for Budget 2024, with the federal government aiming to increase the number of new homes by 3.87 million by 2031, a net 2 million on top of the 1.87 million already expected to be built.
My chart for ICAEW this week suggests that the public sector is less productive than it was, but difficulties in measuring productivity make it hard to say for sure.
According to the Office for National Statistics, public sector productivity has not recovered following the pandemic and is now lower than it was in 1997, despite technological advances since then.
My chart highlights how public sector productivity fell between 1997 and 2010 as spending and investment increased – a fall of 3.3% or 0.25% a year on average over 13 years – before climbing during the austerity years until 2019 – an improvement of 7.5% or 0.8% a year over nine years. The pandemic led to productivity collapsing as public services were severely disrupted before partially recovering, with productivity flat between 2022 and 2023 – overall a net drop of 6.3% or 1.6% a year on average over four years.
Overall, this means public sector productivity as measured by the ONS has fallen by 2.6% or 0.1% a year on average over the last 26 years. It is important to note that these changes do not cover all of the public sector – in some areas such as defence spending, productivity (value of outputs / cost of inputs) is assumed to be a constant 1, reflecting how difficult and subjective it would be to attempt to measure our military preparedness for war.
Despite that, the picture shown by this metric aligns with our more general understanding of what happened in these periods. The decline in productivity between 1997 and 2010 as the then Labour government improved pay and conditions for public sector employees makes sense, while the austerity policies of the Coalition and Conservative governments between 2010 and 2019 constrained the cost of delivering public services. And the pandemic resulted in many public services being closed or curtailed, and we know that many public services – particularly the NHS and schools – are still struggling to recover from the pandemic.
The chart provokes questions about how well this statistic values outputs given that while it is very easy to measure inputs, it is less easy to assess the value produced. For example, larger class sizes might give rise to an apparent productivity improvement as measured (more children taught for the same input of teaching time), but this may not capture any deterioration in quality that may result.
Not only is the quality of outputs difficult to measure in calculating productivity, but it also doesn’t measure outcomes, often much more important than outputs. In the health context this is whether the patient survives rather than how many operations were performed, for education it means how well-equipped our young people are for the world rather than how many hours they spent in a classroom, and for the criminal justice system how few crimes are committed rather than how many criminals are prosecuted.
Public sector productivity is an important metric, even if an imperfect one. It is helpful to understand how well public service activities are being delivered from a cost perspective – and how there is a need for improvement. But it doesn’t tell us whether those activities are improving our well-being, growing our economy, improving our environment, or building our resilience as a nation.
While the UK commits to increasing its defence and security expenditure, our chart this week looks at military spending around the world, which has reached $2.4trn.
Our chart this week is based on the latter, with SIPRI reporting that global military expenditure has increased to $2,443bn in 2023, a 6.8% increase after adjusting for currency movements. SIPRI’s numbers are based on publicly available information, which means that some countries may be spending even more on their militaries that are included in the database. SIPRI was unable to obtain numbers for military spending by Cuba, North Korea, Syria, Yemen, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Laos.
Military spending is the news this week following the announcement by the UK government that it will commit to spending 2.5% of GDP on defence and security, the recent vote by the US Congress to provide $95bn in military aid to Ukraine ($61bn), Israel ($26bn) and Taiwan and others in the Indo-Pacific ($8bn), and the release of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database for 2023.
More than half of that spending is incurred by NATO, with total military spending of $1,351bn, comprising $916bn by the US, $75bn by the UK and $360bn by other NATO members. Of the latter, $307bn was spent by the 23 members of the EU that are also members of NATO (including $67bn by Germany, $61bn by France, $36bn by Italy, $32bn by Poland and $24bn by Spain), while $53bn was spent by the other seven members (including $27bn by Canada and $16bn by Türkiye).
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) are partially overlapping economic and military alliances convened by China and Russia respectively. China has the biggest military with $296bn spent in 2023, while Russia spent $109bn and other members spent $106bn (of which India spent $84bn).
We have categorised the rest of the world between other US allies which spent $304bn in 2023 (including $76bn by Saudi Arabia, $50bn by non-US members of the Rio Pact, $50bn by Japan, $48bn by South Korea, $32bn by Australia, $27bn by Israel and $17bn by Taiwan), Ukraine which spent $65bn, and $212bn spent by other countries for which SIPRI has data.
The numbers do not take account of the differences in purchasing power, particularly on salaries. That means China and India, for example, can employ many more soldiers, sailors and aircrew than NATO countries can for the same amount of money.
The Ukraine number also excludes $35bn in military spending funded by the US ($25bn) and other partners ($10bn) during 2023 that was not part of its national budget.
Global military spending is expected to increase further in 2024 as the international security situation deteriorates. This includes NATO members that plan to increase their defence and security spending to meet or exceed the 2% of GDP NATO minimum guideline set in 2014 to be achieved by 2024.
This includes the UK, which now plans to increase its spending on defence and security from 2.35% of GDP in 2023/24 to 2.5% of GDP by 2028/29, with suggestions from defence sources that setting a target of 3% of GDP may be necessary at some point in the next decade.
