January surplus small comfort for Chancellor ahead of Spring Budget

Better than expected self assessment tax receipts helped generate a small fiscal surplus of £5bn in January, reducing the year-to-date deficit to £117bn, £7bn more than the comparative period in the previous financial year.

The monthly public sector finances for January 2023 released on Tuesday 21 February 2023 reported a provisional surplus for the month of £5bn. This was a significant improvement over the deficit of £26bn reported for the previous month (December 2022), but £7bn less than the surplus reported for the same month last year (January 2022).

A surplus arose primarily because better than expected self assessment tax receipts were sufficient to offset the effect of higher interest costs, higher inflation on index-linked debt, and the cost of the energy price guarantee for households and businesses incurred during the month. January also saw the Office for National Statistics (ONS) record a £2bn charge for custom duties that the UK had failed to collect when it was a member of the EU Customs Union.

The cumulative deficit for the first 10 months of the financial year was £117bn, which is £7bn more than in the same period last year but £155bn lower than in 2020/21 during the first stages of the pandemic. It was £64bn more than the deficit of £53bn reported for the first 10 months of 2019/20, the most recent pre-pandemic pre-cost-of-living-crisis comparative period. 

The deficit was £22bn below the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)’s revised forecast made at the time of the Autumn Statement in November, primarily because the energy price guarantee has cost less than anticipated.

Public sector net debt was £2,492bn or 98.9% of GDP at the end of January 2023, dipping below the £2.5tn reported last month because of corrections to prior month data. This is £672bn higher than net debt of £1,820bn at 31 March 2020, reflecting the huge sums borrowed since the start of the pandemic. The OBR’s latest forecast is for net debt to reach £2,571bn by March 2023 and to approach £3trn by March 2028.

Tax and other receipts in the 10 months to 31 January 2023 amounted to £839bn, £88bn or 12% higher than a year previously. Higher income tax and national insurance receipts were driven by rising wages and the higher rate of national insurance for part of the year, while VAT receipts benefited from inflation in retail prices.

Expenditure excluding interest and investment for the ten months of £802bn was £41bn or 5% higher than the same period in 2021/22, with Spending Review planned increases in spending, the effect of inflation, and the cost of energy support schemes partially offset by the furlough programmes and other pandemic spending in the comparative period not being repeated this year.

Interest charges of £110bn for the 10 months were £49bn or 80% higher than the £61bn reported for the equivalent period in 2021/22, through a combination of higher interest rates and higher inflation driving up the cost of RPI-linked debt. 

Cumulative net public sector investment to January was £44bn, £5bn more than a year previously. This is much less than might be expected given the Spending Review 2021 pencilled in significant increases in capital expenditure budgets in the current year.

The increase in net debt of £120bn since the start of the financial year comprised borrowing to fund the deficit for the 10 months of £117bn together with a further £3bn to fund student loans, lending to businesses and others, and working capital requirements, net of cash inflows from repayments of deferred taxes and loans made to businesses during the pandemic.

Alison Ring OBE FCA, Public Sector and Taxation Director for ICAEW, said: “With a small surplus, January’s fiscal numbers benefited from stronger self-assessment tax receipts than expected, providing some comfort to Chancellor Jeremy Hunt as he assembles his first Budget. The deficit for the current financial year is still on track to be one of the highest ever recorded, reaching £117bn for the ten months to January 2023 after energy support and interest costs more than offset the benefit of higher tax receipts.

Although it appears that inflation has peaked, the near-term economic outlook continues to deteriorate and so calls for immediate tax cuts are likely to remain unanswered. We are asking the Chancellor to take urgent action to eliminate the backlog at HMRC that is inhibiting business growth, and to make improving the resilience of the UK economy and the public finances a priority.”

Table containing four columns with the cumulative ten month numbers from April to January to Jan 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023 - receipts, expenditure, interest, net investment, deficit, other borrowing, debt movement, net debt and net debt / GDP.

Click on link at end of this post to go to the ICAEW website for a readable version.

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled.

The ONS made several revisions to prior period fiscal numbers to reflect revisions to estimates. These had the effect of reducing the reported fiscal deficit for the nine months ended 31 December 2022 by £6bn to £122bn and reducing the reported fiscal deficit for the year to 31 March 2022 by £1bn to £122bn.

For further information, read the public sector finances release for January 2023.

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Slowing inflation

My chart this week illustrates the slowing rate of inflation and how it should fall further once a big surge in prices between February and April 2022 falls out of the year-on-year comparison.

Step chart showing quarterly (annualised) and annual rates of consumer price inflation (CPI):

Quarters to Apr 21, Jul 21, Oct 21 and Jan 22: +4.3%, +4.4%, +8.7%, +4.5% respectively adding up to equal +5.5% for the year to Jan 22.

Quarters to Apr 22, Jul 22, Oct 22 and Jan 23: +19.1%, +8.6%, +12.5%, +0.8% respectively adding up to equal +10.1% for the year to Jan 23.

Final column shows CPI Index increasing from 109.0 for Jan 21 to 114.9 for Jan 22 and then 126.4 for Jan 23.

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) reported that the annual rate of consumer price inflation (CPI) was 10.1% in January 2023, falling from 10.5% last month and down from a peak of 11.1% in October 2022, but much higher than the 5.5% annual rate of inflation for the year to January 2022.

Our chart breaks down annual inflation over the past two years to January 2023 into quarters, highlighting how inflation is likely to fall quite rapidly over the next three months as the big surge in prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year falls out of the year-on-year comparison.

Reported inflation this time last year was 5.5% for the year to January 2022. This can be broken down into quarterly rises (annualised) of 4.3% in the three months to April 2021, 4.4% in the quarter to July 2021, 8.7% in the quarter to October 2021 and 4.5% in the three months to January 2022. Inflation in that period was well above the Bank of England’s target range of 1% to 3%, as supply constraints drove prices higher as the domestic and global economies started to recover from the depths of the pandemic.

Reported inflation for the year to January 2023 of 10.1% can be broken down into quarterly rises (annualised) of 19.1% in the quarter to April 2022, 8.6% in the quarter to July 2022, 12.5% in the quarter to October 2022 and 0.8% in the three months to January 2023. The sharp jump in prices in the period from February to April 2022 was driven by a rapid rise in energy prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that added to existing inflationary pressures, turbo charging the rate of inflation. Since then, prices across the economy have risen rapidly, although with wholesale energy prices retreating from their peak recently, the overall rate of price rises has slowed down significantly in the last quarter.

The chart also shows how the consumer price inflation index (the CPI Index) increased from 109.0 in January 2021 to 114.9 in January 2022 and to 126.4 in January 2023.

The chart doesn’t show the intermediate annual rates of inflation, although these can be calculated using the geometric average of the preceding four quarters. The annual rate increased from 5.5% in January 2022 to 9.0% in April 2022, then to 10.1% in July 2022 before reaching a peak of 11.1% in October 2022, following which it fell to 10.1% in January 2022. 

Successively dropping quarters from the previous year out of the year-on-year comparison and replacing them with price rises over the most recent quarter saw inflation rise as quarterly rises (annualised) of 4.3% fell out to be replaced by 19.1%, 4.4% by 8.6%, and 8.7% by 12.5%, before inflation fell over the last three months as 4.5% was replaced by 0.8%.

These ‘base effects’ mean that most commentators expect a sharp slowdown in the annual inflation rate over the next nine months as monthly and quarterly price rises over that time should be much lower than the comparatives falling out of the year-on-year calculation. The biggest fall is expected over the next three months, as even with a sizeable rise in domestic energy prices expected in the month of April 2023 as government support is withdrawn, price rises are expected to be much lower than the 19.1% annualised rate seen in the quarter to April 2022.

While the medicine of higher interest rates is no doubt playing a key part in restraining prices from rising as fast as they did last year, the Bank of England knows that arithmetic should be the biggest contributor to inflation coming down over the course of 2023.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK business births and deaths

My chart this week illustrates the choppy economic waters facing UK businesses as more stopped trading than were created over the course of 2022.

Bar chart going down vertically from Q1 2017 to Q4 2022 showing business closures and creations on the left and the net decrease or net increase on the right.

Q1 2017 -78,950, +97,340, +18,390
Q2 2017 -96,390, +80,930, -15,460
Q3 2017 -82,555, +86,380, +3,825
Q4 2017 -67,655, -73,975, +6,320
Q1 2018 -86,775, +88,295, +1,520
Q2 2018 -80,550, +95,715, +15,165
Q3 2018 -65,660, +79,410, +13,750
Q4 2018 -72,375, +76,730, +4,355
Q1 2019 -77,990, +97,110, +19,120
Q2 2019 -91,410, +95,675, +4,265
Q3 2019 -74,440, +84,970, +10,530
Q4 2019 -67,990, +77,970, +9,980
Q1 2020 -96,660, +89,910, -6,750
Q2 2020 -72,665, +73,415, +16,170
Q3 2020 -60,415, +76,585, +16,170
Q4 2020 -78,965, +82,080, +3,115
Q1 2021 -86,600, +101,845, +15,245
Q2 2021 -88,515, +91,400, +2,885
Q3 2021 -83,235, +81,165, -2,070
Q4 2021 -87,040, +79,870, -7,170
Q1 2022 -110,515, +98,730, -11,785
Q2 2022 95,155, +89,225, -5,930
Q3 2022 -79,305, +67,390, -11,915
Q4 2022 -82,390, -69,445, -12,945

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) published its latest quarterly experimental statistics on business births and deaths on 2 February 2023. This reports that business closures have increased since before the pandemic at the same time as business creations have fallen, resulting in net reductions in the number of VAT- or PAYE-registered businesses operating in the UK over the past six quarters.

The statistics are taken from the government’s Inter-Departmental Business Register, a database of approximately 2.8m businesses registered for either PAYE or VAT, just over half of the estimated 5.5m businesses operating in the UK (according to the Department of Business & Trade). The difference principally relates to sole traders with turnover below the VAT threshold who have not voluntarily registered for VAT, or for PAYE if they trade through a company. There is also a time lag on reporting the closure of businesses where a business continues to be registered, with the ONS waiting for several periods of zero VAT or zero payrolls before recording a business as closed.

The statistics are labelled as experimental because they are not as rigorous as annual statistics, but the advantage is that they provide data on business births and deaths in 2022, for which we will not get a full set of annual numbers until towards the end of this year. 

As our chart illustrates, the quarterly net change in businesses in 2017 was +18,390, -15,460, +3,825 and +6,320 respectively, followed by +1,520, +15,165, +13,750, +4,365 in 2018, +19,120 and +4,265, +10,530 and +9,980 in 2019. The pandemic saw a fall in business closures as government support enabled businesses that would otherwise have stopped operating to stay alive, with a net decrease of -6,750 in Q1 2020 followed by net increases of +750, +16,170, +3,115 in the second, third and fourth quarters of 2020. 

A spurt in business creations in early 2021 saw net increases of +15,245 and +2,885 in the first two quarters, before net decreases of -2,070 and 7,170 in the last two quarters of 2021. With pandemic support measures coming to an end and the onset of the energy crisis, the trend moved further into negative territory with quarterly net closures of -11,785, -5,930, -11,915 and -12,945 in 2022.

Quarterly business deaths averaged around 81,400 in 2017, 76,300 in 2018, 78,000 in 2019, 77,200 in 2020, 86,300 in 2021 and 91,800 in 2022, while quarterly business births averaged around 84,700 in 2017, 85,000 in 2018, 88,900 in 2019, 80,500 in 2020, 88,600 in 2021 and 81,200 in 2022.

These numbers will not be pretty reading for Kemi Badenoch, the new Secretary of State for Business and Trade. With interest rates on the rise, energy costs still at very high levels and consumers cutting back on spending, the risks are that many more existing businesses will cease trading, while business creations may continue to be subdued.

One crumb of comfort is that businesses founded during downturns are believed to do better than those founded in good times. So, if you are thinking of striking out on your own with a new business idea, there may be no better time than now.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: IMF economic projections

Our chart this week is on the global economy and how the UK is at the bottom of the IMF’s league table for economic growth in 2023 and 2024.

Chart showing the annualised rate of real GDP growth projected for 30 countries by the IMF for 2023 and 2024, together with global averages. Different colours are used to classify countries between (i) emerging markets and developing economies (ii) global averages (iii) advanced economies excluding UK and (iv) UK.

Starts with India at the top at +6.4% and ends with the UK at at the bottom with growth of 0.1%.

Details are in the text below.

The IMF reported in its World Economic Outlook Update published on 30 January 2023 that it expects global economic output to increase by an average of 3.0% or 2.4% over the course of 2023 and 2024, depending on whether you weight the relative sizes of each economy using purchasing power parity (PPP) or market exchange rates.

While headlines have focused on the more immediate prospects for economies around the world in 2023 and an expected recession in the UK, our chart takes a look at projected economic growth for both 2023 and 2024 for the 30 countries tracked by the IMF.

The UK is at the bottom of this table, with a projected economic contraction of 0.6% in 2023 combined with projected growth of 0.9% in 2024 being equivalent to annualised economic growth after taking account of inflation of 0.1% over two years.

This does not compare well with projected real economic growth in the other G7 nations: Germany 0.7% (0.1% in 2023 and 1.4% in 2024), Italy 0.7% (0.6% and 0.9%), France 1.1% (0.7% and 1.6%), the USA 1.2% (1.4% and 1.0%), Japan of 1.3% (1.8% and 0.9%) and Canada 1.5% (1.5% and 1.5%). It is also below other advanced economies such as the Netherlands 0.9% (0.6% and 1.2%), Australia 1.6% (1.6% and 1.7%), Spain 1.7% (1.1% and 2.4%), and South Korea 2.1% (1.7% and 2.6%).

Average growth in emerging market and developing countries of 4.1% over the two years is much higher than the annualised average of 1.3% in advanced economies. India is expected to grow by 6.4% (6.1% in 2023 and 6.8% in 2024), Philippines 5.5% (5.0% and 6.0%), Indonesia 4.9% (4.8% and 5.1%), China 4.8% (5.2% and 4.5%), Malaysia 4.6% (4.4% and 4.9%), Egypt 4.6% (4.0% and 5.3%), Kazakhstan 4.3% (4.3% and 4.4%), Thailand 3.6% (3.7% and 3.6%), Pakistan 3.2% (2.0% and 4.4%), Nigeria 3.0% (3.2% and 2.9%), Türkiye 3.0% (3.0% and 3.0%), Saudi Arabia 3.0% (2.6% and 3.4%), Argentina 2.0% (2.0% and 2.0%), Iran 2.0% (2.0% and 2.0%), Mexico 1.6% (1.7% and 1.6%), Brazil 1.3% (1.2% and 1.5%), Poland 1.3% (0.3% and 2.4%), South Africa 1.2% (1.2% and 1.3%) and Russia 1.2% (0.3% and 2.1%).

Economic performance is not solely about these percentages, which while adjusting for inflation do not reflect the starting point nor changes in population. Advanced economies are much wealthier and smaller levels of growth represents much bigger increments than higher rates of growth in much poorer countries. Japan’s growth is despite a shrinking population, unlike the UK where the population is still expanding.

A devaluing currency can also mean that some countries can end up poorer at the end of the year despite positive headline growth rates. An example is Türkiye, where annualised average growth of 4.5% over the five years to 2022 was accompanied by a 98.9% fall in the value of the Turkish Lire against the Euro.

One crumb of comfort for the UK is that the IMF’s projections (not forecasts) are of course not what is going to happen. They are based on the IMF’s assessment of both official and unofficial forecasts and projections together with a range of assumptions from global energy prices to business investment, from fiscal policy to the behaviour of consumers, from the effects of climate change to the impact of wars. All of these could easily end up being very different, even if economic forecasting was an exact science, which it isn’t.

Policymakers in the UK will definitely be hoping that the British economy performs much better than these dismal projections suggest. After all, if you are at the bottom of a league, the only direction to aim for is up.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Australia federal deficit

Our chart heads down under this week to take a look at how the reported financial position of Australia’s federal government has changed over the last decade.

Australia Day on 26 January provides an opportunity to take a look at the federal balance sheet for Australia. This is included in the audited consolidated financial statements of the Commonwealth of Australia that are prepared in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards, which generally align with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), although AASB 1049 Whole of Government and General Government Sector Financial Reporting diverges from IFRS in some aspects. They encompass the federal level of government in Australia, excluding states, territories and local authorities.

Our chart shows how the balance sheet has grown over the last 10 years, from net liabilities of A$256bn at 30 June 2012 (£147bn at the current exchange rate of A$1.77:£1.00) to A$607bn at 30 June 2022 (£348bn).

At 30 June 2012, the balance sheet comprised non-financial assets of A$123bn and financial assets of A$268bn, less interest-bearing liabilities of A$288bn, and provisions and payables of A$359bn to give a negative net worth of $256bn. These balances had grown to non-financial assets of A$266bn and financial assets of A$788bn at 30 June 2022, less interest bearing liabilities of A$1,109bn, and provisions and payables of A$552bn. 

Non-financial asset balances grew over the 10 years from 2012 to 2022 with land and buildings increasing from A$35bn to A$66bn, military equipment A$40bn to A$81bn, other plant, equipment and infrastructure $19bn to A$72bn, intangibles A$7bn to A$15bn, heritage and cultural assets A$10bn to A$13bn, and other from A$12bn to A$19bn.

Financial assets also grew, with investments and loan balances increasing from A$197bn to A$640bn, advances from A$27bn to A$70bn, receivables and accrued revenue from A$39bn to A$69bn, and cash from A$5bn to A$9bn. A substantial proportion of this growth relates to the Australia Future Fund, a sovereign wealth fund that was established in 2006 primarily to cover the costs of paying for unfunded pension obligations, together with a series of smaller funds intended to support infrastructure investment, disability insurance, medical research, indigenous communities and natural disasters.

Interest-bearing liabilities increased significantly as a consequence of the pandemic, with government securities increasing from A$268bn to A$577bn over the 10 years to June 2022, central bank and other deposits from A$3bn to A$426bn, and loans, leases and other interest bearing liabilities from A$17bn to A$106bn.

Provisions and payables grew by a lesser extent, with superannuation and other employee liabilities increasing from A$252bn to A$359bn, Australian currency on issue from A$54bn to A$102bn, payables from A$23bn to A$27bn, and provisions from A$30bn to A$64bn.

While negative net worth has increased from 17% of GDP to 24% of GDP over the 10 years, principally as a consequence of the pandemic in the last couple of years, the establishment of the Australia Future Fund, the move of federal employees from defined benefit to defined contribution pension arrangements, and active management of the balance sheet means that Australia is in a much healthier fiscal position than many other developed countries. 

For the Australian Department of the Treasury at least, this should make for a happy Australia Day.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

Public sector net debt tops £2.5trn for the first time

The highest December deficit on record has been driven by higher debt interest costs and the cost of energy support schemes.

The monthly public sector finances for December 2022, released on Tuesday 24 January 2023, reported a provisional deficit for the month of £27bn, the highest December deficit since records began in 1993. This was despite a mild December helping to mitigate some of the cost of energy support schemes.

The deficit for the month of £27bn was £12bn higher than the equivalent month in the previous financial year (December 2021) and £8bn more than the previous month (November 2022).

This brought the cumulative deficit for the first three quarters of the financial year to £128bn, which is £3bn below the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)’s revised forecast made at the time of the Autumn Statement last November. This substantially exceeds the budget of £99bn for the entire financial year to March 2023 forecast by the OBR at the time of the Spring Statement as higher interest costs, the effect of higher inflation on index-linked debt, and the cost of the energy price guarantee for households and businesses over the winter all add to public spending.

Public sector net debt was £2,504bn or 99.5% of GDP at the end of December 2022, up £131bn from £2,373bn at the end of March 2022. This is £684bn higher than net debt of £1,820bn on 31 March 2020, reflecting the huge sums borrowed since the start of the pandemic. 

The OBR’s latest forecast is for net debt to reach £2,571bn by March 2023 and to approach £3trn by March 2028, although energy prices falling faster than expected may help improve the outlook somewhat.

The cumulative deficit for the first three quarters of the financial year of £128bn was £5bn lower than this time last year and £143bn lower than in 2020/21 during the first stages of the pandemic. However, it was £67bn more than the deficit of £61bn reported for the first nine months of 2019/20, the most recent pre-pandemic pre-cost-of-living-crisis comparative period. 

Tax and other receipts in the three quarters to 31 December 2022 amounted to £721bn, £73bn or 11% higher than a year previously. Higher income tax and national insurance receipts were driven by rising wages and the higher rate of national insurance, while VAT receipts benefited from inflation in retail prices. Year-to-date receipts included £3.7bn accrued for the energy profits levy ‘windfall tax’.

Expenditure excluding interest and investment for the nine months of £716bn was £30bn or 4% higher than the same period in 2021/22, with Spending Review planned increases in spending, high inflation and the cost of energy support schemes more than offsetting the furlough programmes and other pandemic spending in the comparative period not repeated this year.

Interest charges of £100bn for the three quarters were £46bn or 85% higher than the £54bn reported for the equivalent period in 2021/22, through a combination of higher interest rates and higher inflation driving up the cost of RPI-linked debt. 

Cumulative net public sector investment to December was £33bn. This is £2bn more than a year previously, much less than might be expected given the Spending Review 2021 pencilled in significant increases in capital expenditure budgets in the current year.

The increase in net debt of £131bn since the start of the financial year comprised borrowing to fund the deficit for the nine months of £128bn together with a further £3bn to fund student loans, lending to businesses and others, and working capital requirements, net of cash inflows from repayments of deferred taxes and loans made to businesses during the pandemic.

Alison Ring OBE FCA, Public Sector and Taxation Director for ICAEW, said: “A mild December was not enough to prevent public debt from reaching £2.5tn for the first time, in a disappointing set of numbers for December 2022. However, the Chancellor will take comfort that cumulative borrowing for the first three quarters of the financial year was less than feared when the budget for 2022/23 was updated back in November. Energy prices coming down much faster than expected should also improve the outlook for the final quarter as well as the new financial year.

“The deficit is still on track to be one of the highest ever recorded in peacetime and stabilising the fiscal position is the best that Jeremy Hunt can hope for in the short term. Amid a sea of red ink, sustainable public finances remain a distant prospect for now.”

Table showing trends in receipts, expenditure, interest, net investment, deficit, other borrowing, debt movement, net debt and net debt / GDP for the nine months Apr-Dec 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022.

Click on the link to ICAEW article at the end for a readable version of this table.

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled.

The ONS made several revisions to prior period fiscal numbers to reflect revisions to estimates. These had the effect of reducing the reported fiscal deficit for the eight months ended 30 November 2022 by £5bn to £101bn and reducing the reported fiscal deficit for the year to 31 March 2022 by £2bn to £123bn.

The revisions in the current year principally relate to an increase of £4bn in the estimate for accrued corporation tax receipts at 30 November 2022, while the prior year numbers were updated to reflect a £0.7bn correction to reported VAT cash receipts during 2021/22 and a £1bn increase in the estimate for accrued corporation tax receipts at 31 March 2022.

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: China population

Our chart this week follows the news that China’s population has peaked at just over 1.4bn, illustrating the dramatic change that has taken place over the last 40 years.

Step chart showing the change between China's population in 1981 and 2021.

997m in 1981, comprising 765m age 0-39, 228m age 40-79 and 4m age 80+.

+776m births
- 332m deaths
- 15m net migration

= 1,426m in 2021 comprising 735m age 0-39, 658m age 40-79 and 33m age 80+.

The news that China’s population has peaked and is starting to fall prompted us to take a look at how the country with the largest population in the world has changed over the last 40 years.

In 1981, two years after the introduction of the one-child policy, China was a young country, with a population of 997m and a median age of 21. Today it is a mature country, with a population of 1,426m and a median age of 38, approaching that of many western countries.

Our chart shows how that population has changed according to the United Nations Population Division. In July 1981, China was estimated to amount to 997m, comprising 765m under the age 40, 228m between the ages of 40 and 79, and 4m aged 80 or over. Since then, there have been 776m births, 332m deaths and net outward migration of 15m to reach a total of 1,426m in July 2021. This comprised 735m people aged between 0 and 39, 658m between 40 and 79 and 33m aged 80 or over.

The dramatic change in the age profile reflects the huge success that China has had in tackling poverty and disease, enabling many more children to survive into adulthood compared with previous generations, and to then live longer lives. Infant mortality fell from 45 per thousand births in 1981 to less than six per thousand in 2021 and life expectancy at birth increased from 65 to 78.

The rapid growth in the population over the last 40 years has slowed in recent years as the number of births has fallen and (as the population has aged) deaths have increased. There were 10.9m births in 2021 (down from 12.2m in 2020, much less than the 22.8m births in 1981) and 10.6m deaths (up from 10.3m in 2020 and much higher than the 7.4m deaths recorded in 1981). With net outward migration of 0.2m, the net increase in the population in 2021 was less than 0.1m, down from the net increase of 1.9m in 2021 and much lower than the 17.1m increase experienced in 1982 and the peak increase of 19.9m in 1990.

According to the UN’s numbers, China’s population was expected to peak this year (in 2023), with a central projection that would see the population falling by 233m the next 40 years to 1,193m in 2061, and then to 767m in 2100.

However, China’s population is now believed to have peaked already, with the National Bureau of Statistics of China announcing on 17 January 2023 that China’s population excluding foreign citizens and excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan fell by 0.85m from 1,412.6m in December 2021 to 1,411.75m at the end of 2022.

India, with an estimated population of 1,407m in July 2021 according to the UN, was expected to overtake China as the world’s largest population during 2023, but there is some speculation following China’s announcement that this has already occurred. India’s population is currently projected to continue to grow over the next 40 years and peak at 1,697m in 2064.

With the population peaking and many more people living longer lives, the fiscal challenge facing China becomes similar to those facing western nations: how to support a rapidly increasing number of pensioners at the same time as the working age population is declining.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: UK public finances 2022/23

Our chart this week compares the UK public finances for the current fiscal year with the overall size of the economy, illustrating how taxes are expected to amount to 36% of GDP and expenditure 47% of GDP.

Graphic using circles to illustrate the latest official forecast for UK public finances for 2022/23:

1. A circle for taxes of £910bn (36% of GDP), inside a circle of taxes and other income of £1,005bn (40% of GDP) which in turn is inside a circle of GDP of £2,497bn.

2. A circle for expenditure of £1,182bn (47% of GDP), inside a circle of GDP of £2,497bn.

3. An adjacent circle for the deficit of £177bn (7% of GDP).

The latest official forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) for the current fiscal year ending 31 March 2023 is for a shortfall (or ‘deficit’) of £177bn between receipts of £1,005bn and expenditure of £1,182bn. The largest component of receipts is taxation, which is forecast to amount to £910bn.

Our chart puts these numbers into context by comparing them with the forecast for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of £2,497bn in 2022/23, highlighting how taxes are expected to amount to 36% of GDP, receipts including other income to 40% of GDP, and expenditure to 47% of GDP, resulting in a deficit amounting to 7% of GDP.

As many commentators have noted, taxes are at a historically high level, with taxation at its highest level as a share of economic activity since 1949. This is unsurprising given the combination of many more people living longer lives and the financial commitments made by successive governments to pay for pensions, health and (to an extent) social care.

Expenditure is also at historically high levels, with energy support packages adding to recurring expenditure of around 43% or 44% of GDP. This is below the peak of 53% of GDP a couple of years ago at the height of the pandemic.

As a consequence, the shortfall between receipts and expenditure of 7% of GDP is elevated compared with the 2% to 3% of GDP ‘normal’ range, although still below the 15% of GDP seen in 2020/21 during the pandemic and 10% of GDP in 2009/10 during the financial crisis.

The increase in the corporation tax rate to 25% from April means that receipts are expected to increase to 37% of GDP over the next few years, leading to the total of taxes and other receipts rising to 41%. At the same time total expenditure is expected to stay at 47% of GDP in 2023/24 before falling back to 45% in 2024/25, 44% in 2025/26 and 2026/27, and 43% in 2027/28. 

Unlike in previous generations, the government is restricted in its ability to cut other areas of spending to cover expected further rises in spending on pensions, health and social care as the number of pensioners continues to grow. Savings in the defence and security budgets are no longer possible now that spending has fallen to not much more than the NATO minimum of 2% of GDP, down from in excess of 10% back in the day, while pressures across many other areas of the public sector will make achieving the cost savings already assumed in the forecasts a significant challenge.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

Ideas on fiscal devolution clash as economic progress stalls

Gordon Brown’s constitutional commission calls for greater fiscal devolution, going much further than the government’s gradual rollout of levelling-up devolution deals.

There appears to be a growing belief among policymakers across the political spectrum that regional and local authorities need greater financial powers if economic outcomes are to be improved across the UK. However, while there appears to be some consensus around extending the fiscal powers of the devolved administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, there is much less agreement on how far to go in devolving financial powers for the 84% of the UK’s population that live in England.

Levelling-up ‘devolution deals’ cover almost half of England

The government has adopted a gradualist approach to fiscal devolution that has principally revolved around ‘devolution deals’, part of its wider Levelling Up agenda to spread prosperity across England outside London and the South East. These deals generally provide an agreed stream of investment funding over several decades, greater control over the adult education and transport budgets, and some additional powers (eg, over second homes in Cornwall), in exchange for agreeing to direct elections for combined authority mayors or county leaders.

Regional devolution deals were announced in 2022 for the North EastYork and North Yorkshire, and the East Midlands, together with county devolution deals for SuffolkNorfolk and Cornwall. The government is also working on ‘trailblazer’ devolution deals along similar lines with existing city-regions, starting with Greater Manchester and the West Midlands combined authorities.

The devolution deals do not provide any additional tax-raising powers for regional combined authorities or local authorities, and the majority of local government funding in England continues to be determined by central government. It is also unclear whether the government will attempt to extend the coverage of devolution deals across the rest of England beyond the existing areas covered and the Devon and East Yorkshire deals that are still being negotiated.

Gordon Brown constitutional commission

The Labour Party has also been thinking about devolution as part of a wider debate on the UK constitution, with a review led by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown into the UK’s constitution. While many of the headlines about the review focused on reform of the House of Lords, most of the report focused on devolution and intergovernmental cooperation, including the role played by English regions. This included recommending greater long-term financial certainty and new fiscal powers for local government in England, in addition to deepening the devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Several of the Gordon Brown commission’s proposals align with recommendations made by ICAEW to HM Treasury at the time of the last Spending Review. ICAEW called for stable funding for local authorities, rationalisation of funding streams, investment in fiscal resilience and strengthening financial management.

At the same time as advocating for greater fiscal flexibility for local government, the review stresses the need for scrutiny and accountability to ensure money is spent wisely. One option might be for the proposed Office for Value for Money to expand to cover local government, further developing the ideas put forward in a Fabian Society report, Prizing the Public Pound, produced in collaboration with ICAEW. Other ideas include the piloting of local public accounts committees.

Although clear in the reforms to the UK’s constitutional arrangements that the review would like to see, the report lacks detail on how it intends to achieve its proposals – for example in identifying individual taxes that could be devolved to regional and local authorities. 

The report is ambitious in aiming to implement reforms within just one parliamentary term, meaning there will be a lot of work and consultation required to design the new arrangements, establish public support and then develop and pass the necessary legislation.

Fabian Society-ICAEW round table 

A joint Fabian Society-ICAEW round table last year explored some of the practical challenges involved in devolving fiscal powers to regional and local government in England. The group, which included members and contributors to the Gordon Brown commission, looked at the proposed trailblazer deals being negotiated by Greater Manchester and the West Midlands combined authorities, as well as existing ideas that have been put forward for devolved taxes, such as on tourism.

The participants discussed how existing disparities in tax bases between different parts of the country meant some form of redistribution or central government funding was still likely to be needed, as illustrated by the cities of Westminster and Hull that each serve populations of around 250,000 or so, but which have very different levels of prosperity and hence local tax capacity. 

The approach adopted in Germany of shared national taxes was also discussed, a key element in how regional governments (Länder) are funded. This is further explored in a separate Fabian Society report: Levelling Up? Lessons from Germany.

While there were a variety of views around the funding mechanisms that could be used to pay for local public services, there was general agreement on the need to rationalise funding streams, for long-term funding certainty to enable local authorities to plan ahead, and an end to the process of submitting multiple bids to central government for incremental funding.

Martin Wheatcroft FCA, external adviser on public finances to ICAEW, commented: “While there appears to be an emerging political consensus on the need to devolve much greater fiscal powers to regional and local tiers of government in England, the proposals so far have been relatively limited in their ambition.

“This may be because national politicians find it difficult to let go of the purse strings, but it is also the case that delivering fiscal devolution is not that easy in practice. Economic disparities between different places mean that needs are often greater in areas with less in the way of tax-generating ability, while redistributive mechanisms are challenging to design in a way that all parties deem to be fair. This is not helped by a patchwork quilt of differing regional and local government structures that would make it difficult to implement a single standardised model for funding local public services across England.”

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Peak inflation?

Inflation is believed to have peaked last quarter before being forecast to fall significantly over the course of 2023. We hope.

Line chart showing annual inflation rates on a quarterly basis:

2021
Q1 0.6%
Q2 2.1%
Q3 2.8%
Q4 4.9%

2022
Q1 6.2%
Q2 9.2%
Q3 10.0%

Line switches from actual to forecast

Q4 11.1%

2023
Q1 10.2%
Q2 8.9%
Q3 6.9%
Q4 3.8%

Our first chart of 2023 is on the prospects for consumer price inflation (CPI) over the course of the coming year, based on the latest forecasts for inflation from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) that were released on 21 December 2022.

The OBR’s calculations suggest that CPI should come down significantly over the next four quarters to reach 3.8% by the end of the year, ‘only’ 0.8% above the Bank of England target range of 1% to 3%. The return of inflation to more moderate levels should help stabilise an economy that is currently in a pretty bad place, although it is important to understand that prices will still be rising, just at a slower pace than they have been over the course of the past year.

The chart illustrates how inflation started to rise in 2021, from a below-target 0.6% in Q1, to 2.1% in Q2, then 2.8% in Q3, before jumping to 4.9% at the end of 2021. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in the first quarter of 2022 and its consequences for global energy prices drove the inflation rate even higher, to 6.2% in Q1, 9.2% in Q2 and 10% in Q3, before rising to a forecast peak of 11.1% in Q4 of 2022. The OBR then goes on to forecast that the rate of price increases experienced by consumers will moderate in the coming year, down to 10.2% in Q1, 8.9% in Q2, 6.9% and then 3.8% in the fourth quarter of 2023.

Of course, economic forecasts of this nature are inherently uncertain, especially given the role that volatile energy prices play, both in their own right but also as a cost input to many other products and services. For consumers, the withdrawal of the Energy Price Guarantee will mean energy bills are likely to rise significantly in the second quarter despite falling wholesale prices.

The chart does not extend into 2024, when the forecasts are even more uncertain than for the current year. The OBR suggests that inflation could turn negative during 2024 (Q1: 2.5%; Q2: 0.4%; Q3: -0.2%; Q4: -0.1%) and 2025 (Q1: -0.1%; Q2: -0.6%; Q3: -1.1%; Q4: -1.3%), before heading back to target in 2026 (Q1: -1.0%; Q2: -0.4%; Q3: 0.9%; Q4: 1.2%). Deflation brings with it a whole different set of economic challenges to be faced but, fortunately, forecasts are less accurate the further into the future they go. The hope is that the Bank of England will be able to time its switch in monetary policy actions from countering inflation to countering deflation just right in order to avoid this potential outcome.

Either way, the prospect of inflation coming down over the coming year is a positive amid an otherwise very bleak economic picture for the UK as we begin 2023.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.