Ideas on fiscal devolution clash as economic progress stalls

Gordon Brown’s constitutional commission calls for greater fiscal devolution, going much further than the government’s gradual rollout of levelling-up devolution deals.

There appears to be a growing belief among policymakers across the political spectrum that regional and local authorities need greater financial powers if economic outcomes are to be improved across the UK. However, while there appears to be some consensus around extending the fiscal powers of the devolved administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, there is much less agreement on how far to go in devolving financial powers for the 84% of the UK’s population that live in England.

Levelling-up ‘devolution deals’ cover almost half of England

The government has adopted a gradualist approach to fiscal devolution that has principally revolved around ‘devolution deals’, part of its wider Levelling Up agenda to spread prosperity across England outside London and the South East. These deals generally provide an agreed stream of investment funding over several decades, greater control over the adult education and transport budgets, and some additional powers (eg, over second homes in Cornwall), in exchange for agreeing to direct elections for combined authority mayors or county leaders.

Regional devolution deals were announced in 2022 for the North EastYork and North Yorkshire, and the East Midlands, together with county devolution deals for SuffolkNorfolk and Cornwall. The government is also working on ‘trailblazer’ devolution deals along similar lines with existing city-regions, starting with Greater Manchester and the West Midlands combined authorities.

The devolution deals do not provide any additional tax-raising powers for regional combined authorities or local authorities, and the majority of local government funding in England continues to be determined by central government. It is also unclear whether the government will attempt to extend the coverage of devolution deals across the rest of England beyond the existing areas covered and the Devon and East Yorkshire deals that are still being negotiated.

Gordon Brown constitutional commission

The Labour Party has also been thinking about devolution as part of a wider debate on the UK constitution, with a review led by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown into the UK’s constitution. While many of the headlines about the review focused on reform of the House of Lords, most of the report focused on devolution and intergovernmental cooperation, including the role played by English regions. This included recommending greater long-term financial certainty and new fiscal powers for local government in England, in addition to deepening the devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Several of the Gordon Brown commission’s proposals align with recommendations made by ICAEW to HM Treasury at the time of the last Spending Review. ICAEW called for stable funding for local authorities, rationalisation of funding streams, investment in fiscal resilience and strengthening financial management.

At the same time as advocating for greater fiscal flexibility for local government, the review stresses the need for scrutiny and accountability to ensure money is spent wisely. One option might be for the proposed Office for Value for Money to expand to cover local government, further developing the ideas put forward in a Fabian Society report, Prizing the Public Pound, produced in collaboration with ICAEW. Other ideas include the piloting of local public accounts committees.

Although clear in the reforms to the UK’s constitutional arrangements that the review would like to see, the report lacks detail on how it intends to achieve its proposals – for example in identifying individual taxes that could be devolved to regional and local authorities. 

The report is ambitious in aiming to implement reforms within just one parliamentary term, meaning there will be a lot of work and consultation required to design the new arrangements, establish public support and then develop and pass the necessary legislation.

Fabian Society-ICAEW round table 

A joint Fabian Society-ICAEW round table last year explored some of the practical challenges involved in devolving fiscal powers to regional and local government in England. The group, which included members and contributors to the Gordon Brown commission, looked at the proposed trailblazer deals being negotiated by Greater Manchester and the West Midlands combined authorities, as well as existing ideas that have been put forward for devolved taxes, such as on tourism.

The participants discussed how existing disparities in tax bases between different parts of the country meant some form of redistribution or central government funding was still likely to be needed, as illustrated by the cities of Westminster and Hull that each serve populations of around 250,000 or so, but which have very different levels of prosperity and hence local tax capacity. 

The approach adopted in Germany of shared national taxes was also discussed, a key element in how regional governments (Länder) are funded. This is further explored in a separate Fabian Society report: Levelling Up? Lessons from Germany.

While there were a variety of views around the funding mechanisms that could be used to pay for local public services, there was general agreement on the need to rationalise funding streams, for long-term funding certainty to enable local authorities to plan ahead, and an end to the process of submitting multiple bids to central government for incremental funding.

Martin Wheatcroft FCA, external adviser on public finances to ICAEW, commented: “While there appears to be an emerging political consensus on the need to devolve much greater fiscal powers to regional and local tiers of government in England, the proposals so far have been relatively limited in their ambition.

“This may be because national politicians find it difficult to let go of the purse strings, but it is also the case that delivering fiscal devolution is not that easy in practice. Economic disparities between different places mean that needs are often greater in areas with less in the way of tax-generating ability, while redistributive mechanisms are challenging to design in a way that all parties deem to be fair. This is not helped by a patchwork quilt of differing regional and local government structures that would make it difficult to implement a single standardised model for funding local public services across England.”

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: German federal budget 2022

As Germany heads to the polls this weekend to elect a new federal parliament, the topic of the public finances has moved to centre stage. Our chart this week looks at the federal budget for 2022 and the current plan to sharply reduce the deficit from 2023 onwards.

German federal budget 2022

2021: revenue €307bn + borrowing €240bn = expenditure €488bn + investment €59bn

2022: revenue €343bn + borrowing €100bn = expenditure €391bn + investment €52bn

2023: revenue €398bn + borrowing €5bn = expenditure €352bn + investment €51bn

2024: revenue €396bn + borrowing €12bn = expenditure €357bn + investment €51bn

2025: revenue €396bn + borrowing €12bn = expenditure €357bn + investment €51bn

Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen: 'Draft 2022 federal budget and fiscal plan to 2025'

The coronavirus pandemic has been accompanied by relaxations in both European and German constitutional limitations on the size of the federal deficit for 2020, 2021 and 2022, with Chancellor Angela Merkel of the Union parties (the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) together with Bavaria’s Christian Social Union (CSU)) and Finance Minister and chancellor-candidate Olaf Scholtz of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) setting out a plan earlier this year to reduce federal borrowing significantly by 2023.

As the #icaewchartoftheweek illustrates, the plan is to continue to run a sizeable deficit of €100bn in 2022 with tax and other revenue of €343bn being offset by €391bn in expenditure and €52bn in investment spending. This is a smaller deficit than the €240bn forecast for the current year (revenue €307bn – expenditure €488bn – investment €59bn) and the €131bn recorded in 2020 (not shown in the chart: revenue €311bn – expenditure €392bn – investment €50bn), both of which contained significant amounts of emergency spending in response to the pandemic. 

The hope is that revenues will recover in 2023 to €398bn at the same time as expenditures and investment return to pre-pandemic levels of €352bn and €51bn respectively to leave only a €5bn shortfall to be covered by borrowing. The forecast deficit for both 2024 and 2025 is €12bn, comprising revenue of €396bn in both years, less expenditure of just under €396bn in 2024 and just over €396bn in 2025 and investment in both years of €51bn. It is important to note that this is the budget for the federal government only and excludes the share of joint taxes going to Germany’s states (Länder) as well as expenditures funded from state and local taxation.

The challenge for the three principal candidates for the chancellorship: Olaf Scholtz of the SPD, Armin Laschet of the Union parties and Annalena Baerbock of the Green party, is in how to make promises to spend more on their respective priorities while maintaining the low levels of borrowing required by the constitution outside of fiscal emergencies. 

Major flooding earlier this year has put climate change at the top of the electoral agenda, with the need to increase investment to achieve net zero a key theme of party platforms. Together with promises to invest more in infrastructure and the need to cover the cost of more people living longer, higher defence spending and other financial commitments, there are significant questions about whether the path to near-budget balance can be achieved. Given the economic uncertainty, the prospect of returning to the pre-pandemic policy of paying down government debt seems unlikely, although that policy helped reduce general government debt from a peak of 82% of GDP in 2010 following the financial crisis. Despite the additional borrowing because of the pandemic, general government debt is still below that level at somewhere in the region of 75% of GDP – putting Germany in a much better fiscal position than many of its European neighbours, including the UK.

One candidate to be the next finance minister is Christian Lindner of the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), a possible partner in either a ‘traffic-light coalition’ of SPD (red), Greens (green) and FDP (yellow) or a ‘Jamaica coalition’ of the Union parties (black), Greens (green) and FDP (yellow) although this will of course depend on how the parties perform in the election on Sunday 26 September. Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, joint leaders of the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), and Janine Wissler & Dietmar Bartch, joint leaders of the Left Party (Die Linke), are considered unlikely to find their way into the federal cabinet in most scenarios.

Unlike in the UK, where a new prime minister customarily takes up residence in 10 Downing Street the next day, there is unlikely to be an instant change in national leadership. Chancellor Angela Merkel and most of her existing Union/SPD ‘Grand coalition’ cabinet are likely to stay in caretaker positions for several weeks or potentially months as fresh coalition negotiations between the parties elected to the Bundestag are concluded.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

Fiscal deficit of £24.3bn in May as COVID spending trends downward

COVID-related spending continues to drive borrowing even as receipts approach pre-pandemic levels, with debt up by £24.9bn to £2,195.8bn or 99.2% of GDP in May 2021.

The latest public sector finances released on Tuesday 22 June reported a deficit of £24.3bn for May 2021, as COVID-related spending continued to weigh on the public finances, albeit at a reduced rate. An improvement from the £43.8bn reported for the same month last year during the first lockdown, it was still significantly higher than the £5.5bn reported for May 2019.

The Office for National Statistics revised the reported deficit for the year ended 31 March 2020 down by £1.1bn from £300.3bn to £299.2bn, still a peacetime record. The final total is still expected to exceed £300bn as the ONS has yet to include in the order of £27bn of bad debts on COVID-related lending in this number. Estimates will be refined further over the next few months.

Cumulative receipts in the first two months of the financial year of £128.6bn were £15.9bn or 14% higher than a year previously, but this was still £0.7bn or 0.5% below the level seen a year before that in April and May 2019. At the same time cumulative expenditure of £165.8bn was £20.9bn or 11% lower than the first two months of 2020-21, but £37.2bn or 29% higher than the same period two years ago.

Ultra-low interest rates continued to benefit the interest line, which at £9.1bn in April and May 2021 was £0.1bn or 1% lower than April and May 2020 and £1.5bn or 14% lower than April and May 2019.

Net public sector investment was slightly lower than last year with £7.1bn invested in April and May 2021, down £0.8bn or 10% from a year before but up £0.9bn or 15% from two years ago.

This combined to produce a cumulative deficit for the first two months of the 2021-22 financial year of £53.4bn, £37.7bn or 41% below that of the same period a year previously, but up £37.3bn or 232% from the total for April and May 2019.

Public sector net debt increased to £2,195.8bn or 99.2% of GDP, an increase of £58.4bn since March, reflecting £5.0bn of additional borrowing over and above the deficit, principally to fund coronavirus loans to businesses. Debt is £259.1bn or 13% higher than a year earlier and £427.2bn or 24% higher than in April and May 2019.

Alison Ring, ICAEW Public Sector Director, said: “With numbers for the second month of the financial year now in, we can see tax receipts are starting to approach pre-pandemic levels, while borrowing continues to increase despite COVID-19 spending starting to decrease. 

“The public finances remain in a fragile state, and ongoing debates about education spending, adult social care and the pensions triple-lock highlight the difficult decisions facing Rishi Sunak as he seeks to balance pressures on our public services with still growing levels of public debt. The prospects of the Chancellor raising taxes in the Autumn Budget appear to be increasing.”

Images showing a table of the fiscal numbers for 2 months to May 2021 and variances against the prior year and two years. Click on link at end of this post to the ICAEW website which has a readable version of the table.
Images showing a table of the fiscal deficit by month, including receipts, expenditures interest and net investment. Click on link at end of this post to the ICAEW website which has a readable version of the table.

Caution is needed with respect to the numbers published by the ONS, which are expected to be repeatedly revised as estimates are refined and gaps in the underlying data are filled.

The ONS made a number of revisions to prior month and prior year fiscal numbers to reflect revisions to estimates. These had the effect of reducing the reported fiscal deficit for April 2021 from £31.7bn to £29.1bn and the deficit for the twelve months ended 31 March 2021 from £300.3bn to £299.2bn.

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

OBR: Pandemic worsens long-term outlook for public finances

20 July 2020: The Office for Budget Responsibility suggests tax rises or spending cuts of more than £60bn a year may be needed if the UK public finances are to be put onto a sustainable path.

The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) has reported that the public finances are unsustainable over the next 25 to 50 years, given expected levels of economic growth and pressures on public spending from more people living longer. Fiscal risks have also increased significantly with two ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ economic shocks occurring in just over a decade.

Without action to increase taxes or cut spending over the next few decades, the OBR projects that the gap between receipts and public spending before interest will widen from around 1% of GDP in 2019-20 to between 10% and 15% in 2069-70, depending on how quickly the UK recovers from the coronavirus pandemic. Public sector net debt could increase to between 320% of GDP and 520% of GDP, based on the assumptions made.

The OBR has highlighted how the coronavirus pandemic has not only worsened the immediate prospects for the UK and global economies, but ‘economic scarring’ will permanently damage the expected level of tax receipts over the next 50 years. The vulnerability of the public finances to potential future economic shocks has also increased significantly.

The OBR believes that a V-shaped economy is still possible, but this is now considered to be an upside scenario, with the OBR’s central scenario based on a much slower recovery from the pandemic. The downside scenario takes even longer for the economy to recover.

Economic activity, as measured by GDP, and tax receipts are both expected to be lower in all scenarios than in previous forecasts.

Prospects for the public finances in the current financial year have continued to deteriorate with the OBR now forecasting a fiscal deficit between 15% and 23% of GDP, with a central scenario of £372bn (19% of GDP). This reflects a total of £192bn in fiscal interventions in 2020-21 announced by the Government to date to support the UK economy through the pandemic.

The OBR projects that in its central scenario the gap between receipts and expenditure excluding interest will widen to almost 13% of GDP by 2069-70 if no actions are taken, equivalent to almost £300bn in 2019-20 terms. With much higher levels of debt, and interest rates likely to be higher in the medium to long-term, this could cause the fiscal deficit to increase to over 30% of GDP in 50 years time.

The OBR has calculated that ‘fiscal tightening’ in the order of 2.9% of GDP (£64bn a year) would be required based on a target level for public sector net debt of 75% of GDP. This is subject to a number of fiscal risks, including that no further significant changes are made to the planned profile of spending on health and social care – a key source of policy risk.

Closing this gap could require potentially very significant levels of tax increases or cuts in public spending, especially if difficult decisions, such as on how to fund social care, continue to be deferred.

Martin Wheatcroft FCA, adviser to ICAEW on public finances, commented: “The Office for Budget Responsibility has yet again assessed the public finances and concluded that they are not sustainable, even before taking account of the eye-watering levels of borrowing being added to the national debt as a consequence of the coronavirus pandemic.

Although we should expect tax cuts and spending increases in the immediate future as the Government looks to provide stimulus to the economy, the need to reduce the gap between tax receipts and public spending over the medium- to long-term means that tax rises or further cuts in public spending are likely in the years to come.

Despite this, there are actions that could be taken to improve the outlook for the public finances by developing a long-term fiscal strategy to put the public finances onto a sustainable path.”

Table 1 – OBR projections for the public finances: central scenario

CENTRAL SCENARIO2019-20
% OF GDP
2020-21
% OF GDP
2024-25
% OF GDP
2044-45
% OF GDP
2069-70
% OF GDP
Receipts excluding interest36.136.336.636.636.4
Expenditure excluding interest(37.2)(54.4)(40.3)(43.9)(49.1)
Primary deficit(1.1)(18.1)(3.7)(7.3)(12.7)
Net interest(1.5)(0.8)(0.9)(6.2)(17.8)
Fiscal deficit(2.6)(18.9)(4.6)(13.5)(30.5)

Public sector net debt

(88.5)

(106.6)

(102.1)

(173.7)

(418.4)

Source: OBR, ‘Fiscal sustainability report July 2020’.  2020-21 amounts adjusted for £50bn (2.5% of GDP) of additional fiscal interventions announced on 8 July 2020. Subsequent periods not adjusted.

Table 2 – OBR projections for the public finances: upside and downside scenarios

DIFFERENCES FROM     
CENTRAL SCENARIO       
                2020-21
% OF GDP
2024-25
% OF GDP
2044-45
% OF GDP
2069-70
% OF GDP
Upside scenario
Primary deficit3.62.12.22.3
Fiscal deficit3.62.23.86.5
Public sector net debt9.314.145.798.2
Downside scenario
Primary deficit(4.3)(2.2)(2.3)(2.4)
Fiscal deficit(4.3)(2.2)(3.9)(6.9)
Public sector net debt(9.1)(14.5)(47.9)(103.5)

Sources: OBR, ‘Fiscal sustainability report July 2020’; ICAEW calculations.
Positive differences = lower deficit or lower debt in percentage points of GDP; (negative) differences = higher deficit or higher debt.

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

OBR: deficit could reach £273bn or more

15 April 2020: a report from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) indicates that the fiscal deficit could increase to £273bn in 2020-21, but it cautions that this is only one of many plausible scenarios.

The OBR has produced its first analysis of the potential economic and fiscal impact of the coronavirus, based on a three-month lockdown followed by restrictions for a further three months. 

At the same time, the International Monetary Fund has warned that the global economic contraction underway is likely to be the worst since the Great Depression, dwarfing the financial crisis twelve years ago.  

In its ‘coronavirus reference scenario’, the OBR indicates that the UK economy could fall by 35% in the second quarter of 2020, before bouncing back to leave the economy 13% smaller in 2020 than in 2019. 

The consequence would be an increase in the deficit for the fiscal year ending 31 March 2021 to £273bn or 14% of GDP, while public sector net debt could be £384bn higher than budgeted for, reaching £2.2tn or 95% of GDP by the end of the fiscal year.

The OBR says that the economic impact of the coronavirus will derive much less from people falling ill or dying, than from the public health restrictions and social distancing required to limit its spread, severely reducing demand and supply at the same time. That means lower incomes, less spending and weaker asset prices, all of which reduce tax revenues, while job losses will raise public spending.

Once the crisis has passed and policy interventions have unwound, the OBR thinks that annual borrowing could return to roughly the Spring Budget 2020 forecast. However, net debt would continue to be much higher, potentially £260bn (10% of GDP) more than the baseline forecast by 31 March 2025. 

The OBR analysis assumes that increased public spending, tax cuts and holidays, loans and guarantees, and actions taken by the Bank of England, designed to support household incomes and to limit business failures and layoffs, will help prevent greater economic and fiscal damage in the long term. However, it warns that the longer the disruption lasts, the more likely it is that the economy’s future potential output will be ‘scarred’ with adverse consequences for future deficits and for fiscal policy.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) now predicts that the global economy will contract by 3.0% in 2020, much worse than the 0.1% contraction seen during the financial crisis in 2009 and a cut of 6.3% from its previous prediction in January. The IMF prediction is based on a shallower, but longer recession than the OBR’s scenario for the UK. Overall, the IMF believes that the cumulative output loss in 2020 and 2021 from the pandemic could be as much as $9tn.

Alison Ring, Director, Public Sector for ICAEW, commented: “The analysis published by the OBR is not a forecast, but the scenario it presents is pretty startling; making clear that whatever actually happens, the damage to public finances from the coronavirus pandemic will be extremely severe.

“While the OBR suggests that the economy and tax receipts could recover relatively quickly, the additional debt burden will weigh on the public finances for many years for come.”

Fiscal deficit 2020-21: £55bn Spring Budget +£130bn lower receipts +£88bn higher spending = £273bn Reference scenario.  Net debt: £1,819bn +£384bn = £2,203bn.

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

Treasury announces extra £9.5bn for public services

14 April 2020: the Chancellor has increased the coronavirus emergency response fund to £14.5bn to cover the escalating costs of dealing with the pandemic.

Easter Monday saw Rishi Sunak announce an extra £9.5bn for the NHS and public services, adding to the £5bn already included in the emergency package announced with the Spring Budget on 11 March 2020.

This brings additional funding for the NHS and public services to £14.5bn, comprising £6.6bn for health services, £3.5bn to keep the railways running, £1.6bn for local authorities, and £0.9bn for food packages and other support for clinically vulnerable people, together with £1.9bn for the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Altogether, this brings the estimated cost of fiscal measures announced by the Government in response to the coronavirus pandemic to somewhere in the region of £95bn. In addition to the £14.5bn for the NHS and public services, £27bn has been announced in business rates discounts and small business grants, £5bn in enhancements to Universal Credit and housing benefit and £750m for charities. The costs of the employee furlough and self-employed income replacement schemes will depend on take-up, with estimates that these could cost around £40bn and £9bn respectively for their initial three-month terms.

This does not include the effect of collapsing tax revenues and higher welfare spending on the public finances, nor any potential costs from the £330bn of loans and guarantees being advanced to support business. As a consequence, the fiscal deficit this financial year is now almost certain to exceed £200bn, compared with the baseline of £55bn set out in the Spring Budget just over a month ago.

Martin Wheatcroft FCA, adviser to ICAEW on public finances, commented: “This is probably not going to be the last announcement of additional funding for the NHS and public services this year given the extraordinary challenges posed by the coronavirus pandemic. 

“It is positive that the Chancellor has made it clear that money will be made available to front-line services as needed, an important signal for budget holders conditioned by a decade of austerity to manage resources carefully, rather than to spend whatever it takes to achieve a critical objective.

“We can and will worry about the bill later, when the need for a long-term fiscal strategy to put the public finances onto a sustainable path will be more important than ever before.”

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

IFS: deficit to triple as budget contingency increases

30 March 2020: the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) has suggested that the budgeted fiscal deficit for the financial year starting 1 April 2020 of £55bn could more than triple to £177bn due to the coronavirus pandemic.

In a new publication, the economic research institute also stated that there is a chance the 2020-21 deficit could end up exceeding £200bn.

The Chancellor has already stopped reporting financial estimates for a series of emergency measures, such as the funding of 80% of pay for furloughed workers and support for self-employed workers, incurring tens of billions of public money to keep an economy going whilst in lockdown.

The Contingencies Fund Act 2020 (passed by Parliament on 25 March 2020 alongside the Coronavirus Act 2020), increases the amount available for contingencies from a limit of 2% of spending authorised by Parliament in the preceding financial year to a limit of 50%. In effect, this gives the Chancellor the power to spend an additional £266bn in 2020-21 over and above spending plans already announced, a substantial increase from the £11bn that would have been available otherwise.

The IFS’s estimate assumes that a 5% contraction in the economy would reduce tax revenues by somewhere in the region of £80bn in 2020-21, albeit this would be offset by savings in interest costs following the reduction in the base rate to 0.1% and quantitative easing operations by the Bank of England.

Fiscal measures include the £12bn emergency package announced on the day of the Budget and the £20bn announced on 17 March, together with an estimate by the IFS of £18bn for further measures announced up until 25 March 2020.

The effect on the public finances estimated by the IFS is summarised in the table below.

Estimate of coronavirus revisions to the Spring Budget 2020

Financial year 2020-21Spring Budget
£bn
Economic contraction
£bn
Fiscal measures
£bn

Revised
£bn
Taxes and other income873(80)(22)771
Total managed expenditure(928)8(28)(948)
Fiscal deficit(55)(72)(50)(177)
% of GDP2.4%+3.4%+2.3%8.1%

Source: HM Treasury, Spring Budget 2020; IFS, estimates of economic contraction and fiscal measures to date, 26 March 2020; ICAEW, rough estimate of the split of fiscal measures between waiving tax and additional spending.

The IFS analysis of fiscal measures includes £10bn for the 80% job retention credit for employed workers (for which the IFS have assumed a 10% take-up), but it was prepared for the announcement of support for the self-employed. This could add another £9bn to the deficit for 2020-21.

The IFS has not included the risk of bad debts on the Government’s £330bn programme of financial guarantees and business loans or on the £30bn of second quarter deferred VAT payments. There is also no cost provision for the exposure to additional bank financing and corporate bond purchases by the Bank of England that is being guaranteed by HM Treasury.

Altogether, this would increase the deficit to £177bn, or 8.1% of GDP based on a 5% smaller economy, before taking account of the support package announced for the self-employed. The prospect of further fiscal measures in the weeks and months to come, combined with the risks from loans and guarantees, means that the prospect of a deficit in excess of £200bn is looking increasingly likely.

For more information

  • For the latest news and guidance on the ongoing impact of COVID-19 for businesses and accountants, visit ICAEW’s dedicated Coronavirus Hub.

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Post-GE2019 fiscal deficits

With the General Election now complete, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) was able to release a restated version of its March 2019 fiscal forecasts this morning, reflecting technical revisions to the way the fiscal numbers are calculated, in particular that of student loans. This enables us to update the numbers set out our GE2019 Fiscal Insight on the party manifestos as best we can, given that the OBR has not deigned to include either the changes to public spending announced in the Spending Round 2019 nor the tax and spending changes in the Conservatives manifesto.

As illustrated by the #icaewchartoftheweek, the revised baseline forecast for the fiscal deficit is now £50bn for the current fiscal year, followed by £59bn next year in 2020-21, £58bn in 2021-22 and 2022-23 and £60bn in 2023-24.

It was frustrating that the OBR scheduled their publication of these revised numbers for the first day of the General Election purdah period making it vulnerable – as happened – to being pulled. A day earlier and that would not have happened! Ideally, these revisions would have been published as soon as practical after the publication by the ONS of their revisions to historical numbers in September.

It would have been even better if the OBR had been able to update their economic forecast too, given that the current baseline is still based on an economic and fiscal analysis from nine-months ago. With weak economic growth over the first half of the financial year, it is likely that the OBR will cut its forecasts for tax revenues over the forecast period when it does get round to updating them, resulting in higher deficits – even before taking account of suggestions that the Conservative GE2019 winners plan to announce a splurge of more capital expenditures in the Spring Budget in February.

Unfortunately, we won’t see an updated long-term forecast until at least July 2020, when the OBR is scheduled to publish its next fiscal sustainability report on the prospects for the public finances.

ICAEW chart of the week: General Election 2019

With voters in the UK going to the polls tomorrow, the #icaewchartoftheweek is on the political party’s plans for the public finances.

All the political parties are promising to increase taxes, public spending and investment, with the plan to eliminate the fiscal deficit now well and truly abandoned. 

The Conservatives are promising the least in terms of additional spending and investment, with £3bn a year extra spending in 2023-24, £8bn in extra capital investment and tax rises broadly offsetting tax cuts. However, this is unlikely to be the final result as they have deferred significant financial decisions, such as the funding of adult social care, until after the election. 

Labour is planning to spending much more with £83bn a year more spending by 2023-24, funded by £78bn tax increases and £5bn from higher economic growth. They plan capital investment of £55bn a year and £58bn in total over five years to compensate ‘WASPI’ women. This is pretty ambitious, leading the IFS and others to cast doubt on the achievability of their plans, while these numbers don’t include the additional borrowing from their plans to nationalise utilities, nor the borrowing of those businesses post-nationalisation.

The Lib Dem plans are also very ambitious, with £50bn extra a year public spending by 2024-25 funded by £37bn in higher taxes and £14bn in higher economic growth from cancelling Brexit. They plan to borrow an extra £25bn a year to fund new capital investment.

The Greens’ are planning to be even more ambitious, including completely reforming welfare provision with the introduction of a universal basic income, contributing to a £124bn increase in taxes and public spending (albeit some of this is a switch from tax deductions to cash payments). Their capital investment plans are the largest and likely to most difficult to deliver of all the major parties at £82bn a year on average over 10 years.

Unfortunately, none of the major political parties appear to have a fiscal strategy that extends beyond the next five years, with only limited measures to address the big financial challenges of more people living longer. This is disappointing given that relatively small actions taken now could make a big difference to the financial position of the nation in 25 years’ time.

ICAEW’s full analysis of the party manifestos can be found at icaew.com/ge2019manifestoanalysis.


You can be part of the conversation as part of ICAEW’s GE 2019: It’s More Than a Vote campaign.

ICAEW chart of the week: First half fiscal deficit

H1 2018-19 -£33.2bn fiscal deficit + £4.5bn growth + £1.8bn RBS dividends - £3.0bn lower revenues - £10.4bn higher spending = -£40.3bn fiscal deficit for H1 2019-20.

The ONS published the fiscal numbers for the first half of the UK Government’s 2019-20 financial year this morning, with the #icaewchartoftheweek illustrating the changes in comparison with the first half of last year.

If revenues had increased in line with economic growth then the deficit would have reduced by £4.5bn (net of the effect of inflation on both revenues and expenditures). Unfortunately, tax receipts have been relatively weak, coming in £3.0bn below growth, with higher national insurance and council tax receipts being more than offset by lower corporation tax, income tax, inheritance tax, fuel duties, excise duties, and stamp duty.

The Government’s preferred measure of the deficit (which excludes government-owned banks) did benefit from £1.8bn in dividends from the Royal Bank of Scotland.  

Expenditures were £10.4bn higher than the first half of last year, reflecting more spending on public services (including the NHS), Brexit preparations, a growth in the size of the civil service, and a £3bn or so increase in capital investment.

This means that there is a shortfall of £40.3bn between receipts of £395.5bn and expenditures of £435.7bn in the first half of this financial year, compared with £33.2bn for the same period last time, when receipts were £384.2bn and expenditures totalled £417.4bn. (The first half deficit last year was originally reported as £19.9bn. This was subsequently revised down to £19.3bn before £13.9bn in accounting changes, including irrecoverable student loans.)

Fortunately for the Chancellor, the deficit tends to be much lower in the second half of the year given the boost from self-assessment tax declarations in January. Despite this the deficit could exceed £50bn this year if trends continue, a big disappointment for those who had hoped to continue on the path to eliminating the deficit.

With warning signs over the economy flashing, these numbers do not provide an auspicious backdrop for the Budget on Wednesday 6 November when the Chancellor is hoping to announce a number of major tax cuts.

For further information go to:

ONS – Public sector finances, September 2019

OBR – Commentary on the Public Sector Finances: September 2019