Tag: #mod

ICAEW chart of the week: UK Regular Forces

My chart for ICAEW this week illustrates how soldier, sailor and aircrew numbers have fallen from 338,000 fifty years ago to a new low of 136,000 on 1 Jan 2025. Could this be the turning point now that defence spending is back on the agenda?

Stacked area chart showing decline in the size of the UK Regular Forces from 338,000 in 1975 to 136,000. Analysed between the British Army (167,000 to 74,000), Royal Navy (76,000 to 32,000) and the Royal Air Force (95,000 to 30,000). The numbers fall in the late 1970s then increase again in the early 1980s before falling from 1985 onwards, accelerating in the late 1990s. The numbers stabilised between 2002 and 2008 before starting to fall again, except for a small peak around 2012 and another small peak (at a much lower level) in 2022, before falling again since then. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Design by Sunday. Source: Ministry of Defence, 'Quarterly service personnel statistics: 1 Jan 2025'.

The latest armed forces personnel statistics published by the Ministry of Defence on 20 February 2025 report that UK Regular Forces fell from 136,861 on 1 October 2024 to 136,117 on 1 January 2025, which we have rounded to 136,000 for the purpose of my chart this week. This is made up of just under 74,000 members of the British Army, just under 32,000 in the Royal Navy, and just over 30,000 in the Royal Air Force (RAF).

These numbers exclude around 4,000 Gurkhas, 32,000 volunteers in the Army, Navy and RAF Reserves (including some who are mobilised) and around 8,500 other military personnel.

This is a significant decline from the 338,000 regular service personnel (167,000 in the British Army, 76,000 in the Royal Navy and 95,000 in the RAF) that were in the UK’s armed forces on 1 April 1975. 

While some of this decline is due to automation and a shift of some activities from military to civilian staff, the main reason for the decline has been decisions by government to reduce our military capabilities over the past 50 years. Starting with the ‘peace dividend’ following the end of the Cold War, defence spending has been cut by successive governments to fund an expanding welfare state. 

As a result, serving military personnel fell rapidly during the 1990s to reach 208,000 on 1 April 2000 (110,000 in the British Army, 43,000 in the Royal Navy and 55,000 in the RAF). Numbers started to fall again from around 2005, before accelerating downwards during the austerity years of the 2010s, and then again in the past few years following the pandemic and the energy crisis.

Recent debate about the capacity of the British Army to deploy a peacekeeping force to Ukraine has highlighted how few soldiers the UK now has, given our existing commitments and an increasingly concerning international security position.

Overall, the 136,000 UK Regular Forces comprise around 4% of the 3.4 million total military personnel in NATO. In 2024 this comprised 1,300,000 in the US armed forces, 1,383,000 in EU countries who are also members of NATO (including 216,000 Polish, 205,000 French, 186,000 German, 171,000 Greek and 117,000 Spanish soldiers, sailors and aircrew), Türkiye 481,000, UK 138,000 (last year), Canada 77,000 and other non-EU European countries 39,000 (mainly Norway 24,000). 

This may not be the nadir for the UK armed forces in terms of military strength, as numbers are likely to continue to fall over the next few quarters. However, the indications are that the UK is likely to switch to a path of increasing both defence spending and the number of soldiers, sailors and aircrew as it responds to calls from the US for European countries to increase their contribution to NATO and, more importantly, to address a much higher international risk environment.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

ICAEW chart of the week: Defence spending battle lines

My chart for ICAEW this week takes a dive into the £53.9bn Ministry of Defence expenditure in 2023/24 ahead of what is likely to be a charged debate about defence spending in the coming year.

Two column chart with parliamentary funding of £54.1bn on the left and MOD expenditure analysis of £53.9bn. The left hand column comprises £36.0bn from net expenditure £45.2bn minus depreciation of £9.2bn, pus reconciling items of £2.6bn and capital expenditure of £15.5bn. The right-hand column consists of £17.2bn capital programme, £12.2bn for infrastructure and equipment support and inventory, £2.6bn for Defence Nuclear, £3.9bn for arms-length bodies and other spending, £14.7bn for military and civilian personnel and admin, and £2.6bn for military operations. 10 Jan 2025. Chart by Martin Wheatcroft FCA. Source: Ministry of Defence, 'Annual Reporting and Accounts 2023/24'.

My chart of the week illustrates how parliamentary funding for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) amounted to £54.1bn for the year ended 31 March 2024 while summarising the MoD’s expenditure analysis of £53.9bn between £17.9bn for the capital programme, £12.2bn for infrastructure and equipment support and inventory, £2.6bn for Defence Nuclear, £3.9bn for arms-length bodies and other spending, £14.7bn for military and civilian personnel and admin, and £2.6bn for military operations.

The parliamentary funding of £54.1bn was used to pay for £36.0bn of day-to-day spending (being net expenditure reported in the accounts of £45.2bn less non-cash depreciation and impairments of £9.2bn) and £15.5bn in capital expenditure, after net reconciling items of £2.6bn (the largest being to exclude an exceptional £2.7bn gain from changes in discount rates).

The £17.9bn incurred on MoD’s capital programme during 2023/24 is higher than the total for capital expenditure because it includes research and development and capital grants that are expensed in the revenue and expenditure statement. Most of the amount spent relates to building or upgrading military equipment for the armed forces, ranging from Astute Class nuclear-powered and Dreadnought Class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and Type 31 frigates for the Royal Navy, remotely piloted Protector surveillance and strike aircraft and radar upgrades to the Typhoon fighter for the Royal Air Force, through to Ajax armoured fighting vehicles and Chinook heavy-lift helicopters for the Army. It also includes investment in digital technology, back-office automation and investments in new military accommodation. (Existing military accommodation has been brought back in house since the end of the financial year).

The £12.2bn incurred in non-capital spending on infrastructure and equipment and inventory comprised £5.0bn to maintain and support infrastructure, £5.7bn to maintain and support equipment, and £1.5bn on inventory. A further £2.6bn was spent by the Defence Nuclear organisation to support the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent capability, while £3.9bn went on arms-length bodies and other spending, including £1.3bn on the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) organisation that manages defence procurement, £0.2bn for the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, the Submarine Delivery Agency and other arms-length bodies, £0.7bn for war pensions, and £1.7bn in other costs.

Personnel and admin costs of £14.7bn comprised £11.0bn for 151,905 full-time equivalent service personnel, £1.8bn for 70,881 full-time equivalent civilian and other staff, and £1.9bn in administration costs. This excludes £5.1bn in combined net expenditure for the Armed Forces Pension Scheme and Armed Forces Compensation Scheme that is reported separately from the MoD’s accounts. 

Incremental spending on military operations amounted to £2.6bn in 2023/24, of which £2.2bn (£1.2bn capital and £1.0bn resource) went to support Ukraine and just under £0.2bn was spent on operations in the Middle East, while £0.2bn or so was incurred on other operations elsewhere in the world and on conflict prevention, stabilisation, security and peacekeeping activities.

The net expenditure of £53.9bn reported by MoD in 2023/24 was equivalent to just under 2.0% of GDP, being the majority of the approximately 2.3% of GDP the UK says it currently spends on defence and security for NATO purposes. The difference mainly relates to the cost of armed forces pensions not included in the MoD accounts, spending on the UK’s security services, and spending on counter-terrorism activities.

The UK government has already set out an ‘aspiration’ for UK defence and security spending to reach 2.5% of GDP by the end of the decade, but the return of President-elect Donald Trump to the White House is likely to result in pressure on NATO members to meet an even higher target.

During his first term, President Trump floated the idea of a 4% NATO target, which would have required the UK to spend the equivalent of an additional £47bn of spending based on GDP in 2023/24 and more than £50bn a year extra in future years. Even a more modest target of 3% of GDP would require an extra £19bn (or £20bn in future years) to be found.

Finding such large amounts of money would pose a huge challenge for any government at the best of times, but the current very fragile state of the public finances means the stretch is even greater now – adding to the headaches that are no doubt being inflicted on the Chancellor as she seeks to balance the books over the remainder of the decade.

Definitely time to watch this space.

This chart was originally published by ICAEW.

NAO says £190bn Defence Equipment Plan 2020-30 is unaffordable

21 January 2021: The National Audit Office (NAO) says additional funding provided in the November 2020 Spending Review will still not be enough to plug shortfalls in the 10-year Defence Equipment Plan.

The NAO has issued a report on the £190bn Defence Equipment Plan for the 10 years from 2020 to 2030. For the fourth consecutive year, the NAO reports that the plan by the Ministry of Defence (MoD or the Department) to procure and support defence equipment is unaffordable.

The Equipment Plan is a rolling 10-year set of programmes that currently comprises £87bn in planned procurement, £97bn in support costs and £6bn for contingencies, with the total of £190bn representing a £9bn increase over the previous year’s plan. Excluding contingencies, the plan includes £44bn for the Defence Nuclear Organisation, £35bn for Air Command, £33bn for Army Command, £31bn for Navy Command, £29bn for Strategic Command and £12bn for Strategic Programmes.

The MoD’s forecast assessment is that the 2020-30 plan will cost £214bn if delivered as expected, with £17bn in adjustments and planned savings to bring that down to £197bn, some £7bn more than the allocated budget. The NAO also notes that the Equipment Plan is fully allocated to existing and planned programmes, with no headroom for potential new projects that may be identified over the next few years, although there may be £9bn potentially available from other parts of the MoD’s budget between 2025-26 and 2029-30. 

The primary finding of the report is that not only is there an identified budgetary shortfall of £7bn, but there are potential cost pressures of at least £20bn that put delivery of the plan at significant risk. This includes significant uncertainty as to whether planned efficiency savings can be achieved as well as concerns about escalating costs on major procurement programmes and the impact of fluctuating exchange rates on long-term forward purchases.

The NAO states in the report that the Department “has still not established a reliable basis to assess the affordability of equipment projects and its estimate of the funding shortfall in the 2020–30 plan is likely to understate the growing financial pressures that it faces. The plan does not include the full costs of the capabilities that the Department is developing, it continues to make over-optimistic or inconsistent adjustments to reduce cost forecasts and is likely to have underestimated the risks across long-term equipment projects. 

In addition, the Department has not resolved weaknesses in its quality assurance of the plan’s affordability assessment. While the Department has made some improvements to its approach and the presentation of the plan over the years, it has not fully addressed the inconsistencies which undermine the reliability and comparability of its assessment.”

Additional funding of £16.5bn over four years announced in the Spending Review in November 2020 should, in theory, plug the gap. However, the MoD has indicated it intends to use a substantial proportion of this new money to invest in improving military capabilities, with investments in cyber warfare and drones at the top of the list. This likely means the Equipment Plan remains under significant pressure, with several major new procurements expected to be added this year, many of which will involve untested new technologies with their own set of risks.

This will require some tough decisions to be made as part of the Integrated Review expected to be published shortly. There are rumours this may see cuts in the size of the Army to free up resources for other priorities, with MoD officials informing the Defence Select Committee they were actively looking to “disinvest” from a number of existing capabilities they considered would not be needed in the future.

The NAO concludes, “The Department faces the fundamental problem that its ambition has far exceeded available resources. As a result, its short-term approach to financial management has led to increasing cost pressures, which have restricted top-level budget holders from developing military capabilities in a way that will deliver value for money. The growing financial pressures have also created perverse incentives to include unrealistic savings and to not invest in new equipment to address capability risks.

The recent government announcement of additional defence funding, together with the forthcoming Integrated Review, provide opportunities for the Department to set out its priorities and develop a more balanced investment programme. The Department now needs to break the cycle of short-termism that has characterised its management of equipment expenditure and apply sound financial management principles to its assessment and management of the Equipment Plan.”

Martin Wheatcroft, adviser to ICAEW on public finances, commented, “The Ministry of Defence has made significant strides over the last decade to improve how it procures and supports defence equipment, but there remain significant weaknesses in financial management that need to be addressed. It is concerning that issues highlighted in four successive NAO reports are still not resolved.

However, even the strongest financial management at the MoD would struggle to deliver on the UK’s current ambition to be a global military power on a limited budget. Managing complex procurement programmes effectively will continue to be extremely challenging without a major change in strategy – either to scale back the UK’s defence capabilities to a more modest level or to allocate a much larger share of public spending to defence.”

This article was originally published by ICAEW.

UK aircraft carrier groups won’t be operating to full extent until 2026

26 June 2020: NAO reports on challenges remaining to the Carrier Strike programme, including cost overruns since their last report in 2017.

The National Audit Office (NAO) has published the latest in a series of challenging reports on defence procurement with a critique of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) programme to establish two fully operational carrier strike groups.

This is a complex multi-year effort that has seen the building of the HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales aircraft carriers at a cost of £6.4bn, the initial order of 48 fighter aircraft (out of a long-term plan for 138), and the planned integration of carriers, warships, radar systems and support ships with navy personnel into two fully combat capable carrier groups.

This report focuses on the last three years of development since 2017 – a period that has seen the Royal Navy complete and launch two new aircraft carriers, receive and test the initial batch of aircraft, construct essential on-shore infrastructure, and undertake extensive training of sailors and aircrew.

Key highlights from the report include:

  • There was a further cost overrun of £193m on building the two aircraft carriers, equivalent to 3% of their total cost of £6.4bn.
  • The MoD has spent £6.0bn to date on 48 Lightning II fighter jets, of which 18 have been delivered on schedule. Port and military airfield facilities have now been completed.
  • The Crowsnest airborne radar system is 18 months behind schedule, affecting carrier group capabilities in the first two years of operation.
  • The MoD delayed seven of its 48 jets on order to 2025 to accommodate budgetary pressures, with the approved cost now at £10.5bn, a £1.0bn or 15% increase.
  • Funding has not yet been made available for enough Lightning II jets to support the carriers through to the 2060s as planned, with no commitment as yet to order the remaining 90 jets.
  • The MoD has been slow to develop the support ships needed to operate carrier strike group, with only one ship currently in operation – with delays in ordering three new support ships potentially hampering operations until 2028 or later. The MoD has also not provided the necessary funding for logistics projects and munitions.

The NAO reports that the MoD is making progress in delivering key milestones, albeit with some caveats.

  • Initial operating capability for one carrier group and 12 jets is expected to be achieved by December 2020 on schedule, albeit with more basic radar capability than originally planned.
  • There is a tight schedule to deliver ‘full operating capability’ by 2023 (two carrier groups with up to 24 jets) and the planned extended capability by 2026 to deliver a wide range of air operations and support amphibious operations worldwide. 
  • Significant questions need to be answered about the place of the carrier groups within defence strategy, the investment prioritisation necessary to ensure that they can operate for the planned life-span of 50 years, and a clear understanding of the full costs of operating the carrier groups in the context of a Defence Equipment Plan that is currently unaffordable (as reported in several other NAO reports).

The NAO conclude by making a series of recommendations for strengthening programme management, ensuring there is a clear view of future costs, and on monitoring new governance arrangements that have recently been put in place. The NAO also recommends transferring lessons learned from the Carrier Strike programme over to other major defence projects.

Gareth Davies, the Comptroller & Auditor-General for the United Kingdom and the head of the NAO, commented on the good progress made by the MoD to deliver Carrier Strike. But he also stressed the need for greater attention to be paid to the supporting capabilities essential for full operability, and the need for the MoD to get a firmer grip on future costs.

Martin Wheatcroft FCA, advisor to ICAEW on public finances, said:

“In many ways, the MoD receives quite a positive report card from the NAO on the good progress that it has made over the last three years, improving on much less complementary reports in 2017 and before.

However, as the NAO reports, the MoD continues to struggle to deliver major procurement programmes within a defence budget that is unaffordable and there remain significant issues that need to be addressed. The extent to which further funding will be provided in the long-delayed Spending Review later this year is yet to be seen.”

The NAO report ‘Carrier Strike – Preparing for deployment’ is available on the NAO website.

This article was originally published on the ICAEW website.